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‘More Bang for the Buck’ 
















As modern technologies appear and mature, those concerned with security often fear 
that these technologies will expand the destructiveness of asymmetric adversaries, 
terrorists chief among them. Yet, historically, only a small subset of terrorists has been 
particularly innovative with respect to weapons selection and use. This interdisciplinary 
study seeks to fill a gap in current research on the topic of terrorist behaviour by 
examining the dynamics underlying terrorist weapons adoption, with the aim of 
elucidating the technological and organizational mechanisms behind changes in the 
instruments of terror.  
 
The study explores the topic from two different theoretical perspectives: the historical 
adoption of weapons by a variety of actors and terrorist (and more general) 
organizational innovation. The result is the identification of a complex web of factors 
that is distilled down to a framework representing a highly contingent interaction 
between the terrorist organization and the prospective weapon in a particular social, 
political, and security setting. In order to supplement and provide a preliminary 
validation of the initial model, the adoption behaviour of four different terrorist 
organizations is analysed, using pairwise comparison and other techniques.  
 
The cases largely confirm the central theoretical strategic and tactical logic of weapons 
adoption, as well as highlight the crucial role played by a variety of contingent factors, 
from ideology to the terrorists’ social networks. In so doing, the study challenges 
notions of technological determinism with respect to terrorists and emerging 
technologies by identifying several key factors that can confound or facilitate a terrorist 
group’s successful adoption of a new weapon. The insights gained through this study 
can assist policymakers and practitioners by identifying the technology-organization 
dyads of greatest concern and introducing a new methodology for discerning between 
those terrorists that are likely to embrace new technologies of lethality and those that 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Man has, it can be said, often excelled at engaging in violent conflict with his fellow 
man. Over time, his chosen tools for this purpose – weapons – have become 
increasingly efficient. This dynamic can be illustrated by observing that for several 
millennia the harm that could be reliably inflicted during a single act of violence by an 
independent individual or small group was more or less limited to felling one opponent 
with a blow from a melee weapon, or the launch of a spear or arrow.1  The invention of 
gunpowder, followed several hundreds of years later by dynamite, expanded the scale of 
casualties to the hundreds, whereas the perfidious ploy of turning the enemy’s own 
infrastructures into weapons against him, as on 11 September 2001, elevated the level of 
destruction into the low thousands. Yet at no previous point in human history has a 
relatively small and isolated group of adversaries possessed the ability to, on their own, 
acquire and use a weapon capable of unleashing a single attack that could devastate 
economies, disrupt the social functions of large areas, or kill and injure hundreds of 
thousands of human beings.  
 
Modern technologies, however – ranging from synthetic biology to so-called ‘3D 
printing’ – may very well provide opportunities for creating such asymmetric levels of 
damage. And when it comes to actors capitalizing on these opportunities, terrorists, who 
are counted among the foremost practitioners of asymmetric conflict in our time, 
naturally feature high on the list of concerns. Indeed, if such an unholy union took place 
between certain sets of technologies and non-state malefactors, it would in some sense 
‘represent the apogee of the firepower arc and the true “consumerization” ’ of mass 
destruction, in which ‘small groups of violent dissenters from the status quo, driven by 
solipsistic and uncompromising ideologies, become capable of repeatedly unleashing 
the most devastating weapons known to humanity and are thus able to present 
themselves as credible rivals to the state’s current monopoly on military power’.2   One 
                                                          
1 Arson, poisoning and contamination were not unheard of in antediluvian warfare, but their effects were 
either circumscribed to a single food or water source or ultimately depended on a fair amount of luck (the 
presence of dry wood or the assistance of pathogenic microorganisms), making the scale of the harm 
caused unreliable. Siege engines (such as the ballista, catapult and trebuchet) could inflict more damage, 
but their acquisition was almost certainly beyond the reach of independent actors, i.e., those unsupported 
by a larger political entity.  
2 Jeremy Tamsett and Gary Ackerman, ‘Conclusion’ in Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett (eds.), 
Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 2009), pp. 402, 416; 
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is reminded of the dictum long attributed to that great inventor and mathematician of 
Ancient Greece, Archimedes. ‘Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to 
place it’, he is alleged to have stated, ‘and I shall move the world’. Emerging 
technology could thus very well be lengthening the lever of terrorism. 
 
In this respect, there have been several broad government pronouncements regarding the 
danger. For example, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States maintains 
that ‘The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination’ (emphasis 
added).3 On closer examination, however, at least three questionable assumptions are 
implicit in most such official statements on the topic. The first assumption is that, as 
technological advances applicable in the domain of irregular warfare emerge, terrorists 
will necessarily become aware of their potential for new means of causing harm; 
second, that terrorists and other non-state actors will necessarily seek to employ these 
developments to gain more destructive capabilities; and third, that their adoption efforts 
will be successful.   
 
These assumptions are made despite there being very little rigorous, empirically-based 
discussion, in the scholarly literature or elsewhere, regarding the complex process and 
decision mechanisms by which terrorists adopt new weapons. If the impact of emerging 
technologies on terrorists’ weapons usage could have such potentially deleterious 
consequences as those described above, then surely the topic of terrorist weapons 
adoption should have received close and thorough examination, instead of being 
somewhat cursorily explored or discussed only as part of more general investigations 
into such topics as terrorist innovation or learning? In response, this study will attempt 
to investigate the above assumptions and answer key questions regarding how emerging 
technologies and other factors might affect the desire and capability of terrorists to 
adopt new weapons, and thus how a transition to more lethal forms of terrorism might 
occur. 
                                                          
Chyba and Greninger independently arrived at a similar conclusion in their assessment of advances in 
biology, referring to the possibility of a ‘ “banalization” of WMD capacity’ (Christopher F. Chyba and 
Alex L. Greninger, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World’ in Russell D. Howard 
and James J.F. Forest (eds.), Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2008), p. 204). 




Current Scholarly Understanding of Terrorist Weapons 
Adoption 
 
The existing literature on terrorism often refers to terrorists’ selection of weapons but 
has rarely, if ever, approached the topic of weapons adoption directly, that is, analysing 
the determinants of adoption pursuit and success at a fundamental level. The terrorist 
adoption of weapons has primarily been discussed as part of the broader topics of 
terrorist innovation and learning, which include, inter alia, discussion of the adoption of 
new tactics, strategies, and organizational forms, in addition to new weapons. Even in 
this wider topic area, there has been astonishingly limited research.4 Among the most 
comprehensive efforts in the area of terrorist innovation is the recent work of Adam 
Dolnik5 and of Brian Jackson and colleagues at the RAND Corporation.6  
 
There are also a handful of texts that purport to focus on the specific relationship 
between terrorism and technology.7 With the exception of a single article by Jackson 
(which is based on his terrorist innovation work cited above),8 these texts fail to deliver 
much in the way of detailed investigation into whether and how terrorists adopt new 
technologies, instead describing broad trends in the terrorist usage of weapons9 or 
                                                          
4 See Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, tactics and global trends (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), p. 10. The most in-depth studies that have been undertaken thus far are Maria J. 
Rasmussen and Mohamed Hafez (eds.), Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, 
Causes, and Predictive Indicators (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts 
Office, Report Number ASCO 2010-019, October 2010), Dolnik, and Brian A. Jackson et al., Aptitude for 
Destruction-Vol. 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating 
Terrorism and Vol. 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2007). Martha Crenshaw, as usual, was way ahead in this regard with a conference paper 
delivered in 2000, but this remained unpublished until inclusion in Rasmussen and Hafez. See Martha 
Crenshaw, ‘Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory of Terrorism’ in Rasmaussen and Hafez (eds.). 
5 Dolnik, passim. 
6 See Jackson, et. al. and Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara A. Daly, Brian A. Jackson, Sharing the Dragon's 
Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007). 
7 Texts looking specifically at the terrorists and technology include: David Clarke (ed.), Technology and 
Terrorism (Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004); Brian A. Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition by 
Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24:3 (May 2001); Abraham R. Wagner, ‘Terrorist Use of New 
Technologies’ in Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator and John P. Sullivan (eds.), Countering Terrorism 
and WMD: Creating a Global Counterterrorism Network (New York: Routledge, 2006); and Paul 
Wilkinson (ed.), Terrorism and Technology (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1993). 
8 Jackson, ‘Technology Acquisition’. 
9 Richard Clutterbuck, ‘Trends in Terrorist Weaponry’ in Wilkinson (ed.); Brian A. Jackson and David R. 
Frelinger, Rifling through the Terrorists’ Arsenal: Exploring Groups’ Weapon Choices and Technology 
Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 
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casting their net much more broadly into such areas as counterterrorism technologies. 
 
Even the more comprehensive studies of broader terrorist innovation that do not deal 
solely with the technological aspects, have thus far only touched upon isolated aspects 
of innovation and have left many unanswered questions that pertain to weapons 
adoption. For example, Dolnik’s excellent foray into this topic identified some 
potentially important drivers of innovation, but his case studies were unable to provide 
much insight into several of these.10 Moreover, much of the existing research seems to 
be biased towards cases of successful innovation, not to mention the most durable and 
well-resourced terrorist groups, which can lead to spurious findings.11 Crucially, 
because such studies are cast in broader terms than weapons adoption,12 they also tend 
to underemphasize the role played by the weapons technology itself and how this 
interacts with the organizational features of the terrorist group. 
 
One area of terrorism studies that does focus on the weapons technologies themselves is 
the voluminous literature dealing with terrorist acquisition and use of so-called weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), which are usually taken as including nuclear weapons as 
well as higher-end chemical, biological and radiological weapons (CBRN).13 For the 
most part, scholars have adopted a measured approach to analysing the threat of WMD 
terrorism, providing a welcome antidote to some of the hype circulating in the news 
media and elsewhere, but in many cases still acknowledging a serious threat. Several 
commentators have done a commendable job of tabulating the wide variety of 
incentives and disincentives for using WMD,14 as well as differentiating between the 
                                                          
10 See Dolnik, pp. 173-175. Among his more equivocal results were the impact of intergroup competition 
(pp. 162-163) and the precise relationship between resources and innovation (p. 164). 
11 Gary Ackerman and John Sawyer, Embracing Technologies of Lethality (College Park, Maryland: 
START, 2012), p. 30. Indeed, of the above-cited studies, only Dolnik examines a case of failed 
innovation and even then only a single case (pp. 127-145). 
12 One exception is Cragin, et. al., but this examines weapons adoption in a narrow context, i.e., 
technology transfer between terrorist groups. 
13 The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and its acronym ‘WMD’, as applied in the context of 
terrorism, are used in this study to mean: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and yet-to-appear 
weapons which, if used, would inflict catastrophic casualties, widespread psychosocial disruption or 
devastating economic consequences substantially greater than those brought about by the largest non-
state actor conventional attacks carried out thus far. For a detailed exposition of the reasoning behind 
this definition, in which I have elaborated on the evolution of the term as well as the conceptual and 
practical problems associated with each of its constituent elements, see Gary Ackerman and Jeremy 
Tamsett, ‘Introduction’ in Ackerman and Tamsett (eds.), pp. xix – xxii. 
14 Possibly the most systematic accounting of the various incentives and disincentives for the terrorist use 
of CBRN weapons can be found in Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats 
from Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002). 
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desire to employ WMD on the part of non-state actors and their ability to do so. Indeed, 
a 2005 survey of the literature found something of a consensus among scholars – backed 
up by existing empirical evidence  that for the time being WMD would not be the first 
choice of weapon for most terrorists.15 Moreover, some progress has been made in the 
past seven years towards providing more detailed ‘second order’ analyses of the 
phenomenon.16  
 
Yet, although there is some recognition among scholars of the potential dangers posed 
by emerging technologies with respect to WMD terrorism,17 the discourse so far has 
been superficial in one important respect. While the authors – many of whom are 
physical or life scientists – pay no small amount of attention to the technologies 
themselves, the relationship of terrorists and other non-state actors to these technologies 
as weapons is given short shrift. Consciously or not, the vast majority of discussion in 
this regard reflects a measure of technological determinism – that just because the 
technology exists, terrorists will be aware of it, seek to adopt it and successfully 
integrate it into their violent repertoire in the form of WMD. In short, the WMD 
terrorism literature appears largely to make the same three assumptions, described 
above, that are prevalent among policymakers.18 For example, Thomas Homer-Dixon 
avers that, ‘Little can be done … about terrorists’ inexorably rising capacity for 
violence. This trend results from deep technological forces that can’t be stopped without 
producing major disruptions elsewhere in our economies and societies’.19 Furthermore, 
                                                          
15 See Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary A. Ackerman, ‘Profiling the WMD Terrorism Threat’, in Stephen M. 
Maurer (ed.), WMD Terrorism: Science and Policy Choices (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2009).  
16 Gary Ackerman, ‘Defining knowledge gaps within CBRN terrorism research’, in Magnus Ranstorp and 
Magnus Normark (eds.), Unconventional Weapons and International Terrorism: Challenges and New 
Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 16. 
17 There is surprisingly little mention of future technological developments and how these will affect the 
potential for WMD terrorism. Among those that have at least mentioned the potential dangers associated 
with changes in technology and its diffusion to terrorists in general, are Gurr and Cole, p. 41; Magnus 
Ranstorp and Magnus Normark, ‘Introduction’ in Ranstorp and Normark (eds.), p. 4; Chyba and 
Greninger, pp. 204, 198; Raymond Zilinskas and Malcolm Dando, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism’ in 
Raymond Zilinskas and Richard Pilch (eds.), Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense (Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005); and Amy E. Smithson, ‘Indicators of Chemical Terrorism’ in Ranstorp 
and Normark (eds.), pp. 78-83. Besides a handful of texts considering the dangers of nanotechnology (for 
example, Toby Shelley, Nanotechnology: New Promises, New Dangers (London: Zed Books, 2006)), the 
only discussion of novel technologies with the potential to become WMD that I have encountered is that 
of Waller and George (Forest E. Waller, Jr. and Michael A. George, ‘Emerging WMD Technologies’, in 
Howard and Forest (eds.)). 
18 One of the few exceptions in this regard is Palfy (Arpad Palfy, ‘Weapon System Selection and Mass-
Casualty Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 15 (2003)) who, while not touching on the 
adoption process, goes to great pains to link the decision to use CBRN to strategic and tactical objectives. 
19 Thomas Homer-Dixon, ‘The Rise of Complex Terrorism’ in Howard and Forest (eds.), p. 41. 
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this literature focuses almost exclusively on CBRN, leaving the terrorist adoption of the 
panoply of conventional weapons (not to mention novel exotic weapons systems) 
untouched. 
 
Overall, these earlier works dealing with terrorists and their acquisition and use of 
weapons technology provide useful case studies and overviews but little in the way of 
theory that might be generalized to other contexts. Most importantly, although existing 
studies – whether of a broader topic like terrorist innovation or a narrower one like 
terrorist use of WMD – have described some of the factors underlying terrorist weapons 
selection, none of them have provided a detailed explanation of the process by which 
terrorists make adoption decisions and implement them, which is a central concern of 
this study. Nor do any of these studies provide a means for incorporating the dynamics 
associated with rapidly advancing, emerging technology into these selection and 
adoption processes. 
 
While the existing corpus of literature is on its own insufficient for the current analysis, 
it can provide a useful starting point for understanding the basis of terrorist weapons 
adoption, as well as identifying salient contributing factors in this regard (as utilized in 
Chapter 3).  
 
One of the central observations that does emerge from the literature is a near consensus 
among scholars that terrorists have traditionally tended to be both conservative and 
imitative in their use of weapons (and tactics more broadly).20 Generally speaking, 
irrespective of the idiosyncrasy of their ideologies and goals, most terrorists most of the 
time employ the ‘path of least resistance’21 by seeking to use the easiest, most cost 
effective and reliable methods to accomplish their aims. An example of this 
conservatism is the encouragement in online jihadist forums to scale down grandiose 
                                                          
20 Dolnik traces the evolution of terrorist tactics, finds that small arms and explosives have dominated 
terrorist tactical repertoires (pp. 26, 36) and concludes that ‘when one surveys the last 50 years of terrorist 
operations case by case, very few incidents strike the observer as creative in any way’ (p.56, emphasis in 
the original). See, also, Brian Jenkins, ‘Defense Against Terrorism’, Political Science Quarterly 101, 
Reflections on Providing for “The Common Good,” 101:5 (1986), pp. 777-778; Bruce Hoffman, Terrorist 
Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities (Santa Monica, California: RAND 1992), p. 15; Gavin 
Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century (New York: Macmillan Palgrave, 
1999), p. 156. 
21 Gordon Woo, Understanding Terrorism Risk (Risk Management Solutions). Accessed at 




attack plans to ones that will have more limited effects, but greater chances of success. 
One such posting noted that ‘a hand grenade that explodes in one of New York’s streets, 
is better than a nuclear bomb capable of exploding half of New York that does not 
explode!’.22 
 
 At the same time, terrorists have often been observed to be imitative, learning not only 
from their own experience, but also from myriad other practitioners of violence, be 
these conventional militaries, transnational criminal organizations or other terrorist 
groups. It is therefore common for terrorist groups to adopt the perceived successful 
weapons used by a variety of other actors, albeit with some degree of localization.23  
 
The reasons for a baseline of conservative and imitative behaviour with respect to 
weapons selection are not difficult to discern.  First, scholars have observed a general 
predilection for minimizing the complexity of terrorist operations overall.24 Second, 
most terrorists experience ‘the unavoidable constraints of limited resources’25 and there 
are costs (including opportunity costs) associated with identifying, researching and 
implementing new weapons and techniques in terms of time, finances, personnel and so 
forth.26 Third, in an operational context of incomplete information27 there are also often 
lingering uncertainties about the reliability of any new weapon or tactic in terms of 
achieving its desired effects.28 These uncertainties can be minimized, although not 
completely removed, but only by further costly and often risky processes of testing.29 
                                                          
22 ‘Urgent message to the blessed jihadi cells’, (in Arabic) thread started by ‘ibn al-tanzim’ on al-Ekhlas, 
1 July  2007, accessed at www.alekhlaas.net/forum, on 2 July 2007. Cited in Anne Stenersen, ‘Al-
Qaeda’s thinking on CBRN’, in Ranstorp and Normark (eds.), p. 59. 
23 For example, Carlos Marighella adapted many of Mao Zedong’s formulae for guerrilla warfare to the 
urban context (Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Montreal: Abraham Guillen Press, 
2002 [originally published in 1960]), passim). 
24 Palfy describes a ‘relationship between simplicity and success…because terrorist organizations, similar 
to military units in combat, become vulnerable to factors outside their sphere of control as soon as the 
mission enters its executions phase’ (Palfy, p. 87). 
25 Paul Wilkinson, ‘Editor’s Introduction: Technology and Terrorism’ in Wilkinson (ed.), p. 4. Important 
exceptions are Hizb’allah of Lebanon, which reportedly receives in excess of US$100 million per anum 
in aid from Iran, in addition to other sources of income (Daniel Byman, ‘Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:3 (2008), pp. 172-173) and Aum Shinrikyo, 
whose assets at one point were estimated to be between $20 million and $1 billion (David E. Kaplan, 
‘Aum Shinrikyo (1995)’ in Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 210).  
26 Stephen Maurer, ‘Technologies of Evil’ in Maurer (ed.), pp. 75-76.  
27 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama (University Park, Penn.: Penn State University Press, 2008), p. 
104. 
28 Cragin et al., p.13; Charles D. Ferguson, ‘Influence Diagram Analysis of Nuclear and Radiological 
Terrorism’ in Ranstorp and Normark (eds.), pp. 128-129. 
29 Maurer, pp.75-76. 
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Not to mention the safety issues present for any personnel involved in acquiring, 
producing or deploying a weapon that might contain hazardous materials and involve 
unfamiliar techniques.30 
 
Nevertheless, the prime driver of conservatism in terrorist attack modalities is probably 
the basic lack of an incentive to innovate – much of the time, there are plentiful ‘soft’ 
targets available which remain vulnerable to the tried and true methods of the gun and 
the bomb. This is often true even when the objectives entail substantial numbers of 
casualties or property damage.  
 
There are, however, exceptions to this generally observed pattern of terrorist imitation 
and repetition in attack modalities. It is often these very exceptions, whether they reflect 
an innovation in targeting, command-and-control, or weapons, that prove most costly in 
terms of lives and economic effects.31 So, despite their inherent conservatism, many 
terrorist organizations do adopt new weapons technologies from time to time and a 
small number of terrorists do so frequently. The sizeable potential consequences of 
these departures from baseline behaviour in turn behoove researchers to attempt to 
understand what prompts terrorists to innovate with respect to weapons and how 
successful they will be in doing so. 
 
While the various precipitants of new weapons adoption will be systematically explored 
in a later chapter, the following (partial) list of five possible circumstances under which 
terrorists might embrace new weapons technologies can serve to illustrate why a more 
in-depth examination of the phenomenon is warranted. 
 
1. The group or individual possesses a specific ideological or idiosyncratic 
orientation towards innovating technologically in general or towards a specific 
high-technology weapon. This ‘techno-fetishism’ involves a non-strategic 
affinity – deriving either from the group’s doctrines or from its leaders’ 
personalities or backgrounds – for adopting particular technologies or more 
broadly embracing technological innovations that can predispose the group to 
                                                          
30 MacKenzie claims that highly complex systems and technologies can also introduce ‘relatively novel 
hazards’ (Donald MacKenzie, Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p.209). 
31 A spectacular example is the attacks of 11 September 2001, which many commentators regard as 
representing a tactical innovation in that simple box-cutters, impeccable coordination, and willingness to 
commit suicide were used to circumvent existing defences. 
13 
 
pursue novel or technologically advanced weapons. One example is the 
fascination of Shoko Asahara, the leader of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, 
with WMD and other unconventional weapons – he even went so far as to write 
odes to sarin and to send Aum operatives to archives to explore the documents 
of Nikola Tesla in the hopes of building an earthquake generating machine.32 
The doctrinal features of other non-state actors may likewise drive members to 
push the technological envelope in the future, such as a hypothetically violent 
version of the Raëlian cult, whose members actively pursue human cloning and 
believe that benign extra-terrestrials will only return when mankind has become 
sufficiently technologically advanced. 
2. Existing weapons are seen to be incapable of achieving terrorist operational 
objectives. When current weapons are perceived by terrorists to be insufficient to 
cause desired levels of casualties, physical damage, publicity, or psychological 
impact, an incentive to innovate can be created. One way this can occur is if 
defensive measures increase in effectiveness:33 for example, the introduction of 
metal detectors into American airports in 1973 made it far more difficult to 
hijack aircraft, and consequently the number of hijackings dropped 
precipitously.34 Conversely, this situation might occur if terrorists’ operational 
objectives expand, for example, when a group believes that its attacks no longer 
attract the same levels of publicity that they used to and conclude that the 
situation can be remedied by drastically increasing the number of casualties per 
attack. 
3. Innovation driven by concerns involving status and competition. Not entirely 
dissimilar to the previous factor, new weapons might be sought by terrorists who 
feel the need to distinguish themselves from potential or actual competitor 
groups or to remain relevant to their envisaged constituency. Much of our 
modern culture celebrates technological adroitness and adopting novel weapons 
systems is one means by which a politically astute terrorist group or leadership 
can preserve or enhance its status. 
                                                          
32 Kaplan, p. 212. 
33 Bruce Hoffman, The Modern Terrorist Mindset: Tactics, Targets, and Technologies (Scotland: St. 
Andrews University Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, 1997), p. 16; also Dolnik, 
pp.152, 174. 
34 Laura Dugan, Gary Lafree and Alex Piquero, ‘Testing a Rational Choice Model of Airline Hijackings’, 
Criminology, Volume 43 (2005), p. 1054. 
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4. The group possesses an extremely high level of resources, allowing for extensive 
weapons research and development programmes. This refers not only to copious 
finances, but also to less tangible logistical capabilities, such as well-developed 
communications and transportation structures, or secure locations where the 
often lengthy weapons development process can be carried out without 
interference. The experiences of Hizb’allah and the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army indicate that large, well-resourced terrorist organizations can possess the 
latitude to embark on multiple research and development efforts, while 
continuing to employ traditional weapons. 
5. Costs associated with adopting new technology are lowered. This is a corollary 
to the previous factor in that the group’s material resources remain the same, but 
the costs to the group of acquiring and using new weapons systems decrease. 
This could occur if the group succeeds, either intentionally or unintentionally, in 
recruiting members with more advanced technical capabilities. It can also occur 
as a result of broader patterns of technological change. Relevant technological 
developments could arise from research breakthroughs in specialized institutions 
such as universities, but are more likely to stem from the maturation of existing 
advanced technologies, as these technologies transition from basic research into 
commercially available ‘off-the-shelf’ applications.   
 
The first noteworthy aspect of the above list is that, although most of these factors have 
been referred to, either explicitly or implicitly, in the literature, scholars have heretofore 
not systematically explored how these factors interact with each other and with the 
baseline conservatism already mentioned. In other words, why in a particular case is the 
reticence to innovate overcome by a certain threshold of factors and what makes some 
terrorist groups more likely to tolerate the risks associated with innovation than others? 
A cohesive understanding of these issues is lacking.  
 
The above list also introduces a concept that will be periodically returned to during the 
study. This is the idea that the circumstances that might spur the adoption of new 
weapons reflect two different types of processes: 1) a ‘push’ dynamic wherein factors 
internal to the terrorist group lead the group to seek out and pursue innovation in 
weapons usage, and 2) a ‘pull’ dynamic, which involves factors in the external 
environment attracting the terrorists towards weapons innovation. Certain of the listed 
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circumstances may reflect more of one dynamic than the other, although it is likely that 
most, if not all, adoption circumstances reflect elements of both dynamics.35  
 
While this study will examine the entire process of weapons adoption by terrorists, it 
will focus in its policy-relevant applications on the basic premise that technological 
change in the wider society can constitute an important component of the pull dynamic 
associated with terrorist weapons innovation. In so doing, it will therefore specifically 
attempt to answer key questions regarding how emerging technologies might affect the 
desire and capability of terrorists and other violent non-state actors to employ new 





The above discussion allows me to lay out the objective of the study as follows: 
 
Through the use of an interdisciplinary approach, this study seeks to examine 
the dynamics underlying terrorist weapons adoption, with the aim of elucidating 
the behavioural, technological and organizational mechanisms behind changes 
in the instruments of terror. The study further seeks to delineate the policy 
implications of any identified dynamics and to explore options for minimizing 
the contribution of technological changes to the threat of terrorism. 
 
The study will approach the terrorist adoption of new weapons technologies as a 
process, focusing on three conceptually distinct stages of weapons adoption: 1) 
awareness of a new weapon or a new technology and its potential for use as a weapon; 
2) the decision whether or not to attempt to adopt the new weapon or technology; and 3) 
implementation of a positive adoption decision. A negative outcome at any stage 
terminates the process and results in the potential weapon or technology not being 
adopted. It should be noted that, while many of the same factors might influence more 
                                                          
35 Also, once new techniques have been learnt and (successfully) used by one terrorist group, the imitative 
dynamic can also come into play, even across widely disparate groups. For example, the (relatively 
inefficient) instructions for extracting ricin outlined in al-Qa`ida manuals seem to have been word-for-
word translations of similar instructions found in underground right-wing literature in the United States 
(Jeffrey M. Bale et al., Ricin Found in London: An al-Qa‘ida Connection? (Monterey, California: Centre 
for Nonproliferation Studies, January 23, 2003)). 
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than one stage of the process, they might do so in different ways, whereas other factors 
might be salient at only one stage. Much of the analysis will therefore treat the 
component stages of the adoption process separately, with the understanding that a 
positive outcome must occur at each stage for adoption to be successful. 
 
Signposts and Boundaries 
 
Up to this point, terminology such as ‘terrorist’ and ‘technology’ has been used rather 
loosely, relying on the reader’s intuitive understanding of such things, but serious 
analysis requires precise definition of the concepts under investigation, as well as a 
demarcation of the scope of inquiry. Since many of the terms as used colloquially are 
either ambiguous, controversial or downright misleading, clearly defining the 





When approaching the definition of terrorism, one must do so with the utmost caution 
and humility, remaining fully cognizant that there is nothing even remotely resembling 
a consensus (either within officialdom or academia) on what a terrorist is. This 
uncertainty has naturally resulted in a multitude of divergent definitions.37 The 
significance of the inability of scholars and governments to converge on a more-or-less 
consistent meaning goes beyond mere academic nit-picking. Since an objective 
definition of terrorism has proven elusive, the concept has become liable to subjective 
manipulation by political actors, leading to the aphorism that ‘one person’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter’. Furthermore, the official definition of terrorism often forms 
the basis of the political, military, or legal response to it and the lack of a commonly 
accepted definition can hamper counterterrorism efforts that cut across organizational or 
national boundaries. The one thing almost everyone agrees on, however, is that the word 
‘terrorist’ bestows a negative connotation – it has thus often become politically 
                                                          
36 A modified and abridged version of the first paragraph of this subsection was utilized by the author in 
Ackerman and Tamsett, pp. xxii-xxiii. 
37 See, for example, the extensive survey of definitions of terrorism in Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. 
Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and 
Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988), especially pp. 1-38 and Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 1-42. 
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expedient for governments to label any armed opponent as a terrorist. Acknowledging 
the definitional morass surrounding terrorism, several ‘workarounds’ have been 
attempted, but these are only partial at best and none have proven satisfactory 
replacements for a universally accepted definition.38  
 
The primary function of a constructive definition of terrorism is to allow one to 
distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence (such as guerrilla warfare or 
genocide). The approach adopted here is to formulate a definition around the central 
observation that terrorism is not dyadic in nature. Almost all other types of violence 
involve two main types of actor, perpetrator(s) and victim(s). Terrorism, on the other 
hand, always involves additional actors, namely the audience(s) whose behaviour the 
terrorists seek to alter. The true targets of terrorist violence are thus, paradoxically, not 
the immediate victims who are killed or injured, but rather the wider public, the state, 
the international community, potential recruits, erstwhile state sponsors, or some 
combination of the above. The immediate victims are thus usually little more than a 
symbolic mechanism for sending one or more messages (often disseminated by the 
reflected fear the attack causes) to a wider audience. Terrorism is therefore ‘nothing 
more than a violent technique of psychological manipulation’39 and, as such, has often 
been cast in the mould of theatre of the macabre. Further, since terrorism can constitute 
strategy as well as tactics – and oscillate between these levels of conflict – it is perhaps 
best characterized as an ‘operational posture’ adopted by its protagonists.  
 
It follows that, strictly speaking, acts of violence whose sole purpose is to eliminate a 
hated enemy (such as the assassination of a rival chieftain, or mass murder by an 
apocalyptic cult) should not, at least from this perspective, be categorized as terrorism. 
Neither should violence that only incidentally causes fear in a community (such as the 
predations of a serial rapist), so long as the perpetrator(s) of any of these acts lack the 
intention to influence a wider audience. At the same time, terrorism can be utilized by 
any type of actor and for a multiplicity of causes, whether the violence involves states or 
                                                          
38 One proposed solution, and the one largely adopted by the United Nations, is to avoid controversy by 
drafting international conventions that outlaw specific acts associated with terrorism without mentioning 
or defining the term itself, such as the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft. While this ‘functional’ approach has proven somewhat useful, because it focuses post hoc on the 
assailants and not on the wider networks involved in terrorism, it does little to enable cooperation against 
the larger terrorist organizational structure and even less for cooperation in proactively neutralizing a 
particular terrorist threat. 
39 Bale and Ackerman, p.12. 
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non-state actors, groups or individuals, or occurs during times of war or peace. 
 
Terrorism, as used in the present study will therefore be defined as:  The intentional use 
or threatened use of violence, directed against victims selected for their symbolic or 
representative value, as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting one or more 
messages to, and thereby manipulating the attitudes and behaviour of a wider target 
audience or audiences.40  
 
By extension, while a wide variety of actors can employ terrorism as part of their 
tactical and strategic repertoire, the label of ‘terrorist’ will be reserved for actors where 
the majority of their violent activities can be classed as terrorism. Although few would 
argue that the vast majority of terrorist acts thus defined have historically been 
committed by oppressive states against their own (or other states’) citizens, this species 
of terrorism involves a uniquely large, well-resourced and structured perpetrator and its 
actions are deserving of separate consideration. Therefore, this study will deal 
exclusively with non-state actors and from here onwards the use of the terms ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘terrorist’ is to be regarded in this context. I will also use the terms ‘group’ and 
‘organization’ interchangeably in the broad sense of a social structure that can be 
discerned from its environment (often through membership criteria), where individuals 
cooperate systematically in order to pursue collective goals. A terrorist group or terrorist 
organization is then defined as a group or organization where the majority of its actions 
are oriented towards terrorism.  
 
These definitions may not be suitable for all persons or purposes and are thus offered 
solely with the intention of elucidating the current discussion. Bearing in mind the 
words of J. Bower Bell that ‘no matter what tools of analysis a scholar carries into the 
terrorist thicket, rarely is the venture begun or ended disinterestedly’,41 I do not seek to 
make any broader claims in the definitional fray surrounding terrorism.  
 
Emerging Technology and Innovation 
                                                          
40 This definition is based on that espoused by Jeffrey Bale. See Gary Ackerman, et. al., Assessing 
Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure, Report for Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory for the Department of Homeland Security (Monterey, California: Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, 2004), p. 15 (ftn 51). Accessed at https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341566.pdf on 
10 January 2010.  





Without dipping any toes into debates between economists, say, and anthropologists on 
the meaning of technology, these terms, as they are to be understood in the text, will be 
clarified. I use ‘technology’ in the sense of knowledge applied for a practical purpose in 
order to affect and control the user’s environment.42 It can involve material objects, as 
well as systems, processes and techniques, but is always purposive. Technology is 
linked conceptually to both science and engineering (and usually flows from one or both 
of these activities), but can exist independent of either.43 ‘Weapons technology’ is 
therefore technology specifically designed to inflict harm on other human beings or 
their property.  
 
‘Emerging technologies’ are defined as significant technological developments either 
recently manifested or on the horizon. For this study, the application of the term will be 
operationalized to denote technologies that are at the very least either currently in the 
prototype stage or those that are widely regarded as practically feasible with a 
functioning prototype possible within a decade of the time of writing. The technologies 
at the core of the study, then, consist of both those that might facilitate the acquisition or 
development of weapons by terrorists, and those technologies that in themselves might 
constitute weapons. 
 
Innovation generally refers to the introduction of a new technology or process and this 
meaning will be retained, with some addenda. First, following Joel Mokyr, a distinction 
will be drawn between invention and innovation. The former involves ‘an increment in 
the set of the total technological knowledge of a given society’,44 while the latter carries 
the connotation of the interaction of this new knowledge with the broader environment. 
An invention can therefore occur in the mind of a single brilliant scientist, but does not 
become an innovation until it is ‘released into the wild’, so to speak, and becomes 
embedded in one or more organizational, cultural, economic and social contexts. Mokyr 
argues that the two concepts, at least in the long run, are complements.45  
 
                                                          
42 This is similar to that of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary: ‘the practical application of knowledge 
especially in a particular area’ (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 2004). 
43 Stone Age man, for instance, crafted several tools and processes such as making fire without anything 
that could be described as scientific understanding or engineering prowess. 
44 Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.10. 
45 Ibid, p.11. 
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Second, this study focuses on technological innovation, rather than the purely social 
kind,46 so it is not necessary to enter debates about the factors affecting the innovation 
of memes, legal regimes, sacred values and the like. Moreover, the analysis will 
converge on weapons and weapons-related technologies, which means that it can to a 
large extent ignore the particular complexities that arise from non-weapon tactical 
innovation per se.  
 
Third, while some authors distinguish between innovation, adaptation and emulation, 
restricting innovation to truly novel ideas, since there are few, if any, examples of 
terrorists actually inventing any technology from whole cloth, there does not seem to be 
much value in insisting on this distinction. This study will therefore follow Dolnik47 in 
including adaptation and emulation of existing technology within the rubric of 
innovation. 
 
Last, innovation should always be viewed in a relative sense, i.e., innovation as such 
should be evaluated within a particular sphere of activity. So, for example, if a new 
technique is described as a terrorist innovation, this implies that it is novel only insofar 
as no terrorists have utilized it before, even though it may have existed for some time in 
industry or a state military. If a new weapon is novel only in the context of a particular 
terrorist organization, for example, Hizb’allah, it will be described as a Hizb’allah 
innovation, etc. In the context of this study, then, ‘innovation’ will be defined as: the 
introduction of a technology or process that is novel to a specific social context, 
through invention, adaptation or emulation and the integration of said technology or 
process into the given context.48 
 
Having brought some conceptual orderliness to the proceedings through the definition 
of terms, it remains to more diligently mark the outer boundaries of the study. First, as 
the consummate asymmetric opponents of our age, terrorist organizations as defined 
will remain the focus of the analysis and their behaviour relative to weapons adoption 
will be examined closely. After all, terrorist organizations, mostly lacking their own 
                                                          
46 For a discussion of social innovation, see Steven Peter Rosen, Innovation and the Modern Military: 
Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p.40. 
47 Dolnik, p.5. 
48 This is similar to the definition chosen by Dolnik: ‘an act of introduction of a new method or 
technology or the improvement of an already existing capability’, (Ibid., p.6.) although I have emphasized 




territorial control, often espousing deviant ideologies and explicitly focusing on a 
variety of audiences, usually seek to strike targets that are located deep in their 
opponents’ territory, while avoiding far superior counterterrorist forces. This provides a 
rich strategic, tactical, organizational and social context in which to explore the 
phenomenon of non-state weapons adoption. Furthermore, their penchant for targeting 
civilians means that their successful adoption of new weapons might have particularly 
grave consequences and thus warrants close study. 
 
Second, the study will not single out WMD or CBRN weapons as objects of analysis. 
While many emerging technologies will affect the ease with which CBRN weapons can 
be acquired, produced or utilized, and the adoption of WMD-relevant technologies is 
clearly a matter of serious policy concern, given the above discussion, it is premature to 
focus exclusively on a narrow set of WMD-related technologies when the basic 
elements and processes of terrorist weapons adoption remain poorly understood. So, 
although CBRN weapons and related technologies will be referred to periodically 
during the study and will be used to illustrate some of the policy implications of the 
research in the concluding section, the application of the insights gained to the specific 
context of WMD is left for future research. 
 
Third, while the general dynamics of technological innovation are an important part of 
the analysis, the focus will remain on those technologies and dynamics most likely to 
intersect with violent non-state actors, as opposed to emerging technologies writ large. 
For example, the dynamics of biotechnology diffusion will be favoured over those of 
the development of accounting software. 
 
Weapons Adoption in a Dynamic Context 
 
The history of conflict is replete with cautionary tales warning against relying on static 
evaluations of an adversary’s motivations and capabilities.49 Terrorism, especially, is an 
inherently dynamic phenomenon. Indeed, if terrorist actions over the past four decades 
have taught us anything, it is that among today’s often amorphous, network-centric 
                                                          
49 This paragraph paraphrases a portion of the author’s Congressional testimony (Gary Ackerman, 
Testimony before United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
Hearing on ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat to the Homeland’ (2 April 2008). Accessed at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/040208Ackerman3.pdf on 2 November 2013. 
22 
 
groups and individuals engaging in terrorism there are audaciously nimble operators 
who can adapt through organizational and tactical reinvention and are prepared to 
persevere for long periods to attain their goals. Thus, any analytical models of terrorist 
weapons adoption should be able to account not only for an actor’s initial motivations 
and capabilities, but also for how these might change over time, in response to both 
internal and external stimuli.  
 
At the same time, the social, political and technological environments within which 
terrorists take root and function are constantly reforming into unexpected topologies, 
presenting both opportunities and obstacles for subversives. Perhaps the most vexing 
policy questions currently associated with terrorist weapons adoption relate to the 
impact of emerging technologies, which often possess dual-use characteristics. Since 
several of these questions will be addressed at the end of this study, it is appropriate at 
this juncture to introduce at least some of the broader concerns that emerging 
technologies might present for those seeking to counter the threat of terrorism. It should 
be emphasized, however, that weapons innovation on the part of terrorists does not 
necessarily involve high-technology, sophisticated apparatus.50 
 
Turning, therefore, to the technological context that might tempt terrorists to innovate in 
the direction of new weapons, we can take as our point of departure the tremendous 
advances that have recently been made in almost every scientific and technical 
endeavour, a portion of which are germane to the production and deployment of terrorist 
weapons. Little argument is necessary to convince even the casual observer of the 
remarkable recent progress in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, microelectronic, 
materials and software industries, to name just a few. Yet, lurking behind the glowing 
press releases detailing new drug delivery systems51 and miracle nanofabrics that clean 
themselves,52 there is often – even to those not fixated on security issues – a faint sense 
of foreboding about the consequences of such rapid progress.53  Such disquiet is nothing 
                                                          
50 Wilkinson, p. 6. 
51 For example, see the newsletter ‘Fierce Drug Delivery’ (http://www.fiercedrugdelivery.com) for many 
innovations in drug delivery systems. 
52 ‘Cotton fabric cleans itself when exposed to ordinary sunlight’, Phys.Org News (14 Dec 2011). 
Accessed at http://phys.org/news/2011-12-cotton-fabric-exposed-ordinary-sunlight.html on 10 October 
2013. 
53 Alvin and Heidi Toffler have argued that the dangers posed by emerging technologies are especially 
acute in the current age, reflecting a Third Wave of human activity dominated by knowledge as opposed 
to the previous waves of agriculture and industrialization (Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War 
(London: Warner Books, 1993), pp. 25 and 243). 
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new – visionaries as far back as Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century and Leonardo da 
Vinci in the fifteenth recognized that scientific and technological progress has a dark 
side. It is noteworthy that both these men, who between them foresaw the airplane, 
helicopter, tank, automobile and much else besides, attempted to obfuscate and encipher 
those parts of their research which they believed would prove dangerous in the wrong 
hands.  
 
There are a variety of ways in which budding technological advances might provide 
malefactors with new opportunities for inflicting harm. First, emerging technologies 
might remove obstacles to the acquisition of raw materials. For example, if so-called 
‘gene fabs’ can synthesize microorganisms from scratch, why bother with trying to get 
one’s hands on a closely-guarded sample of the smallpox virus? Or, if laser isotope 
separation becomes feasible on a commercial scale, perhaps terrorists will one day no 
longer be forced to scour the risky ‘black market’ to obtain fissile material for a nuclear 
bomb. Second, new technologies may facilitate the production and weaponization of 
harm agents, in terms of providing greater safety,54 leaving less of a footprint detectable 
by authorities, enabling cheaper production, or lowering the required skill level of 
personnel involved. For example, whereas previously certain complex microbiological 
procedures required the use of expensive equipment and several highly-trained 
technicians, the recent advent of commercial biotechnology ‘kits’ might now enable 
individuals with only basic skills to successfully complete the same procedures,55 a 
clear boon to those terrorists seeking biological weapons. Also, microreactors, 
consisting of fluid transfer platforms barely larger than a microchip, could allow for the 
less hazardous combination of chemical weapons precursors.56 Third, to ensure that a 
new weapon, say a home-made mortar, is truly capable of causing mass casualties 
currently requires extensive testing and trial and error, all of which increases the 
chances of something going wrong and inadvertently alerting law enforcement or 
intelligence agencies.57 New simulation software and the reliability afforded by modern 
                                                          
54 Maurer describes the extensive history of terrorist bomb-factory explosions since the 1870s and 
observes that in general accidents pose an acute security weakness for terrorists. Stephen M. Maurer, The 
Third Wave, Video lecture (2005). Accessed at 
http:www.cs.washington.edu/education/courses/csep590/05au/lectures/slides/Maurer_Sept7.pdf on 10 
January 2010.  
55 Seth Carus and Raymond Zilinskas, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Center for Counterproliferation Research, April 2002). 
56 Smithson, pp. 80-81. 
57 Maurer (2009), pp. 64, 77 and 79. 
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equipment can conceivably reduce (although probably not completely obviate) the need 
for testing. Last, technology might provide for entirely new types of weapons. Potential 
examples include metastable nuclear isomers and self-replicating nanites. 
 
The above examples should suffice to drive home the point that there are a range of 
technological advances, either currently available or on the horizon, that might facilitate 
the acquisition or use of new weapons by malicious actors. Yet, it is not only the bare 
invention of new scientific theories or even their application in technologies that 
presents a potential threat. After all, it is quite unlikely that terrorists will be caught 
peeking over the shoulders of university scientists going about their research. Rather, in 
the context of terrorism, the dangers are likely to stem from the maturation of existing 
advanced technologies, as these technologies transition from basic research into 
commercially available ‘off-the-shelf’ applications. It is therefore the discovery of new 
products and processes combined with the widespread diffusion and commercial 
exploitation of the resultant technologies that is more likely to bring them closer to 
terrorist hands.  
 
Over and above the advanced state of current technology, the rate of change is of 
concern. Technological development in general is accelerating, as new technologies 
enable even more rapid growth in what Ray Kurzweil, a prominent futurist who focuses 
on technology, refers to as the ‘law of accelerating returns’.58 Part of this phenomenon 
of constant change no doubt has its roots in the fact that technology both accretes and 
commoditizes. To understand why, one must first take note of the obvious fact that once 
discovered, a technology cannot be uninvented – students of strategic doctrine are all 
too familiar with the truism that the nuclear weapons genii cannot be put back in his 
bottle. Yet what is less well understood is that at least some portion of the engineers and 
scientists who follow the inventors of an innovative product or process – needing some 
outlet for their intellects and their skills – will continue to build on what has come 
before, making each generation of the technology faster, cheaper, or easier to produce 
and use. All of this does not even begin to take into account the role of discontinuous, 
unexpected and revolutionary changes in technology, which only serve to compound the 
problem.   
                                                          
58 See Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 96. See also, Ibid., 




Furthermore, increasing globalization means that as a technology matures, the products 
based thereon proliferate worldwide at an astonishing pace. For example, globalization 
and information technology are likely creating a more technically literate global 
population. In an age where almost no spot on earth remains untouched by the 
information revolution, disaffected youths in even the most underdeveloped countries 
can now take technical courses online. Conversely, virtual radicalization through the 
Internet means that even the best and the brightest attendees of the most esteemed 
institutions of research and higher learning in the developed world may become 
susceptible to radicalization. Such changes might thus empower the violent aspirations 
of individuals, small groups, and terrorist networks.  
 
At the same time, it must be stressed that this study is not a discourse on technological 
advancement, per se, or even a complete catalogue of technological developments with 
relevance to terrorist weapons. Indeed, beyond this introduction, details of the emerging 
technologies themselves will only be discussed for illustrative purposes. Rather, this 
study will focus on the little-explored topic of the relationship of terrorists to weapons 
adoption in general and novel weapons opportunities in particular. In many ways, the 
technical characteristics of emerging technologies take second stage to the interaction 
between terrorists and these technologies; while the technical attributes are an important 
component of this interaction, they are no more important than, say, the ideological or 
organizational aspects. For as I will show, it is these latter factors, acting in concert with 
the nature of the technology itself, that are more likely to have a determining effect on 
which terrorists will embrace new weapons technologies and which will reject (or even 
remain unaware of) them, or, perhaps more importantly for policy purposes, which 
terrorists are likely to succeed and which to fail in their adoption efforts. In essence, 
‘[t]echnology must be an important factor in any appreciation of the problems of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism in modern society’, as Paul Wilkinson states, but ‘…it 
must always be placed in the wider context of social, economic and political needs and 
problems, at national and international levels, if its role is to be properly understood’.59 
 
Thus, even if it is not possible to accurately forecast the advent and opportunities for 
exploitation presented by a particular emerging technology, the study aims to lend 
                                                          
59 Paul Wilkinson, pp. 3-4. 
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greater prescience to how different terrorist actors are likely to react to such changes (if 
and when they occur). It can thereby enable a better assessment of the nexus between 
the technology and the terrorist milieu, as well as identify opportunities for threat 




This study is an admittedly ambitious undertaking and it is necessary to proceed 
deliberately and to consolidate previous knowledge and understanding at each step 
along the way. The overall research strategy, however, is based on approaching the 
problem from two different perspectives. The first perspective, which can be termed 
‘outside in’, will take as its locus the technological objects themselves and will 
specifically examine the mechanics of weapons innovation and diffusion in a general 
context. The second perspective, an ‘inside out’ approach, focuses on the terrorists as 
purposive actors, on their decision making vis-à-vis emerging technologies and tactics, 
as well as their intentions and capacity for integrating these technologies into their 
existing arsenals. As Ranstorp and Normark point out, the core of the issue is not the 
technical revolutions themselves, but how these are perceived by terrorists as pathways 
to violence.60 The convergence of these two perspectives will then allow us to reconcile 
which of the aforementioned ‘push’ and ‘pull’ dynamics predominates and under what 
circumstances. 
 
In this Introduction, the primary topic has been laid out and rationalized and the scope 
of the study established.  
 
This is followed by the first major section of the study, which deals with the 
development of a theoretical model of terrorist weapons adoption that includes the 
potential impacts of emerging technologies. Chapter 2 commences with the ‘outside in’ 
inquiry  by more closely examining the intersection between technological development 
and the transformation of the use of weaponry over time, irrespective of the type of 
actors involved. Particular attention is paid to the factors that have influenced the 
adoption by both state and non-state actors of new weapons, including the strategic and 
tactical considerations that have affected, and have been affected by, technological 
                                                          
60 Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark, ‘Conclusion’, in Ranstorp and Normark (eds.), p.199. 
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advances, as well as the determinants of adoption success and failure. While history is 
admittedly not a perfect guide, it can at least assist in identifying and navigating the 
structural and contingent elements of a process – in this instance weapons development 
and diffusion – which constrain choices or act as ‘attractors’ making some decisions 
more likely than others. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the ‘inside out’ approach and shifts focus from the objects of 
diffusion to the prospective adopters.  The chapter broadly reviews the existing 
literature regarding technological innovation and diffusion, where possible focusing on 
the terrorism studies literature. It therefore considers how terrorists approach 
innovation, both in general and specifically with respect to new technologies and 
weapons selection. The existing studies of Dolnik, Jackson et. al. and several others are 
used to provide a basis for understanding the factors influencing terrorist innovation and 
adoption of new technologies. Yet, as noted earlier, there is a need to delve deeper and 
to integrate both the behavioural and technological dynamics involved. To do so 
requires supplementing the existing understanding of terrorist weapons innovation in 
two ways. First, relevant insights are drawn from research into other aspects of terrorist 
decision-making and terrorist learning.61 After all, the transition from awareness to 
selection to adoption of new weapons technologies (including knowledge transfer, 
materials acquisition, production and testing) is driven and shaped by a host of factors 
as varied as the terrorist group’s ideology, mechanisms of control, degree of 
factionalization, demographics, the security environment, historical experience, 
perceptual biases and risk thresholds. Prior work in each of these areas will be 
consulted. Second, where the existing terrorism literature is sparse on the underlying 
dynamics and processes, the net is cast as widely as possible, drawing on sources from 
as far afield as management science, organizational psychology, economics and 
sociology. Those theories and propositions that have received significant empirical 
support and that seem to hold the most promise for application to the terrorist realm, 
especially to the questions posed here, are identified and briefly explained. 
 
                                                          
61 Even this literature is quite spare. Among its main representative works are Gordon H. McCormick, 
‘Terrorist Decision Making’, Annual Reviews in Political Science 6 (2003), C.J.M Drake, Terrorists’ 
Target Selection (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), Kenney, and James J. F. Forest (ed.), Teaching Terror: 




The insights derived from the historical survey on weapons development in Chapter 2 
are then combined with the theories and findings from terrorist and general innovation 
and learning in Chapter 3 to develop a theoretical framework for terrorist adoption of 
new weapons in Chapter 4, one which can incorporate terrorist responses to emerging 
technologies.  
 
Section 2 exposes the theoretical framework for the terrorist adoption of weapons 
technology developed in Section 1 to real-world experience. In the history of terrorism 
there have been over 2,000 different terrorist groups recorded, who between them have 
committed over 81,000 attacks since 1970,62 making testing each and every one of these 
against every new and existing technology that has emerged in the past forty years 
impractical to say the least. Preliminary empirical verification is therefore accomplished 
through qualitative means, namely the use of a hybrid case study design combining 
elements of the case-control63 and process tracing64 methods, an approach that is 
outlined in Chapter 5. This entails performing structured process tracing on each 
member of a pair of similarly situated terrorist organizations to analyse their 
organizational and behavioural paths to adoption or non-adoption across three different 
weapons. Within each pair, one organization progressed considerably further along the 
weapons adoption pathway than the other, which provides variance in the dependent 
variables of the adoption process. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the first set of paired case studies, which explore mortar technology 
adoption across the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA). Chapter 7 provides a similar study of the adoption or lack 
thereof of both rockets and cyanide across two right-wing extremist organizations in the 
United States in the early 1980s, namely the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the 
Lord and The Order. The experiences of the studied organizations are comparatively 
analysed in Chapter 8, first contrasting the members of each paired case study with each 
other and then considering relevant features across all of the cases. The adoption paths 
                                                          
62 Global Terrorism Database (College Park, Maryland: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2013). Accessed at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
63 Paul Stolley and James Schlesselman. Case-control studies: design, conduct, analysis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982).  
64 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). 
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and salient variables identified in the theoretical framework are thereafter compared 
against the cases to evaluate the framework’s explanatory power.  
 
Chapter 9 revisits the framing issues put forward in this chapter, in the context of the 
theoretical framework and empirical applications produced in the preceding chapters. In 
addition, certain of the major policy implications of the results are considered, 
particularly as these relate to emerging technologies and government responses to the 
terrorism threat. At its conclusion, the study largely undermines the three terrorist 
weapons adoption assumptions put forward earlier and challenges notions of 
technological determinism with respect to terrorists and emerging technologies. In so 
doing, it identifies several key factors that can confound or facilitate a terrorist group’s 
successful adoption of a new weapon and develops a model that can be applied to 
discern between those terrorists that are likely to embrace new technologies of lethality 
and those that will stumble along the way. 
 
The study is therefore original in at least three respects. First, as discussed above, it 
addresses a key lacuna in the existing understanding of the operational choices of 
terrorists and the impacts thereof. Second, in so doing, the study creates a testable 
construct of new weapons adoption by terrorists that can be applied in both academic 
and practitioner contexts. Third, the study includes original research on four historical 
terrorist organizations that helps explicate the differences in their levels of innovation 
and weapons adoption. 
 
Overall, this study seeks to fill a gap in current research on the topic of terrorist 
behaviour by considering the dynamics of technological and organizational change with 
respect to weapons selection, with the ultimate purpose being to inform policy decisions 
and to assist in developing efficient preparations against what is regarded as one of the 
prime security issues of the 21st century. To accomplish this task, the study chapters 
consecutively construct an analytic framework which consists of marrying existing 
models of weapons innovation and technology adoption to the particular domain of 
terrorism and then evaluating this in an empirical context.  
30 
 
Chapter 2: The Diffusion of Weapons – A Theoretical and 
Historical Analysis 
 
The path across the analytical terrain that has been laid out begins with an examination 
of the broad class of objects whose adoption I seek to elucidate, that is, the physical 
instruments of conflict themselves. It is here that I concern myself with the 
particularities surrounding the diffusion and adoption of weaponry. This chapter 
investigates the theoretical basis for weapons adoption and queries the historical record 
for insights regarding the dynamics of weapons adoption and diffusion among both state 
and non-state actors. These insights, where applicable, will in turn be used to guide the 
development in subsequent chapters, of a theoretical model of how terrorists might 
respond to changes in weapons-relevant technologies. 
  
We are on fertile experiential ground when examining how and why actors adopt novel 
means of combat, so this portion of the analysis lends itself more easily to the historical 
approach. Yet, we must still be cautious lest we place too great a demand on the general 
history of weapons diffusion in explaining terrorist decisions regarding adopting new 
weapons. Therefore, while this chapter will draw on the historical record in search of 
insights that might inform our understanding of the behaviour of actors confronted with 
novel weapons and combat technologies, it recognizes that terrorists differ in many 
respects from other species of combatant and attempts to identify those aspects of 
weapons diffusion which are likelier to permeate the boundaries between contemporary 
terrorism and other forms of conflict. 
 
Conflict and technology are ineluctably intertwined and have been since the earliest 
days when primitive combatants began using simple tools to extend the destructive 
power of the bare hand, foot or tooth. In more modern times, no aspect of combat – 
from the machinery of destruction to the gathering of intelligence and command – is, in 
the words of Martin van Creveld, ‘immune to the impact that technology has had and 
does have and always will have’.1 Expectedly then, the history of weapons development 
and the advent of military technology represent ground that has been well-trodden by 
                                                          




military historians and historians of technology alike,2 making a comprehensive 
exegesis of the wider subject unnecessary and even a little presumptuous. Yet, although 
prior scholarship will provide the bedrock for the discussion that follows, this 
investigation must go beyond a straightforward synthesis of the literature and look down 
upon history from a somewhat atypical vantage point, one established by the overall 
objective of understanding the terrorist adoption of weapons and associated 
technologies. The analysis must, by extension, therefore emphasize certain facets of 
weapons development and adoption over others. 
 
First, without descending into the vociferous debates surrounding what constitutes a 
‘military technical revolution’ and whether the world’s militaries are currently engaged 
in one, I build on the general innovation discussion in the first chapter. In this regard, I 
argue that it makes most sense to view a weapons innovation as a perceptible (and 
perceived) departure from continuity in existing means of exerting force and also that 
the term innovation implies more than bare invention, but rather the manifesting of the 
new weapon into a social, political and economic reality. Weapons innovation is thus 
weapons invention plus process and context. 
 
Second, with respect to this developmental continuum, the inquiry will focus less on the 
invention stages of new weapons development than on the determinants and 
consequences surrounding their adoption and spread. Since terrorists are unlikely to 
themselves engage in scientific derivations of completely new weapons from first 
principles, the admittedly quite fascinating stories of the initial discovery of, say, the 
chemistry of gunpowder are of less concern here. Rather, the emphasis will lie on the 
manner in which other actors besides the original inventor of a weapon became aware of 
                                                          
2 For general surveys, see, inter alia, Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of 
History, 1500 to Today (New York, NY: Gothman Books, 2006); Van Creveld; Geoffrey Parker, The 
Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare 
in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Trevor N. Dupuy, 
The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1990); Brett D. Steele and 
Tamera Dorland (eds.), The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War Through the Age of 
Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Ernest Volkman, Science Goes to War: The Search 
for the Ultimate Weapon, From Greek Fire to Star Wars (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2002); 
Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1973); and J.A. Lynn (ed.), Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-
1871 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). However, as Eliason and Goldman assert, ‘despite the 
large body of scholarship on military innovation, remarkably few studies explore either historical or 
contemporary processes of diffusion of military innovation’, Leslie Eliason and Emily Goldman, 
‘Introduction: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Innovation and Diffusion’, in Emily O. 
Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), p.7.  
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it, how they made their decisions whether or not to adopt the weapon and how the new 
article was embraced and fielded. Of course, weapons development does not occur in 
clean discrete phases along a predetermined pathway, but can, for example, proceed 
through several cycles of improvement and refinement (as was the case with field 
artillery) or be partially developed by one set of actors and then perfected by a 
completely different set of actors, sometimes after a substantial delay (battlefield 
rockets). The various activities that occur after the initial development and diffusion of a 
weapon must therefore be included in the discussion, including improvement, 
improvisation and tactical or strategic innovation in the way the weapon is used.  
  
Third, while the nature of a weapon’s effects will play a large part in prioritizing 
selections from the historical record, details of these effects themselves, a topic upon 
which a large portion of the historiography converges, are relegated to a supporting role, 
with the factors affecting adoption taking centre stage. Weapons performance is still 
mentioned, but only insofar as this influences adoption and diffusion behaviours. 
 
Turning to the analysis itself, this draws upon a broad yet concise exposition of the 
historical development of weapons, which can be found in Appendix A. The primary 
rationale for casting a broad net rather than simply selecting a handful of recent or 
putatively representative cases, lies in the nature of the actors about whose behaviour 
the survey is intended to inform. Modern terrorists, as non-state actors operating in a 
globalized world, encompass a wide range of technical capabilities. It might very well 
turn out, therefore, that the adoption experience of early fourteenth century European 
armies when presented with the supremely efficacious battlefield use of the longbow is 
more akin to that faced by several of today’s terrorist organizations than the highly 
bureaucratized and politicized military research and development structures that have 
dominated Western military procurement since the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Moreover, since the terrorists of today and tomorrow hail from a multiplicity of ethnic, 
religious and cultural backgrounds, a focus on any particular region or cultural milieu 
would seem to be inherently limiting. That being said, there is far more available 
information for some areas and time periods; the most that can be attempted is to 




Setting aside wider epistemological concerns, there remain several practical obstacles to 
drawing defensible inferences from the historical record. The first is the lack of 
sufficient information in the existing historical record of the early development and 
spread of many weapons, especially those of a more ancient nature. For example, details 
on the circumstances surrounding the early diffusion of the crossbow remain obscure. 
Such basic lacunae in the historical record of military technology development are 
compounded by what Jeremy Black refers to as ‘the questionable nature of the 
relationship between literature and practice’3 when it comes to the ways wars are fought 
– whether through conscious selectivity on the part of those reporting events or simply 
because contemporary chroniclers could not have known (or perhaps even cared) which 
aspects of reality would be of interest to future scholars.  
 
The converse problem also on occasion presents itself; in certain cases, especially those 
of the recent past, adoption behaviour seems to be overdetermined, with substantial 
quantities of available data at least partially supporting a variety of hypotheses and 
seemingly little at hand to refute any of them.4 A pertinent example is the adoption of 
the aircraft carrier, which may have been prompted by realization of the inherent 
advantages of air power, the limitations imposed on battleships by the Washington 
Treaty, concerns of status, or some combination of all three. 
 
The above problems are well-known to any serious student of history and historians toil 
much of their professional lives to ameliorate them. Therefore, in addition to the 
obvious exigencies of limitations on space and effort, this chapter will rely primarily on 
secondary sources published by eminent military historians. Of course, such an 
approach increases the responsibility to critically evaluate as many sources as possible 
and to pay special attention to points of the greatest concurrence among scholars. In 
sum, while the following survey might stake out a somewhat unique vantage point, it 
will nonetheless be one that is situated on the shoulders of giants. 
 
One last note of caution before proceeding with the substance of the survey: we must 
remain cognizant that perennially present in any endeavour such as this is the danger of 
hindsight bias – that instead of learning from the past, we project our own mental 
                                                          
3 Jeremy Black, ‘Determinisms and Other Issues’, Journal of Military History, 68:4 (2004), p. 1229. 




constructions of the present onto the historical record and thus interpret past events 
according to our existing sociological frame of reference. We must thus be mindful that 
the ubiquity and rapid pace of technological change in the present does not cause us to 
exaggerate its impact in previous ages, particularly as it relates to weapons development 
and diffusion.  
 
The historical survey that has been undertaken (and is presented in Appendix A) is 
necessarily unable to expose each and every instance of weapons adoption to a rigidly 
systematic analysis. Nonetheless, the author recognizes that an overly simplistic reading 
of the historical record can be more dangerous than none at all and that ‘ “technology” 
is a category of explanations rather than just one’.5 Therefore, this chapter will lay claim 
to a middle ground of detail sufficient to the task at hand and attempt to ask the 
following questions of the historical record, grouped under the stages of adoption 
introduced in the first chapter: 
 
1. Awareness of Innovation Possibilities: 
 What constitutes a ‘new’ technology in terms of weaponry and how is innovation 
in this context characterized? 
 How do actors (both state and non-state) become aware of new weapons or of 
technological innovations and their attendant potential for new weapons? 
 
2. Factors Influencing Adoption Decisions: 
 Who makes the decision to adopt or not to adopt the weapon or technical 
innovation with weapons potential? What is the organizational decision-making 
context (for example, deliberation or dissension amongst multiple parties or the 
whim of a single authoritarian decision-maker)? 
 What considerations are taken into account in deciding whether or not to adopt 
and, if the decision to adopt is made, how to manage the process? 
 
3. Factors Influencing Adoption Outcomes: 
 What are the determinants of successful adoption?  
 How long does the process take and what obstacles are commonly encountered? 
 
                                                          
5 Black, p. 1219. 
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Before embarking on an analysis of weapons diffusion, it is necessary to establish a 
theoretical context by seeking to identify models of weapons development and 
diffusion. To do this, the chapter is structured to first consult a variety of military 
theorists, both classical and modern. Thereafter, consecutive sections engage the 
historical record with respect to each of the above categories and questions. This is 
followed by an assessment of the identified theories in light of the historical record, 
with the final section in the chapter discussing the applicability of these findings to the 
terrorist domain. 
 
Theories of Weapons Innovation and Diffusion 
 
One cannot neglect the enormous contribution to military thought made by classical 
military commentators. Among well-known military strategists – from Kautilya and 
Musashi through Clausewitz to Fuller and Kahn – we see over time an increasing 
awareness and acceptance of the impact of technological developments on war, 
especially as these manifest in weaponry. From an almost total disregard for the role of 
weapons, to a grudging acknowledgement but simultaneous downplaying of their 
significance in favour of military spirit and stewardship, by the mid-twentieth century 
weapons and technology were imbued by at least some strategists with an almost 
reverent power to shape battle. This perhaps in part reflects the broader transition to a 
more technologically developed, diverse and literate global society, but the devastating 
and accelerating growth in firepower and mobility on the battlefield no doubt played a 
major part in concentrating military minds on the role of technology in war. Yet, in all 
the tomes of strategy, the processes of weapons development, adoption and diffusion are 
given scant, if any, regard. Weapons, even the most consequential among them, seem to 
be cast by the vast majority of military strategists up to the middle of the twentieth 
century as a type of deus ex machina which swoops down to the military sphere from on 
high to demand changes in strategy and doctrine. We therefore relegate detailed 
discussion of the place of weapons in classical commentary to Appendix A, which 
traces the abovementioned evolution in the understanding of the role of weapons 
technology in war. 
 
It was only in the latter decades of the twentieth century, that scholars, chiefly 
historians, began to pay closer attention to whence the weapons came. Of course, 
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strategists and historians are by no means distinct species – who indeed would accuse a 
Mahan or a Liddell Hart of an ignorance of history? – and the shift represented more 
one of emphasis from describing how wars should be fought to analysing how they have 
been fought. Nonetheless, it was not until fairly recently in the annals of conflict 
scholarship (really only the past four decades or so) that sustained and wide-ranging 
study of the origin and diffusion of innovations in weaponry has blossomed. This has 
enabled scholars to propose a variety of theories describing innovations in military 
technology, and it is to a brief overview of these theories that I now turn. 
 
There is one prominent topic within the theoretical discourse in this area that might at 
first glance seem a vital element of the discussion, even though it really does not deal 
directly with the dynamics of weapons innovation and adoption. Nonetheless, because 
its persistent presence lurks like a fog over the entire subject of weapons and warfare, it 
warrants at least a brief mention. I am speaking of the debate over social technological 
determinism, the notion that technological developments (including their manifestation 
in weaponry) are the prime movers of changes in society, including determining the 
shape of any major military engagements or outcomes. Several prominent scholars have 
expended great effort in debating the extent to which technology determines both the 
onset and outcome of war and providing what they see as a necessary corrective to an 
apparent post-World War II military fascination with novel technologies.6 For current 
purposes, this debate is something of a red herring in that this study is concerned with 
the extent to which a handful of weapons technologies drive terrorist behaviour, rather 
than the far loftier questions of whether technology drives history, which are at the core 
of several theoretical debates. So, whereas an approach like the Toffler ‘three wave’ 
theory can be argued to be deterministic, in the sense that it a) describes the latest wave 
of human society as characterized by the dominance of information and knowledge 
which permeate modern warfare, and b) predicts conflict between third-wave societies 
and their less developed second- and first-wave counterparts,7 this is more helpful in 
explaining what the world looks like and how it happened to be that way (including the 
myriad high-tech military innovations they describe), than it is in guiding us as to which 
                                                          
6 For a small sample of this discourse, see Black; and M. R. Smith and L. Marx (eds.), Does Technology 
Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA, 1994). Many existing 
surveys (Boot, p.9; Van Creveld, pp.5-6; Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs 
and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 36-39) take pains to play down any hint of 
determinism, while still arguing that technology (and weapons) play a large role in warfare. 
7 See chapter 1, footnote 50. 
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particular actors might choose to embrace these technologies and their success in doing 
so. The same goes for much of the remainder of the debate, which thus becomes useful 
primarily as a check on the present analysis lapsing into quasi-deterministic language. 
On the other hand, this is not to say that in specific circumstances, technological 
advances cannot have a profound (or even decisive) effect on the choices of actors as 
these relate to weapons, but merely to caution against simplistic assumptions that 
‘technology’ as a construct necessarily exerts a uniform and overriding force in the 




Those theoretical models of most interest to us here are the ones that attempt to explain 
different aspects of the innovation and diffusion process, especially those that bear on 
the decision of whether an innovation is adopted or not. One type of theoretical 
discussion examines the causes – actors, motivations and decisions – involved in the 
adoption (and hence diffusion) of military innovations, and another set of theories looks 
at the ultimate effects of deciding to adopt or not to adopt the innovation.8 While several 
of these theories are broadly configured for various sorts of military innovations 
(including those dealing with personnel and doctrine), for current purposes they will be 
outlined only as they apply to the specific context of weapons development, spread and 
adoption. 
 
Theories of the causes and motivations behind weapons adoption and diffusion in 
essence boil down to the familiar International Relations disputation over the correct 
level of analysis to emphasize. Focusing on the level of the international system, the 
neorealist viewpoint sees weapons development in rather simple terms, as a product of 
strategic necessity. According to this strain of thought, which is best epitomized by the 
work of Kenneth Waltz, unceasing competition in the international system provides a 
strong incentive for states to emulate any advantageous developments in weaponry for 
fear that not doing so will place them at a dangerous disadvantage relative to those 
states that do.9 This momentum to adopt innovations is believed by proponents to 
                                                          
8 The schema used here is inspired by, but differs from, that laid out in Eliason and Goldman, pp. 10-11. 
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 127; Joao 
Resende-Santos, ‘Anarchy and Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organizations and Technology in 
South America, 1870-1930’, Security Studies 5:3 (Spring 1996), p. 196.  
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override any cultural or other contextual differences between states,10 with resource and 
skill levels being the only constraints on adoption.11 Hall describes this idea in 
Darwinian terms, in which a weapons innovation by one state is compared to a mutation 
in an organism, and the other states must either adapt (i.e. adopt a similar or 
complementary mechanism) or perish,12 a process that is carried out by military organs 
and becomes especially concentrated during times of conflict.13  
  
The first implication of this theory is that the diffusion of weapons will be rapid and that 
innovations will quickly become ubiquitous, leading all states (or at least those 
intending to survive and thrive) to pursue essentially the same armaments. As Waltz 
himself contends, ‘The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to 
competition in the arts and instruments of force. Competition produces a tendency 
toward the sameness of the competitors.’14 The second theoretical implication is the 
development of arms races, as each state tries to catch up to the innovations of its 
competitors, which in turn spurs secondary innovations that begin the cycle anew. This 
is encapsulated in the oft-stated ‘offence-defence’ dynamic with respect to weaponry, 
which is believed by some to be so central that it is painted as the key impetus in 
weapons development.15 Hugh Turney-High thus goes so far as to claim that ‘[t]he 
offense thinks up new weapons or improves the old ones so that the defence’s genius 
must think up new defence or be crushed out of existence. There is nothing new nor old 
in this. The entire history and prehistory of weapons is summarized in this cycle’.16 A 
final implication of this neorealist approach to military innovation is that the diffusion 
process is assumed to begin with the most powerful and advanced states in the system 
and flow down to the subordinate states, with some versions of the theory describing the 
specific mechanisms through which this can occur, including forced penetration,17 
                                                          
10 See the discussion in Eliason and Goldman, pp. 15, 16, and 21. 
11 James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: The Evolution of High-Tech Weaponry and Tomorrow's Brave 
New Battlefield (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), p. xv. 
12 Hall, p. 3. 
13 Rosen, pp. 21-22. 
14 Waltz, p. 128 cited in Eliason and Goldman, p. 8. 
15 Clifford J. Rogers (‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War’ in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), 
The Military Revolutions Debate (Westview Press, 1995), pp. 55-93) proposes a similar version of this 
dynamic at a longer timescale in which a military innovation causes a temporary disequilibrium in the 
system of warfare, which prompts a search for new military means to restore equilibrium. Colin Gray 
(p.48) critiques this notion as overly orderly and deterministic in light of historical evidence. 
16 Harry H. Turney-High, Primitive War: Its practice and concepts (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1949), p. 7. 
17 See Eliason and Goldman, p. 17 who cite Colin J. Bennett, ‘Review Article: What is Policy 
Convergence and What Causes It?’, British Journal  of Political Science, 21:2 (1991), p. 225. 
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alliance obligations, bandwagoning18 and competition from a local rival.  
 
An immediate potential weakness for this theory is that it depends on perfect 
information – it assumes that states will have sufficient and sufficiently reliable 
intelligence about innovations occurring within other states in the system so as to first 
recognize when a significant weapons innovation has occurred and then to copy or 
adapt that innovation (or develop a counterinnovation) before the adopting state can be 
prejudiced by the innovation in any contest of force. 
 
The bulk of the opposition to this approach, however, arises from the fact that – like 
much neorealist thought – it disregards or discounts to the point of insignificance a 
variety of factors operating at the sub-state level. These include such considerations as 
cultural attitudes, institutional inertia and bureaucratic politics. Rival theories of military 
diffusion bring these intra-state dynamics to the fore. One version asserts that prevailing 
social or cultural attitudes towards innovation, whether among a state’s political or 
military elite, can create a fertile or hostile environment for adopting military 
innovations.19 Other variants of these theories consider national cultures in a relative 
sense, arguing, for example, that cultural, ideological or other affinities between the 
military or political leadership in the innovating and potential adopter states, 
respectively, tend to facilitate diffusion of military innovations.20 Conversely, cultural 
or ideological divergence is asserted to often hamper the emulation and adoption of 
foreign weaponry. These ideas relate to the compatibility criterion in the general 
diffusion literature (see Chapter 3) and are partially based on the finding from general 
organizational theory that extended social interaction can lead to emulation irrespective 
of the relative objective benefits or costs in terms of efficiency or effectiveness.21 
Goldman mentions one important implication of these theoretical approaches, which is 
that, despite the best of intentions, any differences in compatibility (whether arising 
from discrepancies in military practices, values, experiences or infrastructure) will result 
in divergences from the original model by the adopting military institutions.22 
                                                          
18 For an application to the diffusion of military technology, see Chris C. Demchak, ‘Creating the Enemy: 
Global Diffusion of the Information-Technology Based Military Model’, in Goldman and Eliason (eds.), 
pp. 317-323. 
19 Black, p. 1223. 
20 Eliason and Goldman, pp. 15-16. 
21 Emily O. Goldman, ‘Receptivity to Revolution: Carrier Air Power in Peace and War’, in Goldman and 
Eliason (eds), p. 269; Demchak, p. 333.  




Another theoretical perspective cast from the same sub-state mould highlights inter- and 
intra-organizational rivalries within adopting states. Competition over resources, favour, 
or influence between different bureaucratic entities within the state could lead to a 
particular military innovation being embraced (or rejected) merely because it is believed 
to strengthen the hand of one or other service or agency. 
 
The last major theoretical approach to the motives and causes behind adoption decisions 
also has a sub-state focus. It postulates a natural state of institutional inertia among large 
organizations23 and asserts that military organizations in particular are especially 
resistant to change, which presumably would include the adoption of new weapons from 
an external source. Like any large bureaucracy, especially hierarchical ones, state 
militaries are alleged to be conservative, risk averse and less than partial to any novelty 
that might reduce their autonomy or influence, resulting in change occurring 
incrementally, if at all.24 Moreover, many regard the military as possessing a rather 
singular set of jealously guarded values, what John Keegan has termed a ‘warrior 
culture’ that is set ‘a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the 
everyday world but does not belong to it’.25 In the military world, obedience and 
reliability are by necessity paramount, and this is believed to create a distance from the 
rest of society that makes militaries even more resistant to new developments 
(especially if these hail from non-military sources) than other bureaucracies.26 In 
addition, since their lives are both literally and figuratively on the line, it is argued that 
military men strive to minimize risks as opposed to maximizing the potential for 
success,27 which can be construed as a form of behaviour described by Prospect 
Theory.28 All of this means that even civilian directives to embrace a new technology 
might, on occasion, be unenforceable. In short, several theorists predict that the 
institutional inflexibility of military organizations does not tend to favour innovation. 
 
Outcome Theories 
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28 For the original articulation of Prospect Theory, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect 




The second type of theory of interest to us here traces the outcome for the potential 
adopter of an adoption attempt and spans the implementation aspects of the decision. 
Although we shall see that the general diffusion of innovations literature has explored 
this issue deeply, and there are a host of case studies of the adoption of specific 
weapons,29 there are few well-developed theoretical applications specific to the military 
context. Thus, for example, Goldman and Ross describe a theory of contingent capacity 
for adoption, wherein a military’s capacity to incorporate an innovation into its existing 
doctrine and structure is contingent on a variety of factors, including compatibility, 
existing resources, bureaucratic rivalries, and other organizational traits.30 While there is 
nothing inherently objectionable in these and similar approaches, the details of how 
these different factors fit together and interact are rarely delineated further, other than to 
offer that the factors take on different values across cases.  
 
Although I have been unable to find what I regard as a systematic and comprehensive 
theory of the implementation of the adoption of novel weapons, there are partial 
exceptions in the form of theories limited to a particular set of circumstances. Rosen, for 
one, offers an interesting extension to the abovementioned theory of military 
bureaucratic decision-making, which explores the prospects for adopting innovation 
during wartime under different structural conditions. He argues that while a looser 
organizational structure may generally be more open to new ideas, a strict hierarchy and 
tight control mean that any new ideas that do end up being accepted are more likely to 
be implemented quickly. For this reason, Rosen favours a tighter organization as more 
amenable to innovation during wartime, although he does concede that a decentralized 
structure might facilitate innovation if the individual operating units were able to 
assemble all the needed data on their own and the innovation could be implemented 
without making changes to other parts of their organization.31 
 
Each of the above theories addresses part of the question of how and why new weapons 
are adopted, but none of them provide a ‘coherent model’32 that describes the overall 
                                                          
29 These include, inter alia, those commissioned or conducted by (Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. 
Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998)); Hall; Lynn; Steele and Dorland (eds.); and Goldman and Eliason (eds.). 
30 Emily Goldman and Andrew Ross, ‘Conclusion: The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas—
Theory and Practice’, in Goldman and Eliason (eds.), pp. 301-302. 
31 Rosen, p. 39. 
32 Hall, p.3. 
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weapons diffusion process, one that could form the basis for understanding terrorist 
adoption of weapons and weapon technologies. The analysis laid out below will 
therefore not only seek to determine which of the above theories are most consistently 
supported by the historical record, but also to identify additional factors and dynamics 
which pertain to the framing questions presented at the beginning of the chapter and 
which can then be used to supplement or enhance existing theories. 
 
One related theoretical debate is worth noting, as it speaks to the transmission of 
weapons innovation. On a broad scale, it is not difficult to imagine that technological 
prowess and military power are correlated,33 but the direction of causality is a matter of 
some debate, a debate that reduces to a disagreement over the respective roles of 
civilians (particularly scientists and inventors) and military institutions in driving 
innovation. On one side of the aisle are scholars who dust off Heraclitus to proclaim that 
‘War is the father of all things’.34 They propose that war, specifically the search for new 
weapons, has driven advances in science and technology35 and even go so far as to 
argue that the conduct of war plays a major role in shaping the political, economic, and 
social environment.36 The other side downplays any possible contributions made by 
weapons to civilian technology and production and contends that innovative technology 
mostly flows the other way, from the civilian to the military world, where it is moulded 
into instruments of war.37 There seems to be a tacit belief among many commentators 
that militaries are not naturally creative and that much of the truly consequential 
innovation actually occurs outside of military structures, and even outside of 
government altogether.38 Other scholars echo these sentiments but take a less heroic 
view of the civilian sector. In this conception, those industrial or commercial interests in 
the civilian sector who stand to profit from disseminating a new weapons system (most 
notoriously, defence contractors) act to ‘push’ ostensible weapons innovations onto the 
                                                          
33 Mokyr (1990), p. 183 traces this idea back to Werner Sombart’s Krieg und Kapitalismus (Munich: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1913).   
34 Quote listed under DK22B53 in Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 
(Zurich: Weidmann, 1985).  
35 Volkman, passim. 
36 Van Creveld, as understood by Metz (Steven Metz, ‘A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 
21st-Century Warfare’, Parameters, 24 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 126-132). Turney-High (p. 253) even 
suggested that one reason for the emergence of the state was when its future citizens evolved beyond 
primitive forms of warfare, when a population witnessed ‘the rise of the army with officers’ (p. 253 and 
see also Keegan, p. 91). Such arguments sometimes tend towards the type of technological determinism 
mentioned earlier. 
37 Mokyr (1990), pp. 184-186 
38 Boot, p. 457. 
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military sector through a variety of mechanisms, not all of them entirely above board.39 
 
As with any observed correlation, the truth may not lie with any of these causal 
arguments, or perhaps with both.40 Since both technology and war are in many respects 
social constructs,41 it is perfectly plausible that they can have reciprocal effects on one 
another, or are both driven by the same extraneous variable or variables percolating 
through the larger societal bedrock. In other words, there is no theoretical reason to 
dogmatically align with either of the above arguments – civilian science and technology 
can emigrate to the military sphere, just as instruments developed specifically to be used 
in combat can inspire useful spin-offs in the civilian world. Which of these alternatives 
is more common becomes an empirical question.  
 
Bearing in mind the caveats to drawing inferences from a broad consideration of the 
historical record, I can return to the research questions posed earlier in this chapter and 
examine the extent to which the historical record can elucidate the process of weapons 
innovation and diffusion. At the same time, reference will be made to how the various 
theories introduced above fare in light of the historical record. 
 
Awareness of Innovation Possibilities 
 
Characterization of Weapons Innovation 
 
Understanding more about the objects of adoption is a prerequisite to understanding 
why and how they are adopted. In this regard, the historical record provides some 
guidance in a number of areas related to the nature of weapons innovation itself. To 
begin with, the history of weapons development largely confirms general theoretical 
characterizations of innovation as invention plus context and process. Da Vinci, with his 
meticulous drawings of helicopters and tanks, was thus the archetypical weapons 
inventor, but was too far ahead of the materials and technical skills of his time to be a 
weapons innovator. A new idea for a weapon and even the diffusion of this idea 
therefore does not qualify as a true innovation until the idea enters a social, political 
                                                          
39 Goldman and Ross, p. 374. Dunnigan, p. xv. 
40 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 105; Mokyr (1990), p. 186. 
41 Black, p. 1223. 
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and, in the case of weapons, invariably physical reality. This transition from invention 
to innovation is usually marked by moving beyond the prototype stage to the point 
where the weapon is adopted by someone and first put into practice, even if on an 
extremely limited scale. This is useful to remember when one considers the significance 
of the plethora of bomb-making and poisoning materials and manuals that 
circumnavigate the virtual world of the Internet. 
 
What about the ‘newness’ criterion? Here the answers are less clear-cut. We have 
defined weapons innovations as substantial or discontinuous changes in weaponry, but, 
as we have discussed in the introductory chapter, ‘innovation’ lies on a continuum and 
whether or not a particular development qualifies is often subjective. The question then 
becomes: how novel or different from extant weapons systems did weapons have to be 
in order for them to be regarded as innovations? This is complicated by two issues: first, 
that the terminology (and study) of innovation as we are using it is of fairly recent 
vintage, with the consequence that historical annals do not systematically distinguish in 
their recounting between truly innovative and merely incremental improvements and, 
second, that the survey in Appendix A has selected to some degree for consequential 
weapons, thus potentially introducing an element of circularity to any attempt to 
establish criteria for innovativeness.42 Thus, much of the nature of weapons innovation 
must by necessity hang on our definitions thereof. This being said, a basic reading of the 
historical record yields few if any cases where the importance of a weapons 
development was not recognized contemporaneously with its appearance, but is 
revealed only decades or centuries later with historian’s hindsight. From the 
development of the war-chariot to the advent of radar, military actors, once they became 
aware of a new weapons system, have tended to recognize when it is something 
significantly or qualitatively different from what has gone before. Even in a case like 
the Chinese stagnation in artillery development by the sixteenth century, when they 
eventually learned of the advances made in the West, they recognized that subsequent 
innovations had occurred.43 Of course, whether or not the actors chose to act on this 
recognition is another matter entirely and a major element of this investigation. 
 
Yet, with respect to the nature of the weapon itself, it is readily apparent that in the 
                                                          
42 This would logically occur when, as seems to be fairly typical, discontinuous changes in weaponry are 
also consequential ones. 
43 Parker, p. 137. 
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military sphere, innovation does not always arrive in the shape of a sudden ferocious 
blast felt across the battlefield, but can also take more subtle and variegated forms. 
Although most weapons innovations are characterized by the introduction of a novel 
physical apparatus, this does not necessarily have to embody substantial improvements 
in destructive capabilities like range, mobility or firepower. Innovations in weaponry 
can also arise in aspects less directly related to actual combat performance, such as costs 
of production or the expertise required to use the weapon. In fact, on occasion a new 
weapon can underperform on several physical dimensions, but still constitute an 
innovation, as seen with the advent of the crossbow, which was heavier, more expensive 
and had a lower rate of fire than either the composite bow or the longbow. The 
crossbow’s chief source of innovation, however, derived from the dramatically shorter 
training period required, when compared with other bows, before a soldier became 
proficient with the weapon – an important advantage when expert archers took decades 
to develop their skills and were thus a comparatively scarce and expensive element of a 
military arsenal.44 
 
Moreover, an innovation need not be composed of a single ‘macroinvention’,45 but can 
arise from multiple small enhancements, which in isolation may not seem very worthy 
of note, but, acting together, eventually enable the weapon to cross a performance 
threshold and constitute an innovation. However, to qualify as a genuine innovation, the 
cumulative improvements much reach some sort of tipping point that creates a 
qualitative improvement in performance over the status quo weapons. A pertinent 
example is in the area of small arms, which experienced incremental advances over an 
extended period of several centuries, including rifled barrels, breech-loading and the 
percussion cap, none of which produced any military sea-change. However, when these 
factors came together for the first time as a mass-produced weapon in the form of Von 
Dreyse’s Prussian needle-gun (Zündnadelgewehr),46 the weapon – when combined with 
appropriate tactics and organization in the 1866 war with Austria – was able to 
revolutionize land warfare. It is, in addition, actually not uncommon in the annals of 
weapons innovation for a weapon to go through multiple iterations of development and 
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and Society since A.D.1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 67-68, p. 80 and Hall, p. 
17. 
45 Mokyr (1990), p. 13. 
46 Geoffrey L. Herrera and Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Military Diffusion in Nineteenth Century Europe: The 
Napoleonic and Prussian Military Systems’ in Goldman and Eliason (eds.), p. 220; Boot, pp.128-129. 
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refinement before proving effective in combat or to be initiated by one set of actors and 
then consummated after significant delay by a completely different set. Perhaps one of 
the clearest examples is the use of self-propelled rockets on the battlefield, which from 
their earliest appearances in Ancient China to the Mysore Wars and the War of 1812 
had played no more than a supporting and sporadic role on the battlefield, that is before 
making a reprise in World War II and coming to dominate modern warfare.47 
 
The historical record also provides a useful corrective to the tendency to envisage 
weapons innovation as naturally progressing to larger and more complex forms. While 
this is indeed the typical direction (as seen in the case of siege engines, warships, and 
aircraft), in certain instances weapons have for one reason or another grown too large or 
complex and the innovation lies in making the weapon smaller and simpler. To mention 
just two examples – Charles VIII’s bronze cannon that in 1494 obliterated the fortresses 
of the Italian kingdoms were smaller and lighter than the hulking, multi-piece bombards 
that preceded them48 and Shaka Zulu’s short stabbing spear provided a range of 
advantages over the long assegai in close-quarters tribal combat in 19th century southern 
Africa. The past century has, however, witnessed the historically curious trend of 
simultaneous miniaturization of weapon components and an exponential increase in 
their complexity. 
   
It has been emphasized earlier that innovations do not occur in a social vacuum, and it is 
a truism that the level of scientific or technical knowledge must be sufficiently 
developed to allow for any particular invention to occur, but weapons innovations in 
certain cases cannot even come into existence in the absence of broader economic and 
social changes. The so-called ‘American system’ of manufacturing using 
interchangeable parts, which enabled the production of high-quality, mass-produced 
firearms,49 is a case of the former, while the Meiji Restoration allowing for the Japanese 
naval modernization of the late nineteenth century is an example of the latter.50  
 
The historical record also provides ample evidence for the assertion that the rates of 
                                                          
47 Willey Ley, Rockets, Missiles, and Men in Space (New York: Viking Press, 1968), pp. 61-75 and 
Wernher von Braun and Frederick I. Ordway III, Rocketry and Space Travel, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Crowell, 1975), pp. 30-34. 
48 Boot, p. 4. 
49 McNeill, p. 331. 
50  J. Charles Schencking, Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 
1868-1922 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 2-3. 
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technological change in general, and weapons innovation and diffusion in particular, are 
accelerating, especially in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. From taking centuries 
for new weapons to appear and sometimes even longer for them to diffuse widely, the 
past eight hundred years or so have seen the pace of innovation and diffusion quicken 
incessantly, occasionally even outstripping the ability of military organizations to 
understand or accommodate them. The rapid advances in naval gunnery in the late 
nineteenth century51 and in guided munitions in the twentieth are but two examples.52 
 
Mechanisms of Awareness 
 
The historical survey provides some indication of how combatants become aware of 
innovations in weaponry. The most salient insight is that there is no single or even 
predominant mechanism – a variety of avenues have historically led to awareness of 
new weapons or innovative weapons technologies, with some of these avenues 
appearing more obvious than others. 
 
First, awareness of an innovation might arise organically, through trial and error with 
existing implements that could serve multiple purposes, such as when pre-modern 
peoples realized that traditional hunting tools could be used for more than bringing 
down large prey, or at least for dispatching a more zoologically familial sort of prey.53 
Second, awareness of an innovation can arise from a self-reflective recognition of a 
specific military need or to solve a problem or set of shortcomings presented by existing 
weapons. This can then drive actors to either search out solutions external to the current 
armed forces or, where there are none, to set about the process of weapons innovation 
themselves.  
 
Third, awareness of a weapons innovation can arise from its demonstration, either from 
being on the receiving end of its enhanced performance characteristics (presuming one 
survives) or preferably, witnessing or otherwise learning of instances where the new 
weapon or weapons system gave one side in a conflict a distinct advantage. One can 
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only imagine, for instance, that Francesco Guicciardini’s famous reports of the French 
bronze cannon used in Italy in 1494 must have quickly done the rounds of the great 
houses of Europe when he wrote that: 
 
The French developed many...pieces which were even more manoeuvrable, constructed 
only of bronze. These were called cannons, and they used iron cannonballs instead of 
stone as before....and so little time elapsed between one shot and another and the shots 
were so frequent and so violent was their battering that in a few hours they could 
accomplish what previously in Italy used to require many days.54  
 
Recognition of the advantages of a new weapon is not a trait that is restricted to 
scientifically literate peoples. The Native Americans of New England, despite having no 
prior experience with gunpowder weapons, quickly recognized the advantages of a 
musket over a bow (and even, unlike the majority of colonists, of flintlocks over 
matchlocks) and set about adopting these new weapons.55   
 
Fourth, awareness could be either actively or passively encouraged by change agents. 
An example of the former is when Einstein and Szilard informed Roosevelt of the 
possibility of the atomic bomb, and of the latter is the borrowing by the Mongols of the 
weaponry of their defeated foes, the awareness of which was thus disseminated to all 
the lands they subsequently traversed.56 These change agents were sometimes found 
amongst the technical classes (engineers and scientists), who were wont to exchange 
their ideas. Other militaries could also serve as change agents, as occurred across 
various forms of alliance, either voluntarily (for example, the Allies in World War II) or 
coercively (such as the top-down diffusion seen within the Warsaw Pact).57 
 
The channels through which awareness was disseminated also vary considerably, from 
direct observation (such as through espionage or captured weapons), through written 
descriptions and printed materials (from the fifteenth century on) up to video recordings 
and CAD files that can be sent over the Internet today. 
 
One interesting hypothesis suggested by the historical examples presented is that 
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awareness of a weapons innovation might be facilitated by certain qualities inherent to 
the weapon itself or its effects, such as whether the weapon represents a significant 
departure from previous weapons or whether its effects are easily observable and 
immediate. The loud bang emanating from the earliest gunpowder weapons and the 
psychological distress this tended to cause might thus have had something to do with 
the rapid growth in awareness of (and military perseverance with) these weapons in 
Europe despite their initially poor performance relative to torsion or tension projectile 
weapons.58 It can be hypothesized that in a modern society seemingly obsessed by the 
latest iPad or other high-technology device, weapons associated with the latest technical 
breakthroughs or with popular fiction (such as synthetic biological agents) might garner 
widespread and rapid attention by would-be purveyors of violence. Additionally, 
weapons whose advantages over existing modes of combat are easily observable and 
immediate may be more recognizable than those whose benefits are more subtle and the 
former might thereby engender greater awareness amongst potential adopters. 
 
Factors Influencing Adoption Decisions 
 
The Organizational Decision-Making Context 
 
Identifying the specific decision-makers and the decision-making context surrounding 
the potential adoption of a weapons innovation is straightforward in certain cases 
(where authority was highly centralized and records were kept, such as in Ancient Rome 
or Renaissance Europe) but almost impossible in others (say, among pre-literate 
societies or highly decentralized polities) and any overarching conclusions must 
therefore be tempered. However, despite some variation, from the evidence we have the 
decision-making context for new weapons mostly seems to reflect the broader social, 
political and organizational structures in place in whichever collectivity is 
contemplating adoption of an innovation.  
 
Thus, in the most primitive societies, where Darwinian forces applied most directly, it is 
likely that there was no single decision-maker – each individual or small band made 
their own weapon adoption decision and lived (or otherwise) with the consequences. 
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Widespread adoption under such conditions must have functioned as an emergent 
process, with innumerable micro-decisions and their consequences resulting in the 
macro-adoption of a new weapon, such as a flint-topped spear.  
 
As soon as societies recognized some central leadership, it became likely that most 
adoption decisions vested in the ruling individual, whether this was a chief or a king, 
with the degree of consultation that was permitted reflecting the nature of the existing 
polity. Thus it was that through most of history the decision whether or not to adopt a 
new weapon rested primarily with the ruler, whether this was Alexander the Great, 
Charles VIII, Tokugawa or Mehmut II. While one cannot rely on counterfactuals, it is 
debatable, for instance, whether the longbow would ever have secured such a prominent 
position on European battlegrounds such as Crécy in 1346 and Agincourt in 1415, had 
not the person of Edward I recognized that the longbow, a favourite Welsh hunting 
weapon, could be deployed in battle to deliver a dramatic concentration of fire.59   
 
This leads to consideration of an important feature that emerges from the historical 
record, namely that innovation does not always arise completely spontaneously. 
Although invention depends to at least some extent on individual flashes of insight, 
weapons innovation need not always come bubbling up organically through the ranks of 
warriors and military technicians, but is often the result of a top-down 
institutionalization specifically set up to develop novel weapons. From the Assyrians at 
Nineveh60 and Dionysus at Syracuse,61 to the rulers of Italian city-states, the British 
Ordnance Boards and the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, such 
‘directed innovation’ has been all too common within the world’s militaries.  
 
In many cases, rulers institutionalized the process of weapons innovation or of adopting 
innovations, after which day-to-day decision-making might have been delegated to 
subordinates or technicians. However, even then the impetus for adoption still usually 
                                                          
59 Volkman, p. 44; for more detail see Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, The Great Warbow (Stroud: 
Sutton Publishing, 2005). 
60 Volkman, pp. 20-21. 
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remained with the ruler. Of course, even in the most despotic of societies there were no 
doubt advisors and other functionaries who commented on practicalities, priests and 
religious authorities who determined the spiritual suitability of a weapon and elite castes 
of warriors who jealously guarded their positions, so that it was probably only in the 
rarest of cases that the ruler’s decision was absolute or free from external influences.  
 
Once government became more deliberative and overall decision-making more 
decentralized, we see adoption decisions made more often by military professionals. 
Thus, it was the Prussian General Staff under Moltke the Elder that made several 
important weapons decisions in the mid-nineteenth century, and the British Admiralty 
that debated the size and nature of its fleet. Bureaucratization continued throughout the 
twentieth and early twenty-first century, further decentralizing weapons adoption 
decisions, which became the function of dedicated procurement agencies. In 
democracies like the United States, the decision-making is especially diffuse, with 
various military branches, the Executive and various levels of legislative government, 
together with numerous commercial and other special interest groups, all contributing 
towards weapons acquisition decisions. This creates a complex web of interactions, 
coalitions and opposing interests that makes it difficult to determine who has the most 
influence over the outcome of a particular adoption decision. A further complicating 
factor is the complexity of modern weapons systems, which invariably ensures that no 
single decision-maker can have a complete understanding of all the technical, 
organizational, legal and tactical aspects of most weapons. 
 
One sector that, although rarely exercising direct decision authority, has nonetheless 
influenced weapons adoption decisions since the earliest times, is the (often civilian) 
producers of weapons, whether these are individual craftsmen, guilds, entrepreneurial 
inventors or large multinational corporations. Where these actors were responsible for 
the supply of existing or potential new weapons, they often sought a voice at some point 
in the decision process. At times their influence was minimal and indirect (such as royal 
armourers in medieval Europe), while at other times they exercised considerable 
influence on adoption decisions (for example, artillery producers in the late nineteenth 
century or defence contractors in the United States today). 
 
One must not forget the role of weapon champions, those individuals (either military or 
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civilian) that promote a particular weapon or weapons system. While such champions 
can serve to counterbalance bureaucratic inertia or institutional resistance (for example, 
in the case of Lieutenant William Sims’ direct advocacy to Teddy Roosevelt of 
continuous aim gunfire in the U.S. Navy), it is also possible that they can harden 





Beginning at the broadest level, ideological, social and cultural compatibility with an 
innovation certainly seems to play a role in creating an environment that is either fertile 
or hostile to new weapons development.63 An illustrative case is the Japanese rejection 
of firearms – for more than two hundred years – under the Tokugawa shogunate, which 
has been at least partly explained by the incongruity between the chemical reactions of 
firearms and traditional Shinto sentiments regarding harmony with the natural world 
and the purity of bodily kinetics.64 The risk aversion and hence general circumspection 
of military commanders with respect to new weapons, especially for those introduced 
during the crucible of actual combat, has also been noted.65 Overall, Goldman and Ross 
conclude that a military organization’s capacity to adapt its doctrine and institutional 
structure to an innovation is key in the adoption decision, and that this is at least partly 
dependent on resource levels and the compatibility of the innovation with existing 
organizational norms.66 
 
In terms of those factors that drive weapons innovation, the historical record provides 
several insights. First, much weapons innovation throughout history has originated from 
the perceived need to solve a problem not addressed by contemporary weapons, which 
then drives actors to initiate a process of internal weapons development (or, 
alternatively, to scan their external environment for solutions). Examples abound, from 
the development of siege engines by conquerors from Assyrian times in order to assail 
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the fortifications of walled cities,67 to attempts to equip motorized vehicles with tracks 
and armour to overcome the muddied trenches of the First World War and later efforts 
to produce guided munitions as a solution to unaffordably high levels of inaccuracy in 
aerial bombing. 
 
Second, prevailing competition between political entities seems to have been one of the 
central drivers of weapons innovation, from stone-age peoples68 to the superpowers of 
the Cold War. Competition does not only take the form of keeping up with the weapons 
innovations of rival states, clans or tribes, but it can also – in light of the ‘offence-
defence’ co-evolutionary dynamic described earlier – result in the offence being 
compelled to progress in order to circumvent robust defence. 
 
Third, issues of status are also no stranger to the realm of weaponry, with the 
expectation of prestige no doubt playing at least some role in many adoption decisions. 
This is amply illustrated by the often (literally) ludicrous lengths to which medieval 
European armourers went to create ever larger, more elaborate and arguably less 
functional swords, not to mention the proverbial ‘pissing contest’ between Germany and 
Great Britain over the size and complexity of warships at the turn of the twentieth 
century.69 Advancements in technology may only exacerbate this dynamic, as is perhaps 
demonstrated by several of the more recent acquirers of nuclear weapons or the 
sometimes preposterous purchases by small yet wealthy states of more fighter jets than 
they have available pilots for. 
 
Fourth, sometimes the availability of a new weapon provokes a search for ways to use 
it, even when no previously articulated need existed, a situation that Joel Mokyr 
captures by inverting the popular aphorism to describe ‘invention as the mother of 
necessity’.70 This can also occur when new scientific or technological discoveries (often 
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in the civilian world) prompt the creation of new weapons. The canonical example of 
this would be the Manhattan Project, where the tremendous advances in nuclear physics 
in the 1920s and 1930s were brought to military and political leaders’ attention, 
eventually spawning the development of the atomic bomb.  
 
Last, there is the possibility that weapons innovation can arise somewhat spontaneously, 
without a conscious driver. In this case trial and error or curious tinkering results in 
existing (or newly discovered) objects or practices being put to new purposes, thus 
creating novel weapons. A prominent example is the development of the first cannon, 
which first came on the scene around two centuries after the appearance of 
gunpowder.71 This might also transpire when innovation becomes so institutionalized 
within a large bureaucracy that it occurs for its own sake, without any overall 
organizational awareness that it is occurring or relationship to the external environment. 
While rare in its pure form, there are instances within the defence establishments of 
major powers within the past half-century where one might argue that such ‘blind 
innovation’ occurred without complete cognizance thereof. For example, Van Creveld 
points towards Ballistic Missile Defence as a recent example of an innovation that was 
‘driven less by any clear idea as to [its] usefulness or even desirability than by the 
foibles of the powers that be’.72 In such situations, it has been argued that ‘technological 
innovation [became] largely unaffected by the activities of potential enemies, [and] a 
rather self-contained process’.73 
 
Factors Influencing Adoption Success 
 
The extent to which a weapons innovation is successfully adopted by the receiving 
entity and the time until the process is effectively complete74 varies considerably across 
time periods and societies, but historical cases give some indication of the structural 
factors that can impede or facilitate a successful outcome. In this regard, ‘success’ 
connotes that the new weapon or weapon system performs at least as well as the model 
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pp. 31–32; Lu Gwei-Djen, Joseph Needham, and Phan Chi-Hsing, ‘The Oldest Representation of a 
Bombard’, Technology and Culture, 29:3 (July 1988), pp. 594-605. 
72 Van Creveld, p. 260. 
73 Rosen, p. 250. 
74 The term ‘effectively complete’, refers to the point where the innovation has not only been physically 
adopted, but also incorporated into combat systems, doctrine and training; in other words when it is 
capable of being fielded in combat to the extent where its intended advantages can be brought to bear. 
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or models that prompted the adoption, or in the absence thereof, providing a similar 
level of military benefit as initially envisaged by the adopting entity. 
 
An overarching determinant of the successful adoption of a weapons innovation has 
been described by several scholars75 and flows naturally from the fact that all 
innovations, by definition, entail a human or social dimension. Successful adoption 
requires not only developing or acquiring the physical weapon itself (the ‘hardware’), 
but also incorporating the logistical, organizational, doctrinal, training and sometimes 
even broader social changes required for the adopted weapon to function effectively (the 
‘software’).76 Several cases of partially or wholly unsuccessful adoption of weapons 
innovation have been attributed to a failure to imbue the hardware with the required 
software, including the lacklustre attempts by several European countries to imitate 
Prussian combat arms in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the no less 
ineffectual attempts by Arab nations to adopt advanced tanks in the latter part of the 
twentieth.77 
 
The historical record provides several categories of obstacle to adopting both the 
hardware and the software components of a weapons innovation. Perhaps the most 
obvious is a lack of the requisite materials or resources to produce sufficient quantities 
of the new weapon. This may have been one of the major reasons why the Ancient 
Egyptians, who did not have access to copious quantities of the materials to make 
bronze, were still employing clubs and stone-tipped spears at the start of the Middle 
Kingdom (approximately 2000 BCE),78 despite the Bronze Age being well underway, 
and the lack of raw materials certainly limited the spread of gunpowder weapons in the 
fourteenth century. A second, related, obstacle revealed by the record is not having 
sufficient and sufficiently skilled human capital to produce, service and use the new 
weapon system. The lack of large numbers of available highly-trained archers in 
fourteenth century continental Europe, for example, at times hindered the large-scale 
                                                          
75 Steele and Dorland, pp. 16-17; Boot, pp.88-89; Hoyt, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Role of 
the Periphery in Technological and Conceptual Innovation’, in Goldman and Eliason (eds.), p.200; 
Goldman and Ross, pp. 382-384; and Van Creveld, p.156. 
76 This is related to the knowledge concepts of techne and metis, which will be discussed fully in Chapter 
3. 
77 See Appendix A, p. 297; Michael J. Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, ‘Armies of Snow and Armies of 
Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries’ in Goldman and Eliason (eds.), pp. 91-
92. 
78 Barry Kemp, Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 269. 
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adoption of the longbow.79 
 
Occasionally, there are tactical constraints to be considered when adopting new 
weapons. Taking account of the physical terrain, for one, is important; chariots, for 
instance, are of little use on uneven ground. Military or political leaders must also take 
into consideration the support systems required in order to field the new weapon. It is 
trite to state that artillery requires ammunition, trains require tracks and most strategic 
bombers require mid-air refuelling, but if the infrastructure to supply these requirements 
does not exist, then the weapons are useless. This, together with command, doctrine and 
organization, is the essence of what is meant by a weapons system – if actors pay 
insufficient attention to the mundane considerations of support amid the more dynamic 
elements of a weapons system, the new weapon will likely function sub-optimally, if at 
all. 
 
While cultural encumbrances to either innovation in general or the adoption of a 
specific weapons system can lead to a decision not to adopt, oftentimes the cultural 
resistance does not apply to the physical weapons themselves, but to the social changes 
that successful adoption requires and thus affect the software aspects of the adoption 
process. Several militaries have been unable to make the social and organizational 
adjustments necessary to effectively adopt firearms because of cultural 
incompatibilities. One such example is the half-hearted attempts by the ruling Mamluks 
of Egypt to employ gunpowder weapons (the Mamluks viewed firearms as beneath 
them and used traditional weapons themselves while recruiting gunners and musketeers 
from black Africans and people of the Maghreb) and their consequent ignominious 
defeats at the hands of the Ottomans in the battles of Marj Dabiq (1515) and Raydania 
(1516).80 The difficulties that the Muslim world experienced in effectively integrating 
gunpowder weapons in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries can thus be attributed 
in large part to discordance between traditional religious values and the required 
emulation of Western social structures. The presence of cases of cultural incompatibility 
should not, however, be taken as a universal phenomenon – the Native Americans 
accepted firearms with alacrity and incorporated them more or less seamlessly into 
existing cultural traditions81 and the Japanese, when they eventually decided to borrow 
                                                          
79 Appendix A, p. 267. 
80 Keegan, p. 36; Parker, pp. 126-127; Appendix A, pp. 280-282. 
81 Malone, passim. 
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Western technology on a wide scale, managed to merge traditional concepts with 
modern warfare, an obvious example being the kamikaze bombers of the War in the 
Pacific. 
 
Related to, but often distinct from, cultural impediments is resistance to innovation by 
conservative elites or other interests in the adopting entity who are vested in the status 
quo and push back against an innovation despite its military utility. Military 
organizations, with their intrinsic orientation towards obedience, discipline, martial 
values82 and routinization, are held up as being particularly prone to elicit internal 
opposition to change, especially those changes that originate outside of the military 
establishment.83 Possibly the most cited example of this is the resistance of horse-drawn 
charioteers and later horse-mounted knights to the introduction of infantry weapons that 
might challenge their supremacy on the battlefield and hence their elite status,84 but it 
was also seen in more modern times with the resistance of many military commanders 
to concepts of mass mechanized warfare prior to World War II.85 Conservatism need not 
arise from selfish or parochial motives – even an unwarranted degree of risk aversion in 
an otherwise dedicated commander can lead to forswearing a potentially useful weapon, 
as witnessed by Wellington’s dismissal of Congreve rockets.86 
 
Examining these obstacles and pitfalls by contrast illuminates factors that promote 
successful adoption of weapons innovation. These include: a) the availability of 
sufficient human and material resources, preferably with a significant devotion of 
personnel and economic capital; b) cultural compatibility with innovation in general and 
the candidate weapon system in particular; and c) institutional and doctrinal flexibility 
and receptivity to even fundamental changes in practice. While none of these factors are 
necessary or sufficient for weapons adoption, they cumulatively increase the likelihood 
of a successful outcome.  
 
A high threat environment might encourage the decision to adopt, but does not 
necessarily seem to be closely correlated with successful adoption outcomes, as several 
                                                          
82 The argument here is that these values create a cultural barrier between the armed forces and the rest of 
society, one that breeds insularity and an inherent distrust of new developments, especially those 
emerging from non-military innovators. 
83 Keegan, p. xvi; Hall, pp. 4-5; Rosen, p. 19 and Van Creveld, p.220. 
84 Hall, pp.4-5. 
85 Appendix A, pp. 298-301. 
86 Appendix A, pp. 288-289.  
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prominent historical cases reflect failed adoption in the presence of extremely motivated 
adopters facing significant threats to their survival. An example is the willingness but 
continued inability on the part of South Asia’s indigenous militaries to properly 
incorporate gunpowder weapons into their military doctrine, as demonstrated by the 
ineffective performance of the artillery of the Maratha Confederacy in the Battle of 
Assaye (1813).87 Nonetheless, the successful diffusion of a new weapon does seem to 
be correlated with the extent of perceived benefits (or the military costs of non-
adoption), as well as the amount of resources made available for implementation of the 
adoption process, both of which are dependent to some extent on prevailing perceived 
threat levels. One must not forget, however, that, as described above, cultural or 
ideological incompatibilities, bureaucratic inertia or inter-organizational ‘turf  battles’ 
can vitiate the adoption process irrespective of the relative advantage of the weapon.  
 
Moreover, the adoption of a novel weapon may not only require structural and doctrinal 
adjustments by the adopter in order to function properly, but the weapon can itself 
undergo substantial changes as it in a sense adapts to and is adapted by a new 
organizational environment, often by means of extensive improvisation. Thus, all 
weapons innovations are in some ways unique, since they emerge into a specific social 
moment and evolve in a specific adoption context.  
 
One further note – although adoption of new weapons sometimes requires the adoption 
of entirely new systems or platforms (such as the advent of combat aircraft) or complete 
displacement of existing weapons (the socket bayonet replacing the pike), the adoption 
process need not be wholesale. Old and new forms can coexist, as seen most 
spectacularly in the oar-and-sail and sail-and-steam warship hybrids in the naval sphere. 
 
In terms of the speed with which the adoption of a new weapon takes place, this is 
obviously dependent to a large extent on the nature and complexity of the weapon and 
the technical and operational status of the adopter. Nonetheless, the speed of adoption 
also seems proportionate to the perceived advantages of the new weapon (or 
disadvantages from not possessing it), and the resources devoted to the adoption 
process, both of which can be affected by the level of threat perceived by the adopting 
                                                          
87 Vide, Arthur Wellesley to Henry Wellesley, October 3, 1802, in John Gurwood (ed.) The Dispatches of 
Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, 
Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818, Vols. I-II (London: John Murray, 1834). 
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entity. The Manhattan Project is the archetypical example of resource dedication 
resulting in rapid advances and adoption in a relatively short time span, whereas the 
Israelis, who operate in a high-threat environment, have on occasion developed 
weapons systems (including ship-to-ship missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles) more 
quickly than much larger and more powerful nations.88 Moreover, the adoption of 
military innovations is argued to be facilitated by cultural or other affinities between the 
military or political leadership in the innovating and potential adopter states, and 
hampered by dissimilarities.89 
 
One feature that can impact both the success and speed of weapons adoption is 
conscious action by the current holders of the weapon to prevent its spread. Such efforts 
can be as simple as keeping the technology a closely-guarded secret (as in the case of 
the Byzantines and Greek fire) or as extensive as collaborative agreements across states 
to deny the requisite knowledge and materials to produce the new weapon or weapons 
system. In any event, whether it is attempts to keep firearms out of the hands of 
‘natives’ or the creation of global non-proliferation regimes to stop the spread of WMD, 
these efforts seem to be common wherever the current possessors of a new weapons 
system believe it feasible to preserve their advantages over enemies or potential 
enemies. 
 
Theories and the Historical Record 
 
It remains to revisit the various theories introduced above, in light of the historical 
survey. To address the most structural, deterministic theory first, it is immediately 
evident that there is much in the historical record to recommend the neorealist approach. 
Time and again, the rulers of kingdoms and states sought to adopt any weapon that 
threatened to give an opponent or potential opponent a significant military advantage, 
and thereby to redress any perceived deviations from the pre-existing balance of 
power.90 As predicted by the theory, history bears witness to several arms races wherein 
powers of similar strength vie to stay ahead of one another in the quantity, but also type, 
                                                          
88 Hoyt, pp.183-188. 
89 Eliason and Goldman, pp. 15-16. 
90 Appendix A offers several relevant cases, two of the most unequivocal being the scramble to adopt 
bronze artillery in fifteenth century Europe and the widespread adoption of breechloading rifles in the 
nineteenth century following the Prussian example. 
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of weapons, seminal examples being late nineteenth century warship construction and 
the nuclear competition of the Cold War. The ubiquity of certain basic weapons and the 
overall similarity in armaments among powers of similar strength lend further support to 
the theory. 
 
However, the record also contains much that is problematic for the neorealist theory of 
weapons adoption as part of a broader dynamic of inter-state competition, at least in that 
theory’s most basic, unmodified form. The simple fact that history is replete with 
examples of political entities who chose not to adopt the latest innovations in weaponry 
despite their military benefit should lead to some pause, because in order for the theory 
to remain consistent, the leaders of each of these entities must have either lacked the 
capacity for adoption or the basic reasoning faculties to understand that adoption is a 
strategic necessity. Neither of these alternatives explains, for instance, the tacit 
agreement between mounted horsemen of the South Asian kingdoms to make cavalry 
the centrepiece of battle91 or the ritualization of combat among ‘primitive’ warriors, 
such as those of the Yanomamö, Maring and Aztec.92 Even were we to take the position 
that these examples fall outside of the sort of ‘civilized’ warfare among modern nation-
states to which the theory was designed to apply, there are many recent examples of 
states rejecting those weapons systems that would have been most strategically 
beneficial because of internal rivalries or domestic interests.  
 
The theory also predicts rapid adoption of strategically beneficial weapons innovations 
to regain parity of arms with competitors, but in many cases internal resistance slowed 
the adoption process, which became drawn out over decades or centuries. The existence 
of other means whereby nations can pursue security besides parity in the type of 
weapons they can field, such as bandwagoning or developing economic and other 
interdependencies, raises further questions for the theory, as do the numerous examples 
where those who were not leading-edge adopters (such as the Mongols) nonetheless 
managed to exert power in the international system for extended periods. Neorealist 
theories of weapons adoption also experience some difficulty when faced with military 
decisions to devote substantial resources towards strategically marginal weapons for 
purposes of prestige (such as the Soviet interwar pursuit of an aircraft carrier), although 
                                                          
91 G. J. Bryant, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India’, Journal of 
Military History, 68:2 (April, 2004), p. 469. 
92 Keegan, pp. 95-114. 
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in this case the adoption can also be explained in terms of signalling behaviour. 
Explanation becomes harder when key decision makers push for adopting a new 
weapon primarily because they possess a fascination with the weapon concerned. 
Lastly, naked neorealism posits that weapons innovations will flow from the major to 
the peripheral powers in the international system, but the reverse has also sometimes 
been seen. For example, in the case of guided weapons, innovations developed by the 
Israelis spread to the United States and even the first Congreve rockets had their origins 
in India. 
 
Therefore, while the neorealist argument lays down the basic logic of weapons 
innovation and diffusion, and thus describes the ‘background driving force’ operative in 
the international system that stimulates the adoption of new weapons, the basic 
approach needs to be supplemented with several other factors that can facilitate, retard 
or otherwise influence adoption decisions. As discussed above, there is ample evidence 
to support those theoretical approaches that emphasize consideration of the distinctive 
cultural and institutional make-up of the adopting entity, including the fertile or hostile 
reaction to the new weapon based on its compatibility with the dominant culture, the 
effect of internal rivalries and the need to overcome a bureaucratic inertia that tends to 
be especially pronounced and widespread in the military domain. The inclusion of these 
latter factors into the basic theory will no doubt lead to an adoption decision model with 
far greater explanatory power over a broader set of actors and time periods. 
 
Applicability to the Terrorist Context 
 
Before appropriating the conclusions derived above for the current investigation, some 
consideration should be given to their likely applicability to terrorist behaviour, 
especially since much of the historiography of weapons innovation and diffusion centres 
on the behaviour of states or similar large political collectivities. Certain findings relate 
to the nature of the weapons themselves, such as the relevance of a cumulative set of 
incremental improvements or the mechanisms for becoming aware of innovations, and 
can thus be expected to apply to a wide range of adopters, including non-state actors 
such as terrorists. Other findings, particularly those dealing with decision-making and 
organizational structure, may have to be modified for the terrorism context, or perhaps 
discarded entirely. In order to guide in the construction of a reliable model of terrorist 
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adoption of new weapon technologies, the following highlights those aspects of the 
above discussion that might differ when applied to the terrorist context. 
 
First and most obviously, terrorists often experience constraints – such as the need to 
remain hidden and a constant fear of arrest, or worse – that most militaries do not face, 
at least not during times of peace. Terrorist weapons are therefore usually limited in 
physical dimensions to those that are relatively small, light and easily concealable.93 
Second, terrorists cannot compete with states in any literal sense, since they almost 
always lack the material resources, territory and legal recognition within the 
international system enjoyed by even the weakest of states. Terrorist groups therefore 
can almost never act to ‘balance power’ against states as neorealist theory maintains and 
probably will not be driven to adopt new weapons because of a fear that the state will 
get them first. The basic neorealist argument is thus unlikely to be the primary driver in 
terrorist decisions about which weapons to adopt. Other factors must therefore be 
looked to besides neorealist power balancing, yet terrorist organizations do on occasion 
compete against each other and against other types of protest groups for the support of a 
variety of constituencies.94 Thus, the dynamic of adopting a novel weapon as a means of 
offsetting an advantage of a rival might apply in some instances. Here, though, the 
advantage would be the amount of support the organization receives rather than a 
military advantage. 
  
Also, while the efficacy of new weapons systems adopted by states is evaluated mainly 
by battlefield performance, terrorists mostly have a more complex set of criteria for 
success. As asymmetric opponents who seek to influence a spectrum of audiences 
beyond the immediate victims of their violence, terrorists are likely to place greater 
emphasis than would be common in the state context on the psychological effects of a 
new weapon and its potential as a force multiplier in its evaluation of a prospective 
weapon.95 
 
In terms of the actors themselves, terrorist groups are at their core organizations, albeit 
                                                          
93 Van Creveld, p. 306. 
94 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); 
John Sawyer, Competition in the Market for Political Violence: Northern Irish Republicanism, 1969-1998 
(PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2010).  
95 For a discussion of terrorism as a means of psychological combat, see, inter alia, Daniel Gressang IV, 
‘Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential’, Terrorism and Political Violence 13:3 
(Fall 2001), pp. 88-89; Drake, pp. 42, 181; Hoffman (1997), pp. 2, 8. 
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sometimes loosely structured ones, and therefore are susceptible to many of the same 
dynamics that affect all organizations, including internal rivalries and some degree of 
institutional inertia. However, most terrorist organizations display less 
bureaucratization, smaller hierarchies, and greater decentralization than modern military 
organizations.96 They also often consist of charismatic leaders who dominate at least the 
strategic aspects of decision-making together with fanatically devoted followers rather 
than an impartial, ‘professional’ standing force.97 For all these reasons, in the weapons 
adoption process terrorists may more closely resemble armed forces from earlier times 
than those of today and special attention should be paid to premodern experiences in 
seeking lessons, particularly those related to the organizational aspects of weapons 
adoption. 
 
Unlike most militaries, terrorists do not distinguish between the front and the rear in 
terms of operations, nor do they usually think in terms of individual battles. Instead, all 
aspects of the enemy society often become targets in a long, epic struggle. 
Paradoxically, this long-term outlook, tactical flexibility and extended planning horizon 
mean that some terrorist groups might engage in protracted weapons development 
activities that closely parallel the R&D activities of the largest states, which in turn may 
hold clues as to how terrorists might behave during long-term weapons development or 
adoption.  
 
By considering the theories and history of weapons development and adoption, this 
chapter has helped to limn the range of possible precipitants and outcomes, suggest 
regularities in the adoption process, provide a comparative backdrop for current 
developments, and in so doing equip us with a foundation upon which to construct a 
theory of terrorist weapons adoption. The analysis of the historical record has revealed 
some of the basic elements of decision-making and implementation surrounding the 
adoption of innovations in weaponry. It has also highlighted some of the peculiarities 
that attend the diffusion of weapons in particular and has provided a set of broad 
                                                          
96 For example, of a sample of 58 terrorist organizations active in 2011, 34% consisted of horizontal 
networks, whereas 43% were structured as vertical hierarchies, which is clearly far less than for organized 
militaries. See Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson, Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN and Non-State 
Actors Database – Organizational Coding (College Park, Maryland: National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012). 
97 In many ways terrorists are imbued with what can be termed a ‘warrior spirit’ thriving on conflict, 
which Thomas Hammes distinguishes from the modern soldier (Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the 
Stone (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006), p. 41). 
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parameters that constrain, regulate and drive weapons adoption. The next step in 
formulating a model of terrorist weapons adoption is to build on these historical insights 
by investigating the decision-making from the innovator’s point of view, and that of 




Chapter 3: Terrorists and Innovation1 
 
The previous chapter focused on the history of weapons and how instruments of war 
have been adopted over the millennia. This chapter now turns to an exploration of the 
other side of the coin – terrorist organizations themselves and how they innovate in 
general. As discussed in the introductory chapter, until recently there has been relatively 
meagre scholarly study of how innovation and learning occur in terrorist organizations. 
Outside the rather narrow corridors of terrorism studies, however, there is an immense 
corpus of prior work on innovation in other domains, not only in the military context, 
but more generally in disciplines as diverse as business management, public policy and 
sociology. This vast literature incorporates a treasure trove of insights relating to 
innovation in a variety of human activities, but has remained largely untapped by 
terrorism researchers; to all appearances there has been only a single attempt by a 
scholar of terrorism – and a partial one at that – to systematically draw on innovation 
research in the broader social and behavioural sciences.2 This is somewhat odd, 
considering that, at their most basic, terrorists are human beings and terrorist groups are 
social organizations, so there is a prima facie case to be made that this wider body of 
literature is relevant to the terrorist context. 
 
This chapter will therefore proceed with the ‘inside out’ approach of the study by 
highlighting the prominent findings on terrorist innovation, while supplementing them 
with findings and theories drawn from organizational innovation and learning in the 
general innovation literature. Of course, there is no expectation that theories or results 
found outside of the terrorism domain will address all aspects of interest to this study, 
but they may very well provide signposts for where the answers to the study’s questions 
might lie. Furthermore, just as in the previous chapter, one must be cautious in applying 
analogical insights from outside the terrorism context because of the differences 
between terrorist actors and other types of entities. 
                                                          
1 Earlier versions and elements of this chapter have been utilized in Gary Ackerman, ‘Understanding 
Terrorist Innovation Through the Broader Innovation Context’, in Rasmussen and Hafez (eds.); Gary 
Ackerman, ‘The Theoretical Underpinnings of Terrorist Innovation Decisions’, Conference Paper 
Prepared for the Swedish National Defence Centre Seminar on Terrorist Innovation and Learning, 
Stockholm, Sweden (26 June 2012); and Gary Ackerman and John Sawyer, Embracing Technologies of 
Lethality. 
2 The only attempt to explicitly relate broader insights of innovation to the terrorism realm of which the 
author is aware has been that of Brian Jackson and even then his discussion was limited to the domains of 




The structure of the chapter will broadly parallel that of the previous chapter by 
following the major stages of the adoption process, i.e., awareness of innovation, the 
adoption decision and the determinants of success, as well as addressing similar 
subtopics where these are applicable to a focus on actors as opposed to instruments. The 
chapter will end with an analogue of the final section of the previous chapter, only 
instead of dealing with the applicability of general weapons adoption factors to 
terrorism, it will discuss terrorist innovation as this applies to weapons in particular. 
 
Awareness of Innovation Possibilities 
 
Characterization of Terrorist Innovation 
 
Adoption of an innovation can only proceed if a terrorist organization becomes aware of 
an alternative to those tactics currently being used or those weapons presently in its 
arsenal. Recognition that another option is available is an inherently subjective 
determination, implying that what might be regarded as a potential weapons innovation 
by one terrorist actor might not be by another organization or individual decision-
maker.3 Moreover, it also means that this stage of the adoption process can be affected 
by cognitive and other individual and group biases, including confirmatory bias, where 
actors might ‘filter out’ ideas that are not concordant with their values, heuristics or 
existing routines.4 An important note in this regard is that because most technological 
innovations in particular are in essence recombinant (i.e., made up of novel 
combinations of prior technologies5), a terrorist organization need not possess a genius 
inventor in order to adopt a new weapon or tactic, but can engage in this sort of 
innovation so long as it is able to survey existing methods and materials and conceive of 
novel ways of combining them to suit organizational or personal goals. 
 
Mechanisms of Awareness 
                                                          
3 Everett Rogers, one of the seminal scholars of innovation diffusion, defined an innovation in these terms 
as ‘an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or another unit of adoption’ 
(Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003)). He reiterates this by 
stating explicitly that ‘if an idea seems new to the individual, it is an innovation’ (p. 12). 
4 Rogers (2003), p. 171. 





The first mechanism by which terrorists might become aware of candidate innovations 
for adoption is through a self-initiated search after a realization by terrorist leaders that 
there is an operational or strategic need that is unmet by existing capabilities (active 
searching). There are many cases of terrorists proactively seeking out new weapons or 
tactics, from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) deciding that it required its 
own mortars, to Prabhakaran’s desire to equip the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) with a seaborne 
attack capability through his ‘Sea Tigers’ fleet of self-constructed fast attack boats.  
 
The prospects for a self-initiated search for new means and methods of attack will 
undoubtedly be coloured by existing organizational or ideological predispositions 
towards or against innovation in general. The anarchists and early socialists, for instance, 
clearly believed that it was necessary to stay abreast of the latest scientific and technical 
developments in the hope of acquiring new weapons technologies, as seen in the 
declaration by a speaker at the Fifth Conference of Social Revolutionaries in 1909 that 
‘Terror will be terror in the true sense of the word only if it represents the revolutionary 
implementation of the most advanced technical sciences at any given moment’.6 
 
The second avenue by which knowledge of new operational procedures or technologies 
might reach a terrorist organization or individual is through demonstration of their 
usefulness or potential usefulness in the external environment (demonstration). This can 
obviously occur when other terrorist groups successfully employ a new weapon or 
tactic. One particularly salient example of innovation awareness by demonstration is the 
spread of suicide terrorism from Hezbollah in Lebanon to groups as far removed as the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. It might also occur when a capability is used by non-terrorist 
actors such as states, or conceivably when a new technology with weapons potential 
appears in commercial markets.7  
 
The third major mode by which a terrorist organization might become aware of a new 
weapon or tactic is through the conscious efforts of external actors seeking to encourage 
the adoption of a particular modus operandi, weapon or weapons system 
                                                          
6 David Ronfeldt and William Sater, The Mindsets of High-Technology Terrorists: Future Implications 
from an Historical Analog (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1981), p. 1. 
7 For a comprehensive introduction to the early work on terrorist contagion effects, see Yonah Alexander 
and John M. Gleason (eds.), Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1981). 
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(proselytization).8 The general innovation literature emphasizes that social bias can also 
come into play here, where a previous adopter of an innovation, having already 
expended resources on adopting it, will be more likely to extol its virtues than to 
highlight its deficiencies.9,10  
 
The channels through which terrorist groups gain awareness and knowledge of 
innovations depend to some extent on the mechanism by which the awareness is gained, 
but can include a variety of means. These range from direct observation of a 
collaborator’s use of a weapon or tactic, through written descriptions in electronic or 
printed manuals, and even to broadcast media, such as when new weapons are discussed 
in the press or on television, or other terrorist groups produce YouTube videos of their 
latest operations. The general innovation literature, based largely on observations of 
commercial enterprises, suggests that mass-media communications channels are more 
effective at creating awareness of an innovation, while interpersonal ties are better 
avenues for actually persuading an entity to adopt an innovation.11 Although the Internet 
and other modern communications technologies enable even isolated terrorist groups to 
have access to copious amounts of information,12 the ubiquity of communications media 
does not guarantee awareness or interest in any particular capability. For example, 
Stenersen notes that CBRN weapons receive very little attention among al-Qaeda’s 
online followers and even those knowledge objects (including manuals and discussion 
threads) that are available indicate a lack of knowledge of these weapons among 
jihadists.13 At the same time, there has been little research even in the general 
innovation diffusion literature on certain key aspects of information flows in this 
context, such as whether it is more important for a potential adopter to observe first-
hand an innovation in operation, versus hearing about it second-hand through a variety 
                                                          
8 For more on the role of external facilitators, see the discussion of change agents and opinion leaders 
below.  
9 David Strang and Michael W. Macy, ‘In Search of Excellence: Fads, Success Stories, and Adaptive 
Emulation’, American Journal of Sociology, 107 (2001), p. 155. 
10 There is a fourth mechanism of awareness, which, although exceedingly rare, has, as we will see below, 
been observed within terrorist organizations, namely the possibility that tinkerers within a terrorist 
organization might stumble upon a new weapon without a conscious intention to do so. This is likely to 
be more common among lone actors than formal organizations. 
11 David Strang and Sarah Soule, ‘Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn 
to Poison Pills’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998), pp. 270-272; Mark S. Granovetter, ‘The Strength 
of Weak Ties’, American Journal of Sociology, 78:6 (May 1973), p. 1360; Andrew Hargadon, How 
Breakthroughs Happen: The Surprising Truth about How Companies Innovate (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Publishing Corporation, 2003), p. 59. 
12 Dolnik, p. 167. 
13 Stenersen, p. 51.  
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of media.  
 
Several factors might act to facilitate or retard the possibility of a terrorist organization 
becoming aware of a novel capability. In the general literature on the spread of 
innovations, it has been found that networks of actors facilitate the diffusion of 
knowledge about an innovation to others within their network.14 There is no reason to 
conclude that a similar dynamic does not operate within networks of terrorist groups, 
especially when one considers the relative alacrity with which new techniques for 
constructing IEDs spread from jihadist insurgents in Iraq to those in Afghanistan in the 
past decade. This is related to the idea that knowledge tends to spread more easily 
across organizations sharing similar cultures and objectives.15 Conversely, divergent 
cultures and aims can, in general, impede the transfer of knowledge, but do not 
necessarily do so.16 Infrastructural and political barriers in the broader society within 
which an organization is located can also hamper information flows.17 Crucially, 
knowledge of a new weapon or tactic can be expected to be easier to come by for a 
terrorist group that generally functions as what James Forest and others characterize 
overall as a ‘learning [terrorist] organization’, i.e., one that appears to possess the 
‘ability to identify knowledge useful to its long-term success and incorporate that 
knowledge into the operations and future plans of the organization’.18 
 
Information about a new weapon or tactic is, however, regarded as being of little value 
to a terrorist group without the subsequent step of interpreting this information.19 
Interpretation assigns meaning to the raw information about the new weapon or tactic, 
and is described by Jackson, et. al. as consisting of making judgments about the value of 
the terrorist group’s current activities, its possible future activities and the continued 
                                                          
14 Walter W. Powell, ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’, in Barry M. Staw 
and L.L. Cummings (eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 
1990), pp. 295-336; Hargadon, p. 60; and Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for 
Creating and Profiting from Technology (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2003). 
15 Georges Romme and Ron Dillen, ‘Mapping the Landscaping of Organizational Learning’, European 
Management Journal, 15:1 (1997), pp. 68-78, cited in Brian A. Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction 
Vol. 1. 
16 Barbara Levitt and James G. March, ‘Organizational Learning’, Annual Review of Sociology 14 (1988), 
pp. 319-340. 
17 Committee on Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies, Persistent Forecasting of Disruptive 
Technologies (Washington, D. C.: National Research Council, 2009). 
18 James J. F.  Forest, ‘Introduction’, in Forest (2006), p. 18. 
19 Horacio Trujillo and Brian A. Jackson, ‘Organizational Learning and Terrorist Groups’, in Forest 
(2006), p. 57.  
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relevance of older knowledge and practices.20 Important factors affecting a terrorist 
group’s ability to effectively interpret new information include an existing knowledge 
base to make sense of the information; sufficient time and opportunity to properly 
consider the information; the breadth of distribution of information within the 
organization; the extent to which members share common frames of reference; and the 
depth and feedback speed of the channels through which the information is transmitted 
to and within the group.21  
 
Factors Influencing Adoption Decisions 
 
The Organizational Decision-Making Context 
 
Assuming that the terrorist group is aware of an innovation opportunity and has the 
minimal organizational capacity for tactical or strategic decision-making, it faces the 
choice of whether or not to attempt to pursue the innovation.22 Although it might very 
well be that ‘technological gimmicks have long fired terrorist imaginations’,23 it is also 
evident – as discussed in the opening chapter – that terrorists rarely, if ever, innovate 
solely for the sake of innovating.24 This implies that the adoption of new weapons or 
tactics is the result of a decision (though not necessarily a completely rational one) that 
devoting the time and effort to incorporate a new technology or practice that may or 
may not bear fruit is preferable to expending those same resources on maintaining or 
expanding existing capabilities.25 The motivational factors that occasionally coalesce to 
overcome the inertia against terrorist adoption of new technologies of lethality therefore 
require exposition, as do the erstwhile adopters’ strategic and operational conceptions of 
new weapons or tactics.26 
                                                          
20 Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction Vol. 1, pp. 12-13. 
21 Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction Vol. 1, pp. 12-13; Trujillo and Jackson, p. 57. 
22 This is not always a binary choice between adoption and rejection. Cragin, et al. (p. 14) point out that 
the choice can often be whether to adopt now or postpone adoption (i.e. defer) to a later date. More 
strictly speaking, then, a binary version of the choice facing terrorists is whether or not to pursue adoption 
at the current strategic juncture. 
23 Stephen Maurer, ‘Introduction: Worrying about WMD Terrorism’, in Maurer, p. 7. 
24 Jackson (2001), p. 189. 
25 Cf. Waller and George’s discussion regarding uncertainties and opportunity costs with respect to 
familiar versus exotic weaponry (Waller and George, passim). 
26 One of the only extant lists of factors influencing the decision to adopt new weapons or tactics can be 
found in Cragin, et. al., p. 15, but the provided factors, while consistent with those presented below, are 





Although the extant terrorism studies literature does not explicitly address who makes 
innovation decisions, it can be expected that the ultimate arbiter of the decision whether 
or not to innovate will be dependent almost entirely upon the overall command 
structures within the organization, which vary greatly both across and within the 
different forms of terrorist organization. These can range from highly decentralized 
networks where the commander of each subgroup retains the authority to make tactical 
decisions (including those related to innovation) and only relies on the larger network 
for strategic or ideological guidance, to very hierarchical organizations, where decisions 
are held tightly in the hands of a single charismatic leader. In both types of 
organizational structure, as well as the numerous hybrid terrorist group structures that 
have emerged, such decisions can also be devolved to operational commanders or 
technical specialists, either generally or under a specified set of circumstances. This 
becomes more likely in larger, more complex organizations.27 
 
Thus, it is almost impossible to specify in the abstract, without identifying a particular 
terrorist organization, exactly who will be imbued with decision-making authority over 
innovations. For example, just as has occurred in many other innovation contexts, an 
internally initiated search for a new competency might originate either from lower 
organizational levels, as field or cell commanders recognize an operational deficit, or as 
the result of a top-down, semi- or fully-institutionalized process whereby leaders 
explicitly set up an infrastructure to develop new capabilities or issue a command to 
pursue a specific innovation. While it is rare for all decision-making authority in any 
organization to reside in a single individual without other parties exercising at least 
some influence, an especially important feature is likely to be whether any actors in the 
organization possess negative decision-making authority, i.e., are able to veto 
innovation decisions, which can constrain the alternatives that are considered and shape 
the agenda.28 This suggests, as we will see below, that while there may be wide variety 
in who makes innovation decisions across terrorist organizations, the nature of the 
decision-maker unquestionably exerts a great deal of influence on the outcome of the 
decision. 
                                                          
27 John Sawyer, ‘Decision Makers and the Structure of the Decision Process’ in Ackerman and Sawyer, p. 
11. 
28 See George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University 






At least at an operational level, terrorists are widely regarded as employing some sort of 
decision calculus, albeit on occasion one appearing to bear little resemblance to formal 
decision-theoretic analysis.29 This leads to contemplation of the familiar rational choice 
paradigm, which pervades much of the literature on innovation more generally. From a 
broad perspective, this approach implies that terrorist groups operating with absolute 
pragmatism will innovate when they are dissatisfied with their status quo capabilities in 
terms of achieving their operational and strategic objectives. Terrorist innovation 
decisions can thus be expected to reflect the same pattern of problem solving observed 
with respect to states and other political collectives, as well as the notion of 
performance gaps as a major driver of technological innovation more broadly.30 Since 
most terrorist groups will seek to redress a perceived performance gap as efficiently as 
possible (in other words, maximize the ‘bang for their buck’), under this basic 
proposition the decision to adopt new attack technologies or tactics can be expected to 
take on many of the standard rational choice characteristics, including the weighing of 
costs and benefits. The pure interpretation of this approach in the general diffusion 
literature maintains that the innovation that is perceived to supply the greatest benefit 
for the least cost will be adopted.31  
 
Yet, the basic notion of efficiently addressing perceived performance gaps tells us little 
about how or from where such performance gaps (or the perceptions thereof) might 
arise. For this, it is necessary to examine those factors, both within and without the 
terrorist organization, that might lead terrorists either towards or away from the 
realization that innovation is necessary. At the outset, it should be recognized that 
terrorist organizations (and indeed organizations in general) rarely if ever operate with 
an ideal form of ‘absolute pragmatism’ – the impetus to adopt innovations is ultimately 
                                                          
29 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice’, in 
Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind 
(Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p. 481. 
30 The performance gap can be defined as the perceived divergence between a given actor’s expectations 
and its current level of performance (Rogers (2003), p. 422 and Eric Abrahamson, ‘Managerial Fads and 
Fashions: The Diffusion and Rejection of Innovations’, The Academy of Management Review, 16:3 
(1991), p. 592).  




subjective and can emerge wherever a need is perceived,32 which immediately 
highlights the potential role played by cognitive and affect-based biases and other 
framing effects.33 For example, in the general context of technical innovation, 
MacKenzie stresses that the inherent uncertainties attached to an adoption decision lead 
actors to rely on heuristics and ‘satisficing’ in choosing whether and how to innovate, 
which can introduce a range of non-rationalistic (from the point of view of formal 
decision theory) influences on the adoption decision, such as culture, personality, social 
relations, and national circumstances.34 
   
Organizational Incentives for Adoption 
 
Several of the reasons a terrorist group may seek to adopt a new technology or practice 
can be viewed as focused on the organization itself and its direct interaction with 
internal or external entities.35 The first such incentive is the desire to overcome 
countermeasures. Both state adversaries and civilian populations targeted by terrorists 
attempt to adapt their defences in order to reduce the occurrence and severity of terrorist 
attacks, both in terms of physical damage and coercive impact. This ensures that a 
terrorist group’s activities take place in a dynamic, antagonistic operational context akin 
to a strategic game. As a consequence, terrorist groups may pursue new weapons or 
tactics in order to thwart defensive countermeasures.36 As Hoffman argues, terrorists’ 
‘fundamental organizational imperative to act’ forces them to respond to this behaviour 
by outside actors.37 This results in a manifestation of the previously described ‘offence-
defence’ co-evolutionary dynamic, which has occasionally led to a form of  ‘arms race’ 
between terrorists and governments,38 in what Hoffman elsewhere describes as a 
‘technology treadmill’.39 
                                                          
32 This can occur even when such a need is self-created, such as when it is based on a delusional goal. 
Conversely, a genuine need that goes unrecognized by decision-makers may not prompt a consideration 
of weapons adoption, at least not for some time. 
33 Marisa Reddy Pynchon and Randy Borum, ‘Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence: 
Contributions from Social Psychology’, Behavioral Sciences and the Law 17 (1999), p. 345. 
34 MacKenzie, pp. 51-53. I discuss several of these ‘non-rational’ factors below. 
35 Indeed, Jackson and Frelinger contend that, ‘The specific characteristics of a group and its environment 
can significantly influence how it makes decisions regarding technologies’ (Jackson and Frelinger, p.4). 
36 Jenkins (1986), pp. 777-778; Kenney (2008), p. 162. 
37 Hoffman (1997), p. 15. 
38 Examples abound, including the technical ‘arms race’ in explosive triggers between the PIRA and 
British government forces (Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction Vol. 2, p. 99), the similar dynamic 
with respect to IEDs in the Iraqi insurgency (Forest, ‘Introduction’, pp. 21-22) and perhaps even the 
adoption by al-Qa’ida of box cutters on 11 September 2001 as a means of circumventing the introduction, 
since 1973, of metal detectors into American airports. 




A second incentive involves desensitization and other escalatory pressures. As 
asymmetric purveyors of a technique of violent manipulation, terrorists as defined 
usually concern themselves with the publicity they receive from their attacks.40 If the 
public or the media that disseminate information on terrorist activities become 
desensitized to the terrorists’ violent actions, then from the terrorists’ point of view, 
there is a danger of being marginalized. It is widely argued that an increasingly noisy 
global media environment, in which a given type of terrorist attack can become almost 
routine, creates pressure for terrorists to expand their operational objectives in what 
Schmid and de Graff refer to as a ‘built-in escalation imperative’.41 Utilizing a novel 
weapon or tactic (especially a particularly sophisticated or frightening one) may be one 
manifestation of such an escalation. 
  
A third set of incentives can arise from inter- or intra-organizational competition. In 
circumstances where multiple political organizations (both violent and non-violent) 
acting against a common antagonist are vying for sympathy, support, and recruits, 
terrorists might pursue new weapons or tactics in an effort to distinguish themselves 
from potential or actual competitor groups.42 As technological proficiency is celebrated 
to a large extent in modern globalized cultures, a terrorist organization may believe that 
adopting advanced weapons or tactics before others do so will enhance, or at least 
preserve, its status relative to competitors.43 Similarly, if a competitor has already 
adopted a novel, high-profile weapon or tactic, even a well-resourced terrorist 
organization with strong support might feel compelled to follow suit for fear of losing 
its current standing in the dissident milieu.44  
 
At the same time, internal rivalries or factionalization within a terrorist group might 
induce either incumbent leaders or challengers to push for adopting new weapons or 
tactics as a means of bolstering their own positions within the organization by appearing 
                                                          
40 Gressang, pp. 88-89.  
41 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western 
News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 172. 
42 Dolnik, pp. 173-179; Bloom, pp. 162-163; Sawyer (2010), passim. 
43 Cragin et al., p. 45. 
44 Bale hypothesizes that ‘top-rung terrorist groups (such as al Qa’ida) have to keep pushing the envelope 
in terms of attacks to stay relevant and “on top”’, which might not apply to less influential or more 
localized terrorists (Jeffrey Bale, ‘Conceptual Background and Literature Extracts’ in Gary Ackerman, et. 




to be forward-thinking and daring. More generally, elements of an organization can 
influence the adoption of an innovation when internal rivalries between organizational 
factions or individuals within organizations push for or against the adoption of 
innovations irrespective of their actual relative advantage to the adopting organization. 
The possible reasons for opposing or embracing an innovation might thus include 
strengthening the faction’s power base, mounting a challenge to another faction, gaining 
favour with the leadership, or any of a variety of other internal power plays. 
 
It should be noted that the presence of any of the above three types of incentives does 
not necessarily drive a terrorist group to adopt radically new weapons or attack tactics. 
Countermeasures can be circumvented by target shifting or other minor tactical 
adjustments like increasing the number of attackers, while pressures stemming from 
competition or a perceived lack of publicity can result in alternative terrorist responses 
to gain attention, such as taking and brutally killing hostages. More generally, attack 
escalation does not guarantee new weapons or tactics adoption, or even innovation of 
any type by terrorists.45 At the same time, even other avenues of attack expansion (such 
as drastically increasing the body count or attacking a prominent but well-defended 
target) might in turn necessitate the adoption of new weapons or tactics, thus providing 
an indirect instrumental motivation for turning to new technologies of lethality. 
 
Furthermore, some violent non-state actors may be relatively unconcerned with political 
considerations, such as maintaining the support of terrestrial constituencies, and are 
instead oriented purely towards murder and mayhem as ends in and of themselves; yet, 
their decisions might still be rational within their frame of reference.46 For such 
(relatively rare) nihilists, adoption decisions might be as simple as the most destructive 
means and methods that they can utilize within their resource constraints and perceived 
window for action.  
 
Yet, the behaviour of both these actors and terrorists proper can also be affected by a 
variety of cognitive, emotional, cultural and other ‘expressive’ factors47 that operate 
                                                          
45 See Palfy, p.91 for similar notions. 
46 Gressang, p. 96.  
47 One example of an expressive motivational factor is personal glorification, as described by Borowitz 
(Albert Borowitz, Terrorism for Self-Glorification: The Herostratos Syndrome (Kent, OH: Kent State 
University, 2005)). For other examples, including historical prejudice, limbic conditioning processes, and 
in-group maladaptations, see Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘The Making of the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist’ in 
Forest (2006), p. 250. 
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either consciously or unconsciously, and are often responsible for different tactical 
decisions of terrorist organizations within the same ideological milieu.48 An important 
way in which such factors can impact tactical selection and adoption is through a non-
strategic affinity for particular tactics or technologies, or for the process of innovation 
more broadly. Such predilection is often manifested in a desire to be on the ‘cutting 
edge’.49 This can be rooted in the organization’s ideological doctrines,50 but can also 
emerge from the idiosyncrasies of its leaders or key operational decision-makers, 
whether these reflect personal delusions or ego-driven desires to be regarded as a 
terrorist ‘mastermind’.  
 
There are several prominent examples of this dynamic. Besides the aforementioned 
Shoko Asahara’s fascination with exotic weapons, another example is the almost 
metaphysical regard displayed by late nineteenth century radicals towards dynamite as a 
‘scientific’ force for change.51 Furthermore, Ahmad Jibril, the founder of the PFLP-GC, 
regarded himself as something of an inventor and wanted his organization to be the 
technical vanguard among terrorists,52 while two decades later Ramzi Yousef similarly 
sought personal prestige in his creativity with explosives. 
 
Environmental Incentives for Adoption 
 
Although most motivational factors represent to some degree a confluence of forces 
both internal and external to the organization, certain changes that occur mainly in the 
terrorist organization’s broader external environment (rather than acting directly on the 
organization) can fundamentally alter the decision calculus and precipitate or obstruct 
the desire to adopt an innovation.  
  
The first of these involves changes that decrease the costs of adopting an innovation. 
Whereas previously the costs may have outweighed the benefits, a decrease in costs can 
                                                          
48 Bale, p.29. 
49 Dolnik found this factor to be relevant in each of the four case studies of innovation he conducted, 
declaring it to be ‘the strongest and most universal pre-indicator of the propensity of a terrorist group to 
innovate’ (Dolnik, pp. 156, 158, and 175). 
50 This is based on the notion that ‘[i]deology provides a motive – and possibly a formula – for action’ 
(Drake, p. 16). 
51 Ronfeldt and Sater, pp. 2, 11. 




rebalance a terrorist group’s strategic calculations in favour of adoption. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, a central focus of this study involves one avenue by which costs might 
decrease, namely that technological advances in the broader society can make the 
acquisition of a particular lethal capability easier or cheaper to acquire, thus 
encouraging the adoption of a new weapon or tactic. Several examples of how costs 
might be lowered by emerging technologies were provided in the introduction, but an 
obvious historical case in the context of terrorism is the Irish Fenians’ enthusiastic 
embrace of dynamite, which allowed them to create extensive damage with safer, more 
concealable and more portable packages, as compared with large barrels of gunpowder. 
They apparently regarded the invention of dynamite as a ‘gift of science’.53 This 
incentive falls under the more general phenomenon, described in Chapter 2, of invention 
acting as ‘the mother of necessity’. 
 
An important corollary to this concerns technologies or techniques that exhibit 
economies of scale. As the level of adoption increases, especially in the broader 
commercial sector, the acquisition costs to the terrorist group of such products or 
processes might fall.54 Here, again, it is more the commercialization and mass 
production of new technologies, rather than functional characteristics of the 
technologies themselves, that lead to lower costs. 
 
In addition to an actual change in the technological landscape, serendipity can play a 
role – the opportunistic or accidental acquisition of specialized skills or weapons 
materials can reconfigure the cost-benefit equation and prompt a terrorist group to 
seriously consider adopting a particular weapon or technique for the first time.55 
 
The second environmental factor that might affect terrorist adoption decisions is 
security pressures, although the literature is split on how this factor might operate. On 
the one hand, scholars assert that periods of increased action and success by security 
forces can stimulate innovation on the part of terrorist groups as they struggle 
desperately to survive in a pressure cooker of counterterrorist activity.56 On the other 
                                                          
53 Ronfeldt and Sater, p.14 ftn. 23. Also, Wilkinson, p. 2. 
54 Sawyer (2012), p. 18. 
55 Nancy Hayden, ‘Terrifying Landscapes: Understanding Motivations of Non-State Actors to Acquire 
and/or Use Weapons of Mass Destruction’ in Ranstorp and Normark, p. 167.  
56 Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction Vol. 1, p. 15. 
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hand, there are indications that when experienced57 terrorist organizations feel secure, 
with a safe haven58 and/or a surfeit of resources,59 they can investigate and possibly 
adopt new weapons or tactics as a strategic hedge against a future time when 
circumstances change, and their existing arsenal, despite being currently effective, 
becomes unable to fulfil their operational objectives.60 The latitude to undertake this 
kind of exploratory weapons development is akin to successful companies engaging in 
speculative R&D in order to diversify and strengthen their portfolio in the long term. 
After conducting several case studies, Cragin, et. al. found some empirical support for 
both of these viewpoints.61 
 
A third environmental incentive to adopt is one that has been much studied in the 
broader innovation diffusion literature, namely emulation of other actors. The 
uncertainty associated with attempting to adopt a new weapon or tactic can be reduced 
considerably if a terrorist learns that the weapon, tactic and related technologies have 
been developed or adopted and successfully and reliably used by another actor, even if 
it is another type of actor.62 This might in turn lead to a cascade of adoptions among 
terrorist organizations and imitative diffusion thus forms an integral part of the terrorist 
innovation story. Salient concepts related to this dynamic include homophily, change 
agents and the notion of innovation momentum. 
 
It has been argued that the more actors in a social system are alike (a property known as 
homophily), either structurally or culturally, the more likely adoption of an innovation 
becomes.63 This tendency might arise as a result of increased trust – brought about by a 
common language, set of norms, and so forth – either in the initial user’s experience or 
in its adequacy to serve as a model. However, homophily is by no means a necessary 
condition – cases of weapons or tactical emulation have occurred across quite disparate 
                                                          
57 Jackson and Frelinger, p. 25. 
58 Jackson, et. al., Aptitude for Destruction Vol. 1, p. 43. 
59 For example, the availability of copious financial resources has been identified as a major determinant 
in the FARC’s ability to experiment with the development of complex weapons systems such as long-
range mortars and anti-aircraft rockets (Forest, pp. 15-18). 
60 Jackson and Frelinger (pp. 27-28) discuss technology strategies, with groups being faced with the 
decision to invest in a variety of technologies in order to take advantage of attack opportunities that 
present themselves, versus maintaining a narrow arsenal. They posit that groups that do not pursue a 
variety of weapons will seek a smaller number of versatile weapons that are ‘good enough’ to exploit 
most opportunities. 
61 Cragin, et. al., p. 98. 
62 This is related to the concepts of fads and fashions that have been articulated in the business literature 
(see Abrahamson, passim). 
63 Strang and Meyer, p. 490. 
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terrorist organizations and even across ideological milieus, such as the discovery that 
some of the (often imperfect) recipes for extracting ricin found in al-Qa`ida manuals 
appear to be word-for-word translations of instructions published in underground right-
wing literature in the United States.64 
 
In almost all social domains, outside actors often attempt to influence, if not indeed 
drive, the adoption process, and terrorist adoptions are likely no different. Opinion 
leaders are members of the system itself who are able – generally by a combination of 
reputation and demonstration – to influence other members towards or away from 
adopting an innovation. Opinion leaders are often situated at the hub of a social network 
and there is some indication that larger, more successful and better resourced 
organizations are more likely to serve as models and thus have greater success as 
opinion leaders, should they so desire.65 At lower organizational levels, ‘invisible 
colleges’ can form among technical experts across different groups,66 which in the 
terrorism context might serve as conduits for raising awareness and encouraging 
adoption of new technologies and techniques of lethality between terrorist ‘colleagues’ 
in different organizations. Indeed, networks have been shown to have a significant and 
large impact on terrorist organizations’ decisions as to whether to pursue CBRN 
weapons.67 
 
Change agents are actors from outside a defined social domain who seek to encourage 
diffusion of innovations. As noted in the previous chapter, at the level of states, civilian 
producers of weapons have been known to fairly frequently ‘push’ new weapons 
systems onto military organizations. Analogues in the terrorism domain might include 
arms dealers, other transnational criminal organizations, or state sponsors that 
encourage the adoption of certain weapons or tactics for their own pecuniary or political 
purposes. It should be noted that change agents and opinion leaders can encourage 
adoption not only by demonstrating or declaring a weapon or technique’s usefulness, 
                                                          
64 See Chapter 1, ftn. 35.    
65 See John Hagel, John Brown and Lang Davison, ‘Shaping Strategy in a World of Constant Disruption’, 
Harvard Business Review, 85:10 (October 2008), p. 88. Assuming that this observation remains relevant 
in the terrorist context, it is little surprise then that the attack methods and weapons of groups like 
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but also its legitimacy – ideologically or morally – in the armed struggle. 
  
General diffusion research has repeatedly shown that spatial proximity between two 
actors enhances interaction and mutual influence.68 One such study cited by Strang and 
Soule mapped radical ideology in Chile as spreading from mining communities to 
nearby agricultural communities,69 while Jared Diamond stresses geographical 
proximity as a major factor in disseminating agricultural and other innovations, which 
according to this argument tended to spread more quickly across the East-West axis 
than the North-South axis (where climate and natural barriers hampered interaction).70 
This may also hold for terrorist groups or cells that operate in close spatial proximity to 
one another. 
 
An important issue to consider in connection with emulating other actors is the 
momentum of innovation and the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy arising. 
General theorists of technology have described how diffusion often experiences 
increasing returns to scale,71 which can encourage feedback loops of more and more 
adoption (whether self-initiated or through the efforts of change agents and opinion 
leaders). Even when this is not the case, if one or more actors adopt a new technology or 
tactic for purely idiosyncratic reasons, other potential adopters might misperceive this 
adoption decision and believe that adoption by others signifies that the technology or 
tactic is advantageous. If they in turn adopt the technology or tactic, this might spur 
more bandwagon-style adoptions, possibly leading to a non-linear adoption cascade 
reminiscent of the apocryphal onlookers of the Emperor who has no clothes. In this 
way, even a weapon, tactic or other technology that is sub-optimal with respect to 
almost all other features might serendipitously become ‘locked’ into widespread usage 
by terrorists. As Donald MacKenzie has observed, ‘Technologies … may be best 
because they have triumphed, rather than triumphing because they are best’.72  
 
This is linked to possibly the most ubiquitous and robust finding in all of innovation 
                                                          
68 Strang and Soule, p. 275; L. A. Brown, Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective (New York: Methuen, 
1981). 
69 J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, ‘Miners and Agrarian Radicalism’, American Sociological Review, 32 (1967), 
p. 578. 
70 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Co., 1999). 
71 Arthur, p. 2. 
72 MacKenzie, p. 7. 
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studies, namely, that in the vast majority of cases the cumulative number of adopters of 
an innovation when plotted over time yields an ‘S’-shaped curve, with a slow initial 
adoption rate, followed by a rapid take-off in adoptions and, finally, a slowdown as late 
adopters gradually take up the innovation.73 This finding reflects the pattern of 
innovation diffusion in a surprisingly wide variety of contexts, irrespective of the nature 
of the innovation or the identity of the individual adopters.74 While it has never been 
tested in the terrorism context, there is thus every reason to expect it to apply to terrorist 
adoption as well. What the S-curve demonstrates is that the number of prior adopters 
can have a large impact on the pace and number of future adopters, something that has 
already been mentioned. In particular, it shows that innovations can have extended 
periods of latency followed by a rapid acceleration in adoptions.75 Indeed, Rogers 
argues that the portion of the diffusion curve representing points between 10 and 20 
percent adoption is crucial in that after this point ‘it is often impossible to stop the 
further diffusion of a new idea’.76 Thus, even when conducting analysis from the 
viewpoint of a single terrorist organization’s adoption decision or efforts, it is important 
to note where in the adoption macro-cycle the innovation is. In other words, one must 
pay close attention to such factors as the maturity and commercialization of the 
innovation, as well as the number of prior adopters. As David Landes has observed, 
‘Each innovation seems to have a life span of its own, comprising periods of tentative 
youth, vigorous maturity, and declining old age’.77 
 
A parting remark is merited in regards to emulation as a driver of innovation. In the 
general innovation literature, there is the hypothesis that the early stages of diffusion 
(i.e. with few prior adopters) predominantly reflect rational cost-benefit adoption 
decisions, while such decisions in later stages are determined more by faddish imitative 
                                                          
73 Rogers (2003), pp. 272-274; Bryce Ryan, ‘A Study in Technological Diffusion’, Rural Sociology, 13 
(1948); Robert Hamblin, R. Jacobson and J. Miller, A Mathematical Theory of Social Change (New York, 
NY: Wiley, 1973); Vijay Majahan and Robert A. Peterson, Models for Innovation Diffusion (Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1985), p.8. 
74 This has led to the development of a range of mathematical models (Majahan and Peterson, passim) 
designed to predict the future diffusion course and potential of an innovation in a given system (usually 
long-term sales of consumer goods in a given market), the more sophisticated of which include 
components representing external influences like change agents (Thomas W. Valente, ‘Diffusion of 
Innovation and Policy Decision-Making’, Journal of Communication, 43:1 (March 1993), p.30) as well as 
the number of prior adopters in the system.  Yet, such models are often limited by stringent sets of 
assumptions and their ability to describe only the overall rate of adoption (Strang and Macy, ‘In Search of 
Excellence’, p.148). 
75 Strang and Soule, p.278. 
76 Rogers (2003), p. 274. 
77 David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3. 
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dynamics, even when this represents adoption of inefficient innovations.78 In situations 
where adoption decisions are driven by their own momentum, DiMaggio and Powell 
believe that the primary element of the decision becomes which actor to emulate rather 
than which innovation to adopt. 79 
 
A fourth adoption factor that exists apart from the terrorist organization relates to the 
nature of the innovation itself. The physical, logistical, and other characteristics of the 
weapon or tactic under consideration can be expected to influence the probability of 
adoption by terrorists, based on several findings from the broader innovation diffusion 
literature. It has been argued that, all else being equal, innovations perceived to have 
greater trialability and observability, as well as less complexity than others are more 
likely to be adopted.80 There are several additional attributes specific to weapons that 
are discussed in a separate section below.  
 
Adoption Decision Modifiers 
 
In many cases, actors (including terrorists) will reject innovations in spite of clear 
strategic, tactical, political, ideological or psychological benefits and low apparent costs, 
or conversely, attempt to adopt innovations despite seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles.81 This implies that other factors condition the decision to adopt innovations, 
factors that scholars have identified as being rooted in the inherently social and 
psychological nature of the adoption process. Although not acting as drivers of adoption 
themselves, there may thus be several features that can retard, facilitate or otherwise 
shape the decision to adopt a new weapon or tactic, on occasion even overriding the 
core rational cost-benefit calculus of weapons adoption described above. 
 
At the outset, terrorist organizations must invariably contend with the conservative 
                                                          
78 Abrahamson, pp. 605-606. 
79 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, 48 (1983), pp. 147-160. 
80 Trialability represents the degree to which the innovation can be experimented with on a trial basis. 
Observability is the ease with which the results of the innovation and its prior adoption are observable to 
others (Rogers (2003), pp. 15-17).  
81 Illustrative examples of these in the case of terrorism can be found in the case studies in the following 
sections. The archetypal and perhaps most widely-cited case in the general innovation adoption literature 
is the diffusion of the prophylaxis for scurvy, which even after James Lind, a British naval officer wrote a 
treatise in which he identified the importance of citrus fruit, was not implemented by the Royal Navy for 
several decades (James Lind, A Treatise on the Scurvy (London: A. Millar, 1753)). 
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operational tendencies – detailed in the introductory chapter – that combine to produce 
an organizational inertia that usually takes the form of a reticence to adopt new 
weapons or tactics. This stands as an a priori impediment to innovation that must be 
overcome and can be especially prevalent among self-appointed guardians of the status 
quo whose status within the organization might diminish if extant practices are 
displaced by novel means of combat.82 
  
Then there is the most obvious delimiter of an adoption decision, i.e., that the adopter 
must perceive the technology to be within its technical abilities and resources, or at least 
within its expected capacity to acquire these.83 Terrorist weapons and tactics adoption 
are no exception, and are thus constrained by issues of practical feasibility. The FARC, 
for example, was thus able to innovate when it came to mortars and rockets, since it 
could easily afford to pay the IRA for instructional assistance. 84 In addition, economists 
have argued that the innovation must, in most cases, also be economically feasible, that 
is, at least as efficient as existing ways of operating.85  
 
However, the wider diffusion literature suggests that even prima facie technical, 
financial and economic feasibility may be insufficient because the potential adopter can 
shy away from secondary obstacles and costs beyond the innovation itself, such as when 
an adoption requires an expensive restructuring of an entire organization and its 
institutional practices.86 Moreover, in the case of terrorist innovation, initial empirical 
results seem to suggest that while a minimum level of resources (and presumably 
technical skills) are necessary, the possession of copious resources by no means 
guarantees that adoption will be pursued.87  
  
In addition to practical feasibility, there is the issue of ideological and cultural 
                                                          
82 While the existing terrorism literature does not specifically describe instances of this internal 
opposition to new technologies occurring within terrorist groups, the phenomenon is extensively detailed 
in the general technology adoption literature and, as will be shown in the case study of the PIRA, has 
been observed in terrorist groups as well.  
83 Clayton M. Christensen, Erik A.  Roth and Scott D. Anthony, Seeing What’s Next (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2004), p. 21. For the particular difficulties presented by CBRN weapons in a 
terrorism context, see Bale and Ackerman, ‘Profiling the WMD Terrorism Threat’, passim. 
84 Román D. Ortiz, ‘Renew to Last: Innovation and Strategy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of. 
Colombia (FARC)’, in Forest (2006), p. 215. 
85 Mokyr (1990), pp. 291-292.  
86 Arthur, 139. 
87 Dolnik, based on his case studies, concludes that the relationship between resources and terrorist 
innovation is relevant but is not necessarily unconditional (p. 164). 
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compatibility. As noted above, an ideological attachment to certain weapons or tactics, 
or a culture that embraces innovation can prod decision-makers in the direction of 
adopting a new weapon or tactic, but the converse is also true.88 At the very least, for 
adoption to be pursued the use of the new weapon or tactic must not be anathema to 
deeply held cultural values or the worldview of the terrorist.89 As was often the case 
with respect to the historic weapons adoption described in the previous chapter, in 
certain cases it may not be the weapon or tactic itself, but the ideas, practices and 
structural changes its adoption might engender, that are resisted by the group’s 
ideologues. Similar arguments apply with respect to attitudes towards innovation in 
general.90  So, while an ideology or an organizational or national culture that embraces 
innovation can facilitate a positive adoption decision, ultra-conservative belief systems 
that decry innovation of any kind are far less likely to approve of adopting a new, 
untried weapons system or attack technique. However, while ideology has been 
characterized in the literature as an important determinant of terrorists’ decision-making 
in general, and of their adoption of weapons or tactics in particular, it is not always 
paramount in adoption decisions and can be overridden by other concerns91 or even 
adapted to permit the adoption.92  
 
Several scholars have asserted that the most likely terrorist organizations to innovate are 
those that have a high tolerance for risk, i.e. are willing to tolerate some degree of 
operational failure.93 This reflects the broader understanding that any innovation 
requires deviating from the status quo to embrace an uncertain alternative, and will thus 
be facilitated by a higher risk threshold within the organization or the broader culture in 
which the organization is situated.94 The amount of risk a group is willing to tolerate is, 
however, dynamic and can alter according to changes in the circumstances or 
                                                          
88 Hoffman (1997), pp. 171-172.  
89 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), p. 249. In certain cases, it can therefore even be advantageous for a terrorist 
group to have an ill-defined or amorphous ideology. Ortiz, for example, identifies the FARC’s capacity 
for operational innovation with the organization’s ideological flexibility (Ortiz, p. 209).  
90 Mokyr (2002), p. 241.  
91 Cragin et al., pp. xv, 44. 
92 The decision by the traditionally paternalistic Islamist terrorists to allow female suicide bombers is one 
example of how practical exigencies can lead to a rethinking of long-held beliefs. Jenkins (Jenkins 
(2008), p. 29) depicts a contemporary ‘democratization of extremism’ where it is possible to ‘in a sense 
shop for belief systems’, which suggests that even an ideological proscription against a particular weapon 
might not be absolute if certain adherents desire the weapon badly enough. 
93 Jackson (2001), p. 203; Trujillo and Jackson, p. 61; Dolnik, p. 167. 





This brings the discussion to the impact of organizational structure on adoption 
decisions. The structure of a terrorist organization – whether a cohesive, hierarchical 
organization like Hizb’allah or a more diffuse network like the broader al-Qa’ida 
movement – often has a large impact on its behaviour, so it might be expected that this 
extends to the decision about whether or not to adopt an innovation. First, having a 
centralized leadership within a strict hierarchy means that, providing the leadership is 
aware of an innovation and amenable to it, naysayers in the remaining parts of the 
organization can be overruled; in many cases a leader can act with single purpose to 
drive the organizational adoption of a new weapon or tactic.  Terrorist leaders from 
Shoko Asahara of Aum Shinrikyo to Hassan Nasrallah of Hizb’allah have taken their 
organizations along in adopting non-traditional weapons and tactics. Perhaps this is why 
Dolnik opines that ‘...radical innovation is virtually always a product of a top-down 
approach’.96  Moreover, terrorist outfits modelled hierarchically after military 
organizations often tend to specialize functionally, in other words ‘bureaucratize’, 
making it more likely that a specific organ will emerge that focuses on research and 
development, thus generating a constituency for innovation. 
 
At the same time, these very dynamics can present a double-edged sword for 
innovation. For if a leader or bureaucratic constituency in a rigid organizational 
structure is risk averse or wedded to the status quo, there is little scope for innovation to 
develop organically. In hierarchical terrorist organizations, therefore, the decision to 
innovate is very much dependent on the attitudes towards innovation espoused by 
leaders or other key gatekeepers of the hierarchy, either in general or with respect to a 
specific weapon or tactic. 
 
Decentralized terrorist networks, while often smaller and less well-resourced at the 
operational level than their hierarchical cousins, do possess some strengths when it 
comes to recognizing and pursuing innovations. Decentralized networks are generally 
more likely to have the freedom to experiment – for every cell with a leader who 
                                                          
95 Indeed, Trujillo and Jackson maintain that ‘Risk tolerance is a function of the group’s ideology and the 
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disdains innovation, there may be another with a leader who embraces it. Those 
innovations that prove successful can then percolate to other elements of the network, 
especially given the Internet and other modern communications tools that allow 
disparate groups to maintain contact and share tactics. This allows for a more organic 
approach to innovation with little risk to the resources or the prospects of the overall 
network. 
 
More amorphous terrorists do face several important constraints on their ability to 
embrace new weapons and tactics, however. One important weakness of decentralized 
organizations is that disparate members who interact sporadically and remotely may 
find it difficult ‘to engage in a deliberative concerted decision-making process’,97 and 
thus may not be collectively cognizant of the costs or benefits of an innovation for the 
organization as a whole. While modern communications technologies might make 
decentralized awareness and decision-making feasible, they do not necessarily make it 
as seamless as operations under spatial proximity, which ensure direct interaction and 
influence between actors.   
 
Therefore, each type of terrorist organizational structure affords both advantages and 
disadvantages for a positive decision to innovate and much depends on the specific 
attributes of the terrorist network or hierarchy.   
 
Last, it is possible for innovation (and hence new weapons or tactics adoption) to occur 
without any discernible motivating factors. One might find this occurring in overly 
bureaucratic organizations where innovation has become so institutionalized or routine, 
that it occurs without a conscious decision. While probably rare among terrorist 
organizations in practice, it is not unheard of. Jackson, et. al., for example, note that in 
some cases the IRA altered the construction of explosive devices with no clear reason or 
obvious improvement in performance.98  
 
Factors Influencing Adoption Success 
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Following the decision by a terrorist group to pursue the adoption of a new weapon or 
tactic, in many respects the most consequential question then becomes whether or not it 
will succeed in doing so. As with the adoption decision, a basic logic predominates, one 
that is associated with any acquisition endeavour. It goes almost without saying, 
therefore, that the sine qua non for an adoption attempt to succeed is that the underlying 
principle, practice or technology must be practically feasible within the abilities and 
resources of the erstwhile adopter and that the would-be innovator is capable – within 
an appropriate period of time – of marshalling these abilities and resources towards the 
goal of adoption.  
 
Yet, also as with the adoption decision process, these basic requirements for the success 
of innovation adoptions – and even more specifically terrorist adoptions of new 
weapons or tactics – are shaped by a host of contingent organizational and 
environmental factors that ultimately facilitate or retard any adoption efforts. The 
following are the main influences on the outcome of adoption attempts highlighted by 
the literature, together with how these might manifest in the terrorism context. 
 
The first major determinant of adoption success is appropriately transferring knowledge 
about how to produce and use an innovation. There is at least some possibility of 
compensating for shortfalls in most other aspects of adoption – for example an 
organization may be able to work around resource deficits through improvisation or 
theft – but it is far more difficult to successfully adopt an innovation without the proper 
transfer of knowledge about the innovation to the adopting organization. This topic has 
been discussed at length elsewhere,99 but its centrality warrants a description of its most 
important features.  
 
The core concept in innovation knowledge transfer is that of differential knowledge 
requirements, to which a suitable introduction can be made by a discussion of tacit 
versus explicit knowledge. The basic notion is that in any transfer of knowledge about a 
practice or technology, there are at least some elements that cannot be captured in 
                                                          
99 Kenney (2008), passim, esp. p. 4; Michael Kenney, ‘ “Dumb” Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and Poor 
Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:10 (2010); 
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easily-transmissible media, such as manuals, textbooks or Internet sites.100  Such tacit 
knowledge elements, usually related to the ‘how-to’ skills associated with an 
innovation, often need to be transferred from person to person in a hands-on manner 
usually akin to some form of apprenticeship – they are essentially recreated each time 
they are transferred.101 Moreover, unlike explicit knowledge that can be preserved in 
books and on Internet forums, tacit knowledge can much more easily be lost,102 which 
might pose particular problems for terrorists who are at risk of losing the human 
repositories of its tacit knowledge (for example, bomb-makers) to arrest, accident or 
assassination. Several scholars appear to argue strongly that successful innovation 
requires proficiency in or transfer of both tacit and explicit elements. In the particular 
context of the transfer of new weapons and tactics to and across terrorist organizations, 
Jackson contends that the requirement to transfer tacit knowledge, which is generally 
less accessible, can complicate or derail successful adoption. These considerations, he 
suggests, are present even in the case of ‘off-the-shelf’ weapons, which usually still 
require tacit expertise to utilize effectively.103  
 
Michael Kenney has refined this notion further by distinguishing between techne and 
mētis. Techne relates to abstract, universally-applicable technical knowledge that 
underpins specific applications, whereas mētis represents to a large extent the 
instantiation of techne in a particular real-world context. In addition, mētis embodies the 
‘practical skills and acquired intelligence’ that results from partaking in the activity 
itself104 and is also associated with a form of ‘cunning’, the ability to improvise and 
develop workarounds when confronted with unforeseen, practical obstacles. So, while 
techne, for instance, might take the form of a bomb-making recipe, mētis would then be 
the practical know-how possessed by a competent bomb-maker that allows him to 
transform the recipe into a working device, including the local awareness to figure out 
which of the materials that he has access to can substitute in the recipe for those he does 
not, as well as the ability to acquire and work with these materials without being 
                                                          
100 Cowan and Foray argue that tacit knowledge is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, explicit 
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discovered by authorities.105 
 
Whereas explicit and tacit knowledge relate primarily to the tangibility and codifiability 
of the knowledge in question, techne and mētis focus more on the universality versus 
the contextual particularity of that knowledge.106 Sawyer supports Kenney’s formulation 
and argues that, in the terrorism context at least, assessing knowledge transfer from the 
perspective of techne and mētis may be more germane because terrorists often need to 
transfer knowledge and skills, not only across geographic regions, but also between 
functional disciplines. In these circumstances, the practical application of technical 
knowledge in a particular context is paramount, especially when an organization is 
operating in a hostile counterterrorism environment.107 
 
There are, indeed, several examples of terrorists attempting to adopt new weapons or 
tactics where the lack of the requisite techne and mētis has been responsible for the 
failure of these efforts. From the often disastrously mistargeted bombs used by the 
anarchist acolytes of Luigi Galleani in their campaign between 1914 and 1920108 to 
Aum Shinrikyo’s failure to develop or disseminate pathogenic strains of biological 
agents despite copious resources and technical skills,109 even when terrorists possess the 
technical background, their lack of mētis can stifle success. This is not to say that techne 
and mētis can be transferred only in person. British neo-Nazi David Copeland, for 
instance, successfully detonated three nail bombs in 1999 and reportedly was self-taught 
using instructions found on the Internet.110 
 
The prospects for knowledge transfer to occur are tied up in an organization’s capacity 
to interpret, incorporate and institutionalize new information from outside the 
organization, which is asserted to become easier the greater the similarity between the 
                                                          
105 Michael Kenney, personal correspondence (11 March 2013). 
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new knowledge and that already possessed by the organization.111 Institutionalization of 
knowledge is important if this knowledge is to be characterized as robust and not 
dependent on a single individual or handful of individuals. Otherwise, these individuals 
become key nodes and the continued adoptive capacity of the organization is susceptible 
to removal of these nodes, a constant danger in the terrorists’ world.112 The degree of 
institutionalization of knowledge is presumably correlated to some degree with the 
depth of the talent pool with sufficient techne and mētis for a particular tactic or 
weapon, and the deeper the pool, the more robust a terrorist organization is likely to be 
in the face of numerous external threats. 
 
A second key component of the adoption outcome, one that is both obvious and crucial, 
is the nature of the technology or practice under consideration,113 since this determines 
the threshold that the adopter’s resources and abilities must meet. In almost all cases, 
the more complex114 and resource-intensive the technology or practice is to acquire or 
produce, the more difficult it becomes for the group to achieve adoption success. This 
has several corollaries. First, it can be expected that, all else being equal, technologies 
and practices with lower acquisition costs and with lower knowledge requirements (in 
terms of the techne and mētis required to produce and use them) will have a greater 
chance of being adopted successfully. Second, technologies and practices that are 
mature (late in their life-cycle) will likely be easier to adopt, since much of the trial and 
error inherent in the adoption process will have already been completed by prior 
adopters and thus more is likely to be known about the technologies themselves and the 
most effective ways to acquire or produce them. Similarly, a mature technology is more 
likely to spur the creation of supply markets, at least for its component parts. Terrorists 
are also likely to benefit in terms of adoption success from technologies that are 
commercially available (even if not intended to be used for violent purposes), which 
makes both the underlying knowledge base and the physical components of the 
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114 Rogers (2003), p. 15. 
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technology more easily accessible. 
 
Of particular relevance in this regard is the long-held recognition that innovation in a 
particular area of activity is often inextricably connected to (and sometimes dependent 
on) parallel technological or behavioural developments in related or constituent 
domains.115 A recent case in point is the observation that tremendous leaps in computing 
power have enabled the practical, low-cost sequencing and manipulation of genomes, 
thus opening synthetic biology up to rapid commercialization.  
 
Several of the attributes of the technology itself that can affect the adoption decision 
might have an even greater effect on the outcome of the process. In particular, Rogers 
argues that the greater the trialability of an innovation, its compatibility with the 
adopting entity and its observability, the more rapidly it is likely to be adopted.116 The 
rate of adoption is also assumed to be at least partly a function of the success of prior 
attempts at adoption.  
 
The third, and perhaps most obvious, major factor contributing to the success (or 
failure) of an adoption attempt is the level of organizational resources. In a small 
minority of cases, the adoption of a new weapon or tactic by a terrorist organization will 
require no additional physical resources over the status quo practice, such as when a 
group is bequeathed a new weapon by a patron or a tactical innovation involves 
decidedly inexpensive hardware (for example, the use of box cutters to commandeer an 
aircraft).117 However, in the vast majority of instances, the adoption of an innovation 
will require the devotion of significant amounts of organizational resources for tasks 
such as transferring or developing the relevant techne and mētis, acquiring raw materials 
and equipment used to produce the innovation, integrating the innovation into existing 
operational schemas, maintaining security, and so forth.  
 
Possessing a variety of resources in substantial amounts not only makes it more likely 
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that the basic feasibility criterion will be met, but it can also facilitate innovation by 
allowing, for example, numerous people with different expertise to work on the 
innovation (thus bolstering network effects) or for extensive experimentation with 
different methods and materials, not to mention the ability to ‘buy [one’s] way out of 
technical difficulties’.118 Significantly, ample resource reserves allow organizations the 
latitude to devote significant resources to the adoption process without short-changing 
other vital organizational functions. All else being equal, therefore, one can expect more 
successful innovation the more resources are expended in this direction. For example, 
Aum Shinrikyo’s assets of between $20 million and $1 billion119 enabled it to pursue 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs simultaneously, and to purchase its 
way around at least some technical obstacles.120 However, the Aum case also shows that 
even tremendous financial resources cannot always compensate for other organizational 
deficiencies, in that case the lack of suitably skilled and motivated personnel to work on 
their biological weapons efforts. 
 
One factor that is argued to have some impact at the awareness and decision stages of 
the innovation adoption process, but whose effect is especially pronounced at the 
implementation stage, is organizational structure. The literature, however, is not 
consistent as to the effect of different structural attributes on the adoption outcome. 
Trujillo and Jackson cite research which suggests that ‘more hierarchical organizations 
frequently learn less effectively, due in part to the loss of information as it is transmitted 
through and screened by the different organizational levels’.121 At the same time, 
Jackson elsewhere maintains that a cellular group structure makes robust technology 
transfer by the entire network ‘essentially impossible’,122 leaving the situation far from 
clear as to what type of terrorist organizational structure is advantageous for the 
successful adoption of innovation.123 
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One area where there is some degree of consensus is that larger organizations generally 
embrace innovations more rapidly.124  However, whether group size is significant in its 
own right, or as a proxy for a host of other variables like the availability of personnel, 
sufficient resources or an existing knowledge base,125 is still an open question. After all, 
being a large group is hardly necessary and even relatively small terrorist groups like 
Action Directe have succeeded in innovating tactically.126 
 
Complicating purely structural characteristics is the effect of intra-organizational 
authority relationships, which can serve as both impediments to and facilitators of 
successful adoption. The ability of functionaries in an organization to influence 
leadership decisions whether to proceed with adopting an innovation or not has already 
been introduced during discussions of the adoption decision. Yet, after a decision has 
been made to proceed, such personnel can still subvert or expedite implementation. 
While there is little direct engagement with this issue in the terrorism literature, the 
wider diffusion literature maintains that even in those situations where internal 
constituencies lack the power to actively resist implementing an adoption, adoption 
efforts may be slowed down by an ingrained organizational routine originally developed 
to ensure continuity and stability.127 Conversely, the influence of internal supporters can 
have a strong impact on the success of an innovation. In many cases, innovation is 
facilitated by the presence of internal organizational champions and a strong, supportive 
coalition in favour of either innovation in general or the particular innovation under 
consideration.128 
 
Thus, although the balance of the existing argument appears tilted somewhat towards 
more centralized (although not necessarily hierarchical) organizations as being 
generally more successful in implementing adoption efforts, overall adoption outcomes 
are likely to be highly contingent on more specific contextual attributes. For example, a 
strong leader in a more centralized organization may be better able to focus the 
organization’s attention and marshal its resources towards an adoption effort, but it is 
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also at the implementation stage that subordinates who could not countermand the 
leader’s positive adoption decision may have the greatest opportunity to frustrate their 
superior’s designs. The presence or absence of such contingent factors as internal 
roadblocks may therefore have more of an effect on adoption success than broad 
structural characterizations. 
 
Furthermore, among the many other strategies adopted by organizations and individuals 
to overcome structural and other organizational innovation barriers is the creation of a 
specialized bureaucratic organ specifically tasked with research and development. The 
institutionalization of such organizational entities is argued to facilitate successful 
adoption, made even more effective when these take the form of separate, semi-
independent ‘skunkworks’ specifically designed to avoid bureaucratic inertia and vested 
interests.129 Albeit rarely, these functional organs have appeared within terrorist groups, 
including Hizb’allah and the LTTE. Another purposive organizational change that can 
facilitate innovation is the use of specialized brokers to bridge various domains and seek 
out and nurture new technologies and practices.130 
 
Moving away from factors unique to the terrorist organization, a variety of 
environmental factors is believed to affect adoption outcomes. Arguably the most 
valuable source of assistance in adopting new technologies or practices for a terrorist 
comes from state patrons. Although state sponsorship might be accompanied by a host 
of externalities, from a loss of autonomy to the unwanted attention of the state’s 
enemies, there is little doubt that states can provide an invaluable boost to terrorist 
capabilities. From the direct provision of intact weapons systems that a terrorist 
organization could not hope to fashion on its own (for example, Iran’s provision of 
Zelzal 2 missiles to Hizb’allah131) to assistance with logistics in the carrying out of 
attacks (again, Iranian assistance to Hizb’allah in the 1990s bombings in Argentina is a 
good example), the well-developed military and espionage apparatus of a state can 
significantly increase the chances of successful innovation adoption. Then there is the 
more indirect, yet often just as beneficial supply of financial resources or training, 
                                                          
129 Rogers (2003), p.149. 
130 Hargadon, p.26. 
131 Bilal Saab, Levantine Reset: A New U.S. Strategy for Lebanon (Washington, DC: Saban Center for 
Midlle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, April 2010) and Anthony Cordesman, Preliminary 
“Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2006), p. 17. 
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which, as discussed, are themselves major determinants of innovation success.132 There 
are also those cases where a state does not actively support a terrorist organization, but 
merely passively allows the terrorists to operate in its territory unmolested, thus creating 
‘breathing room’ where an organization can focus on adoption without the distractions 
of avoiding counterterrorist forces. It should be noted, however, that even in the most 
extreme cases of support, such as where a state sponsor bestows upon a terrorist 
organization an entire weapons system, adoption success is neither automatic nor 
guaranteed, since the terrorist organization still has to integrate the weapon into its 
operational and strategic processes, including command and control, training regimens, 
operational security and so forth. 
 
Other actors in a terrorist group’s environment can also aid successful adoption, which 
brings the discussion to the topic of networks of violent and criminal non-state 
actors.133 Several researchers decry the ‘myth of the lone genius’134 and claim that, in 
general, communities of practice and social networks facilitate innovation.135 A 
diversity of expertise and bringing in new blood periodically from across one’s 
connections has also been favourably described as helping to catalyse innovation. 
Cragin et. al. have described several cases where technology exchange occurred 
successfully across terrorist networks and between separate organizations, including 
Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah providing the capability to field advanced IEDs to various 
Filipino militants, as well as the transfer of Katyusha rockets and suicide bombing 
techniques from Hizb’allah to Palestinian militants in Gaza and the West Bank.136 Other 
violent or criminal groups such as illicit trafficking networks could play a similar role in 
different geographical contexts. 
 
Not all networks will facilitate adoption, however. There are often a host of 
disincentives in place to confound the development of collaborative networks, 
                                                          
132 For several early examples of state sponsors assisting terrorist groups with new weapons and 
techniques, see G. Davidson Smith, ‘Sources of Terrorist Weaponry and Major Methods of Obtaining 
Weapons and Techniques’ in Wilkinson (ed.), pp. 125-126. 
133 This is distinct from, but overlaps, the previous discussion relating to change agents and opinion 
leaders. 
134 Hargadon, p.93. 
135 Hargadon, pp. ix, 60; Chesbrough, p. x; and Arthur, p.108. 
136 Cragin, et. al., pp. xiv, 48, 63. 
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especially across disciplines137 and within hierarchies,138 which could stymie or delay 
successful innovation. Moreover, organizational research suggests that merely having 
multiple interactions among organizations is not sufficient to ensure success, especially 
if the necessary forms of knowledge are not transferred properly.139  
 
The important influence that the external environment can have on the success of 
terrorist innovation adoption can clearly be seen in the case of the FARC’s innovations 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. To begin with, Colombia’s industrialization made it easier 
for the FARC to acquire technically proficient personnel and raw materials. The 
organization’s forays into illicit narcotics trafficking served to expand its clandestine 
networks and stock its coffers with large amounts of cash.140 Perhaps most importantly, 
the FARC’s association with the Provisional Irish Republican Army – as illustrated by 
the notorious case of the ‘Colombia Three’ – resulted in the direct transfer to the FARC 
of sophisticated Irish Republican Army operational capabilities, such as homemade 
mortars and remote detonation and launch capabilities.141 Indeed, Ortiz declares that 
‘the success of insurgents upon introducing changes in their political and military 
conduct depended on their innovative skills for taking advantage of the ideas and 
resources offered by the strategic environment to develop solutions for the challenges 
faced by them.’142 
 
Finally, an important component in a successful adoption outcome is often learning and 
the will to succeed. Adoption is rarely a one-shot event – initial failure can be followed 
up by subsequent success, especially if an organization applies a trial and error approach 
to adopting an innovation. Since an observed failure to adopt a new weapon or tactic 
may therefore merely signal an intermediate stage in a terrorist group’s successful 
adoption rather than an outright inability to adopt, Jackson, et. al. justly appear to 
caution against inferring too much from apparently botched tests or operations.143 There 
                                                          
137 Ronald Kostoff, ‘Simulating Discovery’ in Klaus P. Jantke and Ayumi Shinohara (eds.), Discovery 
Science: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference, Washington, D.C., November 2001 
(Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2001), pp. 196-197. 
138 MacKenzie, p.13. 
139 See, for example, the discussion in Rui Baptista, ‘The Diffusion of Process Innovations: A Selective 
Review’, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 6:1 (1999), pp. 107–129. Cited in Cragin, 
et. al., p. 14. 
140 Ortiz, pp. 219-221. 
141 For more on the effects of the PIRA training and technology transfer, see Cragin, et. al., pp. 72, 82, 85. 
142 Ortiz, p. 219. 
143 Jackson, et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 1, pp. 63-67. 
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are many examples of terrorists becoming markedly more proficient in their operations 
over time, either unilaterally or in response to countermeasures, including Iraqi 
insurgents’ incremental improvements in the efficiency of disseminating chlorine from 
2006 to 2007,144 and Hizb’allah’s increasingly sophisticated remotely-detonated 
roadside bombs in the 1990s, which presaged a similar escalation against U.S. forces in 
Iraq ten years later.145  
 
Of course, the organization must have sufficient space, time and resources to engage in 
an iterated adoption process, factors that have already been alluded to above. However, 
there are two major facilitators of a sustained process of step-wise improvements until 
adoption success is reached. The first is the ability of the organization to learn from its 
failures and correct past mistakes in subsequent iterations. This is not always easy, as it 
requires the organizational capacity to recognize what went wrong, to internalize this 
information in some form of institutional memory and then to reorient organizational 
functions and operations to make an adjustment in the direction of eliminating the 
shortcoming. Those terrorist organizations which embody these qualities more than 
others can thus be expected to have a relatively greater chance of succeeding in their 
adoption efforts over time. Examples of terrorist groups that have been described as 
being particularly adept at organizational learning are the FARC and the LTTE.146  
 
The second major facilitator of an iterative process of adoption is an expectation of 
success, which inculcates the motivation to persevere despite setbacks. In the general 
organizational sense, MacKenzie, through the use of several enlightening case studies, 
has shown that the ultimate success or failure of a technological innovation is to at least 
some extent dependent on actors’ beliefs and expectations about its future efficacy. He 
argues, for example, that if actors believe that a given technology will succeed, this 
lends impetus to tinkerers, prompts investment in the technology and encourages 
adoption by system members, thus making creation and diffusion of the technology 
more likely, in something akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy.147 In a related vein, 
organizations that have already sunk substantial costs into an innovation are viewed as 
                                                          
144 Smithson, p. 86. 
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being less likely to abandon an effort because this would mean admitting that the 
resources already used have been wasted. In the case of WMD, for example, O’Neil 
asserts that ‘groups which invest enormous amounts of time, energy, and resources in 
endeavouring to acquire these capabilities have a very strong incentive to succeed, 
which itself should not be underestimated as a factor’.148 
 
Reinvention, or the modification and adaptation of an innovation by the adopter during 
the diffusion process to suit the adopter’s unique needs, is likely to be a key aspect of 
terrorist innovation adoption. Reinvention is said to occur when the adopting entity 
needs to adapt an innovation to fit in with its existing structure,149 and is more likely 
with innovations that are relatively difficult to understand150 or those that represent a 
generalized concept with multiple possible applications.151 If a particular innovation is 
accompanied by a high degree of reinvention, it is argued to be more likely to be 
adopted more rapidly, and enjoy a higher degree of sustainability.152 Indeed, in many 
cases extensive modification or adaptation can result in the most efficient or popular 
form of an innovation differing considerably from the initial version that was available 
for adoption.153  
 
Terrorists and Weapons Adoption 
 
The terrorist innovation and general diffusion of innovations literature introduces many 
of the core elements present in any terrorist adoption process. Yet, the terrorist adoption 
of weapons in particular might carry salient features that require greater exposition than 
the adoption of other innovations. Among the few detailed references to weapons 
attributes as these relate to terrorists, Jackson and Frelinger list various attributes that 
differentiate weapons used by terrorists, namely stand-off distance, capacity for use in 
parallel and the option of trading human for technical resources.154 Palfy describes 
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several other aspects, which are specific to weapons, as important in this regard, 
including life span, stability, environmental persistence and methods of dispersal.155 
However, he does not state how these factors might facilitate or retard adoption. To this 
list can be added several more attributes, including level of concentration of lethal 
effect, and capacity for covert delivery, to name just two. 
 
Furthermore, the general innovation literature identifies several attributes attaching to 
an innovation that can exert a significant influence on the adoption process, including its 
trialability, observability and complexity. Especially in situations where an actor is 
competing for support, which is almost always the case with terrorists, observability 
might be particularly important, not only in terms of whether the terrorists, as potential 
adopters, are aware of the weapon, but also in terms of the weapon’s effects on various 
external and internal audiences. This suggests, for example, that weapons associated 
with the latest scientific and technological advances, in other words, those that are seen 
as being on the ‘cutting edge’, might be especially attractive to many terrorists.  It can 
also be proposed in the terrorism context that the more testing that is required to adopt 
an innovation, the greater the chance of either accidental self-harm or detection (and 
hence interdiction) by authorities and thus the lower the chances of ultimate success in 
the adoption process.  
 
From a purely pragmatic perspective, the terrorism literature does identify three primary 
elements with respect to terrorist weapons selection: a) desired attack outcomes (i.e., the 
terrorists’ operational goals and preferences, which are determined by a multitude of 
variables, among which ideology features prominently);156 b) the nature of the weapon 
or weapon technology itself;157 and c) the characteristics of the intended type of 
target(s).158 While the relationship between these three elements is by no means 
unidirectional, it should be theoretically possible, at least, for a terrorist group to select 
the weapon that best matches its operational goals with respect to a particular target or 
set of targets, including desired levels of casualties, physical damage, publicity, or 
psychological impact.159 If their current arsenal is perceived to be inadequate to achieve 
                                                          
155 Palfy, p. 88. 
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159 See Palfy, pp. 86-87, for a similar notion. Jackson and Frelinger (p. 25) take this idea further by 
classifying alternate terrorist weapons strategies as either ‘versatility’ strategies, where a limited 
100 
 
their attack goals in general or against a given target, or is at least judged to be 
inefficient in doing so, terrorists may initiate a search for new weapons.160  
 
However, while this may provide a basic logic for terrorist weapons choice, it does little 
to explain the process. What is required for a fuller understanding is a synthesis of all of 
the factors that can influence the process of terrorist weapons adoption. Both this 
chapter and the last have shown that the set of three premises above is obviously just the 
starting point for understanding terrorist weapons adoption, as innovation and the 
diffusion of innovations are neither simple nor free-flowing processes. There are 
numerous countervailing forces that invariably act to oppose either the generation or 
adoption of innovations and multiple failure points at which these forces can bring 
innovation processes to an abrupt halt. Terrorist organizations are not immune from 
these forces for the status quo, and might even be singularly susceptible to some of 
them. Yet this clearly cannot be the whole story, since terrorist groups do fairly 
regularly decide to adopt new weapons and methods of using them, and sporadically 
succeed in doing so. By surveying the literature on innovation in general and terrorist 
innovation in particular, this chapter has provided numerous clues as to how the process 
of weapons innovation adoption by terrorists occurs and how terrorist actors might 
surmount existing obstacles to becoming aware of new weapons, deciding to adopt them 
and succeeding in that adoption. It has also highlighted that many of the same factors 
operate at multiple stages of the adoption process, but can have different effects on 
outcomes, for instance, between the decision and implementation phases. However, 
beyond the basic criteria of relative advantage over existing methods, feasibility and 
compatibility, none of the factors introduced above have been unequivocally shown to 
be either necessary or sufficient for weapons adoption and thus none can be construed 
as strictly causal in nature.  
 
To summarize the use of prior scholarship, the previous chapter cast a close theoretical 
and historical eye on weapons as the objects of adoption, whereas the very different 
literature reviewed in the current chapter examined innovators and the process by which 
innovation occurs, where possible focusing on the terrorism context but drawing 
                                                          
repertoire of more versatile weapons like firearms and bombs is maintained, versus ‘variety’ strategies 
where a multiplicity of weapons are acquired in order to address a range of possible attack configurations. 




regularly on wider innovation studies. Despite approaching the central question of this 
study from two different perspectives (which I have termed ‘inside out’ and ‘outside 
in’), however, the results of these inquiries have much in common. For example, both 
chapters highlight the dangers for successful adoption from organizational guardians of 
the status quo and cultural incompatibilities. Furthermore, both allude to the degree to 
which the potential innovation and its effects are observable to outsiders as influencing 
the adopter’s awareness and decision to adopt. Each approach also yielded some 
important factors not found in the other perspective. The general (and terrorism 
specific) innovations literature, for instance, has almost nothing to say about the 
weapons perspective’s recognition of the possibility of active efforts to deny adopters 
access to weapons or the need to incorporate both the physical weapon and its support 
systems in order for adoption to be successful. At the same time, the innovations 
literature provides far more detail on various aspects of the emulation dynamic. Overall, 
almost every insight uncovered in the various literatures studied has some bearing on 
terrorist weapons adoption and will be utilized to inform the adoption model presented 
in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Development of a Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model 
 
The preceding reviews of the various literatures on weapons and innovation have 
distilled a central overriding logic of terrorist weapons adoption, namely, that entities 
will likely attempt to adopt new weapons when faced with a disparity between the 
performance sought and that provided by their current weapons. This is quite 
straightforward, but also somewhat unhelpful in both a practical and theoretical sense 
because, short of a terrorist leader actually being overheard stating to a colleague that he 
or she is unhappy with their current arsenal, it does little to help understand or anticipate 
actual instances of weapons adoption. At the same time, the literature posits a plethora 
of forces and factors that might enhance, distort or otherwise influence this central 
logic. It is thus clear that for the current research question, the devil, as they say, is in 
the details and the adoption process cannot be adequately explained or described by 
reducing it to a single hypothesis. Once this has been accepted, the enumeration by 
various theoretical literatures of an array of independent variables together with three 
dependent variables of primary interest (weapon awareness, the adoption decision, and 
adoption success), calls for some theoretical structure, i.e., a model, that can act as a 
heuristic device to make sense of the multitude of factors that might have some causal, 
contributing or modifying effect on the weapons adoption process. 
 
Drawing on the reviews of the literature and reflecting on the roles of the multiple 
factors involved, a preliminary theoretical representation of terrorist weapons adoption 
was developed, upon which a model of terrorist weapons adoption could be built. This 
is shown in diagrammatic form in Figure 4.1 below. The representation is loosely based 
on a contributing factors approach,1 and focuses on the influencing factors themselves 
and the adoption process as a whole, rather than which of the three dependent variables 
is being affected. In other words, it is intended to illustrate the basic connections 
between influences on the adoption process in a stage independent sense, which is 
useful since many of the independent variables are hypothesized to affect more than one 
(or indeed all three) of the dependent variables under consideration. As such, the 
diagram depicts the core of the adoption process with respect to a particular candidate 
                                                          
1 G. Ackerman et. al., Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure, p. 113. These 
are similar to the commonly-used concept of influence diagrams; see Apiruk Detwarasiti and Ross D. 
Shachter, ‘Influence diagrams for team decision analysis’, Decision Analysis 2:4 (December 2005), pp. 
207–222 and, for an application to the terrorist context, see Ferguson, pp. 122-138.  
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weapon as an interaction between several organizational characteristics of the terrorist 
group with the more technical aspects of the weapon itself.  
 
The diagram highlights as a particularly important relationship the level of congruence 
between the skills and knowledge required to acquire, produce or field the weapon 
(encapsulated in the twin measures of techne and mētis) with those possessed by the 
organization. Surrounding this central interaction is the effect of broader environmental 
factors on both the weapons and the terrorist organization, as well as the impact of past 
adoption efforts and the influences exerted by the social networks within which the 
terrorist group operates. 
 







While including characteristics common to all weapons, the diagram does not explicitly 
include the myriad tactical attributes of weapons described in the previous chapter. This 
is primarily owing to the large number of such characteristics, only a handful of which 
are likely to be relevant in any particular operational context, which in turn is shaped by 
both organizational goals and the strategic and operational environment. Instead, the 
tactical features of the weapon are encapsulated within the portion of the framework 
that considers the ‘Perceived advantages of the weapon relative to the status quo,’ which 
thus incorporates such attributes as stand-off distance, concentration of lethal effect or 
capacity for use in parallel, but does so in the specific context of the group’s strategic 
and tactical exigencies. 
 
Owing to the predilection in much social science towards simple, if not univariate, 
explanations for social phenomena, some justification is needed for retaining so many 
variables in an initial model. First, existing literature and empirical experience in other 
domains suggests that there are indeed many factors that impact the process, with no 
clear indications that one or two factors predominate in most cases of adoption. Indeed, 
the outcomes most likely result from the convergence of several factors, rather than any 
single factor or variable.2 Since the current research endeavour is at such an early stage, 
it would thus be premature to discard any potentially salient or essential factors merely 
for the sake of parsimony. As George and Bennett opine, ‘At the frontiers of research, 
… social scientists need to discard stylized simplifying assumptions and build upon the 
most accurate microlevel mechanisms that can be discerned.’3  In addition, there is 
every indication from the literature consulted that weapons adoption, at least when 
considered at any useful level of detail, is likely to be an equifinite process, in other 
words that there can be multiple causal pathways leading to the same outcome. In such 
circumstances of complexity, one would be rash to ignore possibly fruitful avenues of 
research purely owing to an abstract obsession with parsimony. After all, King, 
Keohane and Verba caution that, ‘Parsimony is a judgment, or even an assumption 
about the nature of the world.…In the social sciences, some forcefully defend 
parsimony in their subfields, but we believe it is only occasionally appropriate ….theory 
should be just as complicated as all our evidence suggest.’4  
                                                          
2 This situation is discussed in George and Bennett, p. 212. 
3 George and Bennett, p. 212. 
4 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 




This basic theoretical structure can now be recast in terms of the existing adoption 
process framework (described in Chapter 1) and used to produce a theoretical model 
that incorporates and synthesizes existing hypotheses about terrorist innovation and 
empirical results from the broader innovation literature. The resulting Terrorist 
Weapons Adoption Model thus consists of three connected, but independently 
evaluated, sub-models: 
 
1. Awareness Sub-Model: this model represents the interaction between a set of 
observable characteristics (potential contributing factors) and whether or not a 
terrorist organization will be aware of a particular weapon, i.e., it has a binary 
dependent variable that can take the values ‘Aware’ and ‘Not Aware’. 
2. Adoption Decision Sub-Model: assuming awareness, this model assesses the 
interaction between a set of potential contributing factors and whether or not the 
terrorist organization decides to attempt to adopt the weapon under 
consideration, i.e., it has a binary dependent variable that can take on the values 
‘Decision to Adopt’ and ‘No Decision to Adopt’. 
3. Outcome Sub-Model: assuming an attempt to adopt the new weapon, this 
model assesses the interaction between a set of potential contributing factors and 
whether or not the attempt is successful. In this case success is defined as the 
organization acquiring a relatively reliable capability to acquire and deploy the 
weapon to cause the level of harm or other effects intended by the group, rather 
than whether the adoption of the weapon actually furthered the group’s broader 
political, ideological or social goals. The model has a binary dependent variable 
that can take on the values ‘Successful’ and ‘Unsuccessful’. 
 
Each sub-model was constructed according to the same procedure. Each contributing 
factor shown in Figure 4.1 (treated as an independent variable) was considered 
separately to determine how it might affect the individual dependent variable under 
consideration. More specifically, the factor was scrutinized in terms of both the 
direction of the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable, and the relative 
magnitude of that effect, thus generating a hypothesis with respect to that factor. The 
hypothesis generation process consisted primarily of applying and adapting either: a) 
insights from other domains, as highlighted in the literature reviews, to the terrorist 
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context, or b) existing insights from other aspects of terrorist behaviour to the specific 
context of adoption. An example of a) is the notion in general innovation studies that a 
high degree of homophily (commonalities in culture, ideology, ethnic origin, etc.) with 
an entity that demonstrates or advocates for an actor to adopt an innovation, makes the 
adopter more likely to decide to do so,5 which in the terrorism context implies that 
terrorist organizations would be more likely to accept an innovation already adopted or 
endorsed by its constituency or peer groups. An example of b) is the general notion in 
terrorism studies that intergroup competition leads to a dynamic of ‘outbidding’6 and a 
general escalation in terrorist actions; all else being equal, this might manifest in a 
greater openness to adopting a new weapon.7 
 
In cases where the literature only suggests a relationship of a factor to one sub-model, it 
was considered whether similar effects might apply to the other dependent variables. As 
a result, many (but by no means all) of the independent variables have hypothesized 
relationships to more than one sub-model, making it efficient to represent the 
hypotheses in tabular form. The final model, including all three sub-models, is shown 
below, as Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: The Terrorist Weapon Adoption Model 
 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
 Awareness Decision Success 
    
SOCIETY    
Developed Infrastructure ++ + + to ++ 
Social / Political Openness ++  ~ to + 
Intense Security Pressure – to + – to + – – 
SOCIAL NETWORKS    
Highly Networked (in general) +  + 
Highly Networked (with other violent non-state actors) ++  ++ 
Demonstration – 1st degree (by an actor in its own network) ++ ++ + 
Cultural Affinity (homophily) with Relevant Network Node  ++ + 
Proselytization (change agents / opinion leaders) +++ – – to +++ ~ to ++ 
State Sponsorship ~ to +  ++ 
Serendipitous Acquisition ~ to +++ +++ ~ to ++ 
Intergroup Competition  + to ++  
PRIOR ADOPTION (Outside the Organization)    
Demonstration – 2nd degree (by an actor out of its network) + +  
No. of Successful Prior Adopters [Linear] [+] [++] [+] 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS    
                                                          
5 See Strang and Meyer, p. 490. 
6 See Bloom, pp. 162-163 in the previous chapter. 
7 The author would like to thank Dr. John Sawyer for his input in formulating the various hypotheses 
during a related research project. However, all final choices and decisions regarding the hypotheses, and 
thus any errors or omissions, reside with the author. 
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History    
Age of Group (more than 5 years or not)   + 
Prior Autarkic Technology Adoption + 
+ to ++ (similarity to 
tech required for 
current weapon) 
+ 
Prior Technology Adoption Outcomes [Linear]  [+] 
[~ to +] 
(similarity of 
new tech to 
old) 
Structure / Group Dynamics    
Size [Large] + + + 
Size [Small]  –  
Size [Micro] ~ to – + – 
Size of Talent Pool (with Techne & Mētis) [Large] + + + 
Size of Talent Pool (with Techne & Mētis) [Small]  ~ to – ~ to – 
Centralization [Low] ++ + to ++  
Centralization [High]   + 
Spatial Proximity of Organization Elements   + 
Learning Organization ++ + ++ 
Possesses Institutionalized R&D / “Skunkworks” +++ + to ++ ++ 
Cohesiveness (lack of intragroup competition) [Linear]  [+] [+] 
Resources    
Organizational Techne (Similar Technologies to Weapon) 
[High] + ++ ++ 
Organizational Techne (Similar Technologies to Weapon) 
[Low] – – – 
Organizational Mētis [High] + +++ ++ 
Organizational Mētis [Low]  – – – 
Org. Knowledge Type Ratio [High Techne/Mētis]   – 
Org. Knowledge Type Ratio [Low Techne/Mētis]  + – 
Safe Haven + + + 
Surfeit of Resources (esp. financial) + + + 
Access to Training Programs [Linear] [++] [~ to +] [+] 
Decision Making Characteristics    
Cognitive and Related Biases ~ to – – – Contingent – – – to + 
Follow-The-Leader Bias (prior technology leader) ++ ++ Contingent 
Disposed Toward Innovation + to ++ ++ to +++  
Disposed Away From Innovation ~ to – – – –  
Affinity for the Weapon/Technology ~ to ++ +++  
Ideological/Cultural Compatibility with Technology [High] +   
Ideological/Cultural Compatibility with Technology [Low]  – to – – – – 
Perception of Urgency (limited time to act) ~ to – – – – 
Champion in Leadership  +++ + to ++ 
Veto Players Exist Within Leadership Structure  – ~ to – 
Guardians of Status Quo [Linear] [–] [–] [~ to –] 
Multiple Weapons Needed/Desired  – – to – – 
Risk Tolerance [High]  
+ to +++ (depends 
on overall riskiness 
of technology) 
 
Risk Tolerance [Low]  
– to – – – (depends 
on overall riskiness 
of technology) 
 
Determination   ++ 
Strategic Dynamics    
Active Searching ++ + to +++  
∆ Status Quo Needed: Overcome Countermeasures  + to ++  
∆ Status Quo Needed: Overcome Desensitized Public  ~ to ++  
Perceived Advantages of Technology (vis-à-vis SQ)  ++  
Compatibility between Strategy and Technology ~ to + ~ to + + 
Perception of Ease of Acquisition / Feasibility  +++  
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS    
Information Availability Relative to the Entire Technology 
[Low]  






Information Availability Relative to the Entire Technology 
[High] ++ 
– – to ++ 
(dependent on 
content, i.e. degree 
of difficulty) 
+ 










Knowledge Type Ratio (Techne/Mētis Required to Field 
Weapon) [High]  ++ ~ 
Knowledge Type Ratio (Techne/Mētis Required to Field 
Weapon) [Low]  – ~ 
Ease of Acquisition   ++ 
Commercialized Technology + to + + + + ++ 
Financial Acquisition Cost [High]  – to – – –  
Financial Acquisition Cost [Low]  + + 
Technology Lifecycle [Early]   ~ to – 
Technology Lifecycle [Late]   + 
Economies of Scale  +  
Trialability of Technology [Linear]  [+] [+] 
Observability of Technology [Linear] [++] [+] [+] 
Life Span of Technology [Linear]  [+]  
Stability of Technology [Linear]  [+] [+] 
Environmental Persistence of Technology + 
– – – to +++ 
(depends what is 
being affected) 
 
Active Opposition of Possessors of Technology 





– – to – – – 
 
 
A few notes regarding the interpretation of Table 4.1 are warranted: 
 
 The different sub-models and their dependent variables are represented by the 
columns, with the various potential contributing factors represented by the rows 
of the table. 
 For the dependent variables, the value shown in the table applies to the positive 
outcome (i.e., being aware, making a decision to adopt and succeeding in 
adoption).  
 Each independent variable is listed in the first column, with additional 
information to lend context to the variable shown in parentheses. These are 
drawn from the previous two chapters, which can be consulted for greater detail 
about the meaning of a variable. 
 The values for each of the independent variables are given in square brackets. To 
reduce the size of the table, the absence of square brackets next to a factor 
denotes a binary variable, with a positive outcome (if the negative outcome is 
not shown, it can be assumed that the absence of that variable has no 
109 
 
hypothesized effect on the dependent variable). For example, the State 
Sponsorship variable shows the hypothesized effects on the awareness and 
success outcomes if the organization does have a state sponsor; if it does not, 
there is no hypothesized effect on any of the dependent variables. 
 The direction of effect of each independent variable on each dependent variable 
is denoted by a positive sign for a positive effect and a negative sign for a 
negative effect. The number of positive or negative signs denotes the 
hypothesized strength of the effect relative to other variables and roughly 
corresponds to small, medium and large effects for one, two or three symbols in 
a cell. However, the largest possible effect in the model (in order not to 
prejudice any single factor at this stage of the inquiry) is limited to ‘– – –’ or ‘+ 
+ +’. For many variables, the literature provides little guidance as to the relative 
magnitude of the hypothesized effects, so the best estimate based on prior 
knowledge of terrorist behaviour was resorted to in these cases. 
 A blank cell implies that the independent variable is not hypothesized to have 
any effect on the outcome of that particular dependent variable. 
 Where the table shows an effect for ‘High’ and ‘Low’ values of the variable, and 
does not explicitly show a ‘Medium’ value, it can be assumed that there is no 
hypothesized effect for a value of ‘Medium’ on the independent variable. 
 Some cells display a range of possible effects (with ‘~’ representing a null 
effect), to be determined in a particular case depending on the contextual factors 
specific to that case and/or the strength of the independent variable. Where the 
effect is dependent on a specific characteristic of the organization or 
circumstance, this is noted in the cell.  
 If the independent variable is followed by the word ‘Linear’ in square brackets, 
this denotes that the independent variable can take a range of values and that the 
higher the value, the stronger the effect is in the direction indicated in the 
adjoining cell. So, for example, even if the ‘Number of prior adopters’ variable 
has a ‘+’ associated with it in the Awareness column, this means that if the 
number of prior adopters is zero, the effect will be neutral, if there have only 
been a handful of former adopters the effect would be ‘+’, but if there have been 




Selecting a particular column in the table and reading from top to bottom gives one a 
sense of how the different independent variables as a whole are hypothesized to affect 
the dependent variable. In attempting to strike the correct balance between parsimony 
and complexity, the table contains some implicit weighting of the factors, but it does not 
delve too deeply into possible interaction effects between variables or differences in 
weighting determined by contextual factors of a particular case since this would greatly 
increase the complexity of an already sizeable model. However, basic interaction effects 
are occasionally captured when the model indicates a range of effects contingent on 
other variables, especially in cases where the precise effect is clearly dependent on other 
characteristics of the group or circumstances.  
 
The model is thus only a first-level, mostly linear synthesis of the hypothesized effects 
of the various contributing factors. A basic use of the table is simply to assign ‘scores’ 
to each independent variable with respect to the sub-model under consideration and then 
to sum these scores arithmetically to obtain a total ‘score’ for the particular case with 
respect to awareness, success and so forth. Such scores are usually useful only in a 
relative sense (such as comparing them across organizations or time periods), and more 
complex combinations of factors are of course possible in future iterations of the model 
(discussed in the concluding chapter). 
 
Now that the expansive theoretical landscape relevant to terrorist weapons adoption has 
been encapsulated in a tractable model, it is possible to evaluate and expand upon the 





Chapter 5: Case Study Methodology 
 
The terrorist weapons adoption model, which synthesizes knowledge and theory about 
innovation adoption from several domains, incorporates a multitude of hypotheses 
regarding the process of how terrorists might become aware of sophisticated weapons 
systems and make the decision about whether or not to pursue them, as well as the 
factors contributing towards the success or failure of these efforts. Yet, having 
developed a theory of the process of terrorist weapons adoption, it is clear that few, if 
any, of these hypotheses have ever been systematically investigated in real-world 
instances of terrorist weapons adoption. It is to the empirical exploration of terrorist 
weapons adoption behaviour that this portion of the study now turns. 
 
The primary vehicle through which this will be accomplished is a series of case studies. 
Case studies are well-suited to research programs at a relatively early stage, as with the 
current endeavour, for several reasons. First, the case study method is often better suited 
to examining the causal processes involved than alternative methods, such as formal 
modelling or large-N analysis.1 This is especially true when such processes are likely to 
involve what George and Bennett have termed ‘complex causality’, which includes 
multiple, possibly interacting variables, feedback loops and equifinality.2 Second, case 
studies can prove extremely useful in inductively identifying additional variables and 
generating hypotheses, an indispensable asset in the preliminary stages of any research 
endeavour. Case studies are well-suited to such exploratory inquiries because they are 
not restricted to a given number of variables that are easily quantified, or for which 
systematically coded data exists.3  
 
The case studies presented here were therefore designed with two primary objectives: a) 
to explore the dynamics of the weapons adoption process in greater detail through 
historical example and thereby to identify any possible omitted variables in the model 
not covered in the available theoretical literature; and b) to provide a preliminary test of 
                                                          
1 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), p. 54. However, while their strengths lie in determining whether and how variables impact 
outcomes, case studies are less useful for assessing the magnitude of these impacts (George and Bennett, 
p. 25). 
2 George and Bennett, p. 10. 
3 George and Bennett, pp. 20-22, 45. 
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the validity of the model by examining the interaction of independent and dependent 
variables in an application of the model to real-world cases. 
 
Obviously, a limited number of case studies cannot provide a definitive test of the 
model. Deeply engaging with historical cases can, however, provide prima facie support 
for the model or indicate serious flaws therein, as well as refining the theory and 
guiding future research. In this respect, the case studies will, to some degree, make use 
of all three of the main approaches for testing theories with case studies identified by 
Van Evera, namely, controlled comparison, congruence procedures and process 
tracing,4 although the focus will be on the latter two, since controlled comparison does 
not handle equifinality very well.5 This will consist of a nested design of two sets of 
paired case studies in order to maximize inferential leverage through what Tarrow has 
referred to as ‘dual-process tracing’.6 This research design, which is inspired by case-
control methods,7 allows for multiple within-case and cross-case observations, thus 
getting the most out of the cases in terms of opportunities to investigate the 




This is a crucial part of any research design and is inevitably bounded by the availability 
of historical examples, the richness of available data, and investigator resources. Going 
beyond these minimal criteria, however, I selected for both positive and negative 
outcomes in order to explore both the operation of the independent variables and the 
performance of the model as a whole across both types of outcomes. Thus, one aim of 
the selection process was to obtain as much variance as possible in the outcome 
variables under consideration (awareness of new technologies of lethality, the adoption 
                                                          
4 Van Evera, pp. 56-67. 
5 George and Bennett, pp. 157, 161. 
6 Sidney Tarrow, ‘The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice’, Comparative 
Political Studies 43 (2010), p. 244. Tarrow generally argues that paired comparison possesses advantages 
lacking in either single-case analysis or multi-case comparison (p. 230). 
7 Case-control methods are sample design and analysis strategies involving both ‘cases’ and ‘controls’ 
that disproportionately stratify a binary dependent variable sample (see Michael G. Lacy, ‘Efficiently 
Studying Rare Events: Case-Control Methods for Sociologists’, Sociological Perspectives, 40:1 (1997), p. 
129). While they are a quantitative method usually applied to large-N data, they served as a guide for 
structuring the case studies, which borrowed several of their ideas, such as those concerning matching 
controls to cases. For an example of case-control methods being applied in the terrorism context, see 
Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, ‘The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case-Control Study for the 
Basque Country’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8478 (2001). 
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decision and the success or otherwise of any attempted adoptions). 8 Despite many 
social science methodologists (especially those of the quantitative ilk) decrying 
selection on the dependent variable, for certain purposes – including theory 
development and establishing the necessity or sufficiency of certain variables – even a 
single case selected on a positive outcome can be appropriate.9 This is argued to be a 
particularly valid approach when cases have substantial within-case variance and are 
sufficiently data rich to analyse using process tracing,10 two criteria that were used in 
the current study. 
 
Of the three dependent variables, the adoption decision was prioritized over the other 
two with respect to case selection, as a greater understanding of the determinants of this 
variable is arguably the most relevant in terms of terrorism scholarship and 
counterterrorism policy.  Thus, for the two paired case comparisons (four cases total) 
that were sought, particular preference was given to cases where one terrorist entity of 
the pair attempted to adopt a specific weapon, while the other member of the pair did 
not (i.e., to ensure variance in adoption decision). Nevertheless, at least some variance 
was sought in awareness of the technology and in adoption success.  
 
Moreover, upon examination of the elements in the model, the vast majority of the 
model factors pertain to organizational aspects of the terrorist group itself, with a fair 
amount also related to intrinsic aspects of the weapon technology. Therefore, the case 
analysis was focused on analysing these aspects, which resulted in controlling for 
macro-social factors and basic ideological orientation within each case pair. At the same 
time, it was desired that at least an initial attempt be made to ascertain the extent to 
which any results were generalizable beyond a single weapons technology, extremist 
ideology or geographic locale.  
 
Ultimately the criteria for case selection consisted of identifying two sets of cases 
involving at least two different weapons, countries and ideological contexts, and within 
each set identifying cases where the ideological and socio-political context was constant 
(but organizational factors were likely to differ), while obtaining as much variance as 
                                                          
8 Limitations on space did not permit comprehensive exploration of variance for all three binary variables, 
which would have required eight case studies, even assuming that the requisite cases could be located in 
the empirical record (which is highly doubtful). 
9 See the discussion in George and Bennett, p. 23. 
10 Van Evera, p. 47.  
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possible on the dependent variables relating to the adoption process (especially the 
adoption decision itself).11 In addition, sufficiently rich and detailed data had to be 
available to permit process tracing and within-case variation over time, a criterion that 
had to be balanced against avoiding bias in favour of the most well-studied and often-
cited cases.12 
 
Both historical databases of terrorist groups and various experts in the field were 
consulted and a number of potential sets of cases were subject to preliminary 
investigation in order to examine how closely these matched the aforementioned 
criteria. In certain instances, this revealed that the cases were unsuitable,13 and the 
potential cases were excluded from consideration. The cases that were ultimately 
selected via this process were: 
 
a. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA) with respect to the adoption of mortar technology in 
the 1970s through the 1990s. Both these groups fought for a unified Ireland 
against the British at approximately the same time, whereas the PIRA 
successfully adopted a range of improvised mortars, while the INLA did not even 
attempt to do so. 
b. The Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) and the Order with 
respect to two separate lethal technologies (cyanide and rockets) in the early 
1980s. Both groups were driven by a far right, white supremacist ideology and 
operated in the United States during the early 1980s. Although neither was 
successful in adopting any novel technologies of lethality, the CSA attempted to 
adopt several new weapons, while the Order was largely content with utilizing 
guns and simple explosives. 
                                                          
11 This would ensure that one case in each paired set would proceed at least as far as the adoption attempt 
stage, thus allowing for at least some analysis of the outcome of the adoption process in terms of its 
success or otherwise. 
12 See George and Bennet, p. 51, for warnings against this bias, which is one of the reasons the Aum 
Shinrikyo case was not selected, since it was felt that many of the theoretical arguments in the literature 
were influenced by this case. The other reason for not selecting this case, is that there was no good 
Japanese, apocalyptic cult analogue that did not attempt to procure WMD. 
13 For example, initial indications were that HAMAS had tried to use chemical weapons while the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) had not (Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny, ‘The terrorists in 
their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 15:1 (2003), pp. 171-184) whereas closer examination and consultation with experts in Israel 
revealed that PIJ had recently attempted to use chemical agents as weapons, thus limiting the variance in 






As a starting point, for each of the four organizations under investigation, an intensive 
survey was conducted of publicly available secondary sources relating to the 
organization. These included books by both scholars and investigative journalists, news 
reports, peer-reviewed journal articles, television documentaries, and various 
governmental and non-governmental reports. These sources were supplemented by 
primary source investigation. In the case of the PIRA and INLA, this predominantly 
took the form of field research in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and England 
and consisted of archival research, as well as in-person interviews with former law 
enforcement and intelligence officials, journalists, academic researchers and in one case 
a former PIRA bomb-maker.14 For the CSA and Order studies, owing to the fact that in 
the United States access to law enforcement and perpetrators is much more restricted, 
the predominant primary sources consisted of court documents (trial transcripts, judicial 
orders, affidavits, articles of admitted evidence, and so forth), as well as declassified 
law enforcement documentation, obtained through Freedom of Information Act 
requests.  
 
All data sources on terrorism present potential difficulties for analysis. For example, 
secondary sources can misreport events or limit the scope of their coverage, while 
primary sources (and especially in-person interviews) can result in misleading accounts. 
Such distortions can be either intentional or unintentional and can result from a variety 
of factors, ranging from prejudiced self-interest to memory deficits. Therefore all 
sources in a highly politically charged domain such as terrorism-related research should 
be approached critically. However, intentional bias was expected to be somewhat less 
severe in the current study than in much other research on terrorism, since the study 
focused on the generally less emotionally laden ‘logistical’ decisions of terrorists rather 
than on their ideological and political beliefs, victim selection or internal loyalties, 
where incentives might exist for manipulating the truth. In either event, the best means 
by which to ensure reliable and credible evidence for a case study is to utilize a 
multitude of independent sources, preferably including those with competing inherent 
                                                          
14 These were semi-structured interviews, with a similar set of questions being posed to each respondent, 
while allowing for the discussion to branch into additional avenues related to the topic. 
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biases, and to verify congruence between them. Therefore, as many sources and types of 
sources as possible were sought in the case studies, including employing primary 
sources from both the terrorists and their government opponents (and from different 
government agencies where possible), as well as third party observers. No clear 
instances of intentional dissembling were detected. 
 
In sum, the entire gamut of available sources was consulted, with every effort made to 
corroborate information from multiple sources where possible and the provenance of 
information taken into account at all stages. The quantity of available information 
varied from case to case, but succeeded in addressing the vast majority of independent 




In order to develop a structure around which the different cases could be consistently 
analysed, several longitudinal matrices were constructed for each case. The first set of 
three matrices, each one dealing with one of the dependent variables (awareness, 
decision and success), were structured similarly, with any information relevant to actual 
adoption behaviour mapped to the relevant matrix at the time period when it occurred.15 
For the two Irish Republican organizations and the CSA, time periods were designated 
in years, while for the Order, considering its relatively brief lifespan and intense 
activity, the time periods were designated in months. These matrices thus captured 
changes in the three dependent variables over time. 
 
A longitudinal matrix for each case was also constructed to reflect the case context. The 
columns of this matrix represented the different time periods and the rows a host of 
contextual factors. These contextual factors included all of the independent variables in 
the model (see the previous chapter), as well as some broader descriptors, such as major 
events in the history of the organization or significant leadership changes. Each cell in 
the matrix thus contained evidence related to a specific independent variable or 
                                                          
15 Allowances were made for reflecting indeterminate time periods (such as events occurring over several 
years or where the sources did not provide a time when an event occurred) by having a separate column 
for ‘indeterminate time / throughout the period’ and where a particular factor extended over multiple 




contextual factor in a specific time period. Additional rows were added when there was 
more than a single piece of evidence pertaining to a specific time period.16 The 
categorization of each piece of evidence in a longitudinal matrix in this way facilitated 
both process tracing and cross-case comparison. 
 
Data Analysis 
The first analytical technique utilized on each case separately was process tracing, 
which ‘explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case 
conditions are translated into case outcomes’.17 By identifying when a change in the 
dependent variable occurred and then systematically working backwards utilizing the 
matrices, a likely causal chain was established that traced the outcome to specific 
changes in the independent variables or other aspects of the case context. A similar 
procedure was followed in those cases where there were no changes in the dependent 
variable (for instance, when an organization never made a decision to adopt a particular 
weapon), except that the process trace began at the end of the group’s lifespan and 
worked backwards, constantly asking the question for each preceding time period: what 
antecedent factors (or the lack thereof) were responsible for the decision state not 
changing at this point? Since the antecedent causes of some dependent variables – 
especially leadership decisions – often cannot be established with certainty, this process 
also involves assessing various alternative causal paths and weighing the evidence for 
one against the other. Process tracing thus naturally lends itself to identifying whether 
equifinality characterizes the phenomenon under consideration.18 
 
The next step consisted of generating a narrative for each case that provides a brief 
introduction to the organization, followed by a discussion of which weapons the group 
actually adopted (if any), or a discussion of any group involvement with the technology 
under consideration and a reference to other group innovations. The narrative then turns 
to examining the different dependent variables, one by one, marshalling evidence and 
providing qualitative argument for: a) whether or not the group was aware of the 
innovation and how this awareness may have come about; b) why the group decided to 
adopt or not to adopt the new technology of lethality (or failed to make the decision); 
                                                          
16 The resulting matrices were extensive, most containing well over 150 rows. 
17 Van Evera, p. 64. See also, George and Bennett, pp. 206–218 and Tarrow, p. 240. 
18 George and Bennett, p. 215. 
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and c) reasons for the success or failure of the adoption attempt. Where there was no 
direct evidence to support a specific finding, inferences were made based on the 
available evidence and knowledge of the organization under consideration to arrive at 
the most likely conclusions. 
 
Following the advice of George and Bennett and others, the process tracing was 
supplemented by the application of comparative methods.19 While the procedures used 
will be detailed later, these consisted, first, of a direct assessment of the performance of 
the model hypotheses using within-case congruence testing to evaluate variations in the 
independent variables against observed changes in the dependent variables across time 
periods.20  Since the model is probabilistic, rather than deterministic, the initial 
evaluation was of the model’s overall predictions. This was followed by a more fine-
grained analysis of the extent to which the model components (i.e., its constituent 
hypotheses) were supported. Lastly, elements of controlled cross-case comparison were 
incorporated, using both a method of difference and a method of agreement approach. 
The method of difference could be applied at a macro-level of factor categories, i.e. at 
the level of societal, ideological or organizational influences on terrorist weapons 
adoption, since within each pair the first two elements were held constant and the latter 
varied. On the other hand, the method of agreement could be appealed to, at least for the 
awareness variable, since most of the organizations studied over most periods share the 
same outcome (i.e., awareness) despite differing along many characteristics.21 Lastly, a 
rudimentary counterfactual analysis was employed in evaluating the model even for 
those periods where a particular outcome was infeasible based on insufficient 
antecedents. 
 
In addition to testing the theory (in the form of the model), many of the above 
techniques were also utilized to expand and refine the theory. For example, both the 
                                                          
19 According to George and Bennett, ‘…there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing 
inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons within a single study or research program’ (p. 18). See also, Van Evera, p. 66. 
20 For a discussion of multiple congruence testing, see Van Evera, pp. 52, 58, 61; George and Bennett, p. 
179. 
21 Despite several previous assertions to the contrary, Tarrow argues that neither the method of agreement 
nor the method of difference are intrinsically superior. Rather the preferred approach depends on the 
problem at hand (Tarrow, p. 235). 
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controlled comparisons and the process tracing could identify potentially omitted 
variables and help generate new hypotheses.22  
 
The next two chapters each consist of two separate case narratives and qualitative 
analyses, followed by a chapter that applies the model to the cases and provides 
comparative insights. 
 
                                                          
22 Van Evera, pp. 68-69; George and Bennett, pp. 7, 35, 209. 
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Chapter 6: Irish Nationalists and the Adoption of Mortar 
Technology 
 
As introduced in the previous chapter, the first set of paired case studies explores the 
weapons adoption behaviour of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) with respect to mortar technology in the 1970s 
through the 1990s. The two groups shared a broadly common ideological and 
operational context – to unite Ireland and to expel the British, and their periods of 
operation were similar. Yet, the PIRA succeeded in adopting sophisticated improvised 
mortars (among a variety of other weapons), while the INLA did not even attempt to do 
so. Each of the cases follows the narrative structure laid out previously, beginning with 
a brief introduction to the organization, followed by a discussion of the mortar 
technology the group actually adopted (if any), or in the absence of any adoption 
activity, a reference to other group innovations. The narrative then turns to examining 
the different dependent variables, in turn discussing: a) whether or not the group was 
aware of the innovation and how this awareness may have come about; b) why the 
group decided to adopt or not to adopt the new technology of lethality (or failed to make 
the decision); and c) reasons for the success or failure of the adoption attempt. 
 
Positive Case Study: The PIRA 
 
The PIRA was viewed by its allies and adversaries alike as one of the most inventive, 
innovative and adaptive of all the violent non-state actors who operated in the latter part 
of the twentieth century.1 Born in the sectarian cauldron of civil rights activism in 
Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, the PIRA emerged as a splinter group of the 
traditional Irish nationalist movement, breaking away from the subsequently labelled 
                                                          
1 A.R. Oppenheimer, IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets, A History of Deadly Ingenuity (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 2009), p. 231—‘When some twenty-eight of these mortars were found in a Belfast 
bakery in Belfast in October 1974, the EOD officer, Lt Col John Gaff, reported that: “The equipment and 
ammunition are the most advanced of their type which have been used up to the present time. Much 
thought and care has been taken to produce it … Excellent workmanship is evident … The handwritten 
user instructions give the impression of past military experience of a specialized nature … although the 
writer does not register as having had the benefit of a high standard of education”. This verdict 
epitomized the IRA’s hallmark of improvised skills.... In just over a year, the IRA mortar had developed 
from something relatively primitive to an advanced weapons series’; p. 163. 
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‘Official’ IRA in December 1969.2 Disagreeing with what they saw as the Marxist-
leaning, overly political trajectory of the mainstream IRA (or so-called ‘Stickies’), the 
aims of the PIRA’s new leadership were to return to the ideological purity of using 
armed force to unite the six counties of Northern Ireland (which formed part of the 
United Kingdom) with the independent Irish Republic and to establish a socialist-
oriented state in all 32 counties that make up the island.3 Although not part of their 
official doctrine – which claimed to be non-sectarian – a large part of the PIRA’s ethos 
was also to protect the Catholic population, which formed a minority in the North, from 
the predations of a Protestant majority that was seen at the time to be willing to oppress 
and exploit their Catholic neighbours. During their almost three decades of attacks 
against civilians and security forces until their last ceasefire in 1998, the PIRA 
employed a plethora of means of murder and mayhem, ranging from small arms (most 
notoriously the Armalite assault rifle), to rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to-air 
missiles, flamethrowers, heavier machine guns (such as the M60), and an almost 
dizzying array of improvised explosive and incendiary devices.4 While the following 
discussion will draw upon the entire breadth of PIRA innovations, especially those 
linked to its IEDs and their component trigger and explosive mechanisms, the focus will 
be on the PIRA’s development – spanning almost its entire operational lifetime – of 
improvised mortars as an illustrative investigation of the origins and mechanisms of the 




Before turning to the ‘why’ of the PIRA’s adoption of improvised mortars, it is useful to 
describe the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ – in other words, to outline the actual developmental 
trajectory of its mortar program in terms of the products that it generated and how it 
went about doing this. This will provide context for the decisions and processes that 
were involved in the adoption. In order to circumvent the need for a lengthy exposition 
                                                          
2 For detailed discussions of the PIRA’s genesis, see Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2002), pp. 46-71; also Tim P. Coogan, The IRA (New York: 
Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002), and Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3 Moloney, p. 7; Brendan O'Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1999), p. xiii; Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, 
Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2005), p. 95. 
4 See Coogan, pp. 431-432 and Oppenheimer, passim, especially pp. 137, 170. Although never put into 
practice, the PIRA also reportedly worked on building fuel-air bombs, torpedoes, GPS-guided car bombs, 
and their own surface-to-air missiles (Oppenheimer, pp. xviii, 9). 
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of the evolution of the PIRA’s mortar capability, Table 6.15 portrays the various 
generations of mortars that the PIRA developed, from its first highly hazardous and 
relatively ineffectual attempts in the early 1970s, to its massive ‘barracks busters’ of the 
1990s. The table lists (where known) the year in which authorities first became aware of 
the type of mortar (usually the year it was first used),6 the range and payload of each 
mortar, some technical aspects of its construction, prominent attacks in which it was 
used and additional descriptive information. It should be noted at the outset when 
viewing the table that the designations of the various mortar incarnations (Mark 1, Mark 
2, and so forth) are labels that were applied to the various mortars by the security forces 
in Northern Ireland to denote what they viewed as salient changes in mortar character 
and function. There is thus no evidence that the PIRA leaders or engineers perceived 
their mortars in terms of these discrete categories – indeed, it is likely that those 
developing the mortars subjectively regarded the process as far more fluid and organic.7 
So long as one bears this in mind when drawing conclusions, it is nonetheless useful for 
purposes of clarity to retain these designations, which represent discernible technical 
changes in mortar construction and function. 
 
It is immediately apparent from the table that the variety and technical adroitness that 
characterized the PIRA’s weapons acquisition and use as a whole is mirrored in its 
development of mortars. Although John Horgan and Paul Gill have described the 
PIRA’s development of mortars as an example of ‘incremental innovation’8 consisting 
of small improvements over previous models, this should not obscure the revolutionary 
nature of the program taken as a whole, nor of the numerous substantial advances that 
took place between individual generations of mortars, such as the introduction of an 
impeller-based safety system or the rapid increase in accuracy and range between 1972 
and 1974. It is thus suggested that a better characterization of the process is one of a 
                                                          
5 Table 6.1 is presented at the end of this chapter for formatting reasons. 
6 While it would be preferable to record the year in which the mortar was developed, this information is 
not available for most of the mortar types. Given that because of the nature of their struggle and the 
adversary that they faced, the PIRA, with few exceptions, appeared to employ new weapons relatively 
rapidly after they had been developed, it can be assumed that the delay between development and first use 
is minimal and therefore that the listed date does not egregiously distort the timeline. 
7 The mortars’ designers might not have even conceived of their work as a structured ‘development’ 
process at all, rather focusing on the next project as merely an exercise in providing a weapon that met the 
specifications that the operational personnel desired. 
8 John Horgan and Paul Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker: A Social Network Analysis Model of the Socio-
Psychological and Cultural Dynamics of the IED Process A Report Prepared for the Office of Naval 
Research supported by Grant PAGEN00014-09-1-0667 (University Park, PA: International Center for the 
Study of Terrorism, forthcoming), pp. 1, 15. Horgan and Gill utilize the term in the sense of making small 
advances to current technology and repackaging existing products and behaviours in new forms. 
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hybrid revolutionary-incremental innovation akin to the notion of punctuated 
equilibrium in evolutionary systems. 
 
With respect to the mechanisms employed to pursue development of an effective mortar 
capability, the PIRA almost exclusively cultivated their mortars ‘in-house’, mainly 
through their own institutional research and development (R&D) organ, the Engineering 
Department (ED) of the Army General Headquarters. The following are some of the 
major aspects of this process. 
 
i. Expertise: It is unclear exactly where the expertise required for developing 
mortars was acquired. It is known that the PIRA drew on many talented amateurs 
(such as the Derry volunteers Shane Paul O’Doherty in the seventies and Patrick 
Flood in the eighties) who rapidly became proficient in their bomb making craft 
and were able to improvise extensively. It is also known that the PIRA attracted a 
limited number of highly-skilled technical personnel, including professional 
engineers.9 With respect to weapons-specific knowledge, there is evidence of 
early PIRA access to military manuals of various armed forces,10 certain 
members with military experience, at least some training by Libya,11 and even 
indications of transfer of military knowledge from Russia and Germany during 
the first half of the 20th century.12 It is thus likely that the expertise derived from 
a kernel of inherited knowledge that was built upon by trial-and-error, a 
hypothesis borne out by the intense experimentation evident during the early 
period of mortar development. As to the identity of the developers, directors of 
the Engineering Department, like Frank McGuiness13 and Gabriel Cleary,14 
                                                          
9 Sean Boyne, ‘Uncovering the Irish Republican Army: Organization’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 
August 1996. Accessed at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/org.html on 6 
October 2013, p. 3. Later on, in the 1980s, the organization began to attract even more highly-specialized 
individuals, such as Richard Johnson and Eamon McGuire, who had backgrounds in electrical and 
aeronautical engineering (Eamon McGuire, Enemy of the Empire: Life as an International Undercover 
IRA Activist (Dublin: O'Brien Books, 2006), passim). 
10 Oppenheimer, p. 242; author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty, Athlone, Republic of Ireland, 20 
June 2012. 
11 Patrick Magee, one of the PIRA’s best-known bomb makers, allegedly went to Libya for training in the 
1970s (Oppenheimer, pp. 263, 282; author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty). 
12 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
19 June 2012. According to this source, in the early 1980s, the Garda (Irish police force) arrested a key 
PIRA R&D person and while in prison they uncovered details behind the PIRA’s development of mortars 
(which remain classified), but these included references to knowledge transfer to the old IRA from the 
Russians and Germans. 
13 Moloney, p. 439. 
14 Sean O’Callaghan, The Informer (London: Corgi Books, 1999), p. 305. 
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probably had at least some involvement in the R&D process for mortars, while 
some of those individuals most closely associated with mortar development 
include Bernard Fox,15 Ciarain Chambers,16 and James ‘Mortar’ Monaghan.17 It 
has also been revealed that for most of the period of development, the PIRA stuck 
with more-or-less the same full-time R&D team, as evidenced by the discovery of 
signature welding marks and initiation devices that were consistent across various 
mortars.18 
  
ii. Location: Although organizationally centralized in the ED (with some 
participation from certain highly dynamic local units, especially the South 
Armagh Brigade19), there is some uncertainty as to where the actual development 
of mortars took place and whether this development was at a single or multiple 
locations. One of the former law enforcement officers interviewed for this study 
asserted that the PIRA had a single ‘factory’ responsible for producing mortars, 
but that the location of this factory changed from time to time.20 Reports of Irish 
police raids in the early 1970s, however, suggest that there were different 
locations for different components, including a factory in Dublin (discovered in 
1975) that fabricated firing tubes and a light engineering works in County Cavan 
(uncovered in 1976) where the mortar shell casings were being manufactured.21 
There are also reports that place South Armagh as a hub of mortar building and 
testing activity in the 1970s.22 In 1988, the PIRA allegedly established a mortar 
bomb factory in Belfast itself, in the Andersonstown area,23 and Tony Geraghty 
                                                          
15 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’.  Fox was reportedly not a 
trained engineer but was dedicated and quick to learn and possessed a natural knack for making things 
work. 
16 John Horgan and Max Taylor, ‘The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional 
Structure’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9:3 (1997), p. 14; Oppenheimer (2009), p. 281.  Chambers, 
a Dublin-based bomb expert also known for his development of timing and power units, apparently 
designed later generations of mortars, including those used in the 1994 Heathrow attacks. 
17 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 99. Monaghan was responsible for the development of the Mark 15 ‘barrack 
buster’ and may have been another head of the Engineering Department. He was also one of the three 
PIRA operatives arrested in Colombia in August 2001 and accused of transferring PIRA military 
expertise (including mortars) to the FARC (Cragin, et. al., pp. 71-89). 
18 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
18 June 2012 and author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 18 June 2012. 
19 Eamon Collins and Mick McGovern, Killing Rage (London: Granata Books, 1997), p. 257. 
20 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’. 
21 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 170. 
22 Toby Harnden, Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh (London: Coronet Books, 2000), p. 233 
cited by Jackson et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’. 
23 Martin Dillon, The Dirty War (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 292. 
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reports that in December of the same year, the discovery of a PIRA bomb 
‘factory’ in South London revealed items associated with the manufacture of the 
Mark 10 mortar, indicating that some mortar production might even have been 
occurring outside of Ireland.24 One might speculate that during the initial period, 
mortar development took place mainly in the Republic of Ireland (and some 
Republican strongholds like South Armagh), but that as their production 
capabilities matured and the number of mortars sought increased, production 
locations multiplied and became more local to their places of intended use. 
 
iii. Explosive Components: Explosives used as the main charge in mortars could 
generally be sourced from almost the entire range of the PIRA’s prodigious 
arsenal of explosives types,25 although lighter charges, and hence more powerful 
‘high’ explosives, were probably preferred in most mortars to meet the exigencies 
of aerodynamics. Trigger, timing, and power units for the mortar systems could 
similarly be drawn from the extensive broader PIRA inventories and expertise in 
these areas.26 The propellant used to launch the mortar was a different matter 
entirely. This had to be carefully formulated to achieve a safe and reliable launch, 
imparting a relatively steady explosive force to the mortar shell in order to ensure 
a consistent range. Table 6.1 traces the evolution of propellants, from early 
reliance on commercially available shotgun and related powder cartridges, 
through the J-cloth, to the more sophisticated purpose-built and precisely 
measured propellants that formed part of the weapon itself. 
 
iv. Non-Explosive Fabricated Components: Early seizures of mortars, like that in 
1974, informed the security forces that the components were being manufactured 
in a facility containing at least a metal lathe and heavy welding equipment, akin 
to a light engineering workshop.27 The aforementioned raids of PIRA mortar 
production facilities in 1974 and 1975 indicated an incipient light industrial 
                                                          
24 Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence (The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 192. 
25 When supplies of commercial explosives like gelignite became scarce during the first phase of mortar 
development, specialist units in the PIRA focused on the manufacture of home-made explosives and 
developed multiple recipes, mostly based on various compounds containing ammonium nitrate fertilizer. 
This was supplemented in the mid-1980s by the large shipments of Semtex high explosive from Libya. 
See, among others, Jackson et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, p. 99 and O’Callaghan, p. 89. 
26 For an extensive discussion, see Oppenheimer (2009), Chapter X. 
27 Ibid., p. 170. 
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capacity,28 which undoubtedly grew as the larger mortar models were developed 
to the point where Oppenheimer characterizes this capability as having a 
production line quality.29 Many of the raw materials for mortar components were 
sourced from commercially available pipes and gas cylinders, thus minimizing 
the amount of machine tooling required. 
 
Mortar development therefore primarily consisted of autarkic production, with the vast 
majority of components and production occurring within the organization. There is 
however, evidence of some elements of external patronage in the initial sources of 
knowledge and training and of exploitation of existing networks in the use of widely 
available legitimate products as the basic raw materials for mortars. 
 
Before proceeding, in order to make the subsequent analysis of the model tractable, it is 
necessary to partition the period of PIRA organizational history into a limited number of 
phases between which there are more substantive differences than within. At the same 
time, since there are many important developmental episodes within the PIRA’s long 
history, any such separation into a number of phases that is small enough to analyse 
practically is bound to appear somewhat arbitrary and will elicit protest from one or the 
other expert. The choice of partition was therefore made with two guiding criteria: a) 
that different phases at least contain different organizational, political and operational 
characteristics from each other; and b) that the phases represent, to the extent possible, 
different stages of mortar development, with the objective being to examine how the 
model fares under different circumstances amongst its input and dependent variables. 
While remaining aware of the perils of reductionism, upon reviewing the operational 
history of the PIRA, it can be usefully categorized according to the following four 
phases: 
 
1. Lack of Mortar Capability (1969 to 1971): This period coincides with the 
formative years of the PIRA, from its inception until the end of 1971. In keeping 
with the general paucity of ‘gear’ during the first few years of the PIRA’s 
existence, and the crudeness of the organization’s attempts to improvise 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Author interview with Andy Oppenheimer, London, England, 22 June 2012. 
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weaponry during this period, the PIRA lacked any appreciable capability to 
deliver mortars or similar stand-off projectiles.  
2. Intense Experimentation (1972 to 1974): The second phase begins with Bloody 
Sunday and the imposition of Home Rule and extends until the end of 1974, 
shortly before the beginning of the ceasefire of that year. While these were not 
always (or even often) effective, this phase consisted of a rapid succession of 
attempts to obtain a reliable mortar weapon, culminating in the successful 
production of the relatively effective Mark 6 mortar in 1974. 
3. Approaching Military Grade (1975 to 1987): The third phase contains the ill-
fated 1975-1976 ceasefire, the acceptance by the PIRA of the ‘Long War’ 
strategy, the prison protests and the 1977 reorganization into Active Service 
Units (ASUs). It also witnessed some missteps with respect to mortar 
development (the Mark 8), but a steady improvement towards the deadly 
effective Mark 10 (first used in 1979).  
4. Bigger and Better (1988-1998): This phase begins with the interdiction of the 
MV Eksund at the end of 1987 and traces the consequences for mortar 
development of the receipt of large quantities of Semtex high explosive from 
Libya in the mid-1980s. The fourth phase took the PIRA’s mortar capabilities in 
new directions, both with respect to size – culminating in the ‘barracks busters’ 
– and in versatility, for example, with man-portable versions (Marks 12 and 16). 
 




This question pertains to the initial awareness of mortars as a possible weapon and is 
thus mostly relevant to the first phase of mortar development. There is no direct 
evidence of how the PIRA first became aware of the possibility of acquiring or 
producing improvised mortars, but the circumstantial evidence points towards this 
awareness resulting from an active search in order to address a specific performance 
requirement. In the early days of the PIRA’s campaign, the organization experienced a 
dearth of weapons of any kind, least of all those that could have a measurable impact on 
their well-equipped adversaries in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Ulster 
Defence Regiment (UDR) and the British Army. According to Coogan, ‘It is literally 
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true, for instance, that in August 1969 the only weapons known to be available to the 
IRA were ten guns’.30 At its inception, PIRA volunteers could thus do little more than 
riot and throw petrol bombs.31 The situation, from the Provisionals’ point of view, 
began to improve with the importation of guns from the United States and elsewhere 
and the acquisition of commercial explosives, but very soon they recognized the need 
for stand-off weapons, i.e. weapons that could be fired from a safe distance, while 
minimizing the risk of detection for the attackers.32 The development of new trigger and 
detonating mechanisms for explosives (including command wires and timers) solved 
many of these problems, but the Provisionals were confronted by a new challenge when 
many of its prime targets in Northern Ireland, police stations and barracks, began to be 
heavily fortified in the early 1970s.33 This required a different kind of stand-off weapon, 
one that could breach fortifications that might not always be vulnerable to a pre-planted 
bomb. Initial attempts to circumvent these defences consisted of catapulting petrol 
bombs from nearby roofs and subsequently what is referred to as a ‘spigot grenade’,34 a 
container of explosive with a lit fuse attached to the end of a dowel rod, which was fired 
from a bow or shotgun. Needless to say, both of these approaches left a lot to be desired 
in terms of safety and reliability and alternatives were sought.35 
 
It was at this stage that the obvious possibility of using mortars must have occurred to 
one or more members of the PIRA. By the mid-20th century, mortars were a fairly 
standard complement in armies worldwide, having proven their utility over traditional 
artillery in terms of reaching over all kinds of obstacles, from redoubts on hilltops to 
foxholes in the trenches of World War I. While many of those who flocked to the 
fledgling movement were young people caught up in the activism of the late 1960s, 
there were also a handful of older PIRA members, including those with military 
                                                          
30 Coogan, p. 367; See also English, p. 115 for a similar sentiment. 
31 Gerry Bradley and Brian Feeney, Insider: Gerry Bradley's Life in the IRA (Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 
Ltd., 2009), p. 60. The lack of military capability extended also to the availability of personnel with the 
requisite mētis, perhaps best illustrated by the fact that Jack McCabe, the incipient PIRA Quartermaster 
General and chief bomb maker, blew himself up when his mixing explosives with a shovel gave off a 
spark (Coogan, p. 367). 
32 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 228. Initially, many of the PIRA’s attacks took place in decidedly close 
proximity to their adversaries, for example, engaging troops at close range with pistols or throwing hand-
held nail bombs (Shane Paul O’Doherty, The Volunteer: A Former IRA Man's True Story, (Durham, CT: 
Strategic Books Group, 2011), pp. 60-61; Jackson et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, p. 100), 
practices which do not bode well for the continued availability of large numbers of personnel for a 
protracted struggle. 
33 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 229. 
34 Ibid., pp. 228-229. 
35 Ibid, p. 229. 
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experience in World War II or elsewhere. Some of these old hands had no doubt used or 
at least encountered mortars and were thus equipped to identify the mortar as the ideal 
weapon to solve the problem of fortified targets. This would make the mechanism of 
awareness, in terms of the earlier theoretical discussion, a combination of active 
searching and prior demonstration. Even without men with prior military knowledge, it 
is known that the young, brash volunteers with only street battles under their belt 
consulted military manuals looking for ideas on using explosives,36 providing yet 
another avenue for awareness of the mortar as a possible useful acquisition to the 
PIRA’s burgeoning arsenal. 
 
The Adoption Decision 
 
People and Process 
 
Prior to confronting the actual decision surrounding pursuit of the ongoing development 
of improvised mortars, it is necessary to identify the probable decision makers and the 
decision context in which a decision of this type was likely to be made. 
Organizationally, the PIRA was something of a hybrid. On the one hand, at the time of 
its split with the Officials, the PIRA theoretically inherited the well-defined, traditional 
structure of Irish Republican militants, modelled somewhat ironically on the British 
Army.37  On a daily basis, supreme authority rested in the Army Council – elected by 
the General Army Convention through an Army Executive – which directed a General 
Headquarters (GHQ) consisting of ten specialist departments. At an operational level, 
the Army was for its first decade divided into brigades and battalions, but after 1978 it 
was split for political and security reasons into Northern and Southern Commands, with 
the Northern Command presiding over brigades that were more cellular in nature38 and 
consisted of four to eight person Active Service Units (ASUs).39 On the other hand, in 
practice, while overall strategy was laid out by the Army Council, operational control 
was far more decentralized. Local units (at least down to the brigade level and 
                                                          
36 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. Jackson et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, p. 
121, citing O’Callaghan. 
37 English, p. 114 and Coogan, p. 379. 
38 For more detailed information on this structure, see Horgan and Taylor, passim; Moloney, pp. 376-379. 
39 Moloney, pp. 157-160; Coogan, p. 465; M.L.R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?: The Military Strategy of 
the Irish Republican Movement (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 188.  
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sometimes even to the level of individual ASUs) enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in 
such factors as targeting and weapons employment.40 This was true even in the early 
years, as former PIRA bomb-maker Shane Paul O’Doherty describes: ‘it was largely up 
to the local talent to design, develop, and agree to use a new technology’.41 Therefore, 
the PIRA exhibited both top-down and bottom-up decision-making.42 
 
Yet, it has been asserted that in the case of a decision of the magnitude of whether or 
not to embark on a major enterprise like the acquisition or development of mortars, the 
decision would take place at the centre of the organization.43 In fact, O’Doherty 
specifically mentions the development of mortars as one of the few decisions that was 
centralized during his tenure with the organization in the early 1970s.44 It is therefore 
extremely probable that the final decision regarding whether or not to acquire mortars, 
and whether to embark on an indigenous development program, would rest with the 
Army Council. In the absence of access to internal Army Council documents, it is 
difficult to state with certainty which members of the Council might have been for or 
against the adoption of mortar weapons technology, but of the original tranche of PIRA 
leaders it has been reported that David O’Connell was a keen proponent of the 
Provisionals’ use of the then-novel car bomb,45 so he might very well have been among 
the supporters of an instrumentally useful weapon like mortar systems. 
 
It is quite unlikely, however, that the Army Council would make a decision to adopt 
mortars without some input from below. The most probable sources of such input would 
be the department of the Quartermaster General (QMG) and the Engineering 
Department. While the QMG would presumably have a greater say in the case of 
externally acquired mortar systems and the Engineering Department would predominate 
in discussions of internally developed mortars, both departments would likely be 
                                                          
40 Horgan and Taylor, p. 23; Dillon, p. 153; Kevin Toolis, Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within the IRA's Soul 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 319. All in all, Boyne (‘Uncovering the Irish Republican Army: 
Organization’) argued in 1996 that the core middle-ranking operational decision makers in the PIRA 
numbered approximately 40 individuals.  
41 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. Also see, O’Doherty, The Volunteer, pp. 120-124. This 
independence of action was heightened in the wake of the 1978 reorganization (Jackson et. al., 
‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, p. 134).  
42 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. 
43 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘D’, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
19 June 2012.  
44 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. 
45 English, p. 111. 
131 
 
heavily involved in providing guidance and expert opinion to the Army Council 
(especially since the QMG usually sat on the Army Council itself). 
 
This somewhat bidirectional nature of decision making within the PIRA has been 
confirmed by a former law enforcement official familiar with PIRA command and 
control as being the most probable operationalization of the mortar adoption decision. In 
this dynamic, bottom-up requirements and suggestions would filter up through the 
hierarchy to the Army Council from local units, and technical assessments of the 
feasibility of the endeavour would be given by those with expertise in GHQ (especially 
the Quartermaster and Engineering Departments).46 The Army Council would then 
make the final decision in a top-down fashion and implement it through the Chief of 
Staff and GHQ.47 Richard English has singled out the PIRA’s somewhat flexible 
command and decision making structure – the ‘combination of high-level centralization 
with locally autonomous initiative’ – as playing an important role in the PIRA’s 
constant efforts to innovate.48 
 
Turning to the actual mortar adoption decision, this can be divided into three component 
decisions: a) the initial decision whether to acquire mortars or not; b) the decision 
regarding which mechanism of adoption to employ; and c) the subsequent series of 




The initial impetus for considering mortars has already been introduced. To anyone 
familiar with weapons at the time, mortars were a logical choice in order to overcome 
the physical hardening occurring around the PIRA’s favoured target facilities, such as 
police stations, which usually consisted of stronger perimeter fortifications but left the 
roofs of the facilities relatively unprotected. In other words, the PIRA were driven to 
                                                          
46 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. 
47 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement officials ‘A’ and ‘D’. 
48 Richard English, ‘The IRA’s Attempted Murder of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’, in Rasmussen 
and Hafez (eds.), p. 119. 
49 The last component is not strictly necessary, since it is conceivable that the IRA could merely have 
continued to develop new mortar weapons based on an institutional inertia, as has been argued to have 
occurred with certain other elements of their explosives development. The third decision element might 




seek mortars by a tactical need.50 This echoed a range of other cases of PIRA weapons 
and technology adoption, from its use of long-delay timers in Brighton in 1984 to 
overcome security sweeps, to its adoption of shaped explosives charges to penetrate 
armour.51 The fact that mortars also provided a standoff capability that would help 
shield their operators from detection was another feature making them attractive to the 
PIRA.52 Conversely, the high ballistic arc of a mortar made it possible to fire on targets 
fairly close to the launcher (at least when measured relative to other forms of artillery) – 
or even above it – which at times could be useful in built-up urban environments.53 
Some PIRA commanders might also have believed that using mortars against police and 
military bases would deflect security force attention away from Catholic areas and the 
PIRA.54 
 
Yet, all these benefits do not guarantee that an organization would choose to adopt 
mortars. One needs to consider the costs as well as the benefits, in addition to an actor’s 
perception of the likelihood of success. After all, there is evidence that the PIRA’s 
penchant for innovation – at least in its early years – was not as widespread or 
unequivocal as it later seemed to be. Shane Paul O’Doherty, for instance, describes a 
time in the early 1970s when his commanders were extremely sceptical about the 
technologies that the new crop of volunteers were presenting them with and their 
conservatism led them to favour the simplest methods possible.55  
 
There must also be some consideration of the available alternatives. The security 
countermeasures installed by the British could conceivably have been dealt with in other 
                                                          
50 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. See also, Jon Coaffee, 
‘Rings of Steel, Rings of Concrete and Rings of Confidence: Designing Out Terrorism in Central London 
Pre and Post September 11th’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28:1 (2004), pp. 
201–211.  This was yet another example of where, ‘Above all, necessity – and the constant need to 
improvise, usually in covert and haphazard conditions – was the mother of IRA invention’ (Oppenheimer 
(2009), p. xx). 
51 See Brian Jackson, Peter Chalk, et. al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to 
Overcome Defensive Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007), p. 101. Oppenheimer (2009, 
pp. 209-210) discusses the ‘race’ up and down the electromagnetic spectrum between the PIRA and the 
security forces in terms of attempts to jam detonation signals. 
52 Personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson, RAND, 16 May 2012. 
53 See Oppenheimer (2009), p. 228 for a similar idea. 
54 Keith Craig and Ian Geldard (IRA, INLA: Foreign Support and International Connections (Institute for 
the Study of Terrorism, 1988), p. 99) assert that this was one objective of the larger PIRA bombing 
campaign, but they regard such ideas as misguided and ultimately counterproductive. 
55 O’Doherty was even referred to by some of the old guard as ‘the font of useless knowledge’. On one 
occasion he devised a novel safety mechanism whereby a detonator could be separated by a tube from the 
explosive prior to arming the explosive, but it was rejected with an ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix it’ attitude. 
Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. 
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ways,56 such as shifting to different targets, infiltrating facilities, building bigger bombs 
or finding simpler methods of getting bombs over the walls.57 Upon closer inspection, 
however, none of these alternatives were really open to the PIRA of the early 1970s. 
Target shifting was not an attractive option – the Provisionals were already going hell 
for leather in terms of trying to bring commercial activity in the North to a standstill 
through bombing city centres in towns like Derry and Belfast and, at least in Northern 
Ireland, the PIRA did not want to be seen to intentionally target civilians.58 Allowing 
the other focus of their operations – Northern Ireland and British security forces – to 
retreat to the safety of their bases was not a viable option under the PIRA’s strategy of 
the time.59 Furthermore, while their bomb-making was becoming more proficient and 
they were embarking on the production of home-made explosives, the days of the ‘city 
destroyer’ bombs of the 1990s were far off and it is doubtful whether the organization 
could have developed explosive devices big enough – and stationed them close enough 
– to blast their way through the fortifications. Last, simpler methods had failed to show 
much promise: O’Doherty’s flare bombs (see Table 6.1) were insufficient to cause 
much damage, the spigot grenades were too dangerous, and hijacking aircraft to drop 
bombs on the roofs of police stations was impractical on a large scale.60 
 
When one takes into account the operational benefits of mortars, together with the 
desire of the PIRA at the time to attack the security forces in particular and the absence 
of viable alternatives, there is a strong rational argument for the pursuit of mortar 
capability, despite the anticipated costs. In the absence of any countervailing 
                                                          
56 For an extensive discussion of terrorist adaptations to countermeasures see Jackson, et. al. (2007), 
Breaching the Fortress Wall. 
57 One former law enforcement official remarked that, as well as moving to high-technology solutions, the 
PIRA occasionally moved towards old, tried and true technology to overcome problems (Author 
interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’). 
58 Jackson et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, p. 212.  Because the PIRA wanted to appear to be 
a legitimate military organization, it had a stated goal of minimizing civilian casualties in its operations. 
The PIRA’s commitment to this as a criterion of success differed over the course of its operational 
history, however, and its actual (in contrast to verbal) commitment to it has been disputed. Use of this as a 
criterion also differed among the PIRA’s theatres of operation (J.M. Glover, Northern Ireland Terrorist 
Trends (London: Ministry of Defence, British Government, 1978) and Horgan and Taylor). 
59 Jackson et. al., ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, p. 212.  Because of the focus of its actions in 
Northern Ireland, the PIRA used the damage it inflicted on the security forces as a measure of success. 
Indeed, the group saw this as directly connected to its overall goal: ‘[Reportedly] . . . the Army Council 
set an initial target to kill thirty-six British soldiers because it was thought that this figure matched the 
number of troops killed in Aden and would supposedly impose enough pressure on the British to oblige 
them to negotiate’ (Smith, p. 97). 
60 O’Doherty recounts an episode when he volunteered to go up in a helicopter to investigate whether it 




indications, it appears as if this, or a similar (albeit less formal) calculation, is the most 
likely result of Army Council deliberations on the issue of the PIRA adopting an 
organizational mortar capability. A comparable logic might prevail in other cases of 
PIRA weapons adoption, but that remains an empirical question.  
 
Autarky as the Preferred Mechanism of Adoption 
 
We have seen that the PIRA followed the path of internal development using its own 
resources and expertise, i.e., it engaged in autarkic adoption of mortars. There are 
several mutually reinforcing arguments for how this decision was reached: 
 
i. Expense and Security Risks of External Adoption: The PIRA sourced many of its 
weapons through patronage (primarily through the largesse of Libya’s Moammar 
Gaddafi and Irish-American sympathizers in the United States)61 and exploitation 
(such as purchasing arms from third party suppliers or stealing detonators from 
commercial quarries), but these sources presented certain disadvantages for more 
sophisticated weapons like mortars. First of all, the basic purchase of weapons 
systems on the open market can be expensive, and can open the organization’s 
activities up to interdiction or infiltration by security forces which can simply 
monitor known arms suppliers, not to mention the additional resource costs and 
risks associated with transporting, storing and maintaining purchased arms.62 While 
the IRA had a steady funding stream for most of its existence, especially in the early 
years this funding was limited. Moreover, several of the organization’s attempts to 
import arms, whether from purchases or overseas patrons, were interdicted in the 
1970s and 1980s, with notable examples being seizures of weapons at Schipol 
Airport (1971)63 and on the ships, the Claudia (1973),64 the Marita Ann (1984)65 and 
the Eksund (1987).66 Some reports list mortars among the seized weapons,67 but it 
can be inferred that, while the organization’s officers might have attempted to 
include externally-sourced mortars in large arms consignments at various times, 
                                                          
61 Moloney, pp. 8-12; Dillon, p. 396; Bradley and Feeney, p. 96. 
62 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 150. 
63 Coogan, p. 432. 
64 Craig and Geldard, p. 72. 
65 Toolis, p. 67. 
66 Maloney, pp. 3-8. 
67 Ibid., p. 171 and Dillon, p. 399, for example, mention mortars amongst the weapons seized by Belgian 
customs officers in 1977. 
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these attempts were not successful, since this type of mortar was never used by the 
PIRA. Furthermore, a former law enforcement official has stated that the PIRA 
never procured commercially available mortars.68 Possessing an internal production 
capability would obviate many of these risks, because large numbers of mortars did 
not need to be stored, but could be manufactured as needed. Also, any interdictions 
of mortars would not negate the knowledge of how to build new ones in the future,69 
and necessary components could be purchased legitimately – and more cheaply – 
than military mortars.70 O’Doherty maintains that most R&D was generally 
conducted from within the organization because of a reluctance to be dependent on a 
potentially fickle external supply. He gives the example of detonators as an item 
where interruptions in the external supply at the end of 1973 and beginning of 1974 
in Derry severely curtailed PIRA operations in the area.71 
 
ii. Specific Tactical Requirements: The PIRA had usage requirements that differed 
substantially from military mortars. While military mortars were designed for fairly 
long ranges (~5,000m), to have the firer present upon launch and to be used 
numerous times, the nature of the PIRA’s covert terrorist campaign meant that it 
required mortars operative over shorter ranges (within the confines of a city), with 
options to fire remotely and where the launcher was generally abandoned after a 
single use.72 Moreover, military mortars required expertise and practice to aim 
correctly and achieve desired accuracy; the PIRA volunteers launching mortars from 
the back of a van and aiming in the general direction of a police station were 
operating under different functional constraints.73 Producing their own mortars 
would thus allow the PIRA to customize weapons for their own purposes. 
 
iii. Deficit of Trust in Externally Sourced Materials: As the conflict in Northern Ireland 
wore on, there were increasing cases of British or RUC counterintelligence 
personnel ‘doctoring’ or otherwise sabotaging PIRA weapons – including guns with 
                                                          
68 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’. 
69 Personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson. 
70 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 150. 
71 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. As further support for this thesis, the PIRA was even 
prepared at one stage to undertake the extremely hazardous task of trying to produce its own detonators in 
order to ensure a reliable supply, as uncovered during the Kilcock raid in 1993 (Oppenheimer (2009), p. 
204). 
72 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’.  
73 Ibid. One former law enforcement official mentioned that PIRA mortar operators would merely aim for 
the tall radio masts that formed part of the police station or military complex. 
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built-in surveillance devices or explosives that would not detonate.74 This led to 
PIRA engineers having decreased confidence in externally-sourced materiel and 
provided an additional impetus to produce those weapons internally when it could. 
 
iv. DIY Prestige: In addition to the purely tactical advantages of particular weapons, 
there were also the symbolic messages that would be tacitly conveyed by the use of 
a particularly sophisticated weapon. It is reported that at all levels of the IRA, from 
the organization as a whole to individual units, there was often the desire to show 
various audiences, whether it was the British, the Catholic constituency or even 
other brigades in the PIRA, how ingenious, capable and terrifying the PIRA could 
be. As Oppenheimer contends, ‘doing-it-yourself was and still is irreplaceable as a 
sign of prestige’75 – an indigenous mortar capability would bestow propaganda 
benefits on its developers. 
 
v. Technical Confidence and Constituencies: With the exception perhaps of the LTTE, 
the PIRA possessed the most mature, highly-skilled and productive research and 
development organ in the annals of violent non-state organizations, the so-called 
Engineering Department (ED). The ED’s committed and cunning senior technicians 
were responsible for numerous breakthroughs in the arts and instruments of 
clandestine war against the state and enjoyed a substantial level of influence as the 
PIRA’s elite.76 Their early successes with explosives mixtures in the 1970s 
(following the initial missteps in this regard) might have given them (and the 
PIRA’s senior command) the confidence that they could take on the difficult task of 
developing an effective mortar capability. Even if this confidence was lacking 
among members of the Army Council or other senior leadership, the ED enjoyed a 
degree of independence from frontline operations,77 and the decision to engage in 
the development and production of mortars may have been the PIRA leadership’s 
way of ‘letting the movement's better technical intellects have their experiments’.78 
The subsequent history of the organization certainly presents many examples of 
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highly educated and skilled individuals being given more or less free rein to develop 
or acquire new weapons technologies.79 
 
vi. Weapon Evolution: Indigenous development allowed for the PIRA’s mortar 
capability to evolve over time, and adapt to new requirements and developments, 
whereas if mortars were externally sourced, a new product would have to be 
identified, possibly necessitating the development of a relationship with a different 
supplier and the locating of new transport channels. In-house production would 
allow for incremental, as well as discontinuous, development, as required,80 a 
benefit that would not be lost on forward-thinking leaders. 
 
Impetus for Sustained Development 
 
Even after the initial decision to engage in the production of mortars (during the Lack of 
Capabilities phase), the question remains as to why the PIRA persisted through three 
more phases, even substantially expanding the breadth of their R&D program in the 
Approaching Military Grade and Bigger and Better phases. One of the obvious reasons 
why the development of mortars continued past the initial versions (Marks 1 and 2), is 
the set of drawbacks associated with these somewhat stumbling first steps – both in 
terms of the mortars’ effectiveness as weapons and the risk posed to their handlers (see 
Table 6.1). It was to be expected that the developers would continue for some time until 
they ‘got it right’. Perhaps a more interesting question is why there were another eleven 
models after the Mark 6, which was sufficiently reliable to be utilized in the high-profile 
1994 attack on Heathrow Airport twenty years after it was first deployed. At least part 
of the answer might be found in the momentum that develops behind many long-term 
development programs that are at least partially insulated from interference by the 
leadership or enemy forces – members of the ED revelling in their technical prowess 
may have been loath to cease working on a challenging system that attracted a large 
amount of external attention to the movement. However, there were doubtless external 
in addition to organizational drivers of continued development. We have stated above 
                                                          
79 One of the more well-known examples is that of the so-called ‘Boston Three’ (actually five scientists, 
including an aeronautical engineer, a computer scientist and someone with high-level U.S. security 
clearance) who set about developing a guided missile system in the United States with the aim of being 
able to shoot down British aircraft (primarily helicopters) in Northern Ireland – see McGuire, pp. 211-
212; 25.  
80 Personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson.  
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that offence and defence in general establish a co-evolutionary dynamic that, from the 
PIRA’s point of view, forced their ‘mortar offence’ to constantly adapt and grow in 
order to cope with more robust defences, or in Oppenheimer’s words, ‘to keep the 
authorities on the hop’.81 Larger, more penetrating mortars were required, for instance, 
by further British hardening of military structures specifically against mortars in the 
1980s, including an empty top floor and a reinforced roof.82 Desensitization of the 
media, the enemy and a group’s constituencies from multiple uses of the same weapon – 
some mortars were used hundreds of times – might also drive the leadership to demand 
something new. 
 
The evolution in mortars should be seen in the context of the broader improvements 
made by the PIRA in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) over the 1970s and 1980s. In 
many ways, the development of mortars mirrored the early PIRA bombs, which had 
begun with a barrage of inchoate, often dangerous and counterproductive explosive 
devices in the early 1970s and grew to a more sophisticated, diverse, targetable and 
reliable set of explosive tools by the late 1980s.83 As a last note, although there were 
public outcries at particular mortar attacks (especially when the mortars went awry and 
harmed civilians), there does not appear to have been any specific rancour directed 
towards the mortar as a particular tactic, as there was with letter bombs and later 
‘human proxy’ bombings, which had forced the PIRA to cease or minimize these 
practices. 
 
Factors Responsible for the Success of Adoption Efforts 
 
When it comes to judging the success of the PIRA’s adoption efforts,84 it is apparent 
from Table 6.1 that the PIRA did, by the end of the second phase in the development 
process and barely two years after its first tentative attempts,85 succeed in producing a 
reasonably reliable and safe weapon that at least some of the time resulted in physical 
damage and casualties, thus achieving a minimal level of success. Further, by the 
                                                          
81 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 292. 
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84 Here we are focusing on success in the actual adoption process, rather than the efficacy of mortars in 
advancing the PIRA’s long-term political and strategic objectives. 




middle of the 1990s, PIRA mortars were evaluated as comparable in quality to military 
models.86  
 
However, this broad picture elides to some degree the difficulties and setbacks 
experienced on the road to developing a robust capability, which can also be gleaned 
from a close look at Table 6.1. The accuracy of many of the models was poor, not only 
of the earlier attempts, but sometimes (as with the Marks 7, 8, and 9) accuracy was 
intentionally traded for greater explosive power. Such development choices are 
inconsistent with the PIRA’s avowed desire to avoid civilian casualties in Northern 
Ireland, signalling either gross incompetence and negligence, or belying the claim of 
civilian immunity from attack. The inclusion of shrapnel such as ball bearings or 
pennies in certain mortar shells seems to favour the latter explanation. 
 
Another major problem was the safety of the devices. Many of the explosives used were 
volatile and the designers did not include safety mechanisms in at least the first five 
variants, resulting in ‘own goals’, such as the death of two PIRA volunteers from the 
premature explosion of a Mark 3 mortar in 1973.87 Compounding safety and accuracy 
issues was a lack of detonation reliability – many of the mortars, even if they did not 
blow up on launch or hit the wrong target, failed to detonate upon impacting the 
intended target. 
 
It is little surprise, therefore, that from a purely military utilitarian point of view (putting 
aside psychological or propaganda effects), the effectiveness of many of the mortars – 
even the relatively more reliable ones – left a lot to be desired. From 1973 to 1978, for 
example, the PIRA attempted 71 attacks with mortars, without inflicting any adversary 
fatalities.88  Between 1981 and 1992, even a publication sympathetic to the PIRA 
revealed that 15% of 92 mortar attacks experienced technical glitches such as missing 
the target or exploding improperly or not at all, with a further 35% of attacks resulting 
in no reported casualties.89 Again we see the behaviour of mortars closely tracking that 
                                                          
86 Geraghty, p. 190.  
87 O’Callaghan, pp. 84-85. This to some extent paralleled the wider safety issues that the PIRA was 
having at the time when it came to dealing with explosives. For example, in June 1970 much of Derry’s 
PIRA leadership (together with two children) were killed while constructing bombs in a kitchen (Toolis, 
p. 304). 
88 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 230. 
89 IRIS: The Republican Magazine incident reports between 1981 and 1992, figures cited in personal 
correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson, RAND. 
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of the PIRA’s weapons overall – it has been reported that through the 1980s and early 
1990s, 90% of PIRA operations failed or were called off, although it must be 
acknowledged that not all of these occurrences were due to technical failures.90 
 
Nonetheless, the PIRA’s technicians persevered with the development of mortars and 
were eventually successful in addressing many of the problems of safety and reliability 
through a number of ingenious advances, from impeller-operated arming mechanisms to 
sophisticated timers and triggers. Although accuracy presented a perennial problem, 
even this improved markedly. For example, according to a former Northern Ireland law 
enforcement official, in the 1985 attack on the Newry Police Station the landing 
locations of the several mortars used were closely grouped, indicating a fair amount of 
accuracy and reliability in ballistic trajectory.91   
 
These achievements were all the more remarkable when one considers that over the 
entire period of development, the PIRA was under intense security pressures, including 
surveillance, infiltration by informers and concerted efforts by British and Irish 
authorities to interdict or uncover their weapons supplies and facilities. On an 
operational level, their use of mortars was circumscribed by the lack of opportunity to 
do ranging shots and to remain in place long enough to adjust their aim before trying 
again – most mortars were either worked remotely or were of the one-time, ‘fire and 
forget’ variety. PIRA volunteers came up with creative workarounds, including doing 
practice runs in remote locations and firing from mobile platforms (e.g., through the cut-
out roofs of vans or building equipment).92 
 
Most importantly for measuring success, the PIRA did launch several mortar attacks 
that caused serious injuries or fatalities and some that qualified as ‘spectaculars’.93 
Among the more notable mortar attacks were: 
a) Newry Police Station (February 28, 1985): The local unit and South Armagh 
volunteers launched nine Mark 10 mortar shells from a hijacked truck aimed at 
                                                          
90 Oppenheimer (2009), p. 84; Smith, p. 177, reports figures of eight aborted or failed attacks of eighteen 
between February and May 1983, which equates to a failure rate of 44%. 
91 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’. 
92  Harnden, pp. 233-234, cited in personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson, RAND, 5/16/2012. 
93 Although never causing nearly the scope of death and destruction as the so-called ‘city buster’ bombs 
in London and Manchester in the 1990s, the Downing Street and Heathrow mortar attacks were notorious 
more for the nature of the target than anything else. 
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the RUC station in Corry Square, Newry. Eight shells overshot the station, but 
one landed on a canteen, killing 9 policemen and injuring 37 other people.94 
b) Downing Street Attacks (February 7, 1991): During British Cabinet deliberations 
regarding the Gulf War, the PIRA fired three Mark 10 mortars from a specially-
constructed opening in a van parked near Downing Street, central London. One 
mortar hit a tree and detonated several metres short of its target, shattering the 
blast windows in the Cabinet Room, forming a wide crater in the gardens and 
severely damaging Nos. 11 and 12 Downing Street. The other two shells did not 
explode and were rendered safe.95 According to a law enforcement source 
familiar with the attack, the mortars were actually quite accurate – the only 
reason they missed the target was that the ranging mark on the pavement that the 
attack team had made the previous day had been washed away by snow and the 
team had to estimate its position on the day of the attack, resulting in a few 
metres’ discrepancy.96 Had this intervention by Mother Nature not occurred, 
there might very well have been a direct hit on the Cabinet. 
c) Heathrow Airport Attacks (March 8, 10 and 13, 1994): A PIRA team fired three 
separate salvos of 4-5 Mark 6 mortars at Heathrow Airport’s northern runway 
and Terminal Four building. One bomb landed on the roof of Terminal Four, 
which had approximately 4,000 occupants at the time. None of the mortars 
exploded, perhaps because the PIRA had not intended them to, but one widely-
held opinion is that they had been sabotaged by security forces or an informer.97 
Nonetheless, the targeting of a facility in which a successful attack could have 
caused thousands of civilian casualties represented one of the most ambitious 
attacks by the PIRA up to this time and the fact that a second and third attack 
were possible despite increased security caused embarrassment for authorities.98 
 
Irrespective of casualties, all of these attacks had substantial psychological impact (the 
raison d’être of genuine terrorism). This, together with the casualties that were caused 
                                                          
94 One of the former law enforcement officials remarked to the author that, although the accuracy was 
reasonable, the attack was not quite as successful as often reported, since only one of the eight mortars 
detonated. Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’. 
95 Andy Oppenheimer, 30 Years of IEDs: The Operational Art of the Provisional IRA, PIRA – Lessons 
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96 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’. 
97 Moloney, p. 424. 
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close to the perimeter fence. 
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and the drastic improvements in the weapons themselves lends weight to a conclusion 
that, as a whole, the PIRA successfully adopted the weapons technology of mortar 
systems. 
 
It remains to identify some of the contributing factors to this success. After a thorough 
analysis of the context surrounding the PIRA’s development of mortars, three 
interrelated factors stand out as most salient. 
 
Organizational and Individual Expertise and Access 
 
The PIRA inherited a lot of latent knowledge from before the 1969 split,99 including the 
basics of explosives and some long-standing relationships with foreign supporters (such 
as in the United States). It also had an organizational model that its members were 
comfortable with and that had served them reasonably well in the past. This meant that 
the organization did not have to start from scratch, so to speak, either technically or 
organizationally and, although it was strapped for weapons and other resources in 1970, 
it was able to build on its legacy capabilities to quickly reconstitute its expertise and 
access to resources. In addition, the socio-economic background of its membership 
ended up serving it well in the area of weapons development. The majority of its 
members were working-class Catholics, who while not necessarily possessing the 
techne for weapons development, brought with them a basic inventiveness, creativity 
and ‘working men’s skillsets’ like machining and welding. In addition to the direct 
value of such experience in the fabrication of mortars, this background quickly allowed 
the organization to develop a high level of practical mētis – something that was essential 
for solving the obstacles encountered in developing improvised weapons. At the same 
time, the appeal of the PIRA was sufficiently broad that the organization was able to 
attract the services of a small number of highly-trained individuals, including engineers, 
chemists and computer scientists to provide the requisite knowledge of aerodynamics, 
timing systems and so forth – in other words the right techne to build a mortar 
capability.100 Perhaps the best example of this is the fascinating story of Eamon 
McGuire, an aeronautical engineer, who, while not a full-time member of the 
                                                          
99 Author interview with Jim Cusack, Dublin, Republic of Ireland, 20 June 2012. 
100 An interesting case occurred when the PIRA identified and recruited a British Telecom engineer with 
Republican leanings. Counterterrorism officials were able to identify his origins from the fact that he used 
a method for fastening wires that was characteristic of British Telecom training. Author interview with 
former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. 
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organization, devoted years of service to identifying, acquiring and developing new 
technologies for the Provisionals, including assisting them in their electromagnetic cat-
and-mouse games with British radio signal jammers and his participation in the abortive 
attempt to produce an indigenous surface-to-air missile for the PIRA.101 Agents like 
McGuire – who ended up on the run from the FBI for several years in a chase that 
spanned the globe before spending substantial time in the US prison system – were able 
to acquire necessary technical equipment and knowledge.102 
 
At the same time, there was an organizational structure that was set up to promote and 
implement innovation from the very beginning. The embodiment of this 
institutionalization of R&D, the Engineering Department, was somewhat isolated and 
protected from frontline operations, which allowed for the possibility of long-term R&D 
projects like mortars. This long-term thinking was most cogently expressed in reports of 
the PIRA encouraging promising future technicians to remain in school in order to 
increase their technical knowledge, as in the case of Danny McNamee, who became a 
leading bomb-maker and was supported in his technical studies at Queen’s University, 
Belfast, by the PIRA.103  At the same time, the organization also made room for local 
EOs (explosives officers) in the various towns in the North to react to local conditions 
and independently engage in local-level innovation, which could then filter back to the 
centre.104 
Safe Havens  
 
The existence of a large area in the Republic of Ireland in which to conduct research, 
production and testing that was beyond the reach of British authorities has been 
identified as a key element in the success of the PIRA’s mortar program.105 At least in 
the early days of the development of mortars (during the first two phases of 
                                                          
101 McGuire, passim. Another example is Terry McIvor, who became a leading explosives and electronics 
technician for the Provisionals, while continuing his lecturer position in electronics at a college in 
Dundalk. See Bradley and Feeney, p. 131. 
102 Examples of technology purchased for the PIRA by its operatives include PULNIX light sensor 
systems to use as trigger mechanisms and 2,900 Ireco detonators from a company in Tucson in 1989. 
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103 Oppenheimer (2009), pp. 275-276. 
104 For instance, Shane Paul O’Doherty – at the time the local Derry EO – who had a reputation for 
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mortars. Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. 
105 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. 
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development), the Garda Special Branch was reportedly less than efficient or properly 
resourced in its operations. This allowed the PIRA (especially in areas of the Republic 
where it had strong local support) to engage in its development activities relatively 
unhindered, whereas in the North there was considerable pressure from the security 
forces, making any sustained R&D extremely difficult. One of the more infamous 
examples is the PIRA weapons factory discovered on a farm near Clonaslee, County 
Laois in June 1996, where – in addition to copious amounts of weapons and explosives 
– two senior PIRA technical officers were arrested while in the process of assembling 
mortars in a 14 x 8 foot bunker, which might have served as a testing range.106 While 
some development did occur in certain Republican strongholds in Northern Ireland like 
South Armagh,107 this is unlikely to have been sufficient to permit successive mortar 
developments over an extended period. It was pointed out to the author that it is no 
coincidence that the vast majority of mortar attacks took place in the southern part of 
Northern Ireland, close to the border with the Republic and to rural Catholic-majority 
Northern areas near the border.108 
 
Culture of Learning 
 
While Brian Jackson, in his seminal study of PIRA learning, identifies areas where its 
attempts to learn were of mixed quality,109 in the area of weapons development the 
PIRA displayed an aptitude for learning that is unrivalled among terrorist groups.110 The 
first form of learning it engaged in was pre-employment testing of weapons systems. 
The opportunity to remain relatively unmolested for much of the development period in 
the South and at times in the southern part of Northern Ireland presented ample 
opportunities for testing weapons. O’Callaghan describes firing mortars with dummy 
shells at Inch Strand on the inner side of the Dingle Peninsula, where the shells would 
land undamaged on the sandy beach,111 while O’Doherty describes visiting a farm in 
                                                          
106 Geraghty, p. 201.  
107 Indeed, several innovations such as radio-controlled devices and the large ‘city destroyer’ fertilizer 
bombs were allegedly produced in this area, as well as several mortar systems (Oppenheimer (2009), p. 
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108 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’. 
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Kildare in 1972 where mortars were tested for range and weight-bearing capability.112 
However, this testing was far from foolproof, owing to the fact that the open spaces of 
rural testing areas differed from the mostly urban environment in which the mortars 
would be used.113 
 
The second aspect of the culture of learning was the willingness and institutionalization 
of post-operation analysis. When things went wrong with an attack, the operatives 
conducting the attack would be debriefed by superiors. Of course, ‘own goals’ (where 
the PIRA operatives were themselves killed) made it very difficult to identify the source 
of the failure.114 After-action reporting did not only occur when missions went awry – 
this practice was so pervasive115 that it has been described as ‘debrief – win, lose or 
draw’.116 While the PIRA was unable to perform technical analyses of successful 
attacks or even observable failures (since the mortars or their remnants would be within 
the control of the authorities), they did the next best thing, by sending observers to stand 
at police cordons and try to gather as much information about the effects of the attack or 
the unexploded ordinance as possible.117 This commitment to constant learning and 




Negative Case Study: INLA 
 
The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) was a militant organization seeking to 
combine socialist revolution in the mould of James Connolly with the Republican ideal 
of reuniting Ireland. It was established on 8 December 1974 as a breakaway group from 
the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), from which the Provisional IRA had split 
five years previously and which had given up armed conflict in 1972. Led by the 
                                                          
112 O’Doherty recalls that on one occasion, the mortar shell ‘went so far and buried itself underground that 
they couldn’t find it’ – author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. 
113 The author wishes to thank Interviewee B for this insight. 
114 ‘Bombers’, Stirling Film Television Productions (2012).  Accessed at 
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charismatic Seamus Costello, the splinter group established a new political party, the 
Irish Republican Socialist Party, a subset of which formed a secret military 
organization, which eventually became known as the INLA.118 The INLA engaged in 
bombings and shootings against its British and sectarian enemies from its inception, at 
times even outpacing the PIRA in the number and ruthlessness of its attacks. Among its 
most prominent attacks were the assassination of British MP Airey Neave at the House 
of Commons in London in March 1979,119 a September 1982 destruction of a radar 
station in County Cork, Ireland,120 the December 1982 bombing of the Droppin’ Well 
Inn in Ballykelly,121 the ‘Darkley Massacre’ in November 1983122 and the killing of the 
leader of the Loyalist Volunteer Force, Billy Wright, in prison in December 1997.123 
INLA members also participated in the 1981 prison hunger strike. 
  
However, the organization became embroiled in several bloody and debilitating feuds, 
first with the OIRA in 1975 that ultimately led to the killing of Costello in 1977, and 
then internal hostilities between several rival factions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Another prominent example of internal destabilization is that of Harry Kirkpatrick, a 
senior INLA officer, who became one of the most prominent ‘supergrasses’.124 
Fractious and partially descending into drug-related criminality,125 the INLA eventually 
declared a ceasefire on 28 August 1998 (while rejecting the Good Friday Agreement), 
after which it finally achieved some degree of internal cohesiveness126 before formally 
giving up its arms in February 2010.127  
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Although operating during much the same time period as the PIRA and directing its 
violence against a similar set of enemies, the INLA never developed or used any mortar 
system, or indeed any complex stand-off weapon at all. Investigating the reasons for this 
lack of weapons adoption despite almost identical environmental conditions to the PIRA 




While the INLA did not come anywhere close to the breadth or institutionalized nature 
of the PIRA’s weapons adoption programs, this does not mean that the organization did 
not show inventiveness or did not innovate at all during its two and a half decades of 
armed opposition to the British government. In contrast to many descriptions of the 
organization, they have been described by the person who has studied them more 
closely than any other, investigative journalist Henry McDonald, as ‘pathfinders’,128 
technically, organizationally and in some of their political positions.129  
 
The most prominent example of their technical prowess is in the organization’s 
introduction of the mercury tilt switch, which was used to kill Airey Neave. Although 
the organization did not invent the device itself130 it was the first to employ its potential 
as a motion-sensitive trigger for an explosive.131 After several less publicized uses of the 
switch in a weapon,132 on 30 March 1979, a team of INLA bombers magnetically 
affixed a bomb to Airey Neave’s car at his apartment,133 which armed itself after a timer 
had run out. Later that day, when Neave left the Houses of Commons and drove up a 
ramp, the switch detonated the bomb – killing a renowned World War II veteran and 
close friend of soon-to-be Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This attack, at the very 
heart of the British government, put the INLA on the map as a terrorist organization to 
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murdered-Airey-Neave-decommissions-weapons.html on 11 October 2013. 
128 Author Interview with Henry McDonald, 19 June 2012. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Sheldon Bitko, Mercury Tilt Switch, U.S. Patent 3,978,301, filed 21 July 1975, and issued 31 August 
1976. Available at: http://patft.uspto.gov/. 
131 Author interview with Andy Oppenheimer, 22 June 2012. 
132 Holland and McDonald, p. 167; Bloomer, p. 262. 
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be reckoned with. The mercury tilt switch would later become widely used by violent 
non-state actors in Northern Ireland. 
 
In addition to innovating technically, the INLA innovated tactically, at least in terms of 
the audacity of their target selection. For instance, in 1978, the organization attempted 
to kill the British Ambassador and military attaché to Ireland by hiding a remote control 
bomb in a prayer stool in St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin.134 The bomb would have 
damaged the church and could have killed many supplicants. Fortunately, the detonation 
signal could not penetrate the thick stone walls of the cathedral and the attack failed. 
  
Yet despite these early signs of innovation, there is no evidence whatsoever of the 
INLA even attempting to use mortars, whether self-produced or otherwise. The 
available literature does not mention any such attempts and a search for the INLA in the 
Global Terrorism Database, the most comprehensive open-source database of terrorist 
incidents since 1970,135 revealed only two attacks involving anything resembling a 
mortar. Upon closer investigation, both these attacks, one of which involved a rocket-
propelled grenade and the other a mortar, turned out to have been perpetrated by the 
Provisionals rather than the INLA.136 We can thus confidently assume that this was an 
innovation the adoption of which was not even attempted by the INLA. 
 
In the absence of a mortar development process to act as a guide to dividing the period 
of INLA operations, the span of INLA activity was broken up according to observed 
major organizational changes:137 
 
1. The Formative Years through the McGlinchey Era (1974 to 1985): This phase 
covers the formation and early years of the organization under Seamus Costello, 
and after his death the brutal, authoritarian, but nonetheless still relatively 
cohesive, period under the direction of Dominic ‘Mad Dog’ McGlinchey. 
2. Riven and Declining (1986 to1998): The second phase begins with the late-
1980s feuds and internal bloodletting, followed by the steady decline of the 
                                                          
134 Holland and McDonald, pp. 161-162. 
135 Global Terrorism Database. 
136 Malcolm Sutton, CAIN Database of Deaths, 20 September 1982. Accessed at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1982.html on 6 October 2013; No author listed, ‘Northern Ireland; IRA 
Guerrillas Attack Army Post’, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (25 February 1991), p. A8. 
137 It is possible to divide up each of these periods further, although there is no prima facie indication that 
this would provide greater analytical value. 
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Before asking why the INLA did not adopt mortars, it is necessary to establish that they 
were even aware of mortars as a potential innovation. The preponderance of evidence 
points towards an awareness of mortars. First, many of the founders of the INLA came 
from much the same Republican origins as those in the PIRA, through membership in 
the old IRA. Seamus Costello, for instance, was referred to as the ‘Boy General’ for his 
exploits on behalf of the IRA in the border campaign of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
They would therefore have had similar opportunities as the Provisionals to come into 
contact with experiential knowledge of military matters (in particular, mortars) held by 
IRA veterans of World War II and previous campaigns. Indeed, the INLA was known to 
have included some ex-Army personnel within its ranks.139 Sharing the same enemies as 
the PIRA, the same tactical and strategic exigencies that perhaps prompted the 
Provisionals to first become interested in mortars (e.g., hardened walls around police 
stations and a desire to avoid harming civilians where possible), would have made 
mortars an equally logical military proposition for the INLA. 
 
Most obviously, by the time that the INLA was formed, mortars had already been used 
in the Northern Ireland conflict. Not only had the PIRA already launched many attacks 
with mortars in the two years preceding the 1974 formation of the INLA and thus 
brought the potential of mortars to the public consciousness, but the direct forerunner of 
the INLA, the OIRA, had itself attempted to use mortars only a year previously. In 
1973, the OIRA (despite its ceasefire) had planned a series of coordinated mortar 
attacks against British army bases in Northern Ireland and had trained some of its 
volunteers in the use of mortars at a camp in County Tipperary.140 These mortars were 
improvised and have been described as being ‘of reasonably good quality’.141 The actual 
                                                          
138 In the case of both the INLA and the PIRA, the organization continued to function and even engage in 
limited violence (mostly related to purely criminal activities) for several years after their formal 
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British government, Loyalist paramilitaries and the Northern Ireland security forces) for ideological 
purposes, hence marking the end of their ‘terrorist campaigns’. 
139 Author Interview with Henry McDonald. 
140 Holland and McDonald, p. 25. 
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150 
 
attacks were a failure, with only a single mortar firing but causing no injuries.142 
However, it can hardly be credibly argued that those in leadership positions in the 
INLA, who would at the very least have known about – if not been a part of – this 
planned operation, would have been oblivious to the existence of a mortar option. 
 
The Adoption Decision 
 
A more vexing question is why, if they were aware of the potential of mortars, did the 
leadership of the INLA not pursue this option? As in any investigation into a non-event 
related to clandestine actors, there is a great deal of uncertainty associated with any 
conclusions that are drawn. In the current case, however, there is a strong argument to 
be made that the following inter-related factors played a significant role in the failure of 
the group to pursue a mortar capability: 
 
1. Feuds and Internal Tensions: Most terrorist groups, perhaps as a consequence of 
the high levels of zeal, stress and a proclivity towards violent action, experience some 
degree of internal dissension and rivalries, at times resulting in splits, splinters and other 
forms of organizational fission. Yet, the INLA stands out in this regard as an 
organization so beset by factionalization and (almost existential) internal enmities 
during the course of its history, that the strategic – and hence tactical – development of 
the organization, at least with respect to its campaign of violence, was severely stunted. 
Occurring right at the inception of the organization, the early 1975 hostilities with the 
OIRA that followed the IRSP/INLA breakaway143 was viewed – even at the time – as 
having a deleterious effect on the INLA’s strategic development.144 Perhaps more 
importantly, there were at least two fundamental axes of tension within the organization 
that arguably hobbled it for much of its existence. The first was a tension between the 
leadership of the INLA based in Dublin and those members based in Belfast, who at 
                                                          
142 Ibid. A British soldier was killed but only when he foolishly handled a malfunctioning mortar in its 
tube. 
143 See ‘Paramilitary Feuds in Northern Ireland—A Chronology of Events’ CAIN Web Service, accessed 
at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/feudchron.htm on 4 November 2013, for a list of the feud’s 
violent acts. 
144 Costello had wanted to refrain from announcing the existence of the IRSP’s military wing until the 
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give itself credibility. The 1975 feud with the OIRA forced the organization to reveal itself before he 
believed that it was ready (Holland and McDonald, pp. 63-76; Interview by Henry McDonald of Terry 
Robson held in the Northern Ireland Political Collection of the Linen Hall Library, Belfast, conducted 
April 2-3, 1993).  
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times operated outside of Dublin’s command or control.145 The second axis of tension 
formed between the militants in the INLA and the movement’s political wing, the IRSP, 
with the latter moving away from traditional Republicanism and eventually adopting an 
extreme Marxist-Leninist position in the 1980s.146 These ‘fault-lines in the DNA’147 of 
the INLA would ensure that it would never be a coherent organization.  
 
Steadily rising tensions in the early 1980s, exacerbated by dirty laundry aired during a 
series of supergrass trials, eventually boiled over into a bloody four-way feud after the 
capture of the INLA’s de facto leader, Dominic McGlinchey, in 1984.148 While the 
dynamics were complex, the strife pitted a faction led by the new self-declared leader of 
the INLA, Belfast-based John O’Reilly, against a coalition made up of the former 
Dublin-based leadership on the Army Council, a group of mostly former prisoners 
gathered around Gerard Steenson, and a new offshoot known as the Irish People’s 
Liberation Organization (IPLO).149 This resulted in many prominent members losing 
their lives in the bloodletting that followed, including the Paris-based Seamus Ruddy, 
Thomas ‘Ta’ Power, and O’Reilly himself.150 Thereafter, another member, Dessie 
O’Hare, formed his own faction in the border area and engaged in a series of vicious 
assaults.151 The feuding resumed in the 1990s, with the killing of a new INLA boss, 
Gino Gallagher, in 1996, and finally came to an end later that year, after the murder of 
Hugh Torney, a long-time leading figure in the INLA.152 The fractiousness of the INLA, 
which spasmodically erupted in internecine violence, left the organization disorganized 
and debilitated for much of its history. This was hardly conducive to accomplishing any 
strategic goals, let alone the setting up and maintenance of an external, international 
acquisition channel for mortars, or the internal development of a mortar capability. 
 
2. Leadership Deficiencies and Turnover: The INLA was formally organized along 
similar lines to the PIRA, with an Army Council and General Headquarters Staff 
                                                          
145 An early example was the shooting of a respected OIRA leader, Billy McMillen, by a young Gerard 
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misfortunes (Holland and McDonald, p. 60). 
146 Ibid., p. 368. 
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151 Holland and McDonald, p. 369. 
152 ‘Paramilitary Feuds in Northern Ireland’.  
152 
 
presided over by a Chief of Staff and different brigades at the operational level.153 Yet, 
partly as a cause and partly as a consequence of the internal feuding, the leadership of 
the organization – with the exception of the group’s founder, Seamus Costello, until 
1977 – was neither stable nor forward-thinking. By some counts, the INLA had no less 
than a dozen different Chiefs of Staff during its almost quarter century of armed 
struggle,154 not to mention periods when the Army Council was essentially ignored or 
moribund. For example, with the rise of Dominic McGlinchey in 1981, he (sometimes 
brutally) imposed ‘Direct Military Rule’ and operated without obtaining authorization 
from the Army Council or GHQ staff.155 There does not seem to have been much 
opportunity for any leader to settle into his position and direct the organization in any 
long-term endeavours, least of all those involving fairly unfamiliar weapons systems 
that required training, practice, and iterative refinement.  
 
Moreover, many of the leaders appeared to be hot-headed and more interested in 
securing and preserving their power base than in developing and implementing coherent 
strategies and organizational growth. The lack of steady leadership to lend sustained 
support to an acquisition or development effort and the almost constant internal 
jockeying for position meant that even if there were innovative and forward-thinking 
technicians within the INLA’s ranks, they most probably would have viewed adopting a 
new weapons system like mortars as a decidedly risky proposition – both in terms of 
technical prospects for success and for their standing in the organization. The situation 
is best summed up by one of the prison ‘comms’156 issued by Gerard Steenson (himself 
having played no small role in the instability of the organization) in the mid-1980s: ‘The 
word L/ship is a misnomer as none effectively exists or functions. There is no national 
movement under their control’.157 
 
The innovation-dampening effects of leadership uncertainty and insecurity are perhaps 
best illustrated by exception; arguably the organization’s greatest technical innovation, 
the adoption of the mercury tilt switch that was used, among others, in the bomb that 
killed Airey Neave in 1979, took place during a period of relative stability in leadership. 
                                                          
153 Interestingly, the brigades actually had units based on a cell system years before the PIRA adopted this 
model (Dillon, p. 257).  
154 Robson interview; Holland and McDonald, passim. 
155 ‘The INLA Devours Itself’, p. 24. 
156 Messages smuggled from members in prison to those on the outside, usually written on tiny, easily 
concealable pieces of paper. 
157 Holland and McDonald, p. 322. 
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Although the Chief of Staff position was in flux during this period, senior operational 
control was maintained from 1976 to 1980 by the Belfast Officer Commanding, Ronnie 
Bunting, by all accounts a capable and deliberate man.158 It was apparently under his 
guidance and direction that the decision to target Neave with a weapon using the new 
trigger mechanism was made.159 
 
3. No Institutionalized R&D or Weapons Acquisition Capability: At no time did the 
INLA establish a formal analogue to the PIRA’s Engineering Department, i.e., an 
institutionalized R&D organ whose function it was to undertake complex weapons 
development over an extended period of time. Nor was it ever able – despite 
connections with several other terrorist groups, including Action Directe in France,160 
the Cellules Communiste Combattant (CCC) in Belgium,161 the Red Army Faction in 
Germany162 and the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Fatah wing163 – to cultivate the 
infrastructure required to import large numbers of weapons, especially anything more 
complex than small arms. Unlike the PIRA, the INLA had almost no state support and 
on the one occasion when Libya allegedly offered the organization weapons, the INLA 
was forced to reject the offer on the grounds that it was unable to deal with bringing 
them into Ireland or absorbing shipments of the size that Libya envisaged sending 
them.164 
 
4. Resource Shortages: In spite of the numerous international connections that the 
INLA did manage to make, primarily with other left-wing militant organizations in 
Europe, these did not translate into copious amounts of resources. While they did 
provide a source of small arms (pistols, hand grenades and so forth) and explosives, the 
INLA’s external connections did not provide much in the way of hard currency for the 
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163 Craig and Geldard (pp. 68-69) suggest that the idea for using the mercury tilt switch might have 
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INLA. Indeed, the organization was perennially short of money165 – it lacked the Irish-
American funding stream or legitimate front businesses enjoyed by the PIRA and its 
following was too small to contribute much to the military coffers through the sale of 
magazines like the Starry Plough, the IRSP’s chief periodical. The INLA therefore had 
to rely primarily on criminal activities to fund its armed struggle, including armed 
robberies and later on extortion, kidnapping and an increasing involvement in illegal 
narcotics markets in Ireland.166 There were some spectacular successes in the group’s 
criminal exploits, the most notorious being the 1978 robbery of roughly £460,000 from 
an armoured Brinks-Mat truck near the Barna Gap,167 after which members were said to 
have ‘slept in flats on layers of banknotes’.168 However, such infusions of cash were 
sporadic and ephemeral, and overall the organization was often suffering from severe 
shortages of funds.169 The lack of  stable funding sources introduced a high level of 
uncertainty into their operational planning; these were not quite the ideal conditions 
under which an organization could begin a weapons procurement or development 
program that could be expected to have unforeseen, but likely fairly substantial, costs. 
In addition to being short of funds, the INLA, primarily due to its smaller size and 
limited appeal in the Catholic community of both the North and the South, also did not 
possess the same logistical backbone as the PIRA in terms of supporters willing to 
provide safe houses or farms in remote locations for training or testing purposes. The 
INLA did have some logistical support and training areas170 and people like Dominic 
McGlinchey were able to survive on the run for months on end, but there are no similar 
accounts of the Gardai uncovering large INLA weapons factories or repositories in the 
Republic of Ireland, as there were with the Provisionals. 
 
                                                          
165 Ibid, p. 177. 
166 At times, these activities almost brought the INLA into open conflict with the PIRA, for example, in 
1984 when INLA members began to extort money from Catholic businessmen already dealing with the 
PIRA (S. Freeman and B. Penrose, ‘INLA muscles in on rackets’, Sunday Times (17 June 1984), p. 1). 
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168 Robson interview, p. 1. 
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a token amount would have been given to the IRSP to cover its debts. 
170 Terry Robson described INLA training camps in the Mamore Gap, Inishowen, Fintown, central 
Fonegal and the Wicklow Mountains (Robson interview, p. 1). 
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5. Limited Talent Pool for Weapons Adoption: While the Provisionals were awash with 
innovative individuals who were willing to dedicate themselves to improving its arsenal, 
this does not appear to have been the case with the INLA. First, its smaller size171 meant 
that there were simply fewer people overall who engaged at any level in the armed 
struggle and consequently fewer members available to focus on weapons procurement 
and development, especially if the organization wanted to keep up a high tempo of 
actual attacks, which required volunteers to be on the ‘front lines’.  
 
Second, there was the quality of the personnel it did have. It was not that the INLA was 
completely devoid of talented individuals or that its membership was necessarily 
opposed to innovation.172 The organization counted within its ranks some ex-Army 
members and personnel who were trained by other militants in the Bekaa Valley in 
Lebanon, as well as at least some innovative individuals, such as the unidentified 
member who developed and then demonstrated the mercury tilt-switch’s effectiveness 
to the leadership in 1978.173 After all, the INLA had inherited many members from the 
OIRA, whose cadre had reportedly been well trained.174 It obviously possessed 
sufficient expertise in explosives to produce dozens of successful bombs during its 
active lifespan.  
 
However, overall the INLA’s expertise was not on par with the Provisionals when it 
came to variety or ingenuity. One reason may have been that the expertise that the 
INLA did inherit was somewhat diluted – when the Provisionals had split from the 
OIRA in 1969, they had taken many of the best technical people with them, weakening 
the OIRA in this regard. When the INLA formed from the ‘Stickies’ in 1974, it could 
only draw on this more limited pool of technical talent, and only a portion of these 
people ended up joining the INLA.175 Later recruits with prior training who joined the 
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p. 4).  
173 The organization was also reportedly able to draw on the services of three middle-class professionals 
to carry out the Airey Neave attack; these men were allegedly used for this one, high-profile assassination 
alone and were then allowed to retreat into obscurity (Routledge, p. 17; Dillon, pp. 285-286). 
174 Jim Cusack, ‘IRA –INLA Clash over Fund Raising Issues’, Irish Times (26 July 1984), page unknown.  
175 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘D’. 
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INLA were described by Brendan O’Brien as ‘mainly [coming] from IRA dropouts’.176 
Furthermore, many of the people they did recruit were quite young, and the organization 
was accused at certain times of being less than particular about who it admitted into its 
ranks.177 Perhaps this is why several of those interviewed in connection with this project 
described the INLA’s cadre using terms such as ‘basically street thugs’ possessing ‘no 
military discipline’,178 who were ‘game for anything’179 and engaged in ‘no real 
conscious reflection’. 180 None of these are traits associated with the dedicated and 
systematic experimentation and learning that is arguably necessary for successful 
innovation. Indeed, one former law enforcement official the author consulted was of the 
opinion that much of the INLA’s tactical ethos was centred on acting rather than 
deliberating, that the goal of attacks was often more than not about personal 
glorification and the desire to be seen as a ‘hero’ amongst one’s peers and that as a 
consequence INLA members basically used what they had to hand rather than worrying 
about acquiring something new.181 
 
The above factors taken together paint the picture of a fractious organization with high 
leadership turnover, individual jockeying for status and position, resource shortages and 
a cadre mostly dominated by young ‘hotheads’. This is an organizational environment 
in which there is little scope for anything more than a tooth-and-nail struggle against 
enemies both internal and external, with almost no organizational space to consider any 
innovation, like mortars, that would require a stable strategy and long-term investment 
of resources. It is most probable then, that amidst the maelstrom that was the INLA’s 
daily experience, there was no serious consideration of adopting mortars. This would be 
not so much a decision not to adopt as an organizational inability even to make such a 
decision. One can imagine those leaders who were even aware of the potential utility of 
mortars in all likelihood putting off thinking any further about the issue until ‘things 
settled down’ – which, of course, they never really did.  
 
In the rather unlikely event that any enlightened INLA members, be they among the 
leadership or the rank-and-file, did give a degree of sober consideration to whether or 
                                                          
176 O'Brien, p. 40. 
177 Cusack, ‘IRA—INLA Clash over Fund Raising Issues’.  
178 Author interview with Andy Oppenheimer. Similar sentiments were expressed by former law 
enforcement official ‘C’. 
179 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’.  
180 Author interview with Henry McDonald.  
181 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘D’. 
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not to adopt a new and innovative weapon like mortars, they would undoubtedly have 
been aware of the organizational weaknesses listed above and invariably have come to 
the perfectly rational decision that the organization was simply incapable of carrying out 
such an adoption in its present state. In other words, they would have realized that the 
members of the organization simply ‘weren’t up to it’182 and would have dismissed the 
possibility of adoption. 
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Table 6.1: PIRA Mortar Development 
Relevant Period Designation Date First 
Aware 









 2 kg gelignite 
 
- 15 cm pipe. 
- Fired from shotgun. 
 - Developed to deal with fortified 
police stations. 
- Viewed as too dangerous for 
volunteers to use. 
1972-1974 Intense 
Experimentation 
Flare ‘Mortar’b 1973 ‘flew far’ 
 
‘limited’ amount of 
PETN 
 
- ‘Proto-mortar’ using marine flares. 
- Replaced flare material with 
detonator, explosive and a fuse. 
 - Did not catch on beyond Derry. 
 
  Mark 1c June 1972  250g commercial 
plastic explosive 
 
- Mortar made up of 50mm copper pipe;
.303 cartridge in rear as propellant.  
- Triggered by driving spike against .22 
cartridge (probably nail gun-type ‘Hilti’ 
cartridge) to ignite detonator. 
- Described as having an ingenious 




- Would spin once took off. 
- No safety mechanism so 
dangerous to user. 
- Failed to explode if fuse 
damaged by impact at wrong 
angle. 
 
  Mark 2d December 
1972 
 1 kg commercial 
explosive 
 
- 20cm long, 57mm diameter steel pipe.
- 12-gauge shotgun cartridge as 
propellant. 
- 5 second delay from impact to ignition 
from split fuse 
- Modified, more reliable nose cone. 
- First PIRA mortar 
fatality: British soldier 
attempting to defuse 
wayward mortar fired in 
Turf Lodge, Belfast in 
December 1972. 
- Often fired through the roof of 
the target building. 
- Used 25 times in its first four 
months. 
- Accuracy still poor because of 
base-plate movement. 







0.5 kg high-grade 
crystalline ammonium 
nitrate, boosted by 
aluminium powder 
 
- 60mm mortar barrel; static firing pin 
and Hilti cartridge as detonator; ‘J-cloth’ 
(sodium chlorate-soaked) used as a 
propellant. 
- Accuracy increased through use of 
stronger base plate and configurable 
aiming quadrant. 
- Cut main explosive charge by half 
from previous model. 
- Attacks on Creggan 
Camp, Derry and 
Lisanelly barracks, 
Omagh in 1973 (16 
mortars).  
- Failed attack on RUC 
Pomeroy barracks in 
August 1973 resulted in 
two IRA men killed. 
- Highly volatile explosive tended 
to explode prematurely. 
- Unreliable, given to tumbling in 
flight. 
- Accuracy within 30m over 
300m. 
- Used 105 times in 14 separate 
attacks in first six months. 
 
  Mark 4f 1974 400m 0.45 kg ammonium 




- Extended range version of Mark 3. 
- Used greater amount of J-cloth as the 
propellant. 
- Contained ball bearings 
- Attack on base at 
Strabane (14 mortars 
did not function). 
- Dangerous - could explode in 
tube and no safety mechanism. 
- Abandoned in six months. 
                                                          
a Oppenheimer, p. 229. 
b O'Doherty interview. 
c O'Doherty interview; Geraghty, p. 88; Oppenheimer, p. 229. 
d Malcolm Sutton, CAIN Database of Deaths, 10 December 1972. Accessed on 6 October 2013 at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1972.html; Horgan and Gill, p.11; 
Oppenheimer, p. 229. 
e Geraghty, p. 189; Horgan and Gill, p.11; Chris Ryder, A Special Kind of Courage: 321 Squadron – Battling the Bombers (London: Methuen, 2006), p.215; O'Doherty 
interview; Oppenheimer, pp. 229-230. 
f Horgan and Gill, pp.11-12; Geraghty, p. 189; Oppenheimer, p. 231. 
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- No safety mechanism, so used as 
traditional military mortar. 
  Mark 5g 1974 25m  - ‘Bombard’-like. - Never used. - Discovered during raid on IRA 
workshop in Antrim in 1974. 
  Mark 6h 1974 1,097m 
 
1.36  kg explosive 
charge (often 
Semtex), detonated 
by .22 cartridge on 
impact 
 
- 60mm calibre. 
- Standard launch tube, strong base 
plate and bipod. 
- .22 calibre cartridge initiated 
homemade gunpowder propellant after 
dropping mortar shell down tube. 
- Contained an impeller to arm itself 
during flight (advanced technology). 
- 8 aluminium fins. 
- Electric trigger system using remote 
control technology. 
- Cross-border attack on 
County Armaugh army 
observation post in 
1974. 
- Extensive damage 
caused when thrown by 
hand onto roof of 
armoured vehicle, Divis 
Flats, Belfast in 1987. 
 - 1994 Heathrow 
attacks. 
- First reliable device (much safer 
and longer range minimized risk 
of detection). 
- Warheads in Heathrow attacks 
made from drainpipes with 
tailfins. 
- 28 intact units found in Belfast 
bakery in 1974; allowed security 




Mark 7i 1976  > Mark 6 
 
- Longer version of Mark 6 (1m tube). 
 
- Used against Army-
RUC base at 
Crossmaglen in 1976. 
- Poor flight stability because of 
length. 
- Sacrificed accuracy for greater 
payload. 
  Mark 8j 1976  > Mark 6 - Longer version of Mark 6 (1m tube). 
- ‘Cannibalized’ version of earlier 
models. 
 - Poor flight stability. 
- Less sophisticated. 
  Mark 9k 1976  5 kg explosive - Produced from cut-down gas 
cylinders, so shorter, fatter profile. 
- Could be launched in groups of up to 
10 tubes. 
- October 1976 attack 
on Crossmaglen base; 7 
mortars detonated.  
- 1977: 5 warheads off 
target landed in school 
grounds in Belfast. 
- Sacrificed accuracy for 
explosive payload. 
                                                          
g Geraghty, p. 190; Oppenheimer (2009), p. 231. 
h Geraghty, p. 191; Oppenheimer (2012); Oppenheimer (2009), pp. 170, 231-232.  
i Oppenheimer (2009), p. 233 
j Ibid., p. 233. 
k Ibid., p. 234. 
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Variously reported as 
11kg (Boyne and 
Horgan) and 20kg-
100kg (Geraghty and 
Oppenheimer) 
explosive (1991 





- 150 mm diameter, 1.2m warhead 
made from gas cylinders). 
- Fine black powder as propellant in 
base allowed accurate ranging. 
- Incorporated safety pin and weight-
based safety mechanism with 
detonation on impact.  
- Detonated by electrical timers. 
- Multiple (up to 10) launch tubes (‘set 
at varying angles for maximum target 
coverage’ - Oppenheimer, p. 234). 
- First fatality caused by 
mortar attack in South 
Armagh in March 1979.  
- Corry Square Police 
Station, Newry attack - 
April 1980. 
- 1985 Newry police 
station attack (9 killed). 
- Used in 1991 attack on 
British Cabinet on 
Downing Street. 
- Often launched from back of 
truck. 
- Incorporated incendiary in 
base/launchers to destroy 
forensic evidence after launch. 
- Became ‘workhorse’ of mortar 
arsenal during 1980s, but ‘wide 
angles’ of attack meant that 
chances of civilian injury still 
high. 
1988-1998 Bigger and 
Better 




10 kg (often ANNIE) 
 
 - Used May 1989 





  (Mark 12n) 1989  2.5 kg Semtex - Not actually a mortar, since utilized 
direct fire from a horizontal position. 
- 75cm long. 
- Inertia fuse and triggered by 
command wire or timer. 
- Employed a shaped charge to pierce 
armour. 
- Attack on 
Crossmaglen, October 
1989. 
- Ostensibly made British 
armoured vehicles obsolete. 
  Mark 13o 1990 35m 36 kg - Made from 45-gallon oil drum. 
- Launched from a spigot. 
- Short range meant required truck or 
tractor as a launching pad. 
- First used in attack on 
Dungannon, May 1990. 
- Sometimes used diesel fuel 
tanks as projectiles. 
  Mark 14p 1992  20 kg of home-made 
explosive 
- Made from top halves of two gas 
cylinders welded together. 
- May 1992 attack on 
Crossmaglen base. 
 
  Mark 15q 1992 100-275m 
(depending 
on version) 
70-75 kg of 
ammonium nitrate 
- 360mm diameter cylinder. 
- Tube was 3 metres long. 
- Included coins as shrapnel. 




- British base in 
Osnabruck, Germany in 
June 1996. 
- ‘Barrack buster’. 
- Brought down British 
helicopters in March, July 1994. 
- Improvised from widely 
available gas cylinder used for 
cooking / heating. 
                                                          
l Ibid., pp.193, 234-235, 320-321; Horgan and Gill, pp.11-14; Geraghty, pp.192-195; Sean Boyne, ‘Uncovering the Irish Republican Army: Weapons’, Jane's 
Intelligence Review, 1 August 1996. Accessed at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/weapons.html on 6 October 2013, p. 3; Toolis, p.52. 
m Geraghty, p.192; Horgan and Gill, pp.11-14; Oppenheimer (2009), p.236. 
n Author interview with Jim Cusack; Horgan and Gill, pp.11-14; Oppenheimer (2009), p. 236. 
o Oppenheimer (2009), p. 237. 
p Ibid., p.237; Horgan and Gill, pp.11-14. 
q Geraghty, p. 193; Oppenheimer (2009), pp. 187, 238; Harnden, p. 398. 
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- Horizontal, direct fire weapon (like 
Mark 12). 
- Small and lightweight, no anchoring of 
base plate required (could be shoulder 
launched). 
- Shaped charge. 
- July 1993 attack on 
William Street, Derry. 
- Sometimes launched from 
under bonnet of car. 
- Unlike Mark 12, made from 
easily acquired parts with 
minimal machining needed. 
  Mark 17s 1994-
1995 
  - Described as one of IRA's most 
destructive weapons. 
- Never used. 
 





                                                          
r Oppenheimer (2009), p. 238. 




Chapter 7: The American Far Right and the Adoption of Cyanide 
and Rockets 
 
The second set of case studies compares the weapons adoption behaviour of the 
Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) and the Order, two violent groups 
active in the American far right ideological milieu in the early 1980s. For these cases, 
two dissimilar weapons types are considered, namely cyanide and rockets. Although 
neither organization ultimately succeeded in adopting these weapons, the CSA made 
concerted efforts to do so, while the Order was largely content with utilizing guns and 
simple explosives. 
 
Positive Case Study: The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of 
the Lord 
 
The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) was a millenarian, survivalist 
Christian Identity1 organization that engaged in a wide variety of paramilitary and 
violent activity in the United States in the early 1980s. Centred on James Ellison, their 
charismatic religious leader, the organization operated out of an isolated settlement 
located near the Arkansas-Missouri state border. The CSA had its origins as a Christian 
fundamentalist commune founded in 1971, when Ellison moved to the Ozarks region 
from San Antonio, Texas, before purchasing a 224-acre plot of land around Bull Shoals 
Lake in Marion County, Arkansas in 1976.2 At first, the group did not embrace 
violence, emphasizing a pious communal lifestyle removed from the sin and corruption 
of the outside world. However, under Ellison’s direction the group’s ideology mutated 
into ever more virulent forms. It first took on apocalyptic millenarian tropes in 1978, 
which led to a perceived need to acquire weapons and training to protect the community 
during the imminent, prophesied time of Tribulation. Eventually the group adopted the 
tenets of Christian Identity wholesale by late 1979.3  This transition was signified by the 
                                                          
1 The tenets of the Christian Identity doctrine will be described fully below. 
2 No listed author, Hate Groups in America: A Record of Bigotry and Violence (New York, NY: Anti-
Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, c. 1988), p. 52. 
3 Kerry Noble, Tabernacle of Hate: Seduction into Right-Wing Extremism, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2010), p. 103; Mark S. Hamm, Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to 
Al-Qaeda and Beyond (New York: New York University Press, 2007), p. 93. 
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group – originally called the ‘Zarephath-Horeb Community’ after two sites of biblical 
significance4 – adopting the more militant public name of ‘the Covenant, the Sword and 
the Arm of the Lord’5 in 1981. The CSA, at one stage growing to around 150 members,6 
became increasingly enmeshed in radical right-wing circles, with Ellison exhibiting ever 
more grandiose aspirations, to the extent of having the Identity preacher Robert Miller 
crown him as ‘King James of the Ozarks’ in 1982.7   
 
What followed was a remarkable array of criminal and violent activities, ranging from 
petty theft, welfare fraud and arson to attempts to destroy federal government buildings 
and gas pipelines, plots to assassinate judges, and even plans for engaging in mass 
poisonings of American cities. By 1985, federal law enforcement authorities were 
closing in on the group and the prospect of right-wing extremist fugitives seeking refuge 
at the CSA compound in April 1985 precipitated a four-day standoff between the 
heavily-armed inhabitants of the CSA and over two hundred law enforcement agents. At 
the conclusion of this standoff, Ellison and other residents with outstanding warrants for 
their arrest surrendered to authorities,8 which heralded the denouement of the group, as 
several members served prison terms and the remainder dissolved. However, evidence 
                                                          
4 The Bible (1 Kings 17) describes Zarephath as the city to which Elijah the prophet fled when pursued by 
the evil King Ahab and performed the miracle of raising the dead there. After successfully challenging the 
idol-worshipping priests of Baal, Elijah fled to Horeb, which is the same location as Mt. Sinai, where the 
Children of Israel received the Ten Commandments from God. There Elijah found the oft-quoted still, 
small voice of God amidst wind, earthquakes and fire. The symbolism of the choice of name was 
apparently thus a place of divine revelation that served as a refuge from the unclean practices of the 
outside world (Noble, p.69). Other observers have referred to the name as denoting a purging place (Brent 
L. Smith, Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1994), p. 63; Hate Groups in America, p. 52). 
5  The ‘Covenant’ in the title ostensibly refers to the bond between God and his chosen people. According 
to Stern, who cites Leviticus 26:35 and Deuteronomy 7:19, the ‘Sword’ refers to God’s anger against 
those who do not obey his commandments and the ‘Arm of the Lord’ represents God’s omnipotence 
(Jessica E. Stern, ‘The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (1985)’, in Jonathan B. Tucker 
(ed.), Toxic Terror, p.145). Jean Rosenfeld describes the name change as reflecting the group’s redefined 
mission of physically defending the White race during God’s apocalypse (Jean Rosenfeld, ‘Introduction’ 
in Noble, p. xxiv). James Coates notes that the initials are the same as those of the ‘Confederate States of 
America’, the name adopted by the South during the U.S. Civil War (James Coates, Armed and 
Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1995), p. 136). 
Although he does not elaborate, if this is not a coincidence it might reflect a racist nostalgia for the days 
of slave-ownership and rebellion against the sitting federal government. For purposes of parsimony, this 
study will refer to the organization as the CSA throughout, unless a particular distinction is warranted 
between the two phases of the organization. 
6 Before a split in December 1982, following which several dozen members left the group, Kerry Noble 
estimates that there were up to one hundred and fifty members (Noble, pp.128, 144), although a 
declassified FBI intelligence report from 1982 estimates the number of members at no more than one 
hundred and twenty persons (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Information on the Covenant, the Sword 
and the Arm of the Lord (2 July 1982), File No. 100-HQ-48720).  
7 Hamm, p. 99. 
8 Noble, p. 219. 
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that emerged from subsequent searches of the CSA compound as well as testimony at 
the trials of various CSA members revealed an organization that possessed a well-
developed armaments capability and had at least attempted several weapons innovations 
during its relatively brief campaign of violence. Two of these will be explored here: the 
CSA’s attempts to acquire the capability to launch rockets to destroy a large building 





It was not just in the areas of rockets and chemical weapons that the CSA sought to 
innovate – the organization displayed a much broader pattern of weapons adoption and 
adaptation. This general penchant for weapons innovation serves to bolster many of the 
arguments that will be made with respect to the weapons focused on here so, prior to 
detailing the particular adoption of rockets and cyanide, it is worthwhile to briefly 
describe several of the organization’s other weapons innovations. 
 
Like many U.S. domestic right-wing extremists, the CSA succeeded in assembling an 
impressive collection of explosives and commercially available firearms. For example, 
when federal agents raided the CSA compound in April 1985, they confiscated 38 
handguns, 16 shotguns, 74 assault weapons and various rifles, together with over 183 
large boxes of ammunition.10 In terms of explosives, various reports assert that the CSA 
possessed 86 packs of binary explosives, up to 4,000 feet of detonation cord, 320 
blasting caps, fifty sticks of dynamite and anywhere between one-and-a-half and 240 
pounds of C-4 and C-3 explosives.11  
                                                          
9 Several commentators have observed that, even though the CSA’s large-scale attacks were mostly 
unsuccessful, the group may have spawned a deadly legacy. They suggest that the CSA’s aborted 1983 
plot to destroy the federal building in Oklahoma City was finally completed by Timothy McVeigh on 19 
April 1995, the very day on which Richard Wayne Snell, a member of CSA and a convicted murderer, 
was put to death (Michael Barkun, ‘Religion, Militias and Oklahoma City: The mind of 
conspiratorialists’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8:1 (1996), pp. 57-58).  According to a prison 
official, Snell had ‘repeatedly predicted that there would be a bombing or an explosion on the day of his 
death’ (Howard Pankratz, ‘Blast Blamed on Revenge Attack Linked to Militant’s Execution’, Denver 
Post (12 May 1996), p. A-1, cited in Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants 
Kill (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2003), p. 29). 
10 Noble, p. 222 
11 Noble, p. 222; No author listed, Declassified Memorandum on the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of 
the Lord (Originating agency unidentified) dated 20 May 1985, Declassified on 28 September 1989, p. 2; 




However, as seen in Table 7.1 below, the CSA did not stop there, but put substantial 
effort into acquiring less common weapons, modifying those weapons it already 
possessed and producing its own improvised versions. Of particular note is the CSA’s 
ability to fabricate various improvised explosive devices (in addition to those listed in 
the table, federal documents mention twenty-five unspecified ‘destructive devices’, at 
least one of which was referred to as a boobytrap)12 and machine existing firearms.13 
Nor were the CSA’s innovations limited to weapons adoption; group members at least 
attempted to engage in some attacks that were, for the domestic American context, quite 
tactically innovative. Chief amongst these was an attempt by three CSA members on 2 
November 1983 to rupture a natural gas pipeline where it ran across the Red River in 
Fulton, Arkansas, using 23 sticks of dynamite.14 The pipeline is a major source of 
natural gas for the Midwest15 and the ostensible goal was to disrupt supplies and spark 
violence in major cities.16 Although ‘substantial damage’17 was done to the pipeline, gas 
supplies were not interrupted. 
 








Precision machining of the parts of semi-automatic 
weapons to convert them into illegal, fully-automatic 
assault rifles.18 
‘Briefcase Bomb’ At least one 
produced 
Timed improvised explosive device given to Kerry Noble to 
use in an attack on an adult bookstore.19 
Improvised hand 
grenades 
~4020 Declassified government documents describe 8 MK2-type 
(‘pineapple’) grenades, 2 M59-type (‘baseball’) grenades, 
and 12 ‘stick-type’ grenades. Grenades were reportedly 
made by filling dummy grenades with C-4 and dynamite.21  
                                                          
12 Declassified Memorandum, p. 2; Indictment, United States of America v. James D. Ellison et. al. 
(CR85-20017), U.S. District Court, Western Arkansas District, Fort Smith Division, p.9. 
13 A quintessential example is the rather complex set of modifications made by Randall Rader, then 
CSA’s military chief, to an Ingram MAC-10 machine pistol, a weapon that was subsequently used by the 
Order in assassinating Alan Berg and that Mark Hamm asserts ‘eventually became legendary among 
right-wing activists of the era’ (Hamm, p.95). In order to convert it to a lethal close-range automatic 
weapon capable of firing more than nine hundred rounds per minute, Rader ‘added a takedown pin, [and] 
enlarged the bolt handle’, while the CSA’s chief weaponeer threaded the short barrel for a silencer (Ibid.). 
14 Affidavit of Special Agent Jack D. Knox, United States of America v. Stephen Scott (CR85-20014), 
U.S. District court, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division. 
15 Smith, pp. 64-65. 
16 According to Kerry Noble, ‘It was winter. We thought people would freeze, that they might start riots’ 
(quoted in Stern (2003), p. 27). 
17 Affidavit of Special Agent Jack D. Knox, USA v. Scott. 
18 Rosenfeld, p. xiii. 
19 Noble, p. 172. 
20 Declassified Memorandum, p. 2. 
21 Indictment, USA v. Ellison et. al. (CR85-20017), p. 9; Affidavit of Jack D. Knox, United States of 
America v. James D. Ellison and William Thomas (CR85-20006), U.S. District court, Western District of 





Unknown, at least 
622 
Several of these were later used by other groups during 
assassinations, such as the Order’s murder of Alan Berg. 
Those made by Kent Yates were reportedly described by 
an Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent as being better 
than those made by the government.23 
Landmines ~1524 The majority were home-made, ‘Claymore-type’ mines.25 
At least one mine on the main road to the compound could 
be detonated by remote control from the radio room.26 
Most, if not all, of the perimeter landmines detonated 




1, unfinished In March 1985, construction began on an armoured vehicle 
with thick steel plates atop the chassis of a truck, to which 




1 operational29 M72 version, firing high-explosive 66mm anti-tank 
rounds.30 Hidden in the guttering of James Ellison’s 
house.31 
Anti-Aircraft Gun 1 World War II-era .303 calibre Lewis machine gun.32 
Anti-Aircraft 
‘Rockets’ 





When they conducted their search of the CSA property near Bull Shoals Lake in April 
1985, federal agents made an unexpected discovery – a thirty gallon (113.6 litre) drum 
of potassium cyanide.34 Further investigation revealed the disturbing designs that the 
group had for the poison, which were to contaminate the water supplies of large U.S. 
cities. Kerry Noble later admitted that, ‘The purpose of the cyanide was so that in the 
future, when the judgment time had arrived, we could dump the cyanide into the water 
supply systems of major cities, condemning hundreds of thousands of people to death 
for their sins’.35 The CSA had reportedly been given the cyanide precisely for this 
purpose by Robert Miles, a prominent leader of the Ku Klux Klan and head of ‘the 
Mountain Kirk’ in Michigan, while teaching a survivalist seminar in Detroit in the 
summer of 1981.36 The CSA therefore adopted the weapon in the sense that they 
                                                          
22 Stern (2003), p. 10.  
23 Noble, p. 172. 
24 Noble, p. 196. 
25 Affidavit of Jack D. Knox, USA v. Ellison and Thomas, p.5. 
26 Smith, p. 63. 
27 Noble, p. 196. 
28 Noble, p. 194; Hamm, p. 109. 
29 A witness, Gary Anderson, reported seeing an additional empty LAW rocket (Affidavit of Jack D. 
Knox, USA v. Ellison and Thomas, p. 4). 
30 Indictment, USA v. Ellison et. al. (CR85-20017), p. 10. 
31 Noble, p. 221. 
32 Noble, p. 222. 
33 Affidavit of Jack D. Knox, USA v. Ellison and Thomas, p. 9. 
34 Indictment, United States of America v. Robert Edward Miles et. al. (CR87-20008), U.S. District court, 
Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division, p. 21. 
35 Hamm, p. 100; Noble, p. 288. 
36 Noble, p. 121. 
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decided to retain the cyanide they had been given and even made plans for how to use it. 
Fortunately, the CSA’s lethal ambitions were unrealizable given technical constraints on 
the use of cyanide for this purpose, since the dilution factor alone, not to mention water 
treatment procedures in major cities, would have rendered the poison harmless to the 
drinking public.37 However, the CSA did succeed in harnessing the deadly effects of 
cyanide on a smaller scale, by sealing the poison in the tips of hollow-point bullets, so 




As part of a CSA plot to bomb a federal building, a plan was devised in October 1983 
whereby CSA operatives would park a van in front of the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City and a timed detonating device would launch rockets at the building.39 
After James Ellison, Richard Snell and a third member, Steve Scott, travelled to 
Oklahoma City and posed as maintenance workers in brown uniforms for the purposes 
of determining the building’s vulnerable points and what would be required to blow it 
up, Ellison decided to proceed with the plan and instructed Kent Yates, the CSA’s 
armaments coordinator, to produce the rockets.40 Yates began preparing and testing 
rockets41 for the attack in late November or early December 1983.42 During the 
development process, however, a misfire occurred and a rocket exploded in Yates’ 
hands, badly injuring them. Yates was unable to continue, but rather than designate 
another member to take over the project, the rocket development initiative was 
abandoned. Kerry Noble, in many respects Ellison’s second-in-command, recalls that, 
‘It was interpreted as a sign from God that another plan was to be implemented’. He 
adds that, ‘Had God not intervened, I believe CSA would have begun its war against the 
government with an attack on the federal building at that time’.43 In addition to this 
development, the CSA reportedly had acquired at least one working LAW rocket (see 
                                                          
37 For an in-depth, yet non-technical, discussion of these issues, see Peter H. Gleick, ‘Water and 
terrorism’, Water Policy 8 (2006), pp. 481–503, esp. p. 487. 
38 Noble, p. 121. 
39 Hamm, p. 103, citing Jo Thomas and Ronald Smother, ‘Oklahoma City Building was Target of Plot as 
Early as ’83, Official Says’, New York Times (20 May 1995).  
40 Hamm, p. 103; Noble, p. 158. 
41 Although the type of rockets sought is not mentioned in any sources, the most likely type is either a 
line-of-sight base-propelled charge (akin to a rocket-propelled grenade) or a mortar, based on the 
descriptions of the plan (in Ibid.), which was to park a van some distance away from the building and 
launch the rockets using a timed device from there. 
42 Hamm, pp. 104-105. 
43 Noble, pp. 158-159. 
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above), although the source of this is unknown. However, a single weapon is not 
regarded as constituting an achieved ‘rocket capability’, at least not for the purposes of 
standoff destruction of a major building intended by the CSA. 
 
Following a description of the weapons with which the CSA innovated, we can now 
turn to how they went about doing so. Although not much more is known specifically 
about the process by which the group engaged with rockets or cyanide beyond that 
noted above, it is possible to infer several salient aspects of the process from more 
general knowledge of CSA operations.  
  
a) Equipment and Materials: The locus of all the CSA’s weapons development was 
its compound, with no record of any such activity beyond the borders of its 
property. In keeping with its survivalist mentality, the CSA ensured that its 
compound, while remote, had its own water and electricity supply,44 as well as 
sufficient food and other supplies to last for months, if not years.45 This ensured 
that it could undertake its weapons development activities without reliance on or 
observation by any outsiders. Within the compound, the core location for 
weapons modification and fabrication was a well-equipped machine shop 
located in the basement of one of the buildings on the CSA property.46 The 
machine shop reportedly included a lathe, drill presses, a milling type machine47 
and ‘the best tap and die equipment’.48 It is highly probable that the equipment 
used in the pursuit of a rocket capability and for filling the cyanide bullets, was 
to be found in the machine shop. As for the sources of weapons materials (aside 
from the obvious gift of the cyanide discussed above), it is unclear exactly where 
the CSA obtained all of their explosives (or the LAW rocket for that matter), but 
they purchased many of the stocks of weapons that they would later modify at 
gun shows in Arkansas and Missouri.49 The group also had contact with Robert 
Smalley, a weapons dealer who supplied right-wing extremist groups such as the 
Order with weapons.50 They were not above outright theft, however; when a 
                                                          
44 Coates, p. 136. 
45 Stern (2003), p. 10; Noble, p. 83. 
46 Stern (2000), p. 141, refers to ‘several factories’, but the author has found no other mention of any 
weapons production facility beyond the machine shop. 
47 Affidavit of Jack D. Knox, USA v. Ellison and Thomas, p.3. 
48 Coates, p. 136. 
49 Hamm, p. 91. 
50 Smith, p. 64. 
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member, James Michael Morris, was discharged from the Marines, he stole 
military equipment from his Marine base for use on the compound.51 Whatever 
their origin, these supplies likely provided a source of parts that could be 
cannibalized for use in the rocket program. 
 
b) Personnel: CSA enjoyed a fairly high degree of technical and military 
competence. Overall coordination of weapons logistics, tactics and training 
initially fell to Randall Rader, who had joined the group in 1977 after several 
years engaged in drug use and the pursuit of rock stardom. Although possessing 
no formal military training, Rader threw himself enthusiastically into his new 
appointment as the organization’s ‘defence minister’, becoming an avid reader 
of military manuals and related materials.52 Rader spearheaded the conversion of 
semi-automatic weapons to automatic versions and was assisted by Rodney 
Carrington.53 The bulk of the technical weapons development, however, was 
undertaken by Kent Yates, a former Green Beret in Vietnam with extensive 
training in weapons and explosives.54 Yates, who has been described as ‘a 
genius at his work’,55 would apparently remain alone in the basement workshop 
working on weapons for days at a time, only emerging for food.56 Yates’ 
abovementioned injuries no doubt had a negative impact on his ability to 
physically participate in weapons fabrication, but the CSA was deprived of even 
his expertise when, in the summer of 1984, Yates was arrested on an unrelated 
weapons charge while returning from a trip outside the CSA.57 Not much is 
known about the adroitness or productivity of his purported replacement, Charlie 
Liddell, before the CSA was raided in April 1985.58 The decision in 1978 by 
                                                          
51 Response of the United States of America to James D. Ellison’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence 
(1988), United States of America v. James D. Ellison (CR85-20006-1 and CR85-20017-01), U.S. District 
court, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division. 
52 Hamm, p. 92. Apparently, he even taught himself how to decipher firearms manuals written in Chinese 
and German (Ibid.). 
53 Noble, p. 99. Noble stated that a member by the name of Hoyt Yearber took over the gun conversions 
after Rader and Carrington left CSA at the end of 1982 (Law enforcement interview with Kerry Noble, 
Baxter County Jail, Mountain Home, Arkansas on 22 April 1985, presented as evidence in United States 
of America v. James D. Ellison and Kerry Noble (CR85-20015), U.S. District Court, Western District of 
Arkansas, Fort Smith Division). 
54 Indictment, United States of America v. James D. Ellison and Kent Yates (CR85-20016). 
55 Noble, p. 171. 
56 Law enforcement interview with Kerry Noble. 
57 Affidavit of Jack D. Knox, USA v. Ellison and Thomas, p. 6; Noble, p. 175. 
58 Affidavit of Jack D. Knox, USA v. Ellison and Thomas, p. 6; Report of Interview with David Giles (23 
April 1985), presented as evidence in USA v. Ellison et. al. (CR85-20017). 
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CSA members to rid themselves of almost all electronic communications with 
the outside world (by destroying all the televisions and radios, except for those 
belonging to Ellison) may have had a dampening effect on the CSA’s ability to 
work with electronic equipment. Nonetheless, the CSA did maintain a radio 
communications room and there is circumstantial evidence that they were able to 
retain some electronics expertise. A fugitive who came to CSA at the beginning 
of 1985, Peter Bjerke, reported that a man named John Kennedy had performed 
repairs on the radio equipment, and was, incidentally, paid with burglarized 
electronic devices, such as CB radios and portable televisions. Kennedy had 
reportedly lived at the CSA for three weeks in 1981.59 
 
As in the previous case studies, it is useful for analytic purposes to separate the CSA’s 
weapons development into discrete phases that can be evaluated separately. After 
reviewing the CSA’s overall chronology, a logical categorization of their weapons 
adoption activity is formulated as follows: 
 
1. Building a Better Community (1976 to July 1978): This phase covers the 
founding of the Zarephath-Horeb Community and the period of austere 
isolationism during which there was no weapons procurement or 
development. 
2. Ideological Metastasis (August 1978 to 1982): This period witnessed the 
increasing militarization of the organization, first through adoption of a pre-
millennialist outlook and then the white supremacist doctrine of Identity, 
culminating in the name change to CSA. It ended with the organizational 
split in December 1982, when Rader and many others left the organization. 
During this period CSA acquired the cyanide from Miles. 
3. On a Warlike Footing (1983 to April 1985): Engaging in intense operational 
activity throughout this period, CSA attempted ambitious mass-casualty and 
mass-disruption attacks, including the development of rockets capable of 
destroying a large building. 
 
Utilizing this framework, it is now possible to explore the factors affecting CSA’s 
decision making with respect to weapons adoption and the outcomes thereof. 
                                                          







It is unclear whether CSA was aware of the potential for cyanide to be used as a weapon 
before Robert Miles bestowed the toxic chemical upon them in 1981, but the 
circumstantial evidence argues strongly against this. There are no direct reports in any 
of the insider sources of any conscious organizational awareness of cyanide’s potential 
as a weapon before 1981.60 One should consider, however, whether there were any 
readily-available historical precedents that could have drawn their attention towards the 
utility of using cyanide as a mass-casualty poison through the water supply. 
 
Ensconced as they were in the right-wing extremist milieu by this time, the 
organization’s members were no doubt exposed to many of the contextual narratives 
and tropes prevalent during the period, including past exploits of militant actors and 
works like the Turner Diaries by Dr William Pierce, leader of the National Alliance.61 
To begin with the latter, the Turner Diaries, while brimming with weaponry and acts of 
destruction of all types (including large-scale nuclear weapons use), has only the 
briefest and vaguest of references to ‘chemical weapons’ in its conclusion.62 With 
respect to actual occurrences, the only candidate cases that occurred prior to this time in 
the U.S. and that might have served as a model for using cyanide to cause mass 
casualties are those of R.I.S.E, an idiosyncratic right-leaning group that plotted to 
destroy humanity by poisoning the water supplies of major cities,63 and the 
                                                          
60 These include Kerry Noble’s autobiography of his time with the CSA and the testimony of numerous 
witnesses at various trials related to the organization’s activities. 
61 The Turner Diaries, published by Pierce under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald in the 1970s, has 
been referred to by the FBI as the ‘bible of the racist right’ (Camille Jackson, ‘The Turner Diaries, Other 
Racist Novels, Inspire Extremist Violence’, Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, 115 (Fall 
2004)). The novel details the exploits of one Earl Turner, who is part of a white supremacist revolution 
against the United States government in the 1990s. In the book, Pierce graphically describes a wide range 
of violent attacks against blacks, Jews, government officials and others, ultimately ending with a victory 
for the rebels after using nuclear weapons to decimate their enemies (Andrew MacDonald (aka William 
Pierce), The Turner Diaries ([Place of Publication Not Listed]: National Vanguard Books, 1978), 
downloaded from http://www.jrbooksonline.com/PDF_Books/TurnerDiaries.pdf on 19 November 2012). 
62 MacDonald (Pierce), The Turner Diaries, Epilog [page numbers unavailable in downloaded version; 
chapter where material appears is indicated]. Although Morris Dees maintains that water supplies are 
poisoned in the novel (Morris Dees with James Corcoran, Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat 
(New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1997), p. 139), the author has not been able to find anything of this 
nature anywhere in the text. 
63 W. Seth Carus, ‘R.I.S.E.’ in Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror. 
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Weathermen, who reportedly planned to likewise contaminate Lake Michigan (which 
was much-publicized) or New York City’s Kensico Reservoir.64 Yet, none of these plots 
involved cyanide: the R.I.S.E. plot involved biological agents and the Weathermen 
ostensibly contemplated using LSD or nerve agents. In any event, the applicability of 
anything the left-wing Weathermen had done as a model for emulation by Identity 
Christians is problematic.  
  
Therefore, given the lack of any direct evidence and the scant repertoire of prior cases 
that could have served as demonstrations of cyanide’s use as a weapon, it is likely that 
the first time Ellison and the CSA’s other leaders became aware of the possibility of 
adopting cyanide as a weapon was when they were presented with substantial quantities 
of the substance itself.65 The mechanism of awareness can thus be categorized as one of 




How did rockets come to the attention of Ellison and his operatives? Here, there are 
several likely routes. First, in a broad sense, the CSA had, by 1980 at the latest, become 
steeped in the survivalist context, which is preoccupied with conventional weapons of 
all kinds. Visits to gun shows and scrutiny of survivalist publications no doubt resulted 
in CSA members’ exposure to discussions about a wide range of weapons, possibly 
including rockets. Second, and more specifically, Randall Rader consumed as much 
military literature as he could lay his hands on, including military manuals from around 
the world. It is indeed unlikely that he would not have come across numerous references 
to rockets of all types, from mortars to rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). These could 
have been readily shared with James Ellison, the CSA’s ‘General’66 and its ultimate 
arbiter of military decisions, who might then have drawn upon this information when 
contemplating his attack on the Murrah Federal Building. Third, even if Rader had not 
shared any substantive information about rockets with Ellison, Kent Yates had taken 
                                                          
64 Richard C. Clark, Technological Terrorism (Greenwich, CT: Devon-Adair Pub, 1980), pp. 110, 113. 
With respect to LSD, in 1968 the Weathermen reportedly threatened to ‘space-out’ attendees to the 
Democratic National Convention. 
65 Adding weight to this conclusion is the revelation that the CSA did not consider the use of biological 
weapons (another type of ‘exotic’ agent), apparently because no one in the organization had any 
knowledge of them (Stern (2000), p. 156). 
66 Noble, p.81. 
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over as the munitions expert by 1983 and, based on his extensive military experience, 
would no doubt have been able to suggest the rocket option to Ellison. Last, once the 
CSA had adopted the mantle of Christian Identity, its leaders were almost certain to 
study with great care the exploits described in the Turner Diaries, which had recently 
been published (in serialized form in the mid-1970s and in paperback in 1978) and was 
generating a large amount of excitement in far right circles. Unlike the case with 
chemical weapons, various kinds of rockets, primarily mortars, are prominently 
depicted in the novel. The novel’s characters successfully utilize mortars and other 
types of rockets in several spectacular attacks, including an assault on the U.S. Capitol, 
downing an airliner filled with Jewish passengers,67 destroying the Israeli embassy, and 
delivering radioactive contaminants to a power plant.68 In fact, the book’s protagonist, 
the eponymous Earl Turner, declares mortars to be ‘incomparable’69 and ‘marvellous 
little weapons, especially for guerrilla warfare’.70 Thus, while it remains uncertain 
exactly how the CSA became aware of rockets as a means of warfare, it can safely be 
said that all of the routes to awareness were intimately connected to the increasing 
militarization of the organization from 1979 on. 
 
The Adoption Decision 
 
People and Process 
 
Before turning to the factors that prompted the CSA to pursue rocket technology and 
contemplate a mass-casualty cyanide attack, it is necessary to explore the decision-
making structure and process that prevailed at the time of the adoption decision. 
Beginning with the decision structure, it quickly becomes evident that James Ellison 
was the primary decision maker for almost the entire period of the CSA’s existence. 
According to Smith, ‘There was no disputing his leadership’.71 Although there was 
nominally a group of five or six ‘elders’ who directed the community’s affairs 
(including, most prominently, Kerry Noble, Randall Rader and William Thomas), as 
                                                          
67 Macdonald (Pierce), Chapter 9. 
68 Macdonald (Pierce), Chapter 17. 
69 Macdonald (Pierce), Chapter 17 
70 Macdonald (Pierce), Chapter 9. 
71 Smith, p. 63. 
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founder and spiritual leader Ellison allotted himself two votes and dominated most 
decisions.  
 
Ellison would on occasion delegate authority to trusted lieutenants in some areas of the 
organization, yet would brook no direct challenge to his primacy. An episode which 
illustrates this occurred in 1979, when he left the compound for several months to find 
outside work and left Randall Rader in charge. Rader quickly became dictatorial to the 
point of caricature, carrying a small whip and wearing a monocle, and tried to initiate a 
power struggle by spreading rumours of Ellison’s impending demise.72 He moved to 
shift the community towards a more militaristic posture, initiating the practice of 
converting firearms into fully-automatic mode. When Ellison returned, he took back the 
reins of power, castigating Rader, but decided to retain the illegal weapons anyway. The 
dissension between Rader and Ellison continued, exacerbated by Rader’s blaming 
Ellison for his daughter’s accidental death.73 Ellison’s steadfast refusal to desist from 
his plans to take a second wife was the last straw for Rader and those who supported 
him. This precipitated a split in the organization in December 1982, during which Rader 
and several dozen others left the compound and the CSA for good.74 
 
Described as a ‘spiritual entrepreneur’75 who built his beliefs syncretically, one 
dominating aspect of Ellison’s personality was a narcissism that bordered on 
megalomania. Ellison appears to have honestly believed that he had been chosen by 
God to lead his community through trial and tribulation. This belief was fed by his 
seemingly miraculous recovery from an accident in 1970, after which he declared that, 
‘God had to collapse a building around me and kill me so He could get my attention. … 
He brought me back for a purpose. His purpose!’76 After a similar incident in 1978, 
when his young son was accidentally run over with a car by a member of the commune 
and emerged relatively unscathed, Ellison disclosed to Noble that, ‘I know that I am set 
apart for God; but more importantly, my family is set apart for God also… I knew 
                                                          
72 Noble, pp. 98-99. Rader also apparently swung a double-edged sword against a post during prayer 
services one night and threatened to replicate his actions on another member’s head (Hamm, p. 92). He 
even claimed to have killed and eaten his own dog raw to demonstrate his commitment to survivalism 
(Hamm, pp.95-96). 
73 Noble, p. 118. 
74 Noble, pp. 108, 118, 140-141. 
75 Rosenfeld, p. xix. 
76 Noble, p. 28.  
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Joseph wouldn’t die; no one will ever die here, as long as we trust Jesus and do what is 
right in His own sight’.77 
 
Ellison’s self-belief was buoyed by his confidence in his own prophetic abilities and 
only expanded over time, with Ellison first viewing himself as being without sin and 
then coming to believe that he was the embodiment of the biblical David, whose word 
was God’s word.78 His messianic traits reached their zenith when Ellison, in all 
earnestness, had himself crowned as ‘King James of the Ozarks’ in December 1983. 
These delusions of grandeur arguably were associated with Ellison being extremely risk 
prone. Examples include when he got caught shoplifting in Fort Smith, Arkansas and 
laughed at the incident, or, when facing the FBI lead hostage negotiator in April 1985, 
Ellison chewed on poison ivy leaves ‘to demonstrate how extraordinary he was’.79  It 
also allowed him to legitimize any behaviour that he could attribute to divine will, from 
polygamy to theft and, ultimately, to mass murder. 
 
What Ellison did not want for was charisma, and this formed the basis of much of his 
authority.80  ‘Keith’, an unidentified former government agent who infiltrated the CSA, 
maintained that ‘I can tell you right now, if he walked from where he is into the next 
state, he would gather a lot of followers’.81 Ellison’s impassioned preaching and claims 
to prophetic insight allowed him to hold sway over his flock and direct their behaviour, 
as when, deciding in 1978 that the members should give up their individuality, he 
instructed the men to shave their beards and cut their hair short, which was symbolic of 
shedding their previous rebelliousness, as well as decreed that the entire community 
pool their financial resources and burn all reminders of their time prior to joining the 
CSA.82  
                                                          
77 Noble, p. 49. 
78 Noble, pp. 110, 131. In the face of authority Ellison did not always make such majestic claims – during 
testimony before a Grand Jury in September 1984 in relation to a weapons charge investigation (in which 
he was not a suspect), in answer to a question about his profession, he declared that he was a ‘woodcutter’ 
(Grand Jury Testimony of James Ellison (Sept 26, 1984), reproduced in Indictment, USA v. Ellison and 
Thomas (CR85-20006)). 
79 Danny Coulson and Elaine Shannon, No Heroes: Inside the FBI’s Secret Counter-Terror Force (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1999), p. 299, cited in Rosenfeld, p. xiv. 
80 Kendall, Murray and Linden encapsulate Max Weber’s notion of charismatic authority as ‘power 
legitimized on the basis of a leader’s exceptional personal qualities or the demonstration of extraordinary 
insight and accomplishment, which inspire loyalty and obedience from followers’. See Diana Kendall, 
Jane L. Murray and Rick Linden, Sociology in Our Time (Scarborough, ON: Nelson, 2000), pp. 438-439. 
81 Quoted in Stern (2003), p. 13. 




At least in the early years in the commune, much of the source of this charismatic 
authority appears to have derived from the fact that Ellison was, in style if not in 
substance, less of the autocratic leader so often seen at the head of isolated, fringe 
religious communities. He relied more on patient persuasion to inculcate loyalty and 
bring his followers around to his way of thinking. For example, during Kerry Noble’s 
early years in the community, Noble would often preach against Ellison’s doctrine and 
Ellison tolerated this for several months until Noble eventually accepted Ellison’s 
teachings.83 In this regard, Rosenfeld states that, ‘Ellison won devotion from followers 
by allowing them to think for themselves, while impressing them with his extraordinary 
gifts’.84 At other times Ellison would badger his followers to get his way, for example, 
repeatedly telling William Thomas that ‘God has shown me in a vision that you are to 
carry the sword of war for our group. You are to be the leader of these road trips’.85  
 
As time wore on, however, Ellison seemed to become more outwardly despotic86 and 
less tolerant of dissension,87 to the point where during the federal siege of the CSA 
property, Ellison declared that, ‘anyone who walks down that hill to surrender, I’ll shoot 
them in the back myself!’88 
 
The other side of the coin of any charismatic leadership is the attachment of the 
followers. During the early years of the group (at least until 1982), most of the members 
were genuine religious seekers in their twenties, striving for a better way of serving God 
and raising their families. Increased isolation from the broader American society led 
them to become more susceptible to Ellison’s peculiar teachings and more dependent on 
the CSA community for both their spiritual and physical well-being. This in-group 
affinity gave way to the well-documented social psychological process of polarization 
                                                          
83 Noble, p. 46. 
84 Rosenfeld, p. xxi. 
85 Noble, p. 165. 
86 In the context of the organizational split at the end of 1982, Noble observed that, ‘Even though Ellison 
was in charge, in times past if the other elders overruled him on an issue, he would submit to us. Now, for 
the first time, the votes of the elders meant nothing to Ellison. For the first time in our church, Ellison’s 
“revelation” was more important than the counsel of the elders – more important than the basis of our 
ministry. Now, we had reverted to the “one-man ministry”’ (Noble, p. 145). 
87 When Noble questioned some of Ellison’s decisions in early 1985, Ellison issued a stinging challenge: 
‘We will both plead our cases before God, right here, right now, and believe that He will answer before 
all these witnesses who He honours amongst us. Decide this day, Kerry, who will serve!’ (quoted in 
Noble, p.195), after which Noble acquiesced. 
88 Noble, p. 9. 
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and out-group hostility, as the outside world came to be seen as populated by a 
multitude of threats.89 As is common in such cases, the process was reinforced by 
rituals, as exemplified in the following recollection by Kerry Noble: ‘The men made a 
pact one night during a weekly military meeting to serve each other, to serve our 
military commanders, to serve God’s army and that any traitors or deserters during 
battle would be shot in the back. Each man passed through an archway made by the 
raised weapons of the other men’.90 Loyalty to the group and to Ellison in particular as 
the embodiment of the group’s will became a driving force in members’ lives – to the 
extent where, after being accused of betrayal by Ellison for suggesting that the group 
abandon violence, Kerry Noble was willing to engage in mass-casualty violence by 
planning to bomb an adult bookstore in order to prove his loyalty. ‘My desperation to 
earn a place in Ellison’s kingdom now out-weighed any value for human life’, he 
recalls.91 While differing in some important respects from the coercive control often 
associated with religious cults92 – most importantly, CSA members were allowed to 
come and go as they pleased from the settlement – the deindividuation, polarization, and 
charismatic leadership aspects of the CSA were reminiscent of a long line of insular 
groups, from the Manson Family to Aum Shinrikyo, that ultimately turned malignant 
and resorted to violence. In addition, as time wore on, most of the new recruits appeared 
to be more interested in CSA’s militarism than its spiritual message, as Noble 
eventually came to realize: ‘I sighed. Nothing about God, Jesus or the Bible. Nothing 
about love of the brethren. Guns and war. That’s all he wanted. That’s all anybody 
wanted who moved to CSA now’.93 
 
                                                          
89 Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby and Eric D. Shaw, ‘The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated 
Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25:2 (2002), 
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91 Noble, p. 171. 
92 There is significant scholarly controversy over the definition and usage of the term ‘cult’, with 
pejoratively labelled ‘cult-bashers’ and ‘cult apologists’ lining up on opposite sides. This study 
intentionally attempts to remain outside this debate by being judicious in its use of the term ‘cult’ as 
applied to the CSA. For more on the wider debate, see Benjamin Zablocki and Thomas Robbins (eds.), 
Misunderstanding Cults: Searching for Objectivity in a Controversial Field (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, 2001) and Jeffrey M. Bale, ‘The Cult Wars, Part I’, Hit List Magazine 2:4 (November-December 
2000), pp. 80-85. 
93 Noble, p. 128. 
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Taking into account Ellison’s domineering cult of personality and the dynamics of the 
organization by 1981, it is clear that all important decisions rested with him. Although 
other parties, like Rader and Snell (as we will shortly see) could take the initiative and 
make suggestions as to the direction of military matters, the final arbiter of the decision 






Underpinning the decision to adopt rockets and cyanide for use in indiscriminate attacks 
was a tacit embrace of the legitimacy of killing large numbers of human beings. 
Without the acceptance that such attacks were morally justified, Ellison and the CSA 
would never have pursued either of these weapons. To understand this position and how 
it served as the basis for adopting both weapons under discussion, it is thus necessary to 
examine the ideology of the CSA at the time of their adoption decisions.  
 
As noted in the introduction to this case study, CSA’s ideology evolved over time, 
initially focused on merely seeking refuge from a corrupt society while awaiting divine 
judgment94 and then taking on a more or less apolitical Christian survivalist orientation, 
in which members prepared to survive the imminent catastrophe. However, after Ellison 
and others encountered and became influenced by such anti-government advocates as 
John Todd and Jack Mohr, they began to incorporate more conspiratorial thinking into 
their existing doctrine.95 The final step towards full acceptance of the Identity doctrine 
in late 1979 came after Ellison drew close to Dan Gayman’s Church of Israel and later 
Pastor Robert Millar, who ran Elohim City.96  
 
                                                          
94 Rosenfeld, p. xvii; Hamm, p. 90. 
95 Noble, p. 81-82, 93-94. 
96 Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood: Inside America's racist underground (New 
York: Free Press, 1989), p. 257. 
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While a full accounting of Christian Identity and millenarian thought is beyond the 
scope of this study,97 some of the aspects most salient to the variant adopted by CSA are 
listed below:98 
  
a. ‘Two-seedline’ racist theology: A central tenet of Identity doctrine is that the 
white race (usually referring to those of northern European origin) are the true 
Israelites of the Bible, whereas the Jews are the spawn of Satan’s congress with 
Eve. As such, Jews are inhuman agents of evil and an implacable enemy who 
has usurped the rightful position of the Aryan Children of Israel.99 While not 
viewed as inherently evil, Blacks and other non-Whites are seen as inferior, 
subhuman races (often called ‘mud people’) that predated Adam and whose 
predestined role is to serve Whites.100 When asked in 1984 how God feels when 
a Black man dies, Ellison replied, ‘About like He does when a dog dies’.101 
 
b. ZOG and the secret plans for global control: As part of the Jewish plan for 
world domination, which is well underway, the U.S. federal government and the 
mainstream media have been seized by a Jewish-led cabal that includes the 
Illuminati. The sacred Christian values and fundamental rights embodied in the 
American Declaration of Independence and Constitution are being trampled by 
the so-called ‘Zionist Occupation Government’ (ZOG), which will act quickly to 
eliminate any opposition. This global conspiracy is hidden from all but a few 
enlightened citizens.102 
 
c. Tribulation and Beyond: A strong millenarian strain runs through Identity 
thought, which was in accord with CSA’s previous beliefs of the coming ‘End 
                                                          
97 See, inter alia, Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity 
Movement (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1994); Coates; Howard Bushart, John Craig and Myra Barnes, 
Soldiers Of God: White Supremacists and Their Holy War for America (New York: Kensington, 2000); 
and James Ridgeway, Blood in the Face: The Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Nazi Skinheads, and the Rise 
of a New White Culture (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1995).  
98 This list is similar to that put forward in Michael Barkun, ‘Millenarian Aspects of “White Supremacist” 
Movements’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 1:4 (1989), pp.417-418. 
99 Michael Barkun has compared this notion to the political anti-Semitism of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and characterizes this as a ‘redemonization’ or ‘retheologization’ of anti-semitism 
(Barkun (1989), pp. 423, 425-426). 
100 Stern (2000), p. 142; Hate Groups in America, p. 53; Noble, p. 103. 
101 Noble, p. 171. 
102 As Barkun shows, the more such ideas are rejected by mainstream institutions, paradoxically the more 
credible they become for adherents of the doctrine, since this perpetuates their conception of a larger 
conspiracy (Barkun (1996), pp. 59-60). 
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Times’. As recounted in the biblical Book of Revelations and elsewhere, the 
coming of the latter days of Christ’s Kingdom will be preceded by a period 
(often said to be seven years) of Tribulation,103 during which the righteous 
would be assailed by evil hordes, led by false prophets and the Antichrist. An 
article in the group’s own publication, the CSA Journal, described their view of 
the horrors to come:  
 
Russia and possibly China and Japan will attack America, probably 
with some limited nuclear warfare. Communists will kill white 
Americans and mutilate them; witches and satanic Jews will offer 
people up as sacrifices to their gods, openly and proudly; blacks 
will rape and kill white women, and will torture and kill white men; 
homosexuals will sodomize whoever they can. Prisoners from 
Federal and State prisons will be set free to terrorize, while Cuban 
refugees will do the same. Nowhere will be safe without the grace 
of God.104 
 
One distinction between the Identity version of these events and the CSA’s 
previous beliefs is that under Identity the coming conflagration will take the 
form of a race war against the Jews and their agents in ZOG, thus combining the 
political and religious conflicts mentioned above.105 Most importantly, the 
CSA’s leaders came to believe that not only did they need to prepare to protect 
their community during this time (a defensive posture), but that they could help 
usher in the end times – and the glorious kingdom of the risen Christ thereafter – 
by bringing the fight to ZOG, thus hastening an inevitable war in which the 
White race would ultimately prevail, so long as it took action (an offensive 
doctrine).106 
 
The above beliefs, accompanied by an unhealthy dose of paranoia, combined into a 
dangerous cognitive mix: there was (a) a conflict of cosmic import that (b) had been 
divinely ordained, in which (c) human agency would be required against (d) a 
                                                          
103 Noble, pp. 401-402. 
104 Quoted in Hate Groups in America, p. 51. 
105 Barkun (1989), p. 426. 
106 Stern (2000), p. 143. In an interview with Jessica Stern, Kerry Noble confided that ‘We believed that 
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dehumanized enemy. This led to a mental state among at least certain CSA members by 
the early 1980s107 wherein large-scale violence was not only a legitimate tactic in their 
struggle, but might indeed have become a moral imperative. In his interview with 
Jessica Stern, Noble asserted that ‘There were certain people who would have done it 
[poisoned whole cities], could have done it with no problems. It could very easily have 
happened’.108 
 
One last relevant aspect of CSA’s ideology was its emphasis on prophecy. Like many 
fundamentalist Christian congregations at the time (but less so among Identity groups), 
CSA believed that any member sufficiently close to God could be a vehicle for 
prophecy. While Ellison revelled in the role,109 it was not limited to him,110 which 




The most obvious influencing factor on the adoption decision was that the organization 
had been presented with the cyanide itself and would have had to take the conscious 
action of rejecting or disposing of it in order not to adopt it. The simplest explanation 
would thus be that invention (or in this case donation) became the mother of 
necessity.111 However, the rationale likely goes far beyond this and is related to 
Ellison’s and the CSA’s relationship to the broader right-wing extremist movement. 
Subsequent to Ellison’s adoption of Identity theology, the CSA rapidly rose to a 
position of prominence within the network of Identity churches, tax protestors and 
proto-militias that constituted the American far right scene at the time. Much of this was 
thanks to Randall Rader’s skill in accumulating weapons and military knowledge and 
the CSA’s decision – taken in order to supplement its income – to serve as a hub for 
                                                          
107 As part of bringing his congregation to this point, shortly after invoking Christian Identity doctrine, 
Ellison ordered every CSA member to sign a ‘ “Declaration of Non-Surrender”, in which they vowed to 
fight to the death for Jesus Christ’ (Hamm, p. 93). 
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Lord’ (Noble, p. 195). 
111 Cf. the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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paramilitary training across the far right.112 Ellison, spurred on by his narcissistic self-
conception as a divinely chosen leader, eagerly stoked such perceptions, and by 1982 
even had designs on being anointed as the leader of a united front of all the far right 
groups,113 which included Robert Miller’s Elohim City, Richard Butler’s Aryan 
Nations, William Pierce’s National Alliance, and of course, Robert Miles’ Mountain 
Kirk. So, when an important leader like Miles thought enough of the CSA and its role in 
the struggle to offer them a new, potentially significant, weapon for the cause, Ellison 
likely also attached some degree of prestige to the event and would be loath to appear to 
be an ungrateful recipient before a key player in his constituency. 
 
This was borne out by subsequent events. In the wake of the fatal shooting of Gordon 
Kahl, a tax protester, by law enforcement officers near the CSA compound, the far right 
was galvanized and held an infamous meeting at Aryan Nations in July 1983. During 
this meeting, several leaders, including Butler, Miller, Miles, Louis Beam and Ellison, 
allegedly hatched plans for an armed overthrow of the U.S, Government.114 One of the 
key elements of this plot was allegedly the ‘polluting of municipal water supplies’ 
apparently in New York, Chicago and Washington, DC.115 Incidentally, Ellison was the 
government’s lead witness in a sedition trial that resulted from this meeting, which the 
government lost, at least partly because the jury believed that Ellison was merely 
testifying in order to reduce his sentence.  
 
A further reason for adopting the cyanide is that the toxic nature of the substance itself, 
which could (at least in Ellison’s mind) serve as a means of raining destruction on 
                                                          
112 Rader’s pride and joy was ‘Silhouette City’, a training school complete with buildings, cars, and 
silhouettes of various law enforcement agents and Jewish personages, which was built to emulate the 
FBI’s shooting range at Quantico, Viriginia (Hamm, pp. 95-96). It was here that Rader established the 
‘Endtime Overcomer Survival Training School’, which taught weapons usage, military tradecraft and 
unarmed combat (Hate Groups in America, p. 51). The CSA also published a 174-page CSA Survival 
Manual, which became the primary training manual for the right-wing (Noble, p. 119), as well as selling a 
host of racist and anti-Semitic literature (see Stern (2000), p. 141 for several examples) and publishing 
their own journal with a distribution of two thousand people (Noble, p.119). 
113 Although Noble recalls explicitly suggesting this idea to Ellison only in August 1982 (Noble, p.127), 
given Ellison’s penchant for self-aggrandizement, the prospect of playing some type of major role in the 
far right movement had no doubt occurred to Ellison even as early as 1981 when he received the cyanide. 
It was with the ulterior motive of being endorsed as leader of the far right that Ellison invited its 
luminaries to a CSA National Convocation in October 1982 and, although he did not win outright 
approval for leadership of a united right-wing extremist movement, his stature increased and by the end of 
the following year he had persuaded Robert Miller to crown him King of the Ozarks (Noble, p.129). 
114 Dees and Corcoran, pp. 44-45; Smith, p. 56. 
115 Indictment, USA v. Miles et. al. (CR87-20008); No author listed, ‘Group Weighed Cyanide Assault, 
Witness Testifies’, Birmingham News (23 February 1988), p. 6b; Response of the USA to Ellison’s 
Motion for Reduction of Sentence (1988). 
 183 
 
God’s enemies on a large scale, appealed to the CSA’s apocalyptic outlook. It could 
potentially enable the group, at the appropriate time, to escalate beyond the small-arms 
military manoeuvres that it had been training for, to an attack at a scale matching that of 
their ideology, as described above, which spoke of Armageddon and global conflict, and 
accepted no constraints whatsoever on the means involved.116 At a less cosmic level, 
using cyanide as Ellison envisaged would also serve the general white revolutionary 
strategy, which entailed ‘disrupting public services and creating general turmoil’.117  
 
As for questions whether the group could successfully carry out such an attack, which 
would no doubt figure into any adoption decision, subjectively this did not present an 
obstacle. Ellison and the other CSA members merely took it on faith that, so long as 
they were following God’s will, any venture employing the cyanide would be effective. 
When questioned about how they had envisaged countering the dilution factor or 
preventing Aryans who might drink the water from also being poisoned, Noble 
explained that ‘God would… make sure the poison got to the town’ and ‘…that those 
who were meant to die would be poisoned’.118 Ultimately, while a cyanide weapon in 
particular was not strictly necessary to achieve the CSA’s objectives, it fit in 
exceedingly well with the narrative of a personal and racial manifest apocalyptic destiny 




At least part of the decision to adopt rockets as a CSA weapon likely stemmed from 
tactical exigencies surrounding the target for which they were developed – the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City.119 Given, first, that the intent was for the entire 
building to be destroyed, second, that the perpetrators needed to avoid detection and 
capture, and, third, that there is no mention of the CSA ever considering a suicide 
                                                          
116 Kerry Noble has claimed that if Ellison had encountered an individual with biological expertise, he 
would consider using bioweapons (Stern telephone interview with Noble, 2 March 1998, in Stern (2000), 
p. 139). 
117 Response of the USA to Ellison’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence (1988). 
118 Stern (2000), p. 151. 
119 Richard Snell was the person who recommended destroying a federal building to Ellison and who 
conducted the initial surveillance. In yet another alleged connection between Snell and the Murrah 
Federal Building, Mark Hamm suggests that the source of Snell’s idea was a personal desire for revenge 
against the federal officials (in the Internal Revenue Service) who had impounded all of Snell’s assets, 
left him in financial ruin and who just happened to work at the Murrah Federal Building (Mark Hamm, 
Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge revenged (Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press, 
1997), pp. 5-6). 
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attack, the alternatives in terms of weapons were limited to a bomb large enough to 
bring down the building from some distance away (the solution employed by Timothy 
McVeigh over a decade later), or a series of standoff projectiles.120 Combining these 
considerations with the availability heuristic provided by the copious references to 
rockets in the Turner Diaries and it is little surprise that rockets would be favoured. 
 
However, the greater uncertainties and resources required to develop and deploy rockets 
when compared with those required for a large truck-bomb imply that other factors were 
probably in play. It is argued that the pursuit of rockets was part of a broader pattern of 
operational innovation undertaken by the CSA in the latter part of 1983, which included 
arson at a gay-friendly church in Springfield, Missouri, the previously mentioned 
pipeline attack and attempts to bomb a synagogue and assassinate a judge. This frenetic 
series of attacks and attempted attacks was sparked by the ‘martyrdom’ of tax protester 
Gordon Kahl and the subsequent clandestine meeting of far right gurus in July 1983. 
After this meeting, Ellison – who had declared during the gathering that ‘the sword is 
now out of the sheath’ and that ‘for every one of our people they kill, we ought to kill 
one hundred of theirs!’121 – appeared to assume the role of vanguard of the anti-
government struggle.122 Indeed, with respect to his intended rocket attack, Ellison 
openly declared that ‘We need something with a large body count to make the 
government sit up and take notice. I want to be able to launch these rockets from a 
trailer some distance away. And I want the government to know that the right-wing has 
spoken, that the Second American Revolution has begun’.123 Ellison saw himself as one 
of the founding fathers of this Revolution124 and using fairly sophisticated weaponry 
like rockets would both grab the attention of his enemies and bring him prestige within 
the movement.125  
 
                                                          
120 This assumes that, after their initial surveillance, they realized that smuggling a sufficiently large 
amount of explosives into the building was an impractical proposition. 
121 Noble, p. 154. 
122 During the same time period, Robert Mathews was doing much the same thing, albeit with a much 
lower profile and a different strategy. 
123 Noble, p. 158. 
124 Noble, p. 155.  
125 In late 1983, Ellison remarked to Noble that Louis Beam had given him the code name of ‘Warlord’ 
and that he intended to live up to that name (Ibid.) 
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In any event, as detailed above in the case of cyanide, using rockets to cause mass 
casualties was legitimate in Ellison’s eyes, as demonstrated by the following exchange 
between Ellison and other CSA members regarding the rocket attack:  
 
Unidentified CSA member 1: ‘Are there people in the federal building working there 
besides feds?’ 
Ellison: ‘Doesn’t much matter. There are no innocents in war. Those people have 
chosen to work in a federal building’. 
Unidentified CSA member 2: ‘What about the children? Will there be any children 
there?’ 
Ellison: ‘The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children’.126 
  
Moreover, the use of rockets and the expected subsequent large casualty count also 
supported the CSA’s overall strategy of large-scale disruption in order to defeat ZOG 
and initiate the end times.  
 
In order for charismatic authority to persevere, it requires the sustained belief of the 
followers in their leader’s exceptionalism. Following a series of negatively perceived 
events, by 1983 Ellison’s hold over several members of his CSA flock had waned. 
These events included the death of Randal Rader’s child in March 1981 on the 
ostensibly divinely protected compound, deterioration of living conditions, Ellison’s 
brushing aside of superstitious concerns in 1982 regarding the shape of the new 
sanctuary, and his decision in late 1982 to take a second wife against the advice of the 
elders.127 Another reason for Ellison’s ramp-up in the intensity of his actions in the 
latter part of 1983 – including the pursuit of a complex weapon like a standoff rocket 
capability – might thus have been to galvanize his disciples and reinvigorate their 
allegiance to him and his vision. Moreover, many right-wing conspiracies point to 
technologies as the tools of the Antichrist,128 and the use of higher level technology 
against the enemy might have been Ellison’s way of ‘fighting fire with fire’. 
  
Finally, by this time Kent Yates had joined CSA and had proven himself to be 
technically adept with a variety of weapons and their fabrication. There had even been a 
prophecy by a young female member of CSA regarding Yates’ value to the CSA.129 In 
this context, Ellison most likely had a high degree of faith not only in Yates, but also 
                                                          
126 Reconstructed from Noble, p. 158. 
127 See Rosenfeld, p. xxii; Noble, pp. 118, 135, 137; Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 258. 
128 Barkun (1996), pp. 55-57. 
129 Noble, p. 160. 
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that his plans were blessed by divine sanction and would thus succeed despite any 
technical hurdles. 
 
Reasons for Adoption Success (or Otherwise) 
 
The CSA did not succeed in adopting either cyanide or rockets as viable weapons, 
although they did manage to acquire, store and lace bullets with cyanide. The group did 
possess several organizational attributes often positively associated with successful 
weapons adoption. These included sufficient resources to fund R&D activities, an 
institutionalized R&D function (manifested in their machine shop) and a relatively 
undisturbed safe haven in that they possessed an isolated compound, as well as the time 
to develop at least some degree of proficiency (with respect to both techne and mētis) in 
modifying and producing firearms and basic explosives.  
 
With respect to resources, the CSA had numerous sources of income, including 
legitimate labour such as timber logging, operating a health food store, and working on 
missile silos, as well as illicit activities such as shoplifting (referred to as ‘plundering 
the Egyptians’), food stamp fraud, selling modified weapons and insurance fraud.130 A 
major source of income was derived from their right-wing activities, i.e., their 
paramilitary training activities at Silhouette City and elsewhere and their sale of 
extremist literature.131 These activities enabled them to spend an estimated $52,000 on 
weapons, ammunition and other military equipment during 1978 and 1979 alone.132 
Among the items confiscated during the April 1985 search of the CSA compound were 
155 Krugerrands and numerous gold and silver coins.133 It has even been alleged – 
although without corroboration – that the CSA at one time owned a gold mine in Costa 
Rica.134 
 
                                                          
130 Flynn and Gerhardt,  p. 257-8; Hamm (2007), p. 102 
131 Coates, pp.136-7; Smith, p. 63. 
132 Hamm (2007), p. 91. 
133 Declassified Memorandum. 
134 Coates, p. 68. 
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While several of these strengths were equivocal during certain periods – in particular 
their access to funding135 and their isolation from security forces136 – it might still be 
expected that they would have enjoyed somewhat greater success in their adoption 
efforts with respect to acquiring rocket capabilities or using cyanide as a mass-casualty 
weapon. Yet several significant organizational impediments stood in the way of 





i) Lack of techne (let alone mētis): Of the chemical warfare agents, cyanide (as a toxic 
industrial chemical) is among the easiest to acquire – receiving the cyanide as a gift 
meant that the CSA did not even need to accomplish this step. Yet it is less toxic 
than many other chemical weapons, making efficient delivery mechanisms all the 
more crucial. While the group’s members had some understanding of cyanide’s 
capacity for harm (they knew enough to lock the barrel away from the children137), 
they lacked anyone with sufficient chemistry knowledge to understand the immense 
hurdles – namely dilution and treatment – in the way of successful dissemination of 
the chemical in a way that would cause mass casualties through the water supply.138  
As Kerry Noble admits, ‘Back then there were no books on [chemical warfare], we 
didn’t have the Internet, and we didn’t really know what we could do with it [the 
cyanide]. We were ignorant on that kind of thing’.139 
 
ii) Non-rational, ideologically driven tactical theories: As mentioned in connection 
with the decision to adopt, their lack of techne and mētis did not put a brake on their 
                                                          
135 A downswing in the timber market, as well as Ellison’s disdain for government, resulted in the 
compound being foreclosed upon on 20 December 1983 (Noble, p.177). It was saved from public auction 
only by a wealthy benefactor the following year. 
136 Unlike many classic cults, the CSA compound was not closed, and reportedly as early as 1978, federal 
agents had the compound under some level of observation (Memorandum: SAC, Little Rock to Director, 
FBI (24 August 1983), Declassified File No. 100-HQ-48720; Hamm, p. 107). However, neither the rocket 
plot nor the cyanide was discovered until 1985, so law enforcement infiltration could not have been a 
direct cause of their failure to adopt. 
137 Noble, p. 121. 
138 Stern cites a United Nations study that estimates the amount of potassium cyanide needed to 
contaminate an untreated reservoir at ten tons (United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary 
General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, 
UN Document A/7575 (1 July 1969), cited in Stern (2000), p. 154). 
139 Interview with Kerry Noble (16 December 2004), cited in Hamm (2007), p. 105. 
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aspirations. They believed that God would guide the cyanide through the water 
supply so that it reached only the evildoers in sufficient concentrations. This 
fantastic approach to tactical preparations apparently resulted in the CSA not even 
exploring the delivery requirements in detail, nor attempting to increase their 




i) Ideologically-driven lack of perseverance: The CSA’s intense belief in divine 
imprimatur and involvement in every aspect of their activities meant that when they 
encountered a setback, as with the misfire that injured Kent Yates during the 
development of the rockets, instead of viewing this as a common occurrence during 
any complex operation, they interpreted it as a sign of divine displeasure and 
abandoned the entire enterprise. This was not the only instance in which a plot was 
abandoned or the group’s course changed by its sensitivity to the supernatural.140 
Possibly the most important of these was that it was apparently a prophecy on the 
part of Ellison’s first wife that convinced him to surrender to authorities in April 
1985.141 
 
ii) Lack of operational depth: Again related to their spiritual beliefs, Ellison and the 
CSA put complete faith in Kent Yates’ abilities, particularly after they had received 
a prophecy that he was the right man for the job. While Yates possessed a high 
degree of technical knowledge and was adept at modifying guns, he had less success 
with explosives (as seen not only with the rocket accident but also with the minimal 
damage done in the synagogue attack)142 and thus may have lacked the requisite 
mētis in this area. Once Yates was out of the picture, there were apparently no other 
members with his degree of expertise to continue the project, even if they had 
wanted to. Among the likely reasons for this lack of depth in skilled personnel are 
the isolation from the outside world enforced in the compound (e.g., no access to 
television) and the overall decrease in the number of members – including those 
                                                          
140 A similar reaction occurred when, on 26 December 1983, several CSA soldiers were on their way to 
assassinate a judge and federal agent, and they became involved in an automobile accident (Government’s 
Pretrial Memorandum in USA v. Miles et. al. (CR87-20008)). This was again seen by the CSA that God 
had decided that the time was not right and the plot was abandoned (Noble, pp. 162-163).  
141 Rosenfeld, pp. xv-xvi. 
142 Hamm (2007), p. 102. 
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proficient with weapons – after Rader and at least half of the existing membership 
had left the CSA by the first few months of 1983.143 
 
iii) Forced operational tempo: The latter part of 1983 witnessed a flurry of attacks and 
attempted attacks by the CSA. Although Gordon Kahl’s death and the subsequent 
decision to take the fight to the government was the immediate catalyst, there were 
several other factors driving Ellison to rapidly increase the tempo of CSA violence. 
Especially pertinent was the aforementioned desire to reinvigorate his leadership of 
both the CSA and the broader far right movement in the wake of the split of 1982; 
indeed Flynn and Gerhardt aver that ‘after Rader left, CSA went over the edge’.144 
There was also the factor of Ellison possibly believing that the prophesied 
Tribulation was finally at hand after several disappointments. Since 1978, Ellison 
had been predicting dates for the collapse of the United States and the initiation of 
the end times and each time the prophesied apocalypse had not occurred.145 While 
this had in some ways only made his followers more dependent on him (a process 
described in the seminal work by Festinger, et. al.146), Ellison might have honestly 
believed that the time was finally nigh and that he had to do all in his power to seize 
the opportunity. In any event, moving from almost no terrorist attacks to several 
different missions being planned simultaneously, being plotted and carried out by a 
small subset of CSA members, must have put a tremendous operational strain on 
whatever capabilities the organization had built up over the previous years. It is little 
wonder then that most of these attempts, including the arson attack at the 
Metropolitan Community Church in Springfield, Missouri, the bombing of the 
Jewish Community Centre in Bloomington, Indiana and the attempted rupturing of 
the natural gas pipeline, yielded suboptimal results, if any tangible effects at all. The 
same phenomenon would also likely have infected the mission to develop rockets 
and destroy the federal building. 
 
In short, most of the failure to effectively weaponize the cyanide or to achieve an in-
house rocket capability can be attributed to Ellison’s inherently superstitious world view 
                                                          
143 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Information on the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. 
144 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 258. 
145 Noble, p. 113. 




and narcissistic personality. The CSA’s peculiar ideology, while a substantial 
inducement towards violence, was an impediment to the attainment of the means to 
carry out this violence. Interestingly, with regard to the two technologies under 
consideration here, the dynamic worked in opposite directions. In the case of the 
cyanide, it made the CSA overconfident in their abilities and thus precluded the 
necessary research and development from being undertaken, while in the case of the 
development of rockets, their ideology robbed them of their confidence and led to them 
abandoning the project, arguably prematurely. 
 
 
Negative Case Study: The Order 
 
For a brief period in the early 1980s, the Order, or Bruder Schweigen147 as its members 
referred to themselves, engaged in a number of violent actions that secured the 
organization’s place as one of the most vigorous domestic terrorist groups in United 
States history. Founded in Metaline Falls, Washington by the iconoclastic Robert Jay 
Mathews in late September 1983,148 the Order drew on far right tropes and templates 
and sought to provide a nexus for those disparate extremists throughout the country who 
wanted to do more than just talk about overthrowing the government. Explicitly 
modelled after the exploits of a group in the Turner Diaries with the same name,149 the 
Order’s actions were predicated on defending the white race and triggering a war with 
the Zionist Occupation Government (‘ZOG’).  
 
It lost little time in becoming active, conducting increasingly lucrative robberies in its 
first nine months (see Table 7.2 below). These climaxed in the armed robbery of a 
                                                          
147 This name, which only came to be used in the last few months of the group’s existence, was drawn 
from a verse in a German poem of 1814, which cautioned against the time ‘wenn alle Brüder schweigen // 
und falschen Götzen traun (when all our brothers are silent // and trust in false idols)’ (Coates, p. 40). The 
group has thus also been called the ‘Silent Brotherhood’. 
148 Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 6, 96; Dees and Corcoran, p. 141. The grand jury indictment of the Order 
placed the organization’s beginnings ‘in or about October 1983’ (Second superseding indictment at 4, 
United States of America v. Bruce Carroll Pierce et. al. (CR85-001M), U.S. District Court, Western 
District of Washington, Seattle Division). 
149 The ‘Order’ in William Pierce’s novel is actually the elite leadership cell of a broader group called the 
‘Organization’. Mathews himself did not use the name ‘the Order,’ which was one of the many monikers 
used by members, but became the label appended to the group by authorities (and generally by scholars). 
In fact, Mathews did not name his group at all until September 1984, believing initially that this was more 
secure. A year after the group was created, he finally selected the name ‘Bruder Schweigen’ (Flynn and 
Gerhardt, pp. 140, 294).  
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Brinks armoured truck on a highway near Ukiah, California on 16 July 1984, which 
netted the group a tidy sum of $3.6 million.150 At the time, this was the largest armed 
robbery in U.S. history, and Mathews used the loot to fill the coffers of the far right and 
expand the influence of his group, enabling him to set up a countrywide network of over 
fifty right-wing extremists.151 Along the path to the Brinks robbery, the Order had also 
murdered one of its own152 and attempted to bomb a synagogue,153 before moving on to 
the assassination of prominent Jewish talk show host Alan Berg in June 1984.154 The 
group had far more ambitious plans, and poured its resources into recruitment, training 
and planning large-scale attacks. However, primarily as a result of shoddy tradecraft on 
the part of its members, the Order was infiltrated by the FBI and other law enforcement 
agencies, which led to a deadly game of cat and mouse with authorities in the latter part 
of 1984.  
 
Table 7.2: Summary of Major Criminal Activity by The Order155 
Date Criminal Activity Notes 
28 October 
1983 
Armed Robbery – 
Pornographic bookstore north 
of Spokane 




Counterfeiting – $50 bills (later 
$10 bills) 
Personnel: Lane; Yarbrough; Merki 




Bank robbery – City Bank, 
north of Seattle 
Personnel: Mathews 
Amount: $25,952 (covered in red security dye 
from exploding security device) 
30 January 
1984 
Armed Robbery – Washington 
Mutual Savings Bank, Spokane 
Personnel: Pierce; Yarbrough 
Amount: $3,600 
16 March 1984 Armed Robbery – Continental 
Armoured Transport Service 
truck outside Fred Meyer store  
Personnel: Mathews; Pierce; Yarbrough; Duey 
Amount: $43,345 
23 April 1984 Armed Robbery – Continental 
Armoured Transport Service 
truck, Northgate Shopping 
Centre, Seattle 
Set off bomb in Embassy Theatre (pornographic 
cinema) in Seattle the day before and used threat 
of another attack as diversion for robbery. No 
fatalities but police state that blast sufficiently 
powerful to kill. 
Personnel: Mathews; Parmenter; Barnhill; Pierce; 
Duey; Yarbrough; Kemp 
Amount: $534,000 (approx. $230,000 in cash) 
                                                          
150 Smith, p. 70. 
151 Although there were only nine members at its inception, Richard Scutari, a senior former member, 
asserts that by December 1984, the Order had ‘50 underground members and numerous legal above 
ground supporters’ (Richard Scutari, quoted in Magnus Söderman, ‘Interview with Richard Scutari’, in 
Magnus Söderman and Henrik Holappa (eds.), Unbroken Warrior: The Richard Scutari Letters 
(Stockholm: Nationellt Motständ Förlag, 2011), p. 113. 
152 The Order executed Walter West in a deserted forested area in May 1984 because they believed that 
his drunken ranting would reveal their activities (Smith, p. 69; Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 169-170). 
153 Flynn and Gerhardt, p.157. 
154 United States of America v. David Lane, et al (87-CR-114), U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, 
Denver Division; Coates, p. 67. 
155 Sources: Smith, p. 69, 70; Hamm, p. 130; Stephen Singular, Talked to Death: The Life and Murder of 
Alan Berg (New York: Beech Tree Books, 1987), p. 206; Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 123-124, 150-151, 157, 
167-170; Turning Point: The Order, Documentary, American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 1995. 
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29 April 1984 Firebomb Attempt – 
Congregation Ahavath Israel 
Synagogue, Boise, Idaho 
Personnel: Pierce; Kemp 
Bomb went off but minimal damage caused. 
27 May 1984 Murder – killing of Walter West 
in Kaniksu National Forest, 
near Coeur d’Alene, Idaho 
Personnel: Kemp; Dye; Duey; Tate 
18 June 1984 Murder – Assassination of Alan 
Berg in Denver 
Personnel: Mathews; Pierce; Scutari; Lane 
Pierce was the shooter, using Rader’s modified 
MAC-10 from the CSA. 
16 July 1984 Armed Robbery – Brinks 
armoured car, near Ukiah, 
California 
Personnel: Most members took part 
Amount: $3.6 million 
24 November 
1984 
Shootout with federal agents – 
Portland 
Personnel: Mathews 
Fleeing a trap set by the FBI thanks to Tom 




Shootout with law enforcement  
– Whidbey Island, near Seattle. 
Personnel: Mathews 
Mathews died in ensuing fire. 
 
Eventually, the group was tracked to Whidbey Island, near Seattle, where Robert 
Mathews was cornered and died in a fire during a standoff with law enforcement on 8 
December 1984.156 The remaining members of the Order who had escaped were 
pursued relentlessly;157 almost all were apprehended within the following eighteen 
months and subsequently sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Robert Mathews and other 
well-known members of the Order soon rose to occupy the status of martyrs in the far 
right extremist movement worldwide, a status which persists even today.158 The Order 
presented law enforcement with many innovations, particularly when compared with 
previous far right behaviour; however, despite possessing a similar ideology and having 
access to much of the same type of expertise as the CSA, its innovations were largely 
tactical and organizational in nature and did not involve the adoption of any major 
weapons, including rockets or cyanide.159  
 
The Innovations 
                                                          
156 Mathews refused to give up and had held dozens of law enforcement officers at bay for many hours by 
firing at them from the house where he was holed up. Eventually the decision was made to launch 
military flares into the house, which set it ablaze and resulted in Mathews – who still refused to emerge – 
dying in the fire (David Schaefer, ‘Fiery FBI Raid End Whidbey Standoff’, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (9 
Dec. 1984), p. A1; Peter Lewis and Joni Balter, ‘Whidbey Siege: Roles in a Book?’, Seattle Times (10 
Dec. 1984), p. A1). 
157 Several members of the Order actually fled to the CSA and took refuge on their compound in the early 
months of 1985. It was the murderous actions against a Missouri state policeman of one of the Order 
fugitives, David Tate, who was reportedly on his way to the CSA, that set in motion the chain of events 
which resulted in the federal siege of the CSA compound in April 1985. 
158 Unlike the case with the CSA, almost all of the Order members (except those who turned state’s 
evidence) are still venerated by the extreme right wing. The organization even spawned a more localized 
copycat version, sometimes referred to as Order II, which was far less successful, but just as violent, as its 
namesake (see Smith, p. 79 for details). 
159 Although the group took no known tangible steps towards procuring cyanide, the question of whether 




Much of the innovation that the Order was responsible for consisted of the manner in 
which they attempted to professionalize and systematize their revolution, compared to 
what had previously often been inchoate, unplanned and sporadic violence from the 
extreme right wing. As such, the Order focused heavily on intelligence gathering and 
surveillance. Examples include their trial runs and recruiting of an inside man for the 
Brinks robbery, as well as the use of Jean Craig, the middle-age mother of Mathews’ 
mistress, to gather detailed information on Alan Berg. The extent of the intelligence the 
group was able to collect was apparent when federal agents raided the house of Gary 
Yarbrough, one of the founding members of the Order, in October 1984 and discovered 
substantial information on local law enforcement officers, including photographs, 
printouts of their names and addresses, license numbers and other information, with the 
SWAT team leader at the very top of the list.160 Other attempts at professionalism were 
the use of code names for all members (with some members never knowing the true 
names of others)161 and the cultivation of assumed identities that would withstand some 
degree of scrutiny.162 The Order also engaged in various counterfeiting schemes to 
support their revolution, beginning with rather amateurish attempts led by David Lane 
using equipment at the Aryan Nations compound, but later improving their quality using 
the Order’s own press under the supervision of Robert Merki, a seasoned – albeit less 
than completely successful – counterfeiter.163 
 
The Order was also quite innovative (for the time) with respect to the technological 
aspects of clandestinity, delving into electronic countersurveillance, secure 
communications and even embracing the nascent information revolution. With the 
proceeds of their armed robberies, Order members procured an array of radio scanners, 
                                                          
160 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 318. 
161 These code names included: ‘Carlos’ for Robert Mathews, ‘Mr. Black’ for Richard Scutari, ‘Brigham’ 
for Bruce Pierce and ‘Luke’ for Randy Duey. For a more complete list, see Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 220. 
162 Based on the guidance provided by underground publications, Order members identified dead infants 
in graveyards and obtained birth certificates and other documentation like drivers licenses using these 
names. (United States of America v. Ronald A. King et. al. (CR-85-0102), U.S. District Court, Northern 
District of California, Tuesday, 12 Feb. 1985; Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 139). Later on, their chief 
counterfeiter, Robert Merki, also produced phony identification documents for group members, including 
Costa Rican driver’s licenses and ostensibly even working on a fake ID for the National Security Agency 
(Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 295). 
163Singular, p. 205; Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 140. The initial attempts at counterfeiting produced easily 
detectable $50 bills, whereas later efforts produced $10 bills that were generally passable. However, it 
was the injudicious use of these $10 bills that resulted in the apprehension of Thomas Martinez, an Order 
operative in Philadelphia, and which eventually led to the FBI infiltrating the group through Martinez. 
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transceivers, night-vision equipment, scrambled walkie-talkies, a seismic intrusion 
detector, radio frequency detectors (to discover wiretaps), voice stress analysers and 
telephone scramblers.164 It was suspected that much of this electronic equipment was 
obtained from Tom Metzger, a leading figure in the Ku Klux Klan, who operated an 
electronics business in the San Diego area.165 Mathews also set up a sophisticated 
communications network with manned phone drops166 and contingency numbers if 
members got arrested (called the ‘Beartrap’167), and the Order purchased several 
computers for accessing Louis Beam’s (of Aryan Nations) new electronic bulletin board 
(a progenitor of today’s websites). The latter, known as the Liberty Net, was set up to 
disseminate right-wing propaganda, tactics and hit lists.168 David Lane, a senior Order 
member, even inquired into how to disable telephone networks in major metropolitan 
areas, with the notion of circumventing alarm systems during robberies, although this 
was never attempted.169 
 
With respect to weapons in particular, the Order accumulated an immense arsenal of 
small arms. Court records of items seized from Order members list hundreds of 
weapons, including fully automatic assault rifles, some of them customized, and 
enormous quantities of ammunition.170 The Order was also not shy about acquiring 
explosives, purchasing or otherwise acquiring several pounds of C-4 plastic explosive, 
dynamite, dozens of grenades, detonators, black powder, and Kinestik™ (a brand of 
binary explosive).171 Several Order members, including Gary Yarbrough and Dan 
Bauer, also had explosives expertise and built bombs using the acquired explosives, 
often for the purpose of providing a diversion for police in order to facilitate their 
                                                          
164 Detailed lists of such items can be found in the confiscated equipment lists presented in Second 
superseding indictment at 17, USA v Pierce et. al. (CR85-001M) and Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 254, 333. 
165 Government’s Memorandum on Sentencing, United States of America v. Frank Silva (CR85-001M), 
U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington, Seattle Division, p. 4. 
166 These were manned by Order members, including, at different times, Jean Craig and Frank Silva, who 
would receive messages from other members and distribute information (Government’s Memorandum on 
Sentencing, USA v. Silva (CR85-001M); Exhibit H-2 in USA v. Lane, et. al. (87-CR-114); Flynn and 
Gerhardt, p. 295). 
167 Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 296, 308. 
168 Singular, p. 234. 
169 Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 106-107. 
170 For illustrative lists, see: United States Attorney, Western District of Washington, News Release (15 
Apr. 1985), p.7; Second superseding indictment at 17, USA v Pierce et. al. (CR85-001M).  
171 Indictment at 35, United States of America v. Robert Edward Miles, et. al. (CR87-20008), United 
States District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division; United States Attorney, Western 
District of Washington, News Release, p. 7; Second superseding indictment at 17, USA v Pierce et. al. 
(CR85-001M); Singular, p. 211. 
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robberies.172 One innovative bomb attack that was conceived of but never implemented 
was a suicide bombing of Baron de Rothschild in November 1983.173 Yet, in terms of 
the weapons themselves, there was little that stood out from the arms acquired by many 
other right-wing extremists at the time. 
 
In contrast to the relatively prosaic weapons actually used by the Order, there was one 
example of the Order pursuing an exotic weapon. In the wake of the windfall from the 
Ukiah armoured car robbery, one of the more peripheral Order members, Daniel Bauer, 
proposed to the core members that they fund certain right-wing scientists to work on 
microwave and laser-beam weapons to help fight ZOG. Bauer had ostensibly been 
contacted by sympathetic scientists in the eastern Washington area who had been 
working in these fields. He suggested that the Order fund their research, under a project 
which received the moniker of ‘Reliance’, including setting up a front business and 
helping the scientists to relocate and obtain new identities as part of this project. 
Although senior Order operator Bruce Pierce vociferously objected to such plans as a 
waste of money, the remainder of the inner circle including Mathews went along with 
Bauer’s suggestion and, according to Singular, provided $100,000 for the project. 
Needless to say, the proffered project was a scam concocted by a rather creative writer 
acquaintance of Bauer and the money was never seen again.174 One other purported 
enterprise of the Order that has scant evidence, but is nonetheless worth a brief mention, 
is what has been described as the Order’s attempts to create an ‘Aryan air force’. In 
March 1984, Mathews may have tried to obtain an unspecified aerial capability by 
recruiting two pilots and their planes, none of which were apparently very airworthy.175 





                                                          
172 For example, a fake bomb was utilized on 30 January 1984 to divert police from a bank robbery and in 
Spokane a real bomb was detonated inside an adult film theatre on 22 April 1984, the day prior to an 
armed robbery, in order to give credence to a diversionary bomb threat during an armoured car heist the 
following day (Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 130, 150). 
173 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 106.  
174 Singular, p.239; Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 299; Coates, p. 73. 
175 See Singular, p. 205. Although never explicitly linked to the Order, the two pilots may have been the 
McCoy brothers, two hapless right-wing extremists reported in Bill Morlin, ‘FAA Brings Action Against 
Two-Plane “Aryan Air Force”’, Spokane Chronicle (4 March 1985), p. 3.  
176 Second superseding indictment at 17, USA v Pierce et. al. (CR85-001M). 
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The situation with respect to cyanide is somewhat complicated. Shortly before 
Mathew’s fatal showdown with federal authorities on Whidbey Island in December 
1984, Bruce Pierce, who had taken on the role of key mission planner for the Order, 
reported back to Mathews on his recent activities and was discussing cutting electricity 
supplies to Los Angeles. Once he had achieved this, Pierce contended that his team 
would ‘drop a tub of cyanide into the aqueduct. Hell, it’ll probably be detected at the 
filtration plants, but either way, we’re causin’ problems. The niggers’ll be in the streets 
in an hour, and the cops’ll be shooting. I just hope the big quake doesn't get ’em before 
we do’.177 This was the only mention of cyanide and there is no further evidence that 
Pierce either pursued or possessed any actual chemicals, especially since he had to go 
on the run from authorities shortly thereafter, ultimately being arrested in March 1985. 
 
There does, therefore, seem to have been some interest in cyanide, which could 
conceivably be construed as a decision to adopt it as a weapon. On the one hand, it 
might be argued that, given the time and space in which to operate, Pierce would have 
pursued the acquisition of the toxic chemical and that it was only the intensive 
nationwide manhunt for him that precluded this. On the other hand, this might have 
merely been the somewhat fanciful musings of a subordinate eager to please his 
beleaguered superior (Mathews) with daring tales of large-scale attacks to come. After 
all, at this point in time, the Order members knew that the authorities were breathing 
down their necks, so to speak, and Mathews had just written a Declaration of War and 
hinted to his comrades that he would probably not be much longer for this world.178 The 
latter interpretation is made more likely considering the context of the prior relationship 
between these two strong personalities, which had involved Pierce openly challenging 
Mathews for more autonomy, but still wanting to have Mathews as a leader, and 
presumably seeking to justify the independence and resources that Mathews had given 
him specifically to plan and engage in operations.179 At the same time, Pierce seems to 
realize (unlike the CSA) that cyanide would be more disruptive than destructive and 
thus more of a facilitator of public instability than a mass-casualty weapon. The most 
that can be said for analytical purposes from the available evidence, therefore, is that 
there was a partial or equivocal decision to adopt cyanide, which may or may not have 
been serious but in either event was not followed up in any way whatsoever. 
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There is no real evidence of the Order ever seriously pursuing or acquiring rockets. In 
fact, the closest that the group ever came to a rocket appeared to be the two M158 
Ground Red Star Clusters, which are essentially signalling flares, that were among the 
materials confiscated from Gary Yarbrough.180 They did appear to comprehend the 
possible utility of rockets, however. In preparation for the Ukiah robbery, Mathews 
acquired a length of cardboard tubing which was to be disguised as a bazooka in order 
to intimidate the armoured truck guards. Flynn and Gerhardt assert that Mathews had 
originally sought a military light anti-tank tube for this purpose but had been 
unsuccessful. They specifically refer to Mathews’ desire to acquire the firing tube, 
rather than the rocket itself. Light anti-tank weapons (LAWs) are usually one-shot 
rockets with tubes that are discarded after a single use and are far easier to acquire than 
the LAW itself, which implies that Mathews was after the tube merely as a prop without 
any intention to acquire an actual weapon.181 
 
For parsimony in analysis, the activity of the Order can be separated into two main 
phases, as follows: 
1. Building the Brotherhood (September 1983 to 16 July 1984): This phase begins 
with the oath-taking that created the Order and traces the gradual increase in 
confidence and consequence of the Order’s actions, up to the colossal robbery of 
the Brinks truck in Ukiah, California. 
2. Burning Brightly and Briefly (16 July 1984 to 8 December 1984): The second 
phase begins with the organization’s devolution to a cellular structure and 
expanding influence in the far right, while authorities simultaneously drew 
closer and closer to apprehending them, culminating in Mathews’ fiery death.182 
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182 Although some members of the Order remained free for several months thereafter, they were being 








At least some members of the Order were clearly aware of the potential for cyanide to 
be used as a pollutant, as is made obvious by Bruce Pierce’s statement above. The 
question then becomes how this awareness arose. There are several possible channels, 
all of which are based on the group’s extensive connections with the various elements of 
the American far right. 
 
Mathews had been an itinerant attendee at many of the key far right centres for several 
years prior to his founding of the Order, getting to know the various ideologues as his 
personal belief system was being moulded. One of the places that he had visited several 
times was the Aryan Nations compound of Richard Butler in Hayden Lakes, Idaho. 
Flynn and Gerhardt assert that Mathews was not overly captivated by Butler, but rather 
enjoyed the comradeship to be found among fellow white supremacists there,183 from 
whom he later recruited at least four members of his guerrilla army. Nonetheless, he 
(along with all nine of the founding members of the Order) was present during the July 
1983 Aryan Nations Congress at which the far right became exercised over the death of 
Gordon Kahl.184 Besides being the turning point at which Mathews decided for once and 
for all that more vigorous action was needed than just the endless remonstrations by the 
movement’s old guard, this was also the setting of clandestine meetings between the far 
right’s leaders during which they plotted their strategy for the overthrow of ZOG.185 As 
part of the meetings, which were attended by among others James Ellison of the CSA, 
the pollution of water supplies was explicitly put forward.186 A 1987 sedition indictment 
of right-wing leaders alleges that Mathews (who was already regarded in the movement 
as a promising young firebrand) was included in these meetings,187 but even if he was 
not, it is likely that word got out to other attendees about the content of the meetings, 
                                                          
183 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 84. 
184 Indictment at 6, USA v. Miles et. al. (CR87-20008).  
185 Smith, Terrorism in America, p. 61; See also the related discussion in the CSA case study. 
186 Indictment at 8, USA v. Miles et. al. (CR87-20008). 
187 Indictment at 7, USA v. Miles et. al. (CR87-20008). 
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and one or more of the future members of the Order heard about the plans to poison 
water supplies.188 
 
A second potential source of the Order’s knowledge of cyanide’s potential as a mass-
casualty weapon was its close contacts with the CSA. As already mentioned in the 
profile of that organization, several Order members fled to the CSA as fugitives.189 Yet 
the connections between the two groups predate Order members’ search for a refuge 
and go deeper than the mere fact that they moved in the same far right circles, of which 
the July 1983 Aryan Nations Congress was but one example. Rather, the Order recruited 
several former members of the CSA, who were already linked to one another in a sort of 
alumni network. These included at least three individuals who would play key roles in 
the Order: Randall Rader, who had taken on the chief paramilitary role in the CSA 
before falling out with James Ellison (Rader was recruited to supervise the Order’s 
training activities); Andrew Barnhill, a smart young former CSA member who was 
reportedly adept at mathematics;190 and Richard Scutari,191 who became the Order’s 
chief of security and Robert Mathews’ confidant. Robert Merki, a former industrial 
engineer, who with his wife Sharon would play a large role in the logistical operations 
of the Order, had also reportedly managed a gold mine in Costa Rica on behalf of the 
CSA.192 It is probable that at least one of these individuals (most likely Rader) knew of 
the cyanide stored at the CSA and what it was to be used for and was thus a conduit for 




Although there is no mention of rockets associated with the Order, it is almost certain 
that its members were aware of the weapons and their possibilities for standoff attack. 
The strongest argument for this lies with the Turner Diaries, which – as has been 
previously described – is rife with references to mortars and other rocket-like 
                                                          
188 The available court documents do not state whether a specific toxic agent was mentioned, but cyanide 
would be a prime candidate, given that most laypeople are aware of its toxic reputation. 
189 At least four Order members were present at the CSA in early 1985 and it is highly probable that 
David Tate and Frank Silva were making their way to the CSA when they were arrested. 
190 Flynn and Gerhardt, p.139. 
191 Scutari had been involved with the CSA in 1982 (Henrik Holappa, ‘The Years with Richard Scutari’ in 
Söderman and Holappa, p. 12; Hamm (2007), p. 125). 
192 Coates, p. 68. 
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projectiles. Many books influenced Robert Mathews on his road to violence,193 but none 
more so than the Turner Diaries. Mathews reportedly memorized every word of the 
novel, and drew on it as the blueprint for much of his activity. He would certainly, then, 
have been aware of the positive light in which the novel paints these weapons. In 
addition to this fictional referent, several members of the Order had actually served in 
the military, including Denver Parmenter, Randy Duey, Gary Lee Yarbrough, James 
Dye194 and Richard Scutari,195 while Randall Rader had built up an extensive 
knowledge of military matters. All of these individuals would have encountered rockets 
– if not in practice, at least in theory – at some time during their military training and 
service and would thus have been aware of their potential for use as a weapon in the 
Order’s attacks. Last, Mathews had been inspired by Robert Bolivar DePugh and his 
violent Minutemen group of the 1960s and would have most likely been aware of their 
acquisition of rockets in anticipation of attacks on targets in the Northeast. 196 
 
The Adoption Decision 
 
People and Process 
 
Turning first to the decision making process, the main driver behind almost all Order 
decisions – including whether or not to adopt new weapons – was its founder Robert 
Mathews. Understanding something of Mathews’ character and development can thus 
lead to insights into the Order’s weapon selection decisions. Mathews had followed an 
incremental path towards violent extremism, starting with the John Birch Society and 
the tax protest movement and working his way through to neo-Nazi groups like the 
National Alliance and Christian Identity groups like Aryan Nations, along the way 
becoming increasingly alienated from his family.197 Also, from a relatively early age, 
Mathews demonstrated the capacity to exercise charismatic authority – at only nineteen 
                                                          
193 These included Which Way Western Man? by William Gayley Simpson and Essays of a Klansman by 
Louis Beam (Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 81, 93-94). 
194 Walt Wiley and Herb Michelson, ‘Pieces Missing in Order Puzzle’, Sacramento Bee (8 Apr.1985); 
Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 159. 
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years old in Arizona, he pulled together a short-lived army of would-be anti-government 
guerrillas called the Sons of Liberty. This early experience served him well when, after 
a failed attempt to peacefully establish a ‘White American Bastion’ as a white sanctuary 
in the Pacific Northwest,198 he set about creating the Order. Mathews exhibited 
intelligence, was well read in far-right politics and possessed impressive rhetorical 
skills, as can be seen in the impassioned and eloquent, if extremely violent, imagery in 
the following extract from the oath which he instituted for initiation into the Order: 
 
My brothers, let us be his battle ax and weapons of war. Let us go forth by ones and by 
twos, by scores and by legions, and as true Aryan men with pure hearts and strong 
minds face the enemies of our faith and our race with courage and determination. We 
hereby invoke the blood covenant and declare that we are in a full state of war and will 
not lay down our weapons until we have driven the enemy into the sea and reclaimed 
the land which was promised to our fathers of old, and through our blood and His will, 
becomes the land of our children to be.199 
 
An integral component of charismatic authority is the devotion of one’s followers and 
Mathews inspired profound loyalty in his associates. He is described as being charming, 
extremely generous,200 protective of his ersatz kinsmen201 and took several members 
under his wing in a mentorship role. Richard Kemp, the hammer-wielding murderer of 
fellow member Walter West, has said that Mathews was ‘like the older brother I never 
had’.202 Mathews also led from the front – engaging in behaviour that put him 
personally at risk and not demanding that any other member do for the cause what he 
was not prepared to do himself.203 It has even been asserted that most of the members of 
the Order could never have anticipated their involvement in its violent activities before 
meeting Mathews.204 
 
He was, however, not above blatant manipulation to get what he wanted, for instance 
promising several of his associates who were hesitant regarding assassinations that he 
                                                          
198 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 9.  
199 Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 98-100. 
200 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 93. 
201 This was often to the point of jeopardizing the group’s security, for example, when Mathews wrote a 
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would not go ahead with these activities, while actively pursuing them with the more 
enthusiastic members.205 ‘He knew what buttons he could push on me’, recalls a former 
member.206 
 
Mathews also had a visionary bent, believing that the transition to a better world (for the 
White race) could be initiated by the direct action of his group and others like it, even if 
they themselves did not achieve their ultimate objectives. This outlook was evident 
from one of his oft-used phrases to his men: ‘Cattle die, kinsmen die, and I too shall die. 
The only thing I know that does not die is the fame of dead men’s deeds’.207 This partly 
explains the elaborate rituals and grandiose oaths he created for entry into the 
organization or the quixotic Declaration of War he wrote and had Order members sign 
shortly before his death – he was preparing a legacy for himself and a path for others to 
follow. This complete commitment to a sought-after White future also allowed him to 
maintain his resolve in the face of setbacks. For example, in March 1984, when the 
group was low on money and seemed in danger of dissolving, he pawned his wedding 
ring to purchase the equipment needed until they managed to secure sufficient funds to 
continue by robbing an armoured truck outside a Fred Meyer store.208 
 
Less helpful were Mathews’ argumentativeness and his tendency to accelerate the 
group’s activity beyond what was strategically prudent. As a former friend characterized 
him, ‘He wouldn’t slow down…Bob had to keep going …go go go go go’.209 The result 
was increasingly rash outbursts, reckless decisions and outlandish plans, such as his 
ideas (during the October to November 1984 timeframe) to launch an armed assault to 
rescue Frank Silva and Robert Merki from a pub where the FBI had them cornered or to 
raid law enforcement offices to recover property confiscated by federal agents from 
Gary Yarbrough.210 This behaviour – together with Mathews’ inherent fatalism – led, in 
the weeks before Mathews’ death, to a number of members seeking to leave the group 
                                                          
205 Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 192, 217. When confronted after the Berg assassination by Rader about this 
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 203 
 
and may have been one reason why Mathews stubbornly refused to surrender to 
authorities on Whidbey Island. 
 
Mathews may have been the linchpin of the Order, but he was not a dictator. Tensions 
had been simmering between Mathews and Bruce Pierce in particular, ever since Pierce 
had been arrested for counterfeiting in early 1984 and had indiscreetly called Order 
members from jail. This friction grew over the ensuing months and came to a head right 
after the successful Ukiah robbery in July.211 Pierce, backed up by several other core 
members, confronted Mathews and demanded a greater say in the Order’s affairs and 
more autonomy. Mathews – somewhat surprisingly to some witnesses – backed down 
and essentially agreed to their demands. This led to a transition over the next few 
months to a new, more cellular organizational structure in which Pierce managed his 
own operational group with a substantial portion of the loot, and various other members 
were assigned to take control of specific tasks such as recruitment, training, security and 
so forth.212 Mathews continued to oversee the broader strategy and growth of the group, 
but the change meant that after this point, tactical decision-making, presumably 
including weapon selection, was more dispersed between Mathews and Pierce. After 
Mathews’ death, Pierce – who was, if anything, even more action-oriented than 




Cyanide and Rockets 
 
It is now possible to explore why the Order did not choose to pursue rockets or cyanide 
(or in the case of cyanide, at least not until the end and even then only abstractly). After 
all, there were several elements that the group had in common with the CSA, which did 
pursue these weapons. First, like the CSA, the Order did not really have any moral 
compunction against causing mass casualties. Ideologically, the Order wholeheartedly 
embraced many of the core Christian Identity beliefs, including the primacy of the 
White race, the inherent wickedness of the Jews, and a global conspiracy – manifested 
                                                          
211 For details of the individual episodes leading to this growing tension, see Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 
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in America as ZOG – to dilute and dissolve the Aryan race. In fact, many of the Order’s 
central members were dedicated Identity adherents drawn from places like Aryan 
Nations or the CSA. Interestingly though, Mathews himself was an Odinist,213 and thus 
much of his writing lacks the biblically-derived, overtly apocalyptic references common 
among Identity groups, while its anti-government features were even more pronounced. 
Mathews also appears to have been rather more focused on the concept of sacred 
ancestral land than some Identity preachers. He was, however, not above utilizing 
explicit Christian references for instrumental purposes in order to maintain the loyalty 
of his followers and to broaden his constituency,214 as when he ended his declaration of 
war with ‘Therefore, for Blood, Soil, and Honor, … and for our King, Jesus Christ, we 
commit ourselves to Battle’.215 Whatever his personal theology, it dovetailed with 
Christian Identity in legitimizing large-scale violence against Jews, non-Whites and 
perhaps even to some extent the unenlightened white public, whom Mathews often 
referred to as ‘sheeple’, as part of a holy cause.216 As testament to the acceptability of 
inflicting mass casualties, a poem by Mathews that was recovered during the federal 
investigation of the Order includes the verses: ‘Reclaim our sacred ground for Aryan 
men and Aryan women.//Let the seas run red with the blood of the fleeing alien 
hordes’.217 
 
Nor were Mathews or the other members of the Order Luddites who spurned new 
technology. In some ways they were even more explicit about the need to utilize 
technology than the CSA and James Ellison were. In addition to the evidence for this set 
forward by their fondness for electronic equipment, their faith in voice stress analysis as 
a means of detecting deception218 and Mathews’ enthusiasm for the high-tech Reliance 
Project, it has been argued that members felt that they needed to acquire technology in 
order to be on an equal footing with their enemy, because ‘ZOG’s got it and we 
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don’t’.219 What is more, as we have seen, several members of the Order had prior 
military, paramilitary or engineering training, including the ability to build working 
time bombs and Randall Rader’s previous experience with converting firearms to 
automatic fire. It is unlikely, therefore, that they would have refrained from at least 
attempting to acquire either rockets or cyanide based solely on a lack of confidence in 
their technical abilities. 
 
Why then, given all these apparently favourable factors, did the Order not seriously 
attempt to innovate with respect to weapons, at least not until the very end of their 
lifespan?220 Obviously, the brief duration of their operational activity played a part – it 
was only a little over fifteen months from the creation of the Order until its demise as a 
coherent organization. However, the relatively short window in which to consider 
weapons adoptions cannot be the entire explanation; the organization was extremely 
dynamic, making multiple important strategic and tactical decisions during this period 
and there is no reason why adopting a new weapon could not have been one of them, 
irrespective of how far they proceeded towards actually doing so. For similar reasons, 
neither can the sole reason be attributed to Mathews’ and the others’ proclivity for 
action – while engaging in their struggle at an almost breakneck pace during 1984, they 
still invested time and resources in such preparatory activities as gathering intelligence 
on potential targets and recruiting new members, and thus could arguably have devoted 
some attention to weapons procurement or production while engaging in their other 
undertakings. Rather, it is argued that the primary factor responsible for a lack of 
attention to weapons innovations was that such activity was incompatible with Robert 
Mathews’ strategy at the time. 
 
To demonstrate this, it is necessary to appraise the link between the Order’s strategy and 
the Turner Diaries. Far from merely being an abstract inspiration for Mathews and 
providing the name its members sometimes used for the organization, the Turner 
Diaries served as the direct blueprint for the Order’s revolution. The close connection 
between the two is so blatant that it has been remarked upon, not only by every scholar 
who has studied the organization, but even by the prosecutor at the main trial of the 
Order members, all of whom draw parallels between the early chapters of the Turner 
                                                          
219 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 128. 
220 As will be argued below, the Reliance project, despite the large amount of money involved, should not 
be viewed as a focused weapons adoption attempt by the group. 
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Diaries, which include counterfeiting, robberies of armoured cars and banks, 
assassinations and bomb attacks, and many of the other criminal acts engaged in by the 
Order (see Table 7.2 for details).221 Mathews, besides knowing the text inside and out, is 
reported to have given each member of the Order a copy of the book to study. Yet it is 
argued that Mathews’ exploitation of the Turner Diaries goes far beyond mere 
emulation of its tactical repertoire. Mathews and his cohort actually adopted the strategy 
implicit in the Turner Diaries, which is, at its heart, little more than an updated version 
of the works of Mao and Marighella taken to extremes and adapted to the contemporary 
American context. 
 
Mathews essentially took the Turner Diaries and married its strategic precepts with his 
(and the novel’s) aim of establishing a separate white nation on American soil. He did 
this by distilling his understanding of the strategic narrative of the novel into six steps, 
which he laid out at the time the Order was formed, as follows: 
 
1. Form the group. 
2. Set goals – what the group wants to achieve and how far it is willing to go to achieve 
them. 
3. Establish a war chest, i.e., procure funds. 
4. Recruitment and distributing funds to right-wing causes. 
5. Assassination of racial enemies (Jews or Gentile traitors).222 
6. Formation of a guerrilla army with the ability to carry out sabotage in urban areas.223 
 
From the above list, one can see that weapons capable of causing mass casualties or 
requiring standoff capabilities would most likely only be truly needed when step six is 
reached. Before then, small arms and standard explosives would in almost all cases 
suffice. Mathews followed these six steps faithfully and since the Order never really 
moved on to step six, expending resources on new weapons before then would detract 
from the achievement of its current goals. 
 
                                                          
221 For various expressions of this idea, see Dees and Corcoran, p. 144; Hamm (2007), p. 116; Coates, p. 
50 (also for the prosecution statement); Singular, p. 66; Turning Point: The Order; Smith, p. 67; Barkun 
(1989), pp. 416-417. 
222 While outlining step five, Mathews established a ‘doomsday plan’ in which, if the group was facing 
extinction from authorities, each member was assigned a high-profile target to attempt to kill at all costs. 
Targets included Henry Kissinger and then Chase Manhattan Bank president David Rockefeller (Singular, 
p. 135). 
223 These points are laid out in the affidavit of FBI Special Agent Patrick J. Webb in United States of 
America v. Charles E. Ostrout (CR85-102-2), U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, and 
Flynn and Gerhardt (pp. 97-98), which differ slightly with respect to steps two and three. Where they 
differ, I have adopted those of Flynn and Gerhardt, which represent a more logical progression. 
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An example that shows Mathews’ reticence to deviate from this strategic prescription is 
to be found in November 1983. During surveillance of targets to rob in Seattle (in 
furtherance of step 3), the group discovered that one of the far-right’s most avowed 
enemies, the Baron de Rothschild (who, according to right-wing literature is one of the 
leaders of the Satanic Jewish cabal seeking to control the earth), was to be visiting the 
city shortly. Many of the members in the group took this as a sign, or at least an 
opportunity that was too good to pass up, and pushed for a plan to assassinate 
Rothschild at the Four Seasons Hotel. Mathews strenuously resisted this, arguing that it 
was not yet time for step five and that they first had to acquire a war chest. This caused 
much disagreement, resulting in the group leaving Seattle without even implementing 
their robbery plans.224 Mathews’ willingness to forego a tempting opportunity and to do 
so even at the expense of discord within his embryonic organization demonstrates his 
commitment to his strategic principles. A further example can be found in the wake of 
the Ukiah robbery in July 1984, when the Order was flush with millions of dollars of 
cash. True to his word, Mathews duly implemented step four on a large scale.225 Akin to 
a racist Robin Hood, he dispatched Andrew Barnhill and Denver Parmenter as ‘Order 
missionaries’ across the country, reportedly distributing roughly $650,000 to various far 
right leaders, including William Pierce, Richard Butler, Tom Metzger, Robert Miles, 
Louis Beam and Glenn Miller.226 
 
It remains to explain Mathews’ support for the Reliance project in July 1984, since this 
is seemingly inconsistent with the hypothesis that Mathews eschewed weapons 
development and adoption at this stage of his strategic design. For several reasons, the 
Reliance project can be viewed as the proverbial exception that proves the rule. First, 
this was a serendipitous opportunity that was not sought out by Mathews and therefore 
his acquiescence to Bauer’s request cannot be regarded as part of his broader strategic 
intentions. More importantly, the Reliance project was relatively costless to the 
organization and would not detract from its core plan. The project did not demand any 
time or manpower resources from the group, since it was to be ostensibly carried out by 
                                                          
224 Hamm (2007), p. 128; Flynn and Gerhardt, p.106. 
225 He had already begun implementing step four previously, setting aside a portion of the proceeds of the 
prior robberies for right-wing causes and continuing to recruit. The assassination of Alan Berg, i.e., the 
initiation of step five in June 1984, is thus not inconsistent with his strategy. The post-Ukiah distribution 
of funds and recruitment is noted here, however, because it entailed a significant investment of Order 
resources that could have been devoted to other activities like engaging in larger-scale attacks. 
226 Dees and Corcoran, p. 45. 
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non-group scientists. All it required was the investment of money and, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Ukiah robbery, the Order had ample funds available. So, whereas only 
a few months earlier, $100,000 would have seemed a gargantuan sum, at the time it 
represented less than 3% of their recent haul. Investing in the Reliance project therefore 
had an extremely low opportunity cost for the organization and presented the Order with 
a unique value proposition in that it could potentially provide a ‘silver bullet’ against the 
government. No such outside benefactors were present to assist with the acquisition of 
other weapons like rockets or cyanide. 
 
Indeed, the strategic incompatibility hypothesis is supported even if one considers 
cyanide to have been selected for adoption in late November or early December 1984. 
For, although in the last few months of 1984 the Order was under tremendous pressure 
from authorities and essentially on the run, it can be argued that Mathews and the others 
felt that the time had finally come to move on to step six.227 One aspect of this is 
Mathews’ reported statement, during discussions relating to his declaration of war, that, 
‘It's time to introduce ourselves and get the word out that we exist’.228 In this light, with 
step six finally being embraced, the Order could look towards more expansive attacks 
and more damaging weapons. It is thus no surprise that at that stage a variety of attack 
plans were bandied about to initiate the Second American Revolution, from attacks on 
the Los Angeles Olympics and aspirations to cut off the city’s electricity, to 
consideration of dumping cyanide in water supplies.229 
 
Reason for Adoption Success (or Otherwise) 
 
Even if one does concede that the Order intended to adopt cyanide as a mass-casualty 
weapon, they clearly had no opportunity to do so, most obviously because the group did 
not endure long enough to implement any of its more grandiose plans. Following his 
arrest for counterfeiting in Philadelphia, member Thomas Martinez had been 
cooperating with the FBI since at least the beginning of October 1984 and disclosing all 
                                                          
227 Flynn and Gerhardt contend that by the end of September 1984, with various cells fulfilling their 
designated functions, and new plans underway for gruesomely assassinating Morris Dees of the Southern 
Poverty Law Centre, Mathews felt that he could begin planning significant terrorist attacks (Flynn and 
Gerhardt, pp. 295-296). 
228 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 354. 
229 Turning Point: The Order. 
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of the Order’s secrets.230 So, just as Mathews began to see the time as ripe for 
implementing the guerrilla warfare elements of his plan in step six, the Order was 
infiltrated and its members had to flee to escape authorities. 
 
While space restrictions preclude exploring the counterfactual in depth here, there are 
certain reasons to suspect that even if Martinez had not betrayed the group (which might 
be regarded as a ‘lucky break’ for authorities), Mathews and the Order would by no 
means have been certain to succeed in adopting cyanide. Even though the group was 
tactically creative, committed to its cause and ambitious when it came to operational 
security (with phone drops and codenames), its tradecraft, or rather the members’ 
practice thereof, left a lot to be desired. Members made very basic errors, such as 
Mathews leaving a gun behind at the scene of the Ukiah robbery, one which Andrew 
Barnhill had purchased in his own name.231 Members also held on to incriminating 
evidence as souvenirs of their exploits, or what Mark Hamm has referred to as 
‘totem’.232 For example, the gun that was used to murder Alan Berg was found, together 
with a trove of damning documentary evidence, at Gary Yarbrough’s house when it was 
raided.233 Richard Scutari, who after joining in June 1984 tried to enhance security 
practices, often rebuked Mathews for not compartmentalizing information and ‘letting 
everyone know everything’.234 Some members even exhibited delusional thinking, as 
when Randall Rader began believing that a coven of witches was spying on the training 
camp that he had set up for the Order.  
 
Moreover, while members had military and some degree of technical expertise, the 
Order did not possess anyone with knowledge of chemistry or how chemical weapons 
function. At least Pierce recognized this to some extent when he acknowledged that the 
cyanide would be more likely to disrupt than kill, though with the dilution and treatment 
factors associated with water supplies of major urban areas, even this would have been a 
tall order. Possibly the most damning factor for the group’s chances of success is the 
argument that the group’s dependence on a single individual, Robert Mathews, for its 
                                                          
230 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 335. 
231 The Order did exhibit qualities of a learning organization in incorporating the lessons of past mistakes, 
such as when Bruce Pierce decreed that the men in his cell would use lanyards to connect to their 
weapons, so that they would not lose them on operations as Mathews had done (Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 
282). 
232 Hamm (2007), p. 142. 
233 Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 318. 
234 Richard Scutari to Magnus Söderman (6 Apr. 2008) in Söderman and Holappa, p. 32. 
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cohesion made it inherently unstable, as can be seen from its rapid dissolution after 
Mathews’ death in which members turned on each other in the face of security 
pressures.235 
 
                                                          
235 Smith, p. 73. 
 211 
 
Chapter 8: Cross-Case Comparison and Model Analysis 
 
Having probed deeply into four individual cases in the previous chapters, the discussion 
can now turn to analysing these cases in terms of their relationship to one another and to 
the more general phenomenon of weapons adoption. This chapter will first provide a 
qualitative comparison across all four cases, summarizing the similarities and 
differences between the members of each pair and analysing the set of cases as a whole. 
The Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model formulated in Chapter 4 will then be applied to 
each pair and compared with the qualitative results. Lastly, an analysis will be 
undertaken of the performance of the model overall, resulting in refinements to the 
model being presented at the end of the chapter.  
 
Cross-Case Qualitative Comparison 
 
Taking the cases pairwise initially and beginning by looking at the first case pair (the 
PIRA-INLA with respect to mortars), the cases reveal that, overall, the PIRA was a 
vastly more innovative organization that quickly built up the required techne, mētis and 
institutional capacity required to successfully adopt mortar technology and thereby to 
increase its prestige and adapt its arsenal to the changing conditions of its armed 
struggle. As Oppenheimer contends, ‘…it was in the series of homemade mortars 
produced by the IRA that its ingenuity was revealed, and its ability to supplement 
imported war-fighting equipment by developing its own’.1 On the other hand, observers 
have pointed out that the INLA did not develop or even attempt to acquire mortars 
because it quite simply lacked the organizational capacity to do so.2 The adoption of the 
mercury tilt switch indicated that there were some technical and operational ‘bright 
lights’ within the INLA, but the opportunities did not really exist within the 
organization for these innovators to embark on a sustained programme of weapons 
development.3 The INLA’s technical innovation hit a peak with the mercury tilt switch 
and, together with its overall fortunes, seemed to decline from there. As one interviewee 
succinctly observed, it was as if the INLA ‘had a great first album, but couldn’t follow it 




Turning to the second case pair (CSA and the Order with respect to cyanide and rocket 
weapons), one sees a contrast in terms of the balance between strategic and ideological 
influences on adoption behaviour. The story of the CSA’s weapons innovations is very 
much one about ideology and how it can impact the decision-making of those who 
subscribe deeply to it. It was an incremental metamorphosis in their ideology – from 
fundamentalist Christianity to survivalism and thence to Christian Identity – which led 
the organization to increasingly militaristic behaviour. Part and parcel of this transition 
to an offensive posture was a search for new targets and the weapons with which to 
attack them. Despite possessing at least the rudiments of an in-house research and 
development capability, the CSA’s ambitions to deploy cyanide and rockets were 
stymied by a lack of the techne and mētis required for these sophisticated weapons and a 
limited talent pool, even when, in the case of cyanide, the group was presented with the 
raw materials as a gift. Yet, it was primarily the very same apocalyptic and paranoid 
ideology which spurred the CSA’s weapons adoption in the first place – together with 
the cognitive distortions that these extreme beliefs brought about – that ultimately 
sabotaged the group’s ability to deliver on their weapons ambitions. In other words, the 
CSA was extremely innovative with respect to weapons in spirit but had trouble 
following through in practice. 
 
In contrast, the Order, although motivated by very similar ideological precepts to those 
espoused by the CSA, was constrained by its strict adherence to a strategic doctrine that 
limited the group’s need to adopt new weapons. So, while the Order was a whirlwind of 
activity, creativity and even innovation in several respects, this did not extend to the 
realm of the weapons they used. It was only near the end of the group’s lifespan, in the 
sixth stage of their strategic blueprint, that they considered the types of attacks that 
would require adopting weapons capable of causing large-scale murder and mayhem. 
However, by then it was too late – the group was imploding under the pressure of law 
enforcement. In addition to strategic constraints, Robert Mathews’ imperative to 
constantly act, his and the rest of the members’ poor tradecraft, and their itinerant 
                                                          
1 Oppenheimer, p. 227. 
2 Interview with McDonald: ‘They didn’t do mortars because they couldn’t’. 
3 The inability to transform flashes of tactical and technical inspiration into the organizational momentum 
needed for a long-term weapons adoption highlights the difference between invention and innovation that 
has been pointed out in the theoretical portions of this study.  
4 Former law enforcement official ‘D’. 
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behaviour did not create conditions amenable to the successful adoption of new 
weapons systems. 
 
These dynamics will now be more closely examined across all cases. Tables 8.1, 8.2, 
and 8.3 below present the results for the three main dependent variables (potential 
weapon awareness, adoption decision and success) across all the groups, weapons and 
organizational phases discussed in the case studies. In each instance, a qualitative 
summary of the primary factors affecting the outcome is given, thus enabling a cross-
case comparison. It should be remembered that each case pair represents a common 
context, that is, the geographic location (at the country level), time period, and broad 
ideology (especially the primary adversaries acted against) are similar. The columns are 
grouped by weapon type (even though only the second case pair dealt with the adoption 
of cyanide) and mortars and rockets are presented in the same column. This is done 
because it is unclear what type of rockets the CSA pursued, i.e., it might in fact have 
been mortars, but even if it were a different type of rocket, there is sufficient similarity 
with the PIRA case that a comparison is still worthwhile. 
 
As seen in Table 8.1, the four cases that have been studied do not display much variance 
in the awareness variable – across all of the organizations and time periods, only during 
the first phase of the CSA was there no awareness of the weapons under consideration, 
in that instance because the organization in question had no interest at the time in any 
weapons whatsoever. Strictly speaking then, the cases do little to elucidate specifically 
those factors that differentiate the circumstances when an organization becomes aware 
of a potential weapons innovation from those when it does not. However, the cases can 
tell us something about the mechanisms by which organizations become aware of 
innovations. We see that even looking at only four cases, all three theorized awareness 
mechanisms, namely active searching, demonstration and proselytization, are present, 
which lends some provisional support to the theoretical characterizations in Chapters 2 




Table 8.1: Awareness of New Weapons 
 
Furthermore, in the case of rockets / mortars, while it was not necessarily the primary 
source of awareness, all four organizations were aided in becoming aware by having 
members with prior military experience. This suggests that, at least for weapons that are 
widely used in modern militaries, awareness is much more likely to occur if the 
organization counts among its membership current or former military personnel.  A 
final observation in connection with the channels through which awareness flows, is the 
prominence of existing networks in almost all cases. Whether it was the experiences 
with mortars of other Irish nationalists like the OIRA and PIRA, the proselytization of 
cyanide by far right leaders in the United States or the prevalence of rockets in the pages 
of the Turner Diaries, most of the leaders in the groups in question appear to have 
become aware of the new weapons through sources within their own broader social and 
ideological network, rather than from sources further removed, such as television or 




Outcome Key Reasons Outcome Key Reasons 
Positive Case 1: PIRA    
Phase I Aware Active searching for standoff 
capability to overcome counter-
measures; prior demonstration; 
some members with military 
experience. 
  
Phase II Aware Same as above.   
Phase III Aware Same as above.   
Phase IV Aware Same as above   
Negative Case 1: INLA   
Phase I Aware Prior demonstration (incl. by 
OIRA and PIRA); some 
members with military 
experience. 
  
Phase II Aware Same as above.   
     Positive Case 2: CSA   
Phase I Not Aware No interest in weapons 
acquisition. 
Not Aware No interest in weapons 
acquisition. 
Phase II Aware Increasing militarization, incl. 
Turner Diaries, Rader’s interest 
in military manuals and military 
experience of new members. 
Aware Proselytization by opinion 
leader. 
Phase III Aware Same as above. Aware Same as above. 
Negative Case 2: The Order   
Phase I Aware Turner Diaries; military 
experience of members; 
perhaps demonstration by  
De Pugh. 
Aware Network connections with the 
far right. 
Phase II Aware Same as above. Aware Same as above. 
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through non-network sources such as the World Wide Web, but that in identifying 
possible weapons that an organization might consider adopting, particular attention 
should be paid to weapons that have already been adopted or advocated within their 
own social movement. 
 
A noteworthy observation is that, for all the weapons considered, the organizations 
concerned became aware of them early on in the group’s terrorist campaign (in the case 
of the CSA, shortly after they adopted a violent outlook), irrespective of their later 
adoption choices or successes. The fact that awareness was achieved so rapidly even in 
the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the information revolution, suggests that in today’s social 
media and Internet saturated global polity, it is unlikely that violent non-state 
adversaries will remain unaware of any new, even relatively obscure, weapons for very 
long. Whether they will be able to infer weapons relevance in non-weapons specific 
technologies remains an open question. 
 
In terms of the decision whether or not to pursue the adoption of a particular weapon, of 
the fourteen periods wherein a decision could have been made or continued (i.e. where 
an organization was aware of the possibility) there are eight decisions to adopt5 (four of 
ten if one counts only the initial decision to adopt and not continuation of this decision 
in subsequent phases). This variation allows for some inference as to the factors 
underlying this decision. It appears as if a key driver of weapons adoption (as seen in 
the case of the PIRA with respect to mortars and the CSA with respect to rockets) is to 
address a perceived tactical or strategic performance gap that cannot be addressed by 
status quo weapons. This confirms the predictions of the theoretical discussion and 
mirrors the more general innovation dynamic. As to why that particular weapon was 
selected, the lack of any viable alternatives played a part in both these cases. This is by 
no means the sole driver of adoption, however, with prestige seeming to play a role in 
both the case of the PIRA with mortars and the CSA with most, if not all, of their 
weapons innovations. The strong influence of serendipitous acquisition in favour of 
adoption, as seen in the case of the CSA and cyanide, must also be taken into account. 
Albeit probably a relatively rare occurrence, if a group is presented with a new weapon, 
the decision calculus is inverted, because failure to actively reject the weapon becomes 
                                                          
5 For the purposes of these calculations, it is assumed that the Order did decide to pursue cyanide as a 




tacit acceptance thereof and the burden of argument presumably shifts to those members 
who do not desire the weapon. 





Outcome Key Reasons Outcome Key Reasons 
PIRA 
  
    
Phase I Pursued Tactical need to overcome fortified 
targets with standoff capability; no 
viable alternatives. 
  
Phase II Continued to 
Pursue 
Need for improvements in 
operational effectiveness and safety; 
defensive co-evolution by the British; 
no pushback from constituencies; 
momentum of innovation. 
  
Phase III Continued to 
Pursue 
Same as above.   
Phase IV Continued to 
Pursue 
Same as above.   
INLA     
Phase I Did NOT 
Pursue 
Feuds and internal tensions; 
leadership deficiencies and turnover; 
no institutionalized R&D or weapons 
acquisition capability; resource 
shortages; limited talent pool. 
  
Phase II Did NOT 
Pursue 
Same as above.   
     CSA     
Phase I N/A Not aware of adoption possibility. N/A Not aware of adoption 
possibility. 
Phase II Did NOT 
Pursue 
No strategic or tactical need. Pursued Serendipitous acquisition 
coupled with desire for prestige 
among peers and ideological 
(and to a lesser extent 
strategic) compatibility. 
Phase III Pursued Lack of alternatives to achieve 
tactical objectives; garner greater 
attention from enemies; prestige 
within movement; to shore up 
leadership of group; availability 
heuristic of the Turner Diaries; 
perception of feasibility due to 




Order      
Phase I Did NOT 
Pursue 
Incompatibility with strategy despite 




Incompatibility with strategy. 
Phase II Did NOT 
Pursue 
Same as above. Pursued (?) Same as above, except may 
have become compatible by the 




The cases (especially the negative examples) also shed some light on why new weapons 
might not be adopted despite presenting certain benefits for an organization. Before its 
ideological shift, the CSA would never have considered using cyanide or rockets and, 
despite all their advantages, the Order eschewed these weapons (at least until the end of 
their lifespan) because they did not fit in with the leader’s strategic plan. This implies 
that, of the many preconditions that must be present before a decision to pursue a new 
weapon is made, ideological and strategic compatibility between the weapon and the 
organization is essential. Other necessary elements are minimal organizational stability 
(which was lacking in the INLA’s case) and a perception on the part of the leadership 
that the organization possesses some cadre with sufficient technical skills, or at least the 
ability to acquire these. Last, the cases identify a certain momentum of innovation – 
those organizations that did embark on innovation (the PIRA, the CSA, and in a non-
weapons context, the Order) seemed to continue attempting to innovate, either with 
respect to the same weapon if they were successful, or in other domains, even if they 
failed to acquire the original intended weapon. In other words, cases where the adoption 
of particular weapons was pursued usually formed part of a broader pattern of 
organizational innovation. 
 
Table 8.3 shows that in only a single case (of four attempts) were a group’s adoption  
efforts an unqualified success, that of the PIRA’s adoption of mortars.6 The PIRA paints 
quite a high bar for success – it possessed a safe haven, a sizable talent pool with techne 
and mētis appropriate for the weapon it was attempting to adopt, an institutionalized 
R&D function, copious resources and an organizational culture of systematic learning 
and improvement. Few other terrorist groups have enjoyed such advantages (among 
those who arguably fall into a similar category are Las FARC, Hizb’allah and, before 
2009, the LTTE). Yet, in order to look for guidance as to which of these attributes are 
necessary or sufficient for successful weapons adoption, we must turn to the cases of 
failure. Despite a relatively safe haven and some institutionalized R&D, the CSA failed 
in its attempts to adopt either cyanide or rockets. What it lacked was a sufficient talent 
pool with the requisite techne and mētis for the weapons it was seeking to adopt (as, 
apparently, did the Order). It was also hamstrung by the non-rational, ideologically-
based evaluation of adoption efforts by its leadership. This instilled the adoption process 
                                                          
6 Although CSA succeeded in lacing bullets with cyanide, their attempt to develop a mass-casualty 
weapon that could be delivered through water supplies is not considered a success. 
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with cognitive biases that in the case of rockets resulted in abandoning its efforts and in 
the case of cyanide not even realizing that additional efforts were needed. 
 





Outcome Key Reasons Outcome Key Reasons 
PIRA       
Phase I Unsuccessful Limited resources; setting 
up organization. 
  
Phase II Successful Legacy capabilities 
reconstituted, incl. expertise 
and access to resources; 
ability to rapidly develop 
mētis; buffered and 
institutionalized R&D; safe 
havens; culture of learning. 
  
Phase III Successful Same as above.   
Phase IV Successful Same as above.   
INLA     
Phase I N/A Did not attempt.   
Phase II N/A Did not attempt.   
     CSA     
Phase I N/A Did not attempt. N/A Did not attempt. 





Phase III Unsuccessful Ideologically-driven lack of 
perseverance; small talent 
pool; forced operational 
tempo; leadership 
narcissism and superstition. 
Unsuccessful Same as above. 
Order      
Phase I N/A Did not attempt. N/A Did not attempt. 
Phase II N/A Did not attempt. Unsuccessful No opportunity to 
succeed before 
dissolution; poor 
tradecraft; low techne; 
dependent for survival 
on single leader. 
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Apart from the model, the cases themselves have substantially increased our 
understanding of weapons adoption. While one must not read too much into a limited 
number of cases, the qualitative analysis highlights several salient factors, including 
social networks as avenues for awareness, organizational stability, possessing a talent 
pool that manifests sufficient techne and mētis with respect to the weapons to be 
adopted, and the basic underlying driver of a perceived performance gap. Overall, even 
four case studies have verified that many of the factors identified in the theoretical 
discussion act on real-world terrorist weapons adoption processes. Perhaps the central 
takeaway from the case studies, however, is that the basic processes of weapons 
adoption are indeed equifinite – there are many paths to awareness, several factors that 
can prompt the decision to pursue adoption and many ways in which an adoption 
attempt can fail.  
 
Applying the Model to the Case Studies 
 
One of the aims of conducting the case studies was to provide a preliminary test and 
calibration of the Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model introduced in Chapter 4. In order 
to apply the model to the cases, it is necessary to first operationalize the model in a 
format conducive to the types of data that could be found in the case studies. Taking 
into account that this is a preliminary application of the model, more for exploratory 
than rigorous validation purposes, emphasis is placed on parsimony in the 
operationalization process. One of the more practical solutions, and that adopted here, is 
to construct a series of tables for each case pair, with a separate table for each dependent 
variable (i.e., weapon awareness, adoption decision and adoption success). Each table 
can simultaneously depict the outcomes on the dependent variable and the values on the 
independent variables for both terrorist organizations in each case pair. Tables B.1 
through B.6 in Appendix B display the results, which will be used in the analysis below. 
 
However, before proceeding with the analysis, some notes on the generation of the 
tables are in order: 
 Each table lists the outcome of the dependent variable on the first row adjoining the 
relevant organization. Each subsequent row then assesses the value of each of the 
independent variables associated with that dependent variable in the model. For each 
 220 
 
relevant time period, the value of the independent variable is listed, with justification for 
that value (where not obvious) provided in footnotes.7 
 In the same cell as the value of the independent variable, its hypothesized effect on the 
dependent variable is listed, drawn from the model (see Table 4.1) in terms of a positive 
or negative effect (denoted by one or more ‘+’s or ‘–’s). The number of symbols denotes 
the rough order of magnitude of the effect and thus provides an inherent weighting 
between variables. 
 A neutral effect is denoted by ‘.’; if the value of a variable is unknown or its hypothesized 
effect is indeterminate in certain cases, the same symbol is used, implying that 
indeterminate variables are assumed to have a neutral effect overall. 
 For relevant variable values, if these are true at any point in the designated time period, 
they are regarded as being true. Similarly, the highest value for relevant variables during 
a given time period is used to calculate the effect. 
 With respect to the awareness table, it is assumed that once the organization had become 
aware of the weapon, this awareness persisted and so, in the absence of countervailing 
evidence such as a discontinuous change in leadership, awareness scores are not 
calculated for subsequent periods.  
 Where a group did not proceed sufficiently far along in the process, there is no need to 
apply the model for the subsequent dependent variables. For example, since the INLA 
did not decide to attempt to adopt mortars, the group would not need to be represented in 
the success of adoption table. Nonetheless, to provide some additional opportunities for 
validation, all scores are calculated and should be viewed in the sense of providing 
rudimentary counterfactual analysis. To prevent confusion, these scores are shown in the 
tables in parentheses. 
 The model is only partially quantitative in the sense that several variables rely on 
subjective analysis and their effect will vary according to contextual factors. An example 
is the effect on the adoption decision of the degree of technical knowledge (techne) that 
is required to acquire and field a weapon. Whether this effect is positive or negative 
depends on the enthusiasm with which group decision-makers embrace a challenge, 
which varies according to organizational context. In this way, the model attempts at least 
in a basic fashion to incorporate so-called conjunctive variables which are differentially 
causal only in terms of particular configurations.8 
                                                          
7 There are roughly two hundred and fifty footnotes justifying the values in the tables. Alternative 
methods for representing the model thus could be expected to consume extensive space, for example if an 
explicit discussion of each value across all the variables was presented in narrative form. This serves as a 
practical justification for the choice of a tabular representation for the model applications. 
8 For more on conjunctive or configurational sets of variables, including discussion of the Boolean 
algebra-based Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach, see Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning 
social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2008) and B. 
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 The application of the model also allows for some discretion with respect to weighting. 
For instance, if the weapon or the technology underlying it is commercially available, the 
model prescribes an effect of ‘++’, but in the case where it is only partially available or 
limited to specific sets of commercial buyers (such as is the case with many radiological 
isotopes), this variable might receive a partial score of a single ‘+’. 
 Similarly, those variables that are labelled [Linear] can have a range of effects based on 
the magnitude of the variable. For example, when considering the ‘Weapon Techne’ 
variable, if a weapon has extremely high technical requirements (such as a genetically 
engineered bio-weapon), up to three ‘–’s can be applied in the Adoption Success table; 
conversely, for a weapon requiring almost no techne to acquire or use (such as a 
commercially-produced hand grenade), the score given might be one or more ‘+’s. 
 The final combined ‘score’ for each time period is calculated by an arithmetic summation 
of the effects for each independent variable, which is listed in the last row of the table. 
This is the most parsimonious aggregation method and is utilized in the absence of any 
evidence prescribing a more complex procedure. The inherent variable weighting 
accounts to some degree for different relative effects of variables. 
 
The construction of the tables allows for a comparison of scores across groups and time 
periods. It also allows for a comparison between the model’s predictions and the 
findings of the qualitative analysis. Last, while hardly determinative as to the validity of 
any single hypothesis, those hypotheses that are consistently undermined across time 
periods and groups can provide guidance as to potentially problematic hypotheses. 
 
The table below presents a summary of the case outcomes, together with the 
corresponding model scores. Scores in parentheses indicate counterfactual applications 
of the model, since the organizations in question did not actually reach this stage in the 
adoption process. 
 
Table 8.4: Model Results Summary 
                                                          
Rihoux and C. Ragin (eds.), Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) and related techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2009). 
Group / 








PIRA (Mortars)      
Phase I Aware 20 Pursued 16 Unsuccessful 9 




PIRA-INLA Model Application 
 
When examining the first set of case studies involving the PIRA and the INLA, we see 
the following: 
 
1. Awareness: It was only necessary to examine in Table 8.4 the initial phases of each 
organization, as we can safely assume – based on the relatively short time periods 
involved and some continuity in membership within both organizations – that their 
awareness did not dissipate during the period of study. The table shows both 
organizations scoring quite highly on the aggregate awareness score, with similar 
overall scores,9 though values of individual model factors (seen in Table B.1) differ 
substantially. Nonetheless, these high scores support the qualitative conclusion 
reached during the narrative analysis that the INLA was aware of mortars during 
their formative years. Table B.1 captures the qualitative results that key elements 
responsible for this awareness were an active search by both organizations for new 
weapons and (at least in the case of the INLA), prior demonstration of the utility of 
these weapons. The table identifies additional contributing factors that might have 
influenced each group’s respective awareness of mortars, such as the presence of a 
                                                          
9 Indeed, the INLA has a slightly higher awareness score than the PIRA, primarily because the INLA had 
the PIRA’s demonstration of success with mortars as a model. 
Phase III Aware  Continued to Pursue 25 Successful 22 
Phase IV Aware  Continued to Pursue 22 Successful 16 
INLA (Mortars)      
Phase I Aware 21 Did NOT Pursue 16 N/A (10) 
Phase II Aware  Did NOT Pursue 4 N/A (1) 
       CSA (Cyanide)      
Phase I Not Aware 5 N/A (1) N/A (4) 
Phase II Aware 25 Pursued 28 Unsuccessful 11 
Phase III Aware  Continued to Pursue 30 Unsuccessful 10 
Order (Cyanide)      
Phase I Aware 13 Did NOT Pursue 9 N/A (5) 
Phase II Aware  Pursued (?) 20 Unsuccessful 3 
CSA (Rockets)      
Phase I Not Aware 8 N/A (-1) N/A (3) 
Phase II Aware 26 Did NOT Pursue 19 N/A (8) 
Phase III Aware  Pursued 26 Unsuccessful 8 
Order (Rockets)      
Phase I Aware 18 Did NOT Pursue 14 N/A (7) 
Phase II Aware  Did NOT Pursue 22 N/A (4) 
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‘skunkworks’ within the PIRA and the INLA’s access to many foreign groups and 
some external training during the first period of its existence. 
 
2. Decision: The first observation that emerges from Table 8.4 is that during their 
respective formative phases, both the PIRA and the INLA received the same 
decision scores, albeit with different outcomes. Although varying along several 
independent variables (such as their institutional capacity, size and the existence of 
previous adoptions to emulate), the scores for these cancel each other out. This 
interesting result suggests that the decision model may be missing one or more 
variables that would distinguish between the outcomes of each organization. A 
strong candidate for inclusion in the model is the availability of alternatives to the 
technology under consideration – even though the PIRA may not have been 
perfectly positioned to pursue mortars, the narrative analysis suggests that they did 
not have many (or perhaps any) alternatives to the pursuit of mortars, something that 
does not appear to have been the case for the INLA in the mid to late 1970s and 
early 1980s. An alternative explanation is that perhaps a score in the mid-teens 
implies that a group could go either way with respect to adoption and thus that the 
model is simply less informative in such cases. Table B.2 also shows that the PIRA 
had fairly large decision scores (in favour of adoption) in its second, third and fourth 
phases of mortar development, driven by its continued need to counter new British 
defences and the benefits of the experience it had gained during the first phase 
(reflected in higher mētis, demonstration and greater size). This accords well with 
the qualitative analysis of why the PIRA persisted with mortar development, 
although the notion of a ‘momentum’ of development developing after an initial 
investment in an adoption should be considered for inclusion in future iterations of 
the model. Likewise, the low decision score (with many negative values) during the 
INLA’s second period is unproblematic and supports the narrative conclusion that 
the INLA had so many organizational weaknesses that it simply lacked the 
capability to even make a decision of this magnitude, and even if it did, would have 
recognized this weakness and abandoned any hope of adopting mortars. 
 
3. Success: Table 8.4 provides a good illustration of the PIRA’s relative success during 
the different phases of its mortar development program. The lowest success score is 
for the initial phase, during which the PIRA had no real mortar program to speak of. 
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This was followed by high levels of success in the second and third phases, which 
saw the development of the successful Mark 6 and the high-powered Mark 10 
mortars respectively (together with several other technical successes with mortars). 
The last period (during which the Mark 15 barracks buster was developed) was also 
successful, but received a lower score in the model. The model appears to fairly 
accurately reflect the three broad areas identified in the narrative analysis – a 
learning culture, expertise and a safe haven as keys to success, although the model 
arguably underweights the importance of the existence of a safe haven to the PIRA’s 
ultimate success. Elements in the model that contributed towards the outcome but 
were not reflected in the narrative analysis include the presence of network 
relationships (especially having a state supporter) and the role played by 
determination. 
 
CSA-Order Model Application 
 
Comparing the CSA and Order case studies and the application of the model to these 
cases, the following emerges:  
 
1. Awareness: The model accurately captures the transition from a lack of awareness 
to awareness of both cyanide and rockets between the first and second phases for the 
CSA case (scores increasing from 5 to 25 and 8 to 26, respectively, in Table 8.4). 
The Order case has somewhat lower values for the awareness score than the CSA, 
but these are still well above the only instance of non-awareness scores (during the 
CSA’s first phase). Focusing on cyanide, the model reflected the qualitative results 
quite closely. In the case of the CSA, the case study indicated that awareness 
stemmed primarily from being presented with the cyanide by Robert Miles, which 
itself was a result of the CSA’s ideological shifts and greater enmeshment in the 
militaristic segments of the Christian Identity milieu. As seen in Table B.4, much of 
the increase in the model’s awareness scores from phase 1 to phase 2 was driven by 
changes in variables that reflected the CSA’s increasing militarization, such as 
ideological compatibility, possessing a dedicated weapons R&D capability, training 
programs and being networked with other VNSAs, together with the obvious boost 
given by the more direct proselytization and serendipitous acquisition of cyanide. 
Although the Order did not receive cyanide as a gift, both the case study and the 
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model emphasize the close networks with other elements of the far right and the 
advocacy of poisoning water supplies emanating from this quarter as key variables 
in their awareness of cyanide as a weapon. Similarly, in the case of rockets, many of 
the same variables associated with the increasing militarization of the CSA in the 
second phase (highlighted in the case study) also elevated the awareness score for 
rockets. Although the Order may have been more explicitly influenced by the 
discussions of rockets in the Turner Diaries, both organizations could draw on this 
text as a source of tactical inspiration, as could both be influenced by the military 
experience of their members. The generally lower scores associated with both types 
of weapons in the awareness phases for the Order as compared with the CSA is 
mainly due to the Order’s lack of institutionalized R&D and of an organized training 
program. When comparing across weapon types, the across-the-board higher scores 
in the model for rockets as opposed to corresponding values for cyanide can be 
attributed to the greater observability of rockets and the existence of prior terrorist 
adopters of rockets (including the PIRA and several of the Palestinian terrorist 
groups at the time). 
 
2. Decision: Table 8.4 largely mirrors the qualitative results, with one exception, 
discussed below. While the qualitative analysis concluded that the CSA was not aware 
of either rockets or cyanide as potential weapons for adoption in their first phase, the 
model allows us to explore the counterfactual and suggests that even if they had been 
aware, they would have almost certainly foregone any attempts to adopt these 
weapons, as indicated by the extremely low decision scores for this time period. By 
the second phase, however, the situation with respect to the CSA was completely 
different and this is reflected in the dramatically increased scores for both weapon 
types under consideration.  
 
First, focusing on cyanide, the main reasons for deciding to adopt this agent that 
emerged from the qualitative analysis were the provision of raw poison from a 
trusted source, Ellison’s desire to gain prestige within the far right network and the 
emerging ideological legitimacy of mass murder, all of which are captured in the 
model (as reflected in Table B.5) in such variables as proselytization, serendipitous 
acquisition, ideological compatibility, increased risk tolerance and cultural affinity 
with the entity recommending or demonstrating the use of the weapon. However, a 
case can be made for including the desire for prestige as a separate variable. 
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Elements that were not highlighted in the qualitative analysis but that also 
contributed to the model’s high score were tied to the group’s active searching for 
new weapons, the possession of an institutionalized R&D capability and its prior 
success with autarkic weapons production. Several of these may have contributed to 
Ellison’s confidence (already buoyed by his religious faith) that, despite the CSA 
essentially possessing no techne or mētis with respect to using cyanide as a mass 
poison, he would be able to utilize the agent. This shows how the model can suggest 
supplemental avenues of argument that might be missed in a purely qualitative 
analysis.  
 
As for the Order, although the group’s actual decision to adopt cyanide as a weapon 
is equivocal, if they did indeed decide to do so, this only occurred during the latter 
stages of phase 2, and is reflected in the model by a rise in the decision score for 
cyanide from 9 to 20 across the phases. Despite the ideological suitability of cyanide 
for the group and some degree of proselytization by other elements of the far right 
network (although not as strongly as in the case of the CSA), for most of its 
operational period, the use of cyanide was incompatible with Mathews’ strictly-
adhered-to strategic blueprint. The importance of this variable in the qualitative 
findings suggests that it might be more heavily weighted in further iterations of the 
model. Strategic compatibility with the weapon was not the only organizational 
element that changed in the second phase – other variables that contributed to the rise 
in the decision score for cyanide were: a surfeit of resources following the Ukiah 
robbery; increases in group cohesiveness and a decrease in centralization following 
the restructuring in July 1984; Mathews’ greater tolerance for risk; and the rise in the 
decision-making status of Bruce Pierce who was clearly a technology champion.  
 
Second, when looking at the adoption of rockets, the score for the CSA increased 
from -1 to 19 between phases 1 and 2 (despite not deciding to adopt them during 
period 2) and then to 26 during the third period, when the CSA did try to adopt. This 
might suggest that by the second phase, the CSA was ‘organizationally primed’ to 
make such an adoption decision, and that they only required a few additional 
‘nudges’ – perhaps in the form of trigger events (like the June 1984 Aryan Nations 
Congress after the death of Gordon Kahl) or a tactical opportunity that required 
rockets in particular – to move wholeheartedly to adopt rockets as weapons. Indeed, 
the model points in this direction, since in phase 2, many of the organizational factors 
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hypothesized to underlie positive adoption decisions were present (as detailed in the 
previous paragraph with respect to cyanide). The main additional factors present in 
the third phase were an increase in organizational techne with respect to rockets in 
the person of Kent Yates and the need to overcome the countermeasures in place at 
the Federal Building. The case of the Order, however, presents some difficulty in that 
the model predicts that the Order would pursue rockets in much the same way as they 
pursued cyanide at the end of their second phase, with the decision score for rockets 
rising from 14 in phase 1 to 22 in phase 2.10 This increase is due to many of the same 
organizational changes that were responsible for the rise in the cyanide decision 
score, with the one difference being that cyanide presented specific advantages in 
terms of mass disruption, which is where the organization was strategically headed. 
Acknowledging the obvious possibility that the model is misspecified in this case, 
another explanation is that the Order, had they endured, would have been quite 
willing to utilize rockets as soon as the tactical need presented itself during the sixth 
strategic stage of Mathews’ campaign, which envisaged large-scale, guerrilla-type 
attacks. It is also interesting to note that, while the absolute decision score for rockets 
was higher than that for cyanide in phase 2, this represented a smaller percentage 
increase over the score in phase 1 than cyanide did.11 This suggests the intriguing 
possibility that, in addition to the absolute scores in the model being indicative of 
changes in the dependent variables, the relative changes across organizational periods 
may also be relevant in drawing conclusions from the model. 
 
One last point worth noting with respect to the decision component of the model is 
that, while in the awareness component the greater observability of rockets over 
cyanide resulted in organizations, all else being equal, being more likely to be aware 
of rockets than cyanide, in the decision component of the model, other factors, such 
as cyanide’s greater stability, make the overall relative desirability of both weapons 
(in the absence of any specific affinities or tactical requirements) roughly equal.12 
 
                                                          
10 The overall higher scores for rockets over cyanide are attributable in the model to the demonstration 
effect of the use of rockets by other terrorist groups and the specific promotion of this class of weapons in 
the Turner Diaries. 
11 The increase in rocket scores from 14 to 22 between organizational phases represents a rise of 57%, 
while the corresponding increase for cyanide from 9 to 20 represents a rise of 122%. 
12 Adding up only the weapon-specific scores for cyanide and rockets yields 4 for both weapons. For the 
awareness component, the corresponding scores were 1 for cyanide and 4 for rockets. 
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3. Success: Neither the CSA nor the Order enjoyed any real success in their adoption 
efforts, even assuming that the Order was genuinely seeking to employ cyanide. This 
is reflected in the uniformly low scores across the board for the periods when 
adoption was attempted.13 Moreover, the model seems to closely parallel the results 
of the qualitative analysis. In the case of cyanide, the model (as shown by Table B.6) 
captures all the advantages possessed by the CSA that emerged from the qualitative 
analysis, including having an institutionalized R&D capability that had produced 
some success in terms of adapting weapons, being highly networked in the far right 
extremist milieu and operating from the relative obscurity of an isolated compound. 
Yet, more importantly, the cognitive bias resulting from ideological beliefs, the 
perceived sense of urgency and the low techne with respect to using cyanide as a 
mass-casualty weapon play a major role in the low score received. Similarly, at the 
time that the Order may have considered using cyanide, the model reflects Mathews’ 
increasing perceptions of urgency, security pressures, and low techne, but also takes 
into account that the decentralized nature of the Order at the time, with spatially 
dispersed operational elements, would have likely made any serious adoption efforts 
difficult, which was not considered in the qualitative analysis. One element that the 
model does not explicitly address is the generally poor tradecraft displayed by the 
Order. Although this might be considered part of the organizational mētis, future 
iterations of the model might directly address this variable. 
 
With respect to the CSA’s attempts to adopt rockets, the model incorporated all of 
the general organizational advantages, together with the fact that the group also 
possessed a certain degree of techne in this area. The model also highlights similar 
weaknesses to those identified in the qualitative studies, including the limited size of 
its technical pool and an even greater cognitive bias than it displayed towards 







                                                          
13 As part of the counterfactual exercise, the success scores were calculated even for those periods where 
weapons adoption was not attempted, with similarly low scores obtained in these cases. 
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Assessing the Model’s Performance 
 
The Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model was set up to present a generalized structure 
for understanding the nexus between terrorist and weapon and, secondarily, to provide a 
means for prospectively assessing the likelihood of a terrorist organization proceeding 
through various stages of the weapons adoption process. It was specifically designed to 
reflect equifinality at all stages of adoption, a causal arrangement that has been borne 
out by close examination of the cases. 
 
Evaluating the Model 
 
Overall, the model fared extremely well across the four case studies. Table 8.4 shows 
that, of the thirty opportunities to test the model (across multiple time periods, four 
groups and three weapons) there are only two apparent inconsistencies, both of which 
are equivocal. Beginning with the awareness scores, the average across the six instances 
when awareness was achieved is 20.5, while that for the two instances where it did not 
is 6.5.14 The lowest score for a group that was aware of a weapon is 13 in the case of the 
Order’s awareness of cyanide. This provides a provisional calibration of the model, 
suggesting that a total awareness score of 15 or greater generally implies that a group is 
aware of a particular weapon.  
 
Turning to the adoption decision, this stage was reached by all four groups and there is 
more variation in outcomes. These scores also generally give some guidance as to 
preliminary calibration of the model, with the instances in which a weapon was pursued 
(or continued to be pursued) having scores that average 24.1, while scores in which a 
weapon was not pursued average only 14. Two of these scores do, however, present 
some cause for closer scrutiny, namely the apparently high scores for both the CSA and 
the Order rocket adoption decisions in their respective second phases, despite both 
groups not deciding to pursue rockets at this stage. Indeed, both these scores (19 and 22, 
respectively) are larger than the phase I decision score for the PIRA (16), which did 
decide to pursue mortars. There are several possible explanations for this. The first is 
that the decision sub-model is slightly misspecified – either one or more of the variable 
                                                          
14 For obvious reasons, counterfactual scores in parentheses are not counted in any calculations. 
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weightings is incorrect, the model is missing one or more important variables or there 
are spurious variables included that are confounding the results. The second 
explanation, based on the first, is that scores between fifteen and twenty four (the 
average for a positive adoption decision) are equivocal and imply that a group could 
either pursue or not pursue a particular weapon. The third explanation is rooted in the 
observation that, within the domain of rocket adoption, there is no inconsistency. In 
other words, all of the scores where rockets were not pursued were lower than all of 
those where they were. The implication of this is that the decision model may be most 
successful in detecting a shift towards pursuit of a weapon when it is used to compare 
the same group across different time periods or the same weapon across different 
groups.  
There are no such difficulties present in the success sub-model,15 with the average score 
for a successful adoption being 19.3 and for an unsuccessful adoption being only 8.2. 
The fact that only a single group of the four cases (the PIRA) unequivocally succeeded 
in adopting the weapon that they pursued may limit the generalizability of this result, 
however.  
 
While carrying all the advantages of deep contextualization, assessing the model 
through four case studies has obvious limitations, which nonetheless warrant mention, if 
only to place them in perspective. The most recognizable of these is that only 
considering four cases (even though these attempt to reflect as much variation in the 
outcomes of interest and organizational characteristics as possible) limits the 
generalizability of the results. This is a perennial (if often undeserved) critique of case 
study analysis in general and is why further analysis, through additional cases or large-
sample statistical methods should be undertaken in  future research. One particular 
manifestation of this potential issue is that because the cases focused on attaining 
differences in outcomes and organizational characteristics, they do not exhibit 
variability in terms of socio-political environment – both case pairs are located in 
industrialized, democratic Western countries. Hence, the two variables relating to the 
openness and development level of the society could not be directly tested and this 
raises the possibility that the model might require recalibration when utilized in less-
developed or more autocratic polities. 
                                                          




Despite these limitations, the initial test against thirty relevant time periods across the 
four cases confirms the face validity of the model – the model predictions are 
overwhelmingly supported by the qualitative conclusions of the case studies. Applying 
the model to the case studies also provides some guidance as to how the different sub-
models can be calibrated to be used in an anticipatory fashion. Yet, testing and 
calibrating the overall model was not the only purpose in conducting the case studies. 
First, the case studies can help confirm or disconfirm the salience of particular 
hypotheses in the model.  Second, since in-depth examinations of real-world adoption 
processes also serve an exploratory function, the cases can identify additional variables 
that have not been covered in existing innovation and weapons theory. 
 
Refining the Model 
 
It is to this function of the cases as a means of refining the model that the study now 
turns. Some guidance in this regard has already emerged from comparing the model 
with the qualitative results, but the next step is to systematically examine the logic of 
the model for additional direction. The approach that has been selected is to analyse 
each variable value in each instance of the model independently and then to evaluate 
whether it supports or undermines the particular hypothesis in the sub-model. This is 
accomplished in practice by appending a column to each phase in Tables B.1 through 
B.6 and noting whether the effect predicted by the hypothesis involving that variable 
with respect to the sub-model outcome is consonant with the actual outcome in that 
case. So, for example, one hypothesis asserts that if an organization can be classed as 
having a culture of learning (abbreviated as a ‘learning organization’), then it is more 
likely to make a positive adoption decision for any new weapon. If, as is the case with 
respect to the PIRA during its first phase, it has been established that an organization 
can be categorized in this way, then one checks whether the outcome was in fact 
positive in this case. The PIRA did decide to adopt mortars at this time, so the 
hypothesis is supported (in a narrow sense) in this instance, denoted by placing an ‘S’ in 
the adjoining column. Similarly, if the PIRA had not decided to adopt mortars, then the 
hypothesis could be said (in an equally narrow sense) to have been undermined and 
would thus be marked with a ‘U’. Note that since the hypothesis says nothing about the 
converse, i.e., terrorist organizations that cannot be classified as learning organizations, 
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if the PIRA were not a learning organization, the hypothesis could not be evaluated in 
this instance, denoted by placing a ‘.’ signifier in the column. To avoid confusion, 
where more than one weapon is being considered, the signifier is preceded by either a 
‘C’ or an ‘R’, representing cyanide and rockets respectively. 
 
In what ways can the hypotheses really be supported or undermined using this 
procedure? Clearly, a hypothesis that is discordant with an actual outcome does not 
necessarily mean that it did not have the predicted effect on the decision process – its 
effect might simply have been ‘drowned out’ by other, more powerful or numerous 
countervailing factors. All that can really be tested is whether a particular variable is 
necessary or sufficient for a certain outcome, and since we have established that the 
weapons adoption process for terrorists is dominated by equifinality, we do not expect 
to see many necessary or sufficient variables in the first place. However, if a particular 
hypothesis is consistently ‘undermined’ by the cases using the process just described, 
then one might suspect that it is either indeed false, or that even if it is true, its effect 
does not seem to be strong enough to be determinative in any of the cases considered. 
The latter would imply that even if the hypothesis is a genuine reflection of reality, it is 
not a very useful indicator in any case. In either of these circumstances, the hypothesis 
at least warrants reconsideration and if, upon further investigation of the context in 
which it operated there are no extenuating circumstances that might explain its lack of 
support, then the hypothesis can be shortlisted for modification or removal from the 
model, pending additional empirical research. 
 
In following the abovementioned procedure, criteria were needed for when to flag a 
variable for further consideration, since most of the variables had at least one instance 
where they were undermined. Owing to the limited number of cases and the issue of 
equifinality, a fairly conservative approach was taken, in other words setting a 
reasonably high bar for placing a hypothesis ‘on notice’ so to speak. The first criterion 
was that the hypothesis had to be sufficiently evaluated – only a handful of instances of 
being undermined would not be enough to discredit a hypothesis. The minimum number 
of hypotheses varied according to the number of opportunities presented across the 
cases for evaluation. For example, the awareness sub-model had only eight 
opportunities to test the hypotheses, and thus at least three evaluations of a hypothesis 
were required to question it, whereas the decision sub-model had fourteen chances to be 
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evaluated, so the corresponding criterion was set at five evaluations. The second 
criterion was that a hypothesis could not be questioned if the number of supporting 
evaluations was greater than or nearly equal to the number of undermining evaluations 
(i.e., the number of ‘U’s for a particular variable had to be more than one greater than 
the number of ‘S’s). After evaluating each of the 138 separate hypotheses in the model 
across all organizations, time periods and weapons (see Tables B.1 through B.6 for 
details), the variables representing the sixteen hypotheses that met the above criteria are 
listed in Table 8.5 below. These are the variables that require further consideration to 
see whether they should be modified or even retained in the model at all. Table 8.5 
provides a brief discussion of the investigation into these hypotheses and the 
recommended course of action with respect to the model. 
 
Based on Table 8.5 and the previous qualitative analysis, the following elements are 




‒ Removal of the ‘techne required to acquire / field the weapon’ variable from the 
model.16 





‒ Addition of a variable labelled ‘availability of alternatives to weapons technology 
under consideration’, reflecting the hypothesis that few or no alternatives make a 
positive decision significantly more likely. 
‒ Addition of a variable labelled ‘momentum’, which applies after an initial period 
of adoption and makes continued adoption of the same weapon more likely. 
‒ Addition of a variable labelled ‘desire for prestige’, reflecting the hypothesis that 
if a leader desires personal prestige amongst other group members, other 
                                                          
16 This variable should still be tested in future empirical evaluations of the model, in order to establish 
whether and under what circumstances it can have a positive effect on awareness. 
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organizations or constituencies, then this makes a decision to adopt a new weapon 
more likely. 
‒ Modification of the ‘strategic compatibility’ variable to make it linear, i.e., if the 
weapon is not compatible with the organization’s current strategy, then it makes 
a positive adoption decision less likely. 
‒ Modification of the ‘perception of urgency’ variable to ‘perception of extreme 
urgency’ and allow it to take on the values of ‘~ to ‒ ‒’, dependent on the length 
of the development cycle of the weapon. This reflects the hypothesis that only 
when there is a perception on the part of group leaders that there is extreme 
urgency and that this urgency needs to manifest itself in more frequent operations, 
will this be a deterrent to adoption. 
‒ Modification of the ‘security pressures’ variable to ‘intense security pressures’ to 
raise the evidentiary bar for allowing this variable to negatively affect the adoption 
decision. 
‒ Modification of the ‘number of prior adopters’ variable to reflect that the greater 
the number of prior adopters, the more likely adoption becomes (to a given 
extent), but that no prior adopters does not prejudice the adoption decision in 
any way. 
‒ Modification of the ‘guardians of the status quo variable’ to no longer have a 




‒ Removal of the ‘champion in leadership’ variable from the success sub-model. 
‒ Tentative addition of a variable for ‘general tradecraft’ (distinguished from 
organizational mētis) to reflect the hypothesis that poor general tradecraft should 
negatively affect the probability of a successful adoption of a weapon.17 
 
The relevance of the model (including these suggested changes) will be visited in the 
conclusion. 
  
                                                          
17 The PIRA case study suggested that a safe haven might be more heavily weighted, but the lack of 
support for this variable in the other cases implies that this would be premature. 
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Table 8.5: Suggested Modifications to the Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model 
 





Awareness [Criteria: Total number of evaluations ≥ 3; Number of U’s – Number of S’s >1] 
Cognitive Biases Supporting: 0  
Undermining: 3 
Upon examination, the negative effect of these biases in the INLA 
and Order cases was, if anything, extremely small and not enough to 
prevent awareness; in other cases, there may be a greater effect. 
Recommendation: premature to remove from the model at this stage. 
Techne Weapon Supporting: 1  
Undermining: 4  
There is no qualitative evidence that the techne required to 
acquire/field the weapon affected awareness (even in the supportive 
case), and may in fact have had the opposite effect of increasing 
awareness in some cases. Recommendation: remove from model (or 
even allow the variable to take on positive values based on further 
empirical evidence). 
Perceived Urgency Supporting: 0 
Undermining: 3 
There are only three evaluations, but in none of these was the level 
of urgency sufficiently high to be expected to affect awareness. 
Recommendation: Modify variable to ‘perception of extreme urgency 
to act’. 
Decision  [Criteria: Total number of evaluations ≥ 5; Number of U’s – Number of S’s >1] 
Perceived Urgency Supporting: 1 
Undermining: 6 
This result is mainly due to the CSA exhibiting this factor, but in that 
case the perceived urgency was not very high. The variable should 
capture not just whether or not the group wants to act, but whether it 
feels an intense pressure to operate at a high pace. 
Recommendation: Modify variable to ‘perception of extreme urgency 
to act’ and allow it to take on the values of ‘~ to - -’, dependent on the 
length of the development cycle of the weapon. 
Number of weapons 
needed / desired 
Supporting: 2 
Undermining: 5 
Only a small effect is predicted, thus this may have been drowned out 
in the cases; also it is a theoretically persuasive argument. 





Undermining: 5  
The results argue for a recalibration. Recommendation: Allow the 
variable to take on the values of ‘~ to ++’, depending on the number 
of prior adopters. No or one prior adopter = ~; Handful of prior 
adopters = +; only if many, then = + +.  
Security Pressures Supporting: 3 
Undermining: 5 
Since almost all terrorist organizations experience some security 
pressures, this variable would function better if better specified. 
Recommendation: Modify variable to ‘INTENSE security pressures’, 
in other words, greater than traditional law enforcement and 
intelligence efforts. 
Presence of 




Recommendation: Variable should not be linear in its effect: if one or 
more guardians present, its effect should be ‘-’; if absent, a ‘~’. 
Success  [Criteria: Total number of evaluations ≥ 4; Number of U’s – Number of S’s >1] 




Since there was no variation within this variable in the case studies, it 
would be premature to exclude it. (It was tacitly supported for the 
PIRA, but did not have an effect so was not counted). 






Same as above.  
Centralization Supporting: 1 
Undermining: 4  
The PIRA only exhibited moderate centralization, so the results are 
based only on the CSA case, which could be an outlier. 
Recommendation: Retain, pending further empirical evidence. 
Mētis Required to 




Much of the undermining of the hypothesis is driven by the PIRA 
case. It is suspected that this variable should not be evaluated in 
isolation, but should be compared to the organizational metis. When 
the two variables are interacted (Mētis Weapon is added to Mētis 
Organization), the hypothesis is confirmed in all cases (similar case 
with techne variables). Recommendation: Retain variable, but 
















The variable was only partially fulfilled for all cases, so conclusions 
cannot be drawn from this set of case studies. Recommendation: 





Upon investigation of the cases, it is clear that while an innovation 
champion is consequential in the decision whether to adopt, it has 
little bearing on the success of adoption. Recommendation: Exclude 





An insufficient number of weapons was tested, so it is premature to 
exclude this variable. Recommendation: Retain, pending further 
empirical evidence. 
Safe Haven Supporting: 2 
Undermining: 4  
In the last period of the PIRA, the group probably still had some safe 
havens in the Republic of Ireland, but the variable was coded 
conservatively. If indeed the PIRA did have a safe haven during this 
period, there would be insufficient evidence to exclude this variable. 
Recommendation: Retain, pending further empirical evidence. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
Our future is in our own hands, to make or to mar. It will be an uphill fight to the end, and would 
we have it otherwise? Let no one suppose that evolution will ever exempt us from struggles. 'You 
forget,' said the Devil, with a chuckle, 'that I have been evolving too.'  - William Ralph Inge1 
 
It has become almost trite to say that we live in a technological age. Many observers 
then proceed to evoke one or more of the shiny new gadgets, from smartphones to 
robotic vacuum cleaners, that are the quotidian technological emblems of the 21st 
century. The implications of technological advancement go far beyond these superficial 
accoutrements, however, and scholars have only just begun to reflect on a world in 
which the social, economic, cultural, and scientific spheres are becoming dominated by 
complex tools that we have created but often barely understand. Considering the far-
reaching societal effects wrought by previous technological transformations like the 
Industrial Revolution, the astounding velocity of contemporary technological change 
presages major shifts in global civilization. After all, technology not only breaks new 
boundaries in the physical world, but also empowers individuals and groups and 
democratizes and amplifies knowledge. 
 
Those tasked with thinking about security, however, fear that modern technology will 
do the same for those asymmetric adversaries – terrorists chief amongst them – who 
would use technology as weapons, to destroy rather than to create. Thus is established a 
conceptual linkage between the terrorist threat and emerging technology. Yet, this 
linkage is empirically tenuous, for historically only a small subset of terrorists have 
been particularly innovative when it comes to their pursuit of weapons and, conversely, 
most technological breakthroughs with the potential to cause harm have not been swept 
up by terrorists as soon as they made their appearance. This study has sought to unravel 
one of the theoretical and empirical threads linking terrorists and technology by 
exploring how and when terrorists adopt new weapons. It has approached this from two 
different perspectives, traversing theories and experience in several domains. First, in 
what this study has characterized as an ‘outside in’ orientation, the study examined the 
historical adoption of weapons by a variety of actors, from primitive humans to modern 
militaries. The second source of insights, reflecting an ‘inside out’ orientation, sprang 
from the scholarship on organizational innovation and learning, primarily that 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Tom Crisp (ed.), The Book of Bill: Choice Words, Memorable Men (Kansas City, MI: 
Andrews McMeel Publishing, 2009), p. 99. 
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pertaining to terrorist groups, but ranging more broadly when necessary to other 
organizational entities like firms and government agencies.  
 
The result was the identification of a complex web of factors that might influence the 
three main stages of terrorist weapons adoption – awareness of a new weapon or 
weapons-relevant technology, the decision (or lack thereof) to adopt or refrain from 
adopting, and the success or otherwise of an attempt to adopt. Terrorists must 
successfully pass through each of these gateways if they are to acquire a new, and 
presumably more potent, weapons capability. This set of diverse influencing factors was 
distilled down to a framework representing a highly contingent interaction between the 
terrorist organization and the prospective weapon in a particular social, political, and 
security setting, all of which is coloured by the organization’s prior experiences and 
current perceptions. The framework was then embedded in a Terrorist Weapons 
Adoption Model, which dealt separately with each adoption stage and reflected the 
hypothesized effects of each contributing factor. 
 
In order to supplement and provide a preliminary validation of the model, it was 
exposed to real-world cases of the terrorist weapons adoption process. The adoption 
behaviour of four different terrorist organizations was analysed, with the cases carefully 
selected to provide maximum inferential leverage, both within cases (since each group’s 
behaviour was studied over time) and comparatively across both related and different 
contexts. The cases largely confirmed the central strategic and tactical logic of weapons 
adoption, as well as highlighted the crucial role played by a variety of contingent 
factors, from ideology to the terrorists’ social networks. The model also fared 
surprisingly well against the empirical data; the cases suggested a handful of 
modifications, but many of the hypotheses were supported by the evidence and, overall, 
the model accurately predicted most of the key outcomes reflected in the cases. Some of 
the more important and novel insights about the weapons adoption process that emerged 
from the model and cases are summarized below.  
 
In terms of gaining awareness of potential weapons or related technologies as 
candidates for adoption, this tends to arise fairly rapidly after a group makes the 
decision to engage in violence, irrespective of the group’s outlook or capability. Even 
the significantly isolated CSA had no problem keeping abreast of options for new 
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weapons. Turning to the main theorized awareness mechanisms, namely active 
searching, demonstration and proselytization, we see that each played a significant role 
in at least one terrorist group becoming aware of a weapon, thus validating the 
categorization schema. As for the source of the awareness, ‘word of mouth’ across 
existing social and ideological networks appears to be a particularly important channel 
through which awareness of a weapon can flow. In this context, the prior weapons 
experiences of group members or like-minded violent organizations in the group’s 
milieu and even the written prescriptions of movement ideologues can garner the 
attention of group decision-makers. A key corollary, at least for military armaments, is 
the part played by group members with previous military expertise in facilitating a 
terrorist organization’s awareness of candidate weapons. The study also confirms that if 
there are salient group members who are positively predisposed towards the notion of 
innovation in general, awareness of any particular weapon becomes more likely. Last, 
with respect to the nature of the weapon itself, the case evidence supports the theoretical 
contention that, all else being equal, the more easily observable a weapon’s operation 
and effects are, the greater the likelihood of a terrorist group becoming aware of that 
weapon. 
 
Turning to influences on the decision to adopt the candidate weapon, the cases 
collectively confirm the basic logic of innovation adoption – that a new weapon is 
generally sought by terrorists when they perceive a tactical or strategic gap in 
performance that cannot be addressed by their existing arsenal. The cases also 
demonstrate clearly that simply providing perceived advantages over the status quo is 
not enough; the devil is in the details and there are a host of other influences that come 
into play in the adoption decision. First, the cases point to three preconditions as being 
crucial: compatibility of the new weapon with the organization’s overall strategy as well 
as its ideology, and a sufficient level of internal cohesiveness for a decision to be made 
and implemented. Second, among the perceived strategic factors that can stimulate 
adoption of new weapons, the anticipated prestige that adoption might provide for the 
terrorist leaders or the group as a whole with respect to either internal or external 
audiences should not be overlooked. Other factors that the case evidence indicates make 
a positive adoption decision more likely include a fairly high tolerance for risk on behalf 
of group decision-makers, the possession by the terrorist organization of a safe haven 
where it can operate relatively undisturbed, and the prior institutionalization in the 
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organization of a ‘skunkworks’ or other dedicated research and development capability. 
Having a larger membership overall, and especially a sizeable cadre with technical 
expertise, are also associated in the cases with decision-makers opting to pursue a new 
weapon. Factors that appear to make the choice of a specific type of weapon more likely 
include a limited availability of alternatives to the weapon under consideration, the 
amount of information available about the weapon or technology overall and 
serendipitous acquisition, where the terrorists are presented with a specific weapon with 
little to no effort required on their part. Third, the cases support the contention that there 
is a certain momentum to weapons adoption; if an organization had already developed 
the infrastructure and sunk the resources into developing or acquiring a new weapon in 
the past, it was more likely to continue to pursue adoption of new weapons, not only 
updated versions of the previously adopted weapon, but completely new platforms as 
well. 
 
The most obvious discriminating determinant between adoption success and failure is 
whether the terrorist organization possesses, or is able to develop, the requisite levels of 
techne and mētis within the organization to produce or acquire, and use, the particular 
weapons technology pursued. This finding is supported by all the cases where it applies. 
It goes almost without saying that the less complex and unfamiliar the weapons 
technology is, the greater the chances are that a given terrorist group will fulfil this 
criterion.  Several ancillary factors increase the likelihood that the necessary levels of 
techne and mētis will be present or attained. These include having a sizeable talent pool 
of experts, prior experience in adopting or producing technology, a safe haven in which 
to operate, significant resources, a dedicated R&D apparatus, and an overall 
organizational culture of learning. Maintaining extensive network relationships with 
other entities through which to acquire resources or expertise can also bolster a terrorist 
group’s prospects for successful adoption of a weapon. An important caveat to all of 
this is that ideological and other cognitive biases on the part of group decision-makers 
can negate almost all of these advantages; among the cases, the CSA failed in its 
weapons adoption primarily because its leader’s eccentric beliefs resulted in the 
organization both not realizing the degree of techne (let alone mētis) that was needed for 




Although the case studies were selected and structured to yield as much comparative 
and longitudinal insight and to provide as robust a validation of the model as possible, 
there are inherent limitations on the generalizability of results obtained from focusing 
on only four cases, which covered only two extremist ideologies and only three different 
weapons technologies (two of which are closely related). There are therefore several 
opportunities for continued future research. First, while the cases studied provided 
explicit tests for many of the constituent hypotheses of the model, there were also 
several hypotheses for which the cases did not provide direct guidance, such as when a 
variable was not present in a case or the value of the variable was not known. 
Conducting additional cases would thus in general serve as a means of directly 
confirming (or disconfirming) the relevance of a greater number of variables and further 
refining the model, thereby increasing the model’s saliency and parsimony. Second, 
with respect to the type of additional case studies that might be conducted, while the 
studies reflect variation in terms of perpetrator ideologies and national backgrounds, all 
the cases took place in developed, Western countries. Future tests of the theory and 
model would usefully be situated in less-developed polities and cultures that do not 
have their antecedents in the Western liberal tradition. This would explicitly address the 
impact of the broader societal influence variables in particular, investigating whether, 
just as with many a worthy tale, the setting is just as much an element of the drama as 
the actions of the protagonists.  Third, as noted in the introductory chapter, the effect of 
emerging technologies raises particular concern when it comes to so-called WMD. 
While one of the weapons studied (cyanide as a mass-casualty weapon) does fall into 
this category, and the illustrative application of the model to emerging technology 
provided below also pertains to this class of weapons, the historical cases did not 
directly reflect the impact of major technological changes in this regard. There may thus 
be considerable utility to a follow-up study in which the model is examined specifically 
in light of the organizational incentives and sometimes unique weapons characteristics 
of WMD.2 Last, the current study focuses only on terrorist organizations, but there is no 
                                                          
2 This might enable the assessment of whether WMD in the terrorism context act as so-called ‘disruptive 
innovations’, innovations that eventually simultaneously fulfill the minimum requirements along 
traditional demand categories (for example, for some terrorists, the number of casualties per unit 
resources expended) and offer something new to potential adopters that existing technologies or practices 
do not (say, greater ease of use or psychological impact on the target society). See Christensen, et. al., 
passim and Erwin Danneels, ‘Disruptive Technology Reconsidered: A Critique and Research Agenda’, 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 21 (2004), pp. 246-258). The most important aspect of 
disruptive innovations is that they can rapidly and permanently displace established technologies after a 
critical point in their performance trajectories has been reached; the adoption by terrorists of WMD might 
reach a tipping point, after which the use of these technologies might rapidly become much more 
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inherent reason why the adoption of weapons by non-state actors could not be analysed 
more broadly. Potentially fruitful avenues of future research could thus be to apply the 
basic approach to other forms and types of actor, including so-called ‘lone wolves’3 and 
groups in more traditional (i.e., non-terrorist based) insurgencies. This would necessitate 
some modifications to the model, however, especially where certain hypotheses and 
variables no longer apply. Despite the clear need for investigation of additional, more 
varied cases before any claims can be made about the universality of the findings about 
weapons adoption by violent non-state actors, the current study has provided both a 
theoretical and methodological template for ensuing research and will thus considerably 
facilitate future endeavours in this regard. 
 
Overall, an important part of what has been accomplished through this study has been to 
show, both empirically and theoretically, that a terrorist group’s organizational 
attributes matter at least as much as the technological attributes of a candidate weapon 
when it comes to the question of whether the terrorist group will pursue that weapon 
and succeed in doing so. In fact, it appears that the relationship between terrorists and 
new weapons is far more reflexive than is often assumed – while the physical and 
technological characteristics of a weapon are important, it is only in how these are 
reflected in and measured against the organization’s ideological, strategic and logistic 
outlook that the weapon’s attributes really influence the group’s awareness, decision-
making and likelihood of adoption success. In terms of the dynamics introduced in the 
opening chapter this implies that the ‘push’ dynamic, which emphasizes factors arising 
within the terrorist organization, is at least as, if not more, important than the ‘pull’ 
dynamic in terms of the overall threat posed by terrorism, especially in the short term. 
For, if a terrorist organization is not primed to be aware of new technologies, is not in 
an innovative organizational posture and does not possess the capabilities to take 
advantage of a new weapons technology, it is very unlikely to make it through all three 
of the procedural gates needed to adopt and utilize the technology.  
 
                                                          
widespread (see also Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big 
Difference (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2002)). 
3 In this context, lone wolf terrorists could be construed as ‘superempowered individuals’; see John Robb, 
Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, New Jersey: John 




Terrorist weapons usage is thus likely to continue to display a certain ‘stickiness’ or 
inertia in the face of even today’s rapidly emerging technologies, with the vast majority 
of terrorist organizations being unwilling or unable to jump on the latest technological 
bandwagon. This is not to say that the ‘pull’ dynamic should be ignored. The case 
studies also indicate that there will likely always be some terrorists, like the PIRA, with 
the right set of organizational capacities and incentives to become seekers and early 
adopters of new weapons technologies. The Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model in turn 
suggests that once adoption by even one terrorist organization has been successful, 
demonstration and network effects make the next adoption that much easier. For 
innovative terrorists, who are likely to already be paying close attention, even relatively 
minor changes in the technologies themselves in terms of their performance, ease of 
acquisition, and so forth, might tip the balance in favour of an acquisition attempt or 
success. In the longer term, as new technologies mature and one or more maverick 
terrorists ‘try them on’ as weapons, the threat thus increases. From a counterterrorism 
perspective, then, the key question becomes less about what the new technologies do 
than about which terrorists are likely to exploit such technologies first. 
 
Illustrative Application of the Model 
 
In order to demonstrate how the Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model might be utilized 
in practice, an illustrative application of the model (as refined in Chapter 8) is presented 
below. It should be noted at the outset that since this exercise is intended for illustrative 
purposes only, the model inputs have not been rigorously researched and justified.4 The 
two emerging technologies with weapons potential that will be examined are chemical 
microreactors and rapid prototyping. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
microreactors can allow for the controlled mixing of even highly toxic chemicals, 
conceivably making the production of chemical weapons such as sarin or VX nerve 
agents safer and yielding less of a footprint.5 Rapid prototyping technologies, popularly 
referred to as ‘3D printing’, allow for even complex real-world objects to be rapidly 
                                                          
4 The author does, however, have extensive experience researching all three of the organizations 
examined and supplied his best estimates of the values of each variable based on his existing knowledge 
of each group, thus making the results at the very least a plausible approximation. 
5 See, for example, Smithson, pp. 80-81; Patrick L. Mills, David J. Quiram and James F. Ryley, 
‘Microreactor Technology and Process Miniaturization for Catalytic Reactions—A Perspective on Recent 
Developments and Emerging Technologies’, Chemical Engineering Science 62 (2007), pp. 6992-7010; 
and Tuan H. Nguyen, ‘Microchallenges of Chemical Weapons Proliferation’, Science, 309:5737 (12 
August 2005), pp. 1021. 
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produced (usually through selective deposition techniques) from computer models, and 
the concern is that they might obviate the need for terrorists and other non-state actors 
to undertake the onerous and highly-skilled task of machining precise parts for use in 
explosives or other weapons.6 It may even be conceivable in the near future for 
terrorists to ‘print’ entire bombs (including the explosive components) from plans that 
could be sent over the internet to even inexperienced operatives. It should be 
emphasized that these, like most emerging technologies, have legitimate, non-violent 
uses that hold tremendous value for the betterment of humanity. Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of users of these technologies are likely to do so for productive, 
beneficial or at least benign purposes, ranging from new commercial processes and 
pharmaceuticals that conquer age-old diseases to tinkering by hobbyists. This 
immediately raises a dual-use dilemma in that the tremendous benefits to society need 
to be weighed against the baleful consequences of the potential misuse of these 
technologies by a relatively tiny minority. 
 
The terrorist organizations that are considered in this example are the central core of al-
Qa’ida, currently headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri and thought to be based in 
northwestern Pakistan, Hizb’allah, the Lebanese Shi’ite militant and political 
organization, and an American apocalyptic-millenarian cult (modelled along the lines of 
Aum Shinrikyo) that is headed by an idiosyncratic leader who has a fascination with 
chemical weapons. The demonstration consists of applying the model (as described in 
Chapter 8) to each of these organizations for each of the two emerging technologies. 
The application will also consider the adoption of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
– which both al-Qa’ida and Hizb’allah have already adopted in the past – as a 
calibration mechanism and control. The diversity of weapons and organizations should 
suffice to adequately illustrate the use and potential of the model. The full application of 
the model is provided in Appendix C, Tables C.1 to C.4, with the summary results 
presented below in Table 9.1. 
 
                                                          
6 See, inter alia, Joseph Flaherty, ‘Looks Could Kill: Using 3-D Printers to Design Guns’, Wired (20 
August 2012), accessed at: http://www.wired.com/design/2012/08/rapid-fire-rapid-prototypes/ on 2 
November 2013; Jamais Cascio, Open the Future Blog (24 July 2006). Accessed at: 
http://www.openthefuture.com/2006/07/monday_topsight_july_24_2006.html on 2 November 2013; and 
Gefang Wang, et. al., ‘Application of Rapid Prototyping Technology in Equipment Parts Rapid 
Manufacturing’, 3rd International Conference on System Science, Engineering Design and 
Manufacturing Informatization, 2012. Accessed at: 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/abstractAuthors.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6340744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexp






Table 9.1: Summary Results of Illustrative Model Application 
 
Adoption 
Phase Weapon Scores 
    
   AQ Central Hizb’allah 
Apocalyptic 
Cult 
       
Awareness IEDs 15.5 28  19
 Chemical Microreactors 7 19  19
 Rapid Prototyping 6 21.5  15
       
Decision IEDs 27.5 31  15
 Chemical Microreactors 17 18.5  26.5
 Rapid Prototyping 11.5 21  19
       
Success IEDs 17 26  10
 Chemical Microreactors 7.5 14.5  9.5
 Rapid Prototyping 5 17  6
 
As displayed in the table, if one takes al-Qa’ida’s known awareness of IEDs as the 
benchmark score for awareness, all three organizations are likely to have awareness of 
this weapon, as expected. Hizb’allah has the greatest awareness of the two emerging 
technologies overall, with the apocalyptic-millenarian cult having lower awareness 
scores generally than the Shiite group but equal in terms of microreactors and still 
comparable to the benchmark. However, the model suggests that, especially in light of 
its weakened position and the intense security threats it is currently facing, primarily in 
the form of unmanned ‘drones’, al-Qa’ida central may not even be aware of the 
potential weapons utility of microreactors or rapid prototyping. It should be noted that 
the discrepancy between groups is almost solely due to non-weapons related factors, 
since Table C.2 shows that the purely weapons-related awareness scores are similar 
across the three weapons. 
 
With respect to the adoption decision, on the basis of only the characteristics that 
pertain to the weapons or technologies, microreactors are by far the most attractive 
technology of the three, yet the model predicts a variety of relative preferences across 
the technologies. Even if it were aware of the other potential weapons technologies, 
according to the model al-Qa’ida is likely to choose to favour IEDs over the emerging 
technologies, although microreactors would have some latent degree of attractiveness to 
the group. Hizb’allah is also most likely to maintain its usage of IEDs and related 
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weapons, but in this case, rapid prototyping and even microreactor technology do not 
lag far behind in the model. The model suggests, therefore, that relatively minor 
changes (e.g., demonstration of rapid prototyping in a weapons context by another 
organization, a lower acquisition cost, or an increase in the group’s mētis as the 
technology becomes more widely used) could precipitate an attempt to adopt rapid 
prototyping technology. The apocalyptic-millenarian cult clearly favours adopting 
microreactors, mainly driven by its leader’s affinity for chemical weapons, but also 
because of its general predilection for innovation and the high level of technical 
expertise among its membership. Again, although an intuitive result was obtained in this 
case, the model considered multiple factors that might have disincentivized the group 
from adopting microreactors relative to the other two weapons and established that these 
did not override the strong push and pull factors towards adopting microreactors. 
 
In terms of success, al-Qa’ida is much less likely to succeed with either of the emerging 
technologies, when compared with IEDs, while Hizb’allah has relatively high scores 
across the board, especially with respect to rapid prototyping when it comes to the 
emerging technologies. Although the model shows that the apocalyptic-millenarian cult 
is more likely to succeed in adopting IEDs and microreactors than rapid prototyping, it 
is far behind Hizb’allah’s scores in all weapon types.  
 
From the perspective of a counterterrorism policymaker or practitioner, the results of 
the model indicate that of the three organizations considered, the greatest threat with 
respect to these two emerging technologies lies with Hizb’allah, especially relating to its 
possible use of rapid prototyping technologies. The apocalyptic-millenarian cult 
certainly has the willingness to pursue using microreactors to develop chemical 
weapons. Although its capability to do so is somewhat constrained at present, it 
nonetheless bears close monitoring in case its adoption capacity increases. In this 
regard, in addition to providing practitioners with a means to prioritize and focus its 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts, one advantage of using the model is 
that it provides a mechanism for continuing to evaluate the weapons adoption process of 
a given terrorist group or with respect to a particular technology over time. In other 
words, once the model has been applied to a particular organization, it is relatively easy 
to track and evaluate the importance of changes in the organization and its operating 
environment, as well as to analyse new technologies or the evolution of existing ones, 
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by simply updating those variables that are changing and recalculating the model. 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
The implications of the study’s findings for counterterrorism policy and practice are 
severalfold. At the broadest policy level, since there are multiple failure points along a 
terrorist organization’s road to weapons adoption success, much of the hyperbole that 
sometimes attends the unveiling of a new technological breakthrough is misplaced. The 
technology may very well present terrorists and other malevolent actors with new 
opportunities, but that is only the first step in assessing the actual danger and 
policymakers should not jump to conclusions about the terrorist threat posed by the 
technology, at least in the short term, before conducting an analysis of whether extant 
terrorist groups are even likely to be interested in, let alone capable of, exploiting the 
new technology.  
 
This study and the model it has produced might thus hold some utility for addressing the 
so-called dual-use dilemma exhibited by many emerging technologies. Rather than 
imposing blanket restrictions on all new technologies that might pose some danger, 
which would no doubt become a Sisyphean, if not downright counterproductive, task, 
the insights gained through this study can assist policymakers by identifying the 
technology-organization dyads of greatest concern and thereby prioritizing technology 
control and non-proliferation efforts. If, for example, a given new technology provides 
several performance advantages for terrorists, but is likely to be successfully adopted 
only by at most one or two extant organizations, then in the short term at least, it makes 
more sense to focus on constraining and negating the relevant organizations, rather than 
controlling the spread of the technology. On the other hand, if the new technology not 
only provides inherent tactical benefits, but is likely to be attractive to and rapidly 
adopted by a multiplicity of terrorist organization, that technology might be prioritized 
for control efforts. It should be borne in mind, of course, that emerging technologies can 
also contribute to the defence and amplify the capabilities of counterterrorism agencies 
and thus that the risks of a new technology in terms of its use in a terrorist weapon must 
be measured relative to its defensive benefits (not to mention those in other social 




At the same time, the study has indicated that it is likely to be more difficult to prevent 
terrorist awareness of a new technology and its weapons potential. Even in the case 
studies, which took place prior to the advent of the Internet, terrorists quickly became 
aware of new means of destruction, either from open information sources or from other 
nodes in their respective networks. As a consequence, any government attempt to keep 
the existence of emerging technology secret is unlikely to work and, in fact, may be 
counterproductive in the sense of attracting terrorists’ attention by lending the 
technology the allure of the forbidden.  
 
A better strategy might be to monitor more closely those organizations with the 
motivation and capability to exploit these technologies, in search of indications of their 
interest, once again arguing for a focus on organizations in conjunction with 
technologies, rather than on the technologies in isolation. Of course, efforts should still 
be made to limit the availability to malefactors of the precise techne (and even more 
importantly mētis) surrounding adoption of a dangerous new technology. In practical 
terms this argues that in cases such as the recent controversy surrounding the 
publication of studies increasing the virulence of the influenza virus,7 the results of the 
research should be published widely, but not necessarily the detailed blueprints for 
making the virus more deadly. The centrality of techne and mētis to adoption success 
also validates to some extent the contention that it is easier for a scientist to become a 
terrorist than for a terrorist to become a scientist,8 thus placing renewed focus on issues 
of personnel reliability.  
 
The most important contribution of the current study is perhaps to be found in the more 
operational counterterrorism context. In addition to functioning as a means of scholarly 
investigation, the Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model (or a future, more refined, 
iteration thereof) can be used as an analytical tool to assist practitioners in identifying 
which terrorist adversaries are likely to pursue and successfully adopt emerging 
technologies as weapons. It can thereby allow counterterrorism authorities to prioritize 
resources towards monitoring and countering those organizations that pose the greatest 
threat in this regard. It is important to recognize that the model, even when applied to 
                                                          
7 For example, see Simon Wain-Hobson, ‘H5N1 viral-engineering dangers will not go away’, Nature (27 
March 2013). Accessed at http://www.nature.com/news/h5n1-viral-engineering-dangers-will-not-go-
away-1.12677 on 27 October 2013. 
8 For a discussion of this in the context of bioterrorism, see New Horizons in Bioterrorism Workshop 
Report (Boston: National Security Innovations and START, 17 September 2008), p. 30. 
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historical case studies, utilizes observable or inferable attributes of an organization to 
make analytical forecasts about the organization’s adoption behaviour. It is thus 
eminently suitable for use by intelligence and other national security analysts. Those 
analysts familiar with a particular terrorist organization can input what they already 
know or are observing with respect to the organization, and the model will assist in 
accounting for the myriad influences on adoption behaviour and can provide guidance 
on the likelihood of the organization passing through the various stages of adoption. The 
model is likely to be most useful when applied periodically, as it seems most accurate in 
detecting likely changes in group behaviour over time. The model can, of course, also 
be applied to a range of organizations when a new technology of concern presents itself 
in order to determine which organization is most likely to pursue and succeed at 
adoption.  
 
The problem with most threat assessments is that no sooner has the proverbial ink dried 
on a fixed analysis than many of the observations upon which it relies begin to become 
outdated in light of constantly evolving terrorist strategies, tactics, ideologies and skills, 
as well as synergistic changes in the broader terrorist eco-system. If this necessitates 
beginning an assessment from scratch with each change, an analyst is unlikely to invest 
the time and effort to constantly revisit and update an assessment. In the case of the 
model presented here, however, longitudinal change is explicitly built in (as shown in 
the case studies and application) and an analyst merely needs to update the relevant 
variables and perform a quick recalculation.  
 
Paul Wilkinson has bluntly stated that ‘the terrorist almost invariably has the 
inestimable advantage of surprise’9 and other scholars have bemoaned the fact that ‘the 
terrorists’ own operational ingenuity has enabled at least some groups to stay constantly 
ahead of the counter-terrorist technology curve.’10 By employing a future version of the 
model as an analytical tool, counterterrorism practitioners will hopefully be able to 
reduce the chances of surprise and mitigate the terrorist advantage, at least with respect 
to the adoption of a new weapon.  
 
                                                          
9 Wilkinson, p. 6. 
10 Hoffman, ‘Terrorist Targeting’, p. 19. 
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This study has elucidated the behavioural mechanisms behind changes in the 
instruments of terror by exploring terrorist selection and pursuit of weapons in light of a 
variety of organizational shifts, security force countermeasures and, in particular, 
technological developments in the broader society. In so doing, it has touched upon 
deeper currents in human history, diving into the tumultuous confluence of forces 
ideological and technological, the thrashing together of human will and human artifice. 
The main theoretical result has been the rejection of determinism in the terrorist 
adoption of new weapons and technology and the confirmation of contingency and 
equifinality in the adoption process.11 After all, as the historian Joel Mokyr has so deftly 
observed, technology ‘opens doors; it does not force society to walk through them’.12 
Yet, as evoked by the quotation that opens this chapter, terrorists can on occasion be 
inherently adaptive and even innovative. As a result, at least some terrorist 
organizations will attempt, and a subset of these may even succeed, in exploiting the 
extraordinary technological developments that the modern world presents. The second 
major contribution of this study, the model of terrorist weapons adoption it has 
produced, can serve as the basis for identifying and thus interdicting these terrorist 
adepts before they have the opportunity to rain destruction upon an unsuspecting 
citizenry. 
  
                                                          
11 Paul Wilkinson notes this in his own compilation of papers on terrorism and technology, and adds that 
‘So much depends on the ability and will to gain the technological edge in this constantly evolving form 
of covert warfare’ (Wilkinson, p. 10). 
12 Mokyr (2002), p. 162. 
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Appendix A: The Diffusion of Weapons – A History 
The Place of Weapons in Classical Commentary 
 
Military tacticians and strategists have overwhelmingly been concerned with how to 
win battles and wars.13 One should not expect, then, for the bulk of their writings to 
revolve around the origins of war-fighting implements, but rather to elucidate the 
manner by which the means at hand are to be used to achieve victory. Nevertheless, the 
great military thinkers thought broadly and deeply about many constituents of the 
military equation and their thoughts sometimes turned to technological development and 
new weaponry. Where these occur, such ruminations are relevant, both intrinsically and 
because the opinions of the luminaries among military theorists often exerted a strong 
influence on the behaviour and attitudes of those members of military and political 
staffs down the line of history who were entrusted to actually make decisions 
concerning new weapons.  
  
Among the ancient strategists, there is very little discussion of weapons development or 
military technology as such. Sun Tzu hardly mentions weapons at all, except for a 
cursory mention of crossbows, bows, spears and chariots14 and certainly does not 
provide criteria for evaluating or using new technologies. Kautilya refers but briefly to 
traditional weapons (in Book 9, Chapter 2 of the Arthashastra) and then only to advise 
on their tactical use. He does, however, expound at some length on the production and 
use of a variety of toxic smokes and poisons by which one can overcome an intransigent 
foe, thus making his treatise one of the first manuals of chemical and biological 
warfare.15 Yet, even the latter discussion does not conceive of weapons technology as 
such. In fact, it was not until the seventeenth century, with the publication in Japan of 
Miyamoto Musashi’s Book of Five Rings, that a discussion of weapons featured 
prominently in a text devoted primarily to martial strategy.16 Musashi expends much of 
                                                          
13 This was true at least until the advent of nuclear weapons, when it can be argued that theorists began to 
seriously consider how to refrain from actually fighting large wars, let alone winning them – see a similar 
discussion in Buzan, p. 31. 
14 Sun Tzu, On the Art of War – Special Edition, translated by Lionel Giles, edited by James H. Ford (El 
Paso Norte Press, 2005), II.14 and V.15. 
15 Kautilya, Arthashastra, Book XIV ‘Secret Means’. Accessed from 
http://www.bharatadesam.com/literature/kautilya_arthashastra/arthashastra.php, on 8 April 2009. 
16 Of course, several well-known Greek and Roman observers (most prominent among them Thucydides) 
discussed the use of weapons, but most of these narratives were generally of a more historical than 
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his effort on an idiosyncratic amalgamation of swordsmanship and spiritual philosophy, 
but in so doing he succeeds in drawing attention to the importance of weapons and their 
performance. ‘The Way of the Warrior’, he states, ‘is to master the virtue of his 
weapons. If a gentleman dislikes strategy he will not appreciate the benefit of 
weaponry’.17 Perhaps uncharacteristic of a master swordsman, Musashi analysed and 
endorsed the battlefield utility of a variety of other weapons, even acknowledging that 
‘the gun has no equal among weapons’, at least not until the point when swords cross, 
whence guns become in his words ‘useless’.18 He does not, however, dwell on the 
origins or development of these weapons, but seems to take their existence as a starting 
point for analysis. 
 
The nineteenth century heralded a golden age of grand theories of military strategy. The 
doyen of that period’s strategists was Carl von Clausewitz, who distilled his experiences 
in the Napoleonic Wars into his magnum opus of military theory, On War. In his 
characteristically thorough style, Clausewitz acknowledges that weapons are an 
important aspect of the totality of warfare in that ‘Fighting has determined the nature of 
the weapons employed. These in turn influence the combat; thus an interaction exists 
between the two’19 and even goes so far as to recognize changes in the modes of war, 
wherein combatants were led to ‘invent appropriate devices to gain advantages in 
combat, and these brought about great changes in the forms of fighting’.20 Yet he firmly 
minimizes the importance of these changes and in essence dismisses the entire 
enterprise of studying weapons development or adoption.  
 
He does this in at least three ways. First, Clausewitz argues in a most straightforward 
manner that while the instruments of war (or rather their effects) are important, the 
origins thereof are largely irrelevant:  
 
The range and effectiveness of different firearms is tactically most important; 
                                                          
predominantly strategic nature and relevant commentary from these sources is included in the historical 
survey that follows. 
17 Miyamoto Musashi, Book of Five Rings, Book of Earth. Accessed from 
http://www.miyamotomusashi.com/gorin.htm, on 8 April 2009. He goes further to state emphatically that: 
‘This is a truth: when you sacrifice your life, you must make fullest use of your weaponry. It is false not 
to do so, and to die with a weapon yet undrawn.’ As part of maximizing a weapon’s potential, Musashi 
admonishes his readers to ensure their weapons are hardy and without defect. 
18 Musashi, Book of Five Rings, Book of Earth. 
19 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 




but their construction, though it governs their performance, is irrelevant. The 
conduct of war has nothing to do with making guns and powder out of coal, 
sulphur, saltpetre, copper and tin; its given quantities are weapons that are 
ready for use and their effectiveness.21 
 
Second, Clausewitz attempts to create a conceptual separation between the invention or 
procurement of arms and the actual fighting or conduct of war, stating that the former is 
distinguished from the latter by an absence of the element of danger, and asserting that 
the idiosyncratic nature of weapons development means that analysing the two together 
would obviate a strategist’s ability to derive general principles about war. The 
implication, therefore, is that the strategist must concern himself only with ‘the art of 
using the given means in combat’. 22 Lastly, Clausewitz contends that the only true 
advantage in war lies with the innate abilities of the general, as the brisk and mutual 
emulation of weapons capabilities by antagonists makes an analysis of the details of 
their development or adoption moot. In his opinion, ‘what it usually comes down to is 
that one side invents improvements and first puts them to use, and the other side 
promptly copies them’.23 
 
This laconic disregard for technology becomes more understandable in context. 
Clausewitz was something of a fervent acolyte of the Napoleonic way of war and the 
majority of the military innovations of that period, such as the levee en masse, were 
based on political rather than technological eruptions.24 For Clausewitz, the morale of 
men and the genius of leaders reigned supreme on the battlefield. It was only later, in 
the post-Napoleonic period of rapid European industrialization, that the burgeoning 
impact on warfare of technological progress became unmistakable. One wonders 
whether the great man’s dismissal of any discussion surrounding the adoption of new 
weapons and technologies would have been quite so peremptory had he put pen to paper 
only in the latter half of the nineteenth century.   
 
Clausewitz’s near-contemporary and putative intellectual nemesis, the Baron Antoine-
Henri Jomini, appears to pay greater attention to technological developments in 
weapons and allows that these can bestow dramatic advantage in war, especially in 
terms of tactics and organization. In the Art of War (1838), Jomini lists examples of the 
                                                          
21 Clausewitz, p.144. 
22 Clausewitz, p.127. 
23 Clausewitz, p.282. 
24 Buzan, p. 32. 
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increasing destructiveness of weapons, and even advocates for governments to 
‘combine in a congress to proscribe these inventions of destruction’.25 Yet, although not 
quite as vociferously as Clausewitz, Jomini similarly does not see new inventions as 
having much of an impact on the strategic aspects of warfare,26 allowing at most that 
‘the superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it does not, of 
itself, gain battles, but is a great element of success’.27 
 
In Battle Studies (1880), Ardant du Picq admits to tremendous changes in battle since 
ancient times as a result of technological advances, especially in the realm of increasing 
firepower, but seems to find a reliance on the material aspects of war to be a touch 
distasteful. So, while he discusses the newest weapons of his time, including rifled gun 
barrels and expanding cartridges, and even provides a detailed history of the progressive 
introduction of firearms into the infantry,28 he still asserts the primacy of morale over 
machine and the superiority of élan over equipment – with devastating results for his 
followers, who would three decades hence occupy the trenches of the Somme. 
 
A similar attitude prevailed at this time in the sphere of naval strategy. Both Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and later Julian Corbett noted improvements in weapons technology and 
their potential consequences for tactics but then seemed to fall back on arguments 
referencing general (that is, atechnological) principles of history and warfare that 
transcend the technological advances of the day.29 This sentiment is pithily summed up 
by Mahan’s dictum that ‘men don’t change’.30 
 
It was left to Ivan Bloch in the waning years of the nineteenth century to delve deeply 
into the effects of increased firepower and to conclude that increases in defensive 
firepower would lead to long, painful wars of attrition.31 Yet Bloch was not destined to 
                                                          
25 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1992 [1838]), p. 48. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Jomini, p. 47. To be fair, Jomini, like Clausewitz, was also writing based on a technological milieu that 
had remained mostly static for a hundred years, before major innovations of the 19th century (such as the 
telegraph and the minie ball–percussion cap combination) had made their mark. 
28 Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies, translated by John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton (Charleston, SC: 
Bibliobazaar, 2006), p. 205. 
29 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 1987); Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, Dover Edition, 2004). 
30 Mahan, p.506. 
31 La Guerre Future, popularized in translation as Ivan Bloch, Is War Now Impossible?: Being an 
Abridgement of the War of the Future in Its Technical, Economic and Politics Relations (Farnham: 
Ashgate Publishing, 1991[1898]). Interestingly, two decades earlier, Friedrich Engels had written in his 
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have his sought-for influence on the militaries of pre-World War I Europe, who largely 
ignored his dire predictions that new weaponry had inescapably altered the character of 
war. Nevertheless, by the turn of the twentieth century, respected military strategists 
were far more accepting (if not quite unequivocally or happily) of the significance of 
advances in weaponry on the outcome of major conflicts. So it was, that although 
Ferdinand Foch, in his Principles of War, could claim that material factors were still far 
from being everything in modern war,32 after analysing the advantages bestowed by 
superior weapons in the Franco-Prussian War, he acquiesced that ‘Moral superiority, 
resulting from numbers, formations, etc., is no longer sufficient today with modern 
weapons: their effects are too demoralizing’.33 Yet, even Foch seemed to ignore the 
process of weapons development or adoption and merely dealt with weapons as a 
prespecified input into the wartime environment. 
 
By the decade before the Second World War, however, the pendulum seemed to have 
swung in the opposite direction. A host of military practitioner-scholars, coloured by 
their experiences in the First World War, began to fixate on the role of technology in 
war, in some cases elevating novel weapons to the determining factor in the outcome of 
contemporary warfare. While Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell trumpeted air power34 
and Heinz Guderian35 and Basil Liddell Hart36 propounded new forms of mechanized 
warfare, chief among the military disciples of technology during this period was surely 
J.F.C. ‘Boney’ Fuller. Fuller enthusiastically embraced the notion that weapons and 
their attendant technology constituted the key to military success, famously intoning 
that ‘Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form 99 per cent of 
victory....Strategy, command, leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organization and 
all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are nothing to a high superiority of 
weapons—at most they go to form the one per cent, which makes the whole 
                                                          
book commonly known as Anti-Dühring that victory in war owed more to industrial might than the 
general’s genius (Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft (Berlin: Dietz 
Verl., 1958 [1878]), referred to in Van Creveld, p.322). 
32 Ferdinand Foch, Principles of War, translated by J. de Morinni (New York: The H. K. Fly Company, 
1918), p. 8. 
33 Foch, pp. 370-371.  
34 William Mitchell, The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power – Economic and Military 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2006), p. 119; Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (USAF Warrior 
Studies) (Office of Air Force History, United States Government Printing Office, 1983). 
35 Heinz Guderian, Achtung—Panzer! (London: Arms & Armor Press, 1995). 
36 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, Second Revised Edition (New York: Meridian 1991 [1929]). 
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possible’.37 The transition to an almost total focus on technology reached its zenith in 
the work of Herman Kahn, who, in his On Thermonuclear War38 (with its less than 
oblique nod to Clausewitz) reformulated military strategy in terms of a single, 
overarching technology – nuclear weapons. Kahn relegated other factors such as morale 
and training to the background and in fact posited no less than six future world wars, 
each based on more advanced technologies for conducting nuclear warfare. 
The Historical Experience of Weapons Diffusion and 
Adoption 
Primitive Weapons 
We know very little detail about the origins and spread of the earliest weapons – for 
periods before the detailed writings of ancient Sumer, historians have to infer the 
development of weapons from archaeological scraps,39 ambiguous cave drawings and 
the war-making implements of isolated groups of Stone Age peoples encountered in 
modern times. Nonetheless, a plausible story of the development of the most primitive, 
pre-metallurgical weapons can be constructed as follows. Early man evolved to become 
cognizant of the elementary physics of the world around him, which allowed him to 
manipulate his environment so as to transcend the limits of his biological frame. He did 
this using tools he selected or fashioned from materials at hand. Most of his initial tools 
were multi-purpose, used for hunting, gathering or making more tools. And, of course, a 
shaped rock or rough-hewn tree branch would come in useful for settling challenges 
from or against other members of his own species. In consequence, as tools began to 
specialize for specific tasks, it was only natural that some of them would be crafted with 
the specific end of enhancing one’s odds in any physical altercation with another human 
being. So it was, then, that the first weapons acted mainly to extend the reach and power 
of the human body. The heavy club40 exerted leverage over a distance and the wooden 
                                                          
37 From a memorandum that Fuller wrote in 1919. Cited in J. F. C. Fuller. Armament and History: The 
Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the End of the Second World 
War (New York: De Capo Press, 1998 [1945]), p.30. 
38 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
39 Many of the earliest weapons were made of wood, which rarely preserves well, thus leaving an 
incomplete record of fortuitously preserved wood, partial wooden remnants of weapons and the hardier 
bits of early weaponry, such as those crafted of bone and stone. 
40 Some of the earliest evidence for these weapons comes from South African rock paintings dated circa 
6,000 BCE that purportedly show the use of clubs (The Diagram Group, Weapons (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990), p.14). It is possible, however, that forms of the club existed much earlier. 
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spear41 was an extension of the arm that concentrated force in its tip and therefore 
provided the ability to penetrate flesh. Such specialization into means of combat was 
sometimes obvious. A wooden axe, for example, is of little use for cutting timber, but 
can still do a good job of splitting skin and muscle. Bone and stone, however, proved to 
be more robust than wood and were promptly added to the mix from at least 200,000 
years ago in the form of spear-points, daggers, picks, war-axes and other variations on 
the basic theme.42 Although the majority of early weapons were only suitable for close 
combat, others were developed to cover greater distances, including the bolas, the sling 
and the atlatl, the latter being traced as far back as the Upper Paleolithic.43 While many 
of these early weapons were superseded by the superior metal varieties, some 
civilizations that were at once very warlike and sophisticated never made the transition 
beyond wood and stone weapons, the Aztec and Maori being two prominent examples.  
 
One of the most long-lived weapons in history also made its appearance in prehistoric 
times. The bow, most likely the first true machine in that it stored muscular energy and 
released it as mechanical energy, made its debut as far back as 10,000 years ago,44 if not 
earlier, and quickly established itself as the consummate hunting tool, as well as an 
enduring projectile weapon.  
 
Considering the rather arid baseline, it can be argued that the earliest forms of almost all 
these weapons can be (and perhaps were) regarded as innovations. In many cases, initial 
awareness of their value probably came from trial with similar tools used for hunting, 
with the combat application quickly becoming evident. After all, anything that will 
bring down a wild boar is likely to fare at least as well against a physically inferior 
human opponent.  There is still debate over the extent to which these early weapons 
diffused from a single locus or were developed independently in multiple locations,45 
                                                          
41 Wooden spears were probably used for hunting at least 400,000 years ago and the fact that chimpanzees 
have been observed making simple wooden spears implies that early humans may have first begun using 
them as far back as 5 million years ago (Jill D. Pruetz1 and Paco Bertolani, ‘Savanna Chimpanzees, Pan 
troglodytes verus, Hunt with Tools’, Current Biology (March 6, 2007)). 
42 Although occurring far later in history, the embedding by the indigenous peoples of Kiribati of shark 
teeth into their wooden clubs to create a form of proto-sword is an illustration of the diverse ways in 
which bone has been combined with wood.  
43 James Edward McClellan and Harold Dorn, Science and Technology in World History: An 
Introduction, 2nd Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p.11. 
44 Paleolithic carvings in Castellon, Spain seem to indicate bows being used in combat, in addition to 
hunting (The Diagram Group, p.96). 
45 In some cases the diffusion process is straightforward. For instance, the wooden spears and clubs of the 
denizens of Polynesia accompanied them as they settled island after island, as far as New Zealand, where 
the Maori supplemented the wahaika and patu (wooden clubs) with the mere (a club made from jade). In 
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but the relatively rapid (by prehistoric timescales) ubiquity of especially the club, spear 
and bow across multiple cultures demonstrated that early man quickly became aware of 
the advantages these specialized tools presented in relation to both hunting and conflict 
with other groups or individuals. Awareness no doubt either led to fast emulation or 
likely decimation, making the decision one of ‘adopt or die.’  
 
Decisions on whether to adopt new weapons in primitive societies were therefore driven 
by a rational desire for survival first and foremost. However, even at these early stages, 
simple expediency was not the only factor. Keegan elegantly details the limitations 
placed on the choice and use of weapons by the Yanomamö, Maring and Aztec peoples 
based on custom and religion, which led to highly ritualized forms of combat.46 For 
example, Aztec weapons were designed in most cases to wound but not kill, because the 
primary objective of combat had become the securing of prisoners for later human 
sacrifice.47 
 
It is a matter of debate whether one can properly speak of strategy with respect to 
primitive warfare,48 but at the tactical level Hugh Turney-High notes two constraints 
that structured the choice and development of the earliest weapons. He first admonishes 
scholars for paying insufficient attention to the fact that it is not only the defender in an 
engagement that experiences fear; the attacker must exercise prudence in order to avoid 
defensive injuries and this may condition his choice of weapon. In other words the 
attacker could favour those weapons that can get the job done with minimum exposure 
to himself from any defensive measures his opponent might employ.49 The second 
tactical constraint is the nature of the physical environment and in this regard Turney-
High offers for comparison the terrain of east and west Africa. In the tall grasslands of 
the former, the bow was of little use and so spear and shield tended to predominate, 
while the tropical forests of the latter were not well suited for shock weapons and so the 
bow became the weapon of choice.50 Keegan surmises that the rise of the bow itself may 
have been spurred by the greater distances available for prey to travel as the last Ice Age 
retreated, which may have necessitated longer range weapons capable of securing more 
                                                          
other instances, for example among the early inhabitants of Western Europe, the process of diffusion was 
not always so clear. 
46 Keegan, pp. 95-114.  
47 Keegan, p. 114. 
48 Gray, pp. 94-95. 
49 Turney-High, pp. 6-7. 
50 Ibid, p. 19. 
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dispersed meals.51  
 
In addition to the constraints of custom and terrain, there was also, of course, the 
limitation in the days before systems of trade that early weapons could only diffuse to 
areas where the materials for their construction were relatively easily available. These 
features no doubt introduced a healthy dose of conservatism in approaching new 
weapons, but the exigencies of continued survival in a world ‘red in tooth and claw’, 
introduced powerful incentives to innovate when it was clearly necessary. For example, 
the relatively rapid mass adoption and production by the inhabitants of Easter Island of 
the mata’a, an obsidian spearhead more deadly than its predecessors, accompanied a 
period of increasing social instability.52 
 
In terms of their performance, even though many of the earliest weapons were 
eventually eclipsed by other weapons for large-scale military use, several of them 
proved so reliable and effective on the battlefield that they perpetuated into the Bronze 
and Iron Ages and even into modern times. For instance, the Bayeux tapestry (circa late 
eleventh century) depicts William the Conqueror brandishing a club,53 and of course 
bows were only supplanted by firearms in the sixteenth century and spears (in the form 
of pikes) even later. However, the earliest weapons were not capable of dispatching 
multiple opponents with a single action, a development that would have to wait for a 
later age. 
The Age of Metal 
The search for a material stronger than wood but more durable than brittle stone must 
have led our ancestors to look closely at copper, deposits of which were widespread and 
fairly easily obtainable.54 The problem with copper is that it is too soft for use as an 
effective weapon. The discovery in Mesopotamia around 3500-3000 BCE55 that 
combining it in an alloy with tin yielded a robust metal (bronze) suitable for a variety of 
edged and pointed weapons therefore represented one of the earliest major innovations 
in the means of combat. The so-called Bronze Age heralded the development of a broad 
                                                          
51 Keegan, p. 119. 
52 Keegan, pp. 26-27. 
53 Toffler and Toffler, p. 43 
54 Volkman, p. 16. 
55 McNeill gives the date as around 3500 BCE (McNeill, p. 9), but most commentators have the Bronze 
Age beginning in the Near East around 3300 BCE and in other areas later.  
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range of weaponry, including metal maces, scimitars, spears and arrowheads, but the 
application of metallurgy to warfare was not without its complications. Chief of these 
was the fact that, while copper was plentiful, tin was not and the life-blood of the new 
military industry had to be imported from outside Mesopotamia, making the users and 
manufacturers of these weapons dependent on trade and transport.56 Unavailability of 
materials may thus have been one reason why Egyptian warriors at the start of the 
Middle Kingdom (approx. 2000 BCE) were still using clubs and stone-tipped spears,57 
even though bronze weapons were widely utilized elsewhere. Another explanation for 
their failure to adopt this important innovation until much later is that they chose not to, 
perhaps for ritualistic or other yet-to-be-determined reasons.58 Bronze did not only 
enhance the penetrating and cutting actions of combat, but also proved to be a workable 
material for the defence, enabling the construction of bronze armour to protect against 
these amplified offensive capabilities. Moreover, the coming of bronze was not just a 
boon for weaponry, but introduced a variety of other tools, thus creating what may have 
been the first, but would certainly not be the last, instance in history where an 
innovation had simultaneous military and civilian applications, giving rise to a political 
and economic dynamic both between and around them. 
 
Yet perhaps the most significant contribution during this period to the military arts was 
an innovation that for the first time made mobility a major factor in warfare – the rise of 
the war chariot in approximately 1800 BCE.59 The development of light (less than 46 
kilograms), strong vehicles mounted on a fixed axle to which wheels that used a hub 
and spoke design were attached, was a leap in technological complexity.60 The war 
chariot originated amongst nomads of the steppes of Central Asia, most likely as a 
superior means of hunting,61 and was based on the lumbering ox-carts that had 
previously been used for transportation.62 When married with the horse and an equally 
potent innovation, the shorter yet powerful and accurate composite bow,63 the war 
                                                          
56 Keegan, p. 134; McNeill, p. 1. 
57 Kemp, p. 269. 
58 Keegan, p. 131. 
59 Van Creveld, pp. 12-13. 
60 Volkman, p. 14; McNeill, p. 10.  
61 John N. Wilford, ‘Remaking the Wheel: Evolution of the Chariot’, New York Times (22 February 
1994), p. C1; Keegan, p. 165. 
62 Volkman, p. 14. 
63 The power of the simple bow was enhanced by layers of bone and sinew to form the composite bow 
(Dunnigan, p. 8) which is thought to have originated with the steppe peoples and evolved in lockstep with 
the chariot (Keegan, pp. 162-163). The shorter composite bow, with its enhanced flexibility, was capable 
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chariot constituted a complete weapons system that swept all before it. The chariot 
vastly increased the speed and mobility of combatants and, initially at least, completely 
overwhelmed even bronze-armed and -armoured infantry. The steppe nomads, with 
their ample supplies of horses, descended with their chariots upon the lands of the Near 
East and in short order subjugated the existing civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, 
India and China.64  
 
The conquered peoples did not sit idly by – they had been taught a harsh lesson in the 
effectiveness of this new weapons platform and set about adopting the weapon of their 
conquerors as rapidly as possible. Although it took several centuries for the adopters to 
refine chariots to the breath-taking level of perfection depicted in films such as Ben 
Hur, the indigenous populations of the Near East wasted no time in casting off the yoke 
of the original charioteers.  
 
One outcome of the adoption of chariots was its effect on the military itself. Since 
chariot warfare required expensive materials, well-trained and well-fed horses, and 
highly-skilled workmanship, it could not be a plebeian instrument, but a weapon whose 
use was restricted to a specific class of warrior, one who came to occupy a central 
position in society.65 Some scholars contend that the chariot, owing to the arms races it 
initiated and the huge logistical burden it imposed, was thus responsible for the creation 
of the ‘warmaking state’, including the first true army capable of campaigning.66 So, in 
addition to providing one of the earliest clear examples of the rapid diffusion of a 
militarily successful technology, the Bronze Age chariot also demonstrates the effect 
that new weapons can have on the institutions that adopt them. 
 
The dominance of the chariots was cut short with the discovery of methods for smelting 
                                                          
of firing with equal if not greater power than a much longer simple bow, thus making it ideal for use in 
the confines of a moving chariot. 
64 McNeill points out that in Southern Europe chariots did not have quite the same impact, with warriors 
tending to dismount for combat and use chariots mainly as a means of transporting troops, but does not 
offer a reason for this seemingly anomalous behaviour (McNeill, p. 11). Perhaps McNeill is referring to 
the later period after the 11th century BCE, when chariots everywhere became less of a battlefield weapon 
and more a source of ceremony and sport. Another possibility is the unsuitability of the terrain in 
Southern Europe for effective use of the chariot as a weapon on the battlefield. In the British Isles, the 
Celts did use war chariots in the traditional manner as a weapons platform, but probably only from the 6th 
century BCE. 
65 See Van Creveld (p. 13) for a discussion of how change manifested itself in some polities in the rise of 
an aristocracy and in others cemented the control of the central state. Also, see McNeill, p.12.  
66 Keegan, p. 169; Wilford, C1; and Robert Drews, The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and 
the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 112.  
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iron, which although more difficult to make (by requiring hotter temperatures), carries 
the advantages of being much more abundant and (eventually) providing for a more 
durable weapon edge than bronze. The technology of iron-smelting first arose sometime 
between 2000 and 1400 BCE in what is now Anatolia,67 and was exploited by the 
Hittites (or, more correctly, the Hattusa people). Interestingly, unlike the case of the 
bronze chariot, this new technology did not diffuse immediately, but remained the sole 
province of its discoverers for at least two hundred years, until around 1200 BCE. Two 
reasons have been advanced for this delay in diffusion: first, that the Hittites were able 
to maintain a monopoly on the working of iron which was relinquished only when they 
were overcome and their ironsmiths subsequently dispersed, taking their skills to new 
areas and, second, that the technology itself only matured at this time, with the 
development of the technique of hammering the metal while hot and quenching in 
water, which was for the first time able to give iron an edge that was harder, longer-
lasting and thus superior to bronze.68 Either of these developments, or both in concert, 
might therefore have acted as a catalyst or ‘tipping point’, allowing the technology to be 
widely adopted for weapons use – a paradigm that may have relevance for the subject of 
terrorist adoption of emerging technologies.  
 
Iron bestowed both tactical and organizational advantages, both of these stemming from 
its greater availability and thus lower cost. For one thing, the use of iron armour and the 
extravagantly-sized weapons that the relatively cheap material permitted, for the first 
time allowed foot soldiers to stand up to chariots. For another, the fact that a far larger 
number of men at arms could be equipped with iron weapons diluted the political power 
of the elite chariot-riders, leading to a ‘radical democratization of war’69 in which iron-
armed masses overthrew the chariot-dominated kingdoms. It was the Assyrians who 
rode a wave of iron to conquer almost the entire Near East. Moreover, the Assyrians 
were far from languid adopters of this new technology (a label that might apply to the 
Egyptians of that age); according to Volkman, they established a significant military 
research and development program at their capital Nineveh where they paid technicians 
to develop new war-making implements, such as a conical helmet that could deflect 
                                                          
67 Volkman, p. 18; Van Creveld, p. 13; Recent archeological finds have dated iron remnants found in 
Turkey to 2100-1950 B.C. (Nobuyuki Watanabe, ‘Excavation in Turkey set to rewrite history of Iron 
Age’, Asahi Shimbun (27 March 2009)). 
68 Keegan, pp. 238-239.  





What is remarkable about iron is that, in the form of swords, spears and pikes, it 
persisted as the dominant basic weapons material for almost another two and a half 
millennia. Occasionally in the history of warfare, though, the benefits of iron were taken 
too far and the temptation to create ever larger weapons with it actually reduced military 
effectiveness. In these cases it could be a decision to employ smaller weapons that 
represented a beneficial innovation. For example, in 19th century Africa, one of the most 
astute and advantageous innovations of the hugely successful Zulu king Shaka was to 
reduce the length of the spear to create a shorter stabbing weapon – an instructive lesson 
that, when it comes to weapons, bigger is not always better. 
 
Near the end of the seventh century BCE, a new military force emerged – the cavalry – 
as Scythian nomads from the steppes once again invaded the lands of the Near East.71 
Through selective breeding, horses had been developed that were strong enough to bear 
an armed man on their backs, thus providing a mobility advantage over chariots, since 
horses could manoeuvre over more varied terrain. In 612 BCE, the Assyrian Empire 
crumbled before these horse people.  
 
Even during the age of Assyrian dominance, the existence of basic fortifications 
(usually in the form of high walls) around many cities prompted the development of 
siege engines, which protected besiegers as they assaulted the defenders on the walls.72 
However, from around 400 BCE, new mechanical engines began to appear, first in the 
form of overgrown crossbow-like contraptions and then torsion-based machines, such as 
the ballista, the onager and, later, the katapoltos (catapult). The primary innovation of 
these mechanisms was their ability to accumulate and store the energy of one or many 
men for a significant period, before releasing the combined energy to thrust a projectile 
                                                          
70 Volkman, pp. 20-21. 
71 Keegan, pp. 177-178. Keegan notes (p.177) that the Assyrians had bred a sufficiently strong horse by 
the eighth century BCE, but they were apparently not as proficient with these animals as the steppe 
nomads. 
72 Thucydides ably demonstrates the difficulties involved in attempting to overcome the dedicated 
defence of a city in a History of the Peloponnesian War (sections 2.75, 2.76 and 4.100), with both the 
besieged and the besieger trying to undermine (sometimes literally) each other’s constructions (see 
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Thomas Hobbes tr. (London: Bohn, 1843), accessed from 
the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, at www.perseus.tufts.edu.  
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with great power and speed,73 independent of the physical or moral condition of the 
operators.74 This represented the rise of a new and important technical role in the 
military beyond the mere craftsman – the engineer who used his understanding of 
mathematical and physical principles to design and operate these imposing weapons. 
These technical principles, which were proving so useful in war, were made possible by 
significant leaps both in man’s understanding of the natural world and in humanity’s 
attitude towards discovering these secrets, advances driven by the Greek philosophers 
we know so well, men such as Plato, Aristotle and Socrates.  Moreover, for the first 
time, it was the scientific, rather than the purely physical, prowess of a man that might 
make him valuable in combat.  
 
It was arguably the Greeks’ orientation towards technology that accounted for a large 
part of their military success. They encouraged the free flow of scientific ideas75 among 
engineers and travelled extensively with their designs, which facilitated their diffusion 
and improvement. Also, engineers generally believed that science could be applied in 
service to the state and, as had been the case with the Assyrians, they were encouraged 
(often by the promise of huge reward) by many of the rulers of the Greek city-states. 
For example, the catapult was invented during a substantial program of weapons 
development presided over by Dionysus, the ruler of Syracuse, ‘since the ablest skilled 
workmen had been gathered from everywhere into one place. The high wages, as well 
as the numerous prizes offered the workmen who were judged to be the best, stimulated 
their zeal’.76 This tradition continued under Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander 
the Great,77 the latter bringing these mechanical machines into the field for use as 
artillery. Most scholars accept that (contrary to Plutarch) even Archimedes applied his 
prodigious acumen to weapons development,78 organizing a spirited defence of 
Syracuse against the Romans using siege engines,79 and perhaps even inventing a 
steam-powered catapult. 
                                                          
73 Soedel and Foley describe that with the best torsion-based machines, it was possible to project a stone 
weighing as much as 78 kilograms (Werner Soedel and Vernard Foley, ‘Ancient Catapults’, Scientific 
American (1979), pp. 150–60). 
74 Van Creveld, p. 32. 
75 Volkman, p. 25. 
76 Diodorus Sicilius, Library of History Vol. VI, translated by C. H. Oldfather (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1954), p. 131 [Book XIV, Chapter 42]. 
77 Soedel and Foley, pp. 150-160. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Steele and Dorland, p. 2. Unfortunately, although Archimedes’ defensive siegecraft was effective 
against repeated Roman assaults, the city fell to the Romans in 212 BCE, when they entered through an 




While there were occasional advantages enjoyed by one party or another, the use of 
siege engines spread rapidly, at least around the Mediterranean and beyond. For 
example, as late as the seventh century CE, Muhammad enthusiastically embraced the 
use of siege engines (trebuchets) in his famously successful siege of the city of Ta`if.80 
However, after the spurt of diffusion of the original Greek technology, further 
innovation with respect to siege engines slowed down. For example, although an 
ingenious repeating catapult was invented, which could fire multiple bolts in rapid 
succession, military commanders did not put it to much use, ostensibly fearing that it 
would waste ammunition.81 Historians also seem to concur that the Romans, despite 
using the Greek ballistae and catapults extensively, did not try to improve on them,82 
and indeed did not feel it necessary to innovate much beyond Greek technology in 
general. Instead, they relied on reverse engineering captured technology when 
absolutely necessary.83 Indeed, the famous Roman civil servant, Sextus Julius 
Frontinus, declared in the first century CE that he would ‘[Lay] aside also all 
considerations of works and engines of war, the invention of which has long since 
reached its limit, and for the improvement of which I see no further hope in the applied 
arts’.84 
 
While siege engines can be argued to have shifted the advantage somewhat to the 
offence in the struggle between besieger and besieged,85 they never reached the level 
where they could breach well-constructed fortifications. They were, however, excellent 
for use as terror weapons, harrying defenders, hurling missiles in high arcs to hit targets 
in the interior of a fortified city, or even being used as a more exotic delivery system, to 
cast everything from incendiaries, to live snakes and dead horses, into a besieged 
                                                          
80 George F. Nafziger and Mark Walton. Islam at War: A History (Praeger Publishers, 2003), p. 13  
81 Soedel and Foley, pp. 150-160. 
82 Volkman, p. 34; Mokyr (1990), p. 21. 
83 Volkman (p. 35) describes how when the Romans encountered superior Carthaginian warships in 260 
BCE they did not try and improve their own ships, but instead captured a Carthaginian warship, 
discovered how it was built and made hundreds of copies in order to defeat the Carthaginian navy. Rice 
describes at length a case study of how the design and development of immense warships spread from 
Macedonia, to Epirus, to Carthage, to Rome in a period of thirty years, as an early instance of repeated 
diffusion and technology transfer (Rob S. Rice, ‘The Peregrinations of the Queen: Technology Transfer in 
the Hellenistic World’ 1996 APA Convention Session on Naval History, New York Hilton, Regent 
Parlor). 
84 Frontinus, Strategems, translated by Charles E. Bennett (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 
1925), p. 205.  
85 Soedel and Foley, pp. 150-160. 
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town.86 These tactical attributes undoubtedly served to encourage (if not, on occasion, to 
precipitate) a speedier capitulation by the besieged forces. 
 
This brings us to a brief reference to more exotic weaponry invented by the Greeks, 
their successors and other military powers of the time. These included working 
flamethrowers, increasingly complex oared fighting ships (from triremes to quadriremes 
and possibly quinqueremes),87 and innovative ship-borne ramming and striking 
equipment.88  
 
The early years of civilization thus contained several important innovations, most (but 
not all) of which were adopted widely as soon as they were shown to provide military 
advantage. At the same time, one should not become mesmerized by the ingeniousness 
of these weapons and forget the continuing relevance throughout this period of training 
and morale (as epitomized by the epic story of the Battle of Thermopylae), as well as 
the often decisive role played by great leadership, embodied in commanders such as 
Alexander and Julius Caesar. 
 
Medieval Warfare  
 
The first major innovation of the medieval period was the widespread adoption of the 
stirrup, high saddle and the horseshoe,89 which presaged a new form of warfare – that of 
the armoured knight on horseback. Around 500 CE, the stirrup appeared; although its 
origins (Indian or Chinese) are cloudy, we do know that it diffused rapidly from the 
steppe peoples to Europe.90 Some scholars regard this as a watershed innovation in that 
it enabled the warrior to firmly implant himself on his mount, thus enabling the use of 
heavy sword and lance, in addition to the bow, while seated on horseback.91 Others 
                                                          
86 Van Creveld, p. 33. 
87 Van Creveld asserts (p. 69) that these increases in the size and complexity of fighting ships reached a 
point where these ships became militarily useless, suggesting that competition to be bigger sometimes led 
to non-rational (in a tactical sense) weapons development. 
88 Volkman (p. 20) points to a brace design for a ram as a key scientific advance in this regard, and Yang 
Hung describes the use of a ‘striker’ on Chinese ships from around 567 CE (John W. Killigrew 
‘Reviewed work: Chung-kuo Ku-ping-ch'i t'ao-lun [A Discussion of Ancient Chinese Military 
Equipment] by Yang Hung’ Military Affairs, 46:1 (February 1982), p. 47). 
89 The origin of the horseshoe has not been conclusively determined – Van Creveld, p. 18. 
90 Initially, stirrups consisted of cloth loops, but eventually these were replaced by iron and were attached 
by the eighth century (Keegan, p. 285) to a solid seat. 
91 Lynn White, for example, perceived a direct connection between the introduction of the stirrup and the 
rise of feudalism (Lynn White, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), p.28). According to this line of thought, the new, expensive armour and armaments which 
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downplay its significance by claiming almost equal proficiency for highly skilled but 
stirrupless horsemen,92 such as the cataphracts of Eastern Europe and Asia. The debate 
has yet to be decided conclusively one way or another, but demonstrates that the 
military advantages of an innovation may not always be quite as clear or easy to 
evaluate as one might expect. Nonetheless, by the ninth century, the dominant force on 
the European battlefield became the heavily armed and armoured knight. It was not, 
however, a complete dominance by any means – as Van Creveld points out, the expense 
and availability of suitable horses meant that only a tiny proportion of fighting forces 
could be so equipped, and even the vaunted knight was not much help for many military 
functions, including holding captured ground and laying siege,93 thus requiring a 
continued role for infantry and siegecraft. Nor did the knight necessarily prevail against 
non-European contemporaries, such as the Muslims (vide the Crusades) or the mounted 
steppe warriors of the time. 
 
Once he had adopted his basic set of equipment, however, the armoured knight on 
horseback is often caricatured as among the most elitist and conservative of creatures, at 
least with respect to weapons innovation. John France writes of this age that ‘[t]here 
was no forum in which to develop weapons…for war already had its elite, who felt no 
need to give way to any new forces…there was no marriage of thought and technology, 
so that advance remained piecemeal and by individual experiment. In these 
circumstances, new ideas would have been diffused only slowly and unevenly’.94 In 
fact, many of the most important innovations of the medieval period would arise from 
those wishing to challenge the supremacy of the knight, rather than from the ranks of 
the noble heavy cavalry itself.95 
 
Sometime during the twelfth century CE in Wales, the locals began using large simple 
bows made of Mediterranean yew, cut and cured so that they carried the power to 
launch arrows that rivalled if not exceeded that of the best composite bows.96 The 
                                                          
the stirrup and saddle enabled could only be sustained by an elite class of warrior (the knights), and it was 
to support this class of warrior that the entire feudal economy developed. 
92 Dunnigan, p. 5.  
93 Van Creveld, p. 19. 
94 John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), pp. 49-50. 
95 One exception to this was the replacement of chainmail by plate armour, the latter becoming 
predominant among the heavy cavalry of Europe by the 14th century. 
96 Dunnigan aptly describes the longbow as an ‘ “organic” composite bow’ (p. 8) since, although it used a 
single piece of yew, this piece was selected to ensure that the sapwood (which was flexible to resist 
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longbow, as it came to be called, might never have transcended the ranks of highly 
effective local hunting weapon were its tremendous military potential not recognized by 
a person with the authority to transform it into a revolutionary weapon of war.97 It was 
Edward I of England who, during a campaign to quash a Welsh rebellion in the late 
thirteenth century, first encountered the longbow and saw the opportunity to organize 
groups of archers using this weapon to deliver a devastating concentration of fire. When 
used with a (for the time) technologically advanced, longer arrow (over three foot) 
capped with a conical, squared ‘bodkin’ arrowhead, the longbow was capable of 
piercing much of the armour of the day over substantial ranges.98 The longbow made its 
splash on history at Crécy in 1346 and even dominated the field at Agincourt in 1415, 
when ranks of English commoners wielding longbows were instrumental in securing 
victory for the English against much larger French forces. These and other battles 
during the Hundred Years’ War arguably represented the beginning of the end to the 
battlefield (and some would argue also social and political) supremacy of the mounted 
knight by introducing a form of concentrated firepower.99 The longbow was another 
example, of course, of a weapon only achieving full effectiveness when combined with 
optimal tactical deployment. Although the armies of Europe soon clamoured to 
introduce these newly decisive weapons, the primary drawback of the longbow soon 
became apparent – unlike most other weapons, its effective use depended on the skill of 
the archer and over a decade of intensive training was required to produce the required 
level of expertise. Archery contingents thus became much sought-after and expensive 
military commodities, with desired numbers of archers not always being available to 
field in battle.  
 
A partial answer to this limitation lay in the crossbow, a weapon with a long 
provenance. The crossbow had been in use in Ancient China100 since approximately the 
fifth century BCE – Sun Tzu refers to its usefulness in combat in the Art of War – and 
there is evidence of the development of similar devices in Ancient Greece shortly 
                                                          
tension) lay next to the heartwood (which resisted compression), with the entire bow subjected to the 
applications of oils or fats to keep it supple and weather resistant (Volkman, p. 42). 
97 Volkman, p. 44. 
98 The longbow was more effective against chain-mail and wrought iron armour than against the most 
expensive steel plate armour (Strickland and Hardy, pp. 272-278). 
99 Inventive tactical use of a long-standing weapon, the pike, was also shown to be effective against heavy 
cavalry in battles such as Laupen (1339), thus reclaiming the military utility of the infantryman. 
100 For greater detail of archaeological evidence, see Mao Ying, ‘Introduction of Crossbow Mechanism’, 
Southeast Culture, No. 3 (1998), pp. 109–117.  
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thereafter.101 The crossbow was bulkier than other bows and had a lower rate of fire, but 
the majority of the effort involved was couched in the expertise and materials needed 
for its construction – once in the hands of a soldier, the crossbow could remain cocked 
and loaded for extended periods before firing and thus required a minimum of training 
(ranging from hours to at most several months depending on the type of tactical 
deployment).  
 
The crossbow was far from the perfect weapon – it was expensive to produce and 
maintain, requiring legions of skilled technicians, its low rate of fire made it better 
suited for defending fixed fortifications (where the crossbowman could duck behind 
cover while reloading), and it was inferior in performance in several ways to the best 
longbows and composite bows. It did, however, represent an early form of weapons 
automation102 or ‘mass’ production and helped offset some of the military disadvantage 
if one was short of well-trained archers. Although being produced in the hundreds of 
thousands for use in Chinese arsenals for centuries (including such innovations as a 
repeating version), crossbows never became popular in Europe except for pockets in the 
Italian principalities.103 After all, it was not as if the warrior class at the time, the 
mounted knights who dominated military matters, was overly enthusiastic about having 
to deal with a lot of crossbow bolts on the battlefield being fired at them by commoners, 
no matter how useful these weapons could be. The distaste for the crossbow among the 
ruling class of men-at-arms may have had something to do with a general feeling in 
some quarters that the crossbow was somehow immoral, leading to contested reports 
that Pope Innocent II in 1139 tried to impose an early form of arms control by limiting 
the use of crossbow to non-Christian targets.104 In the end, it was not until the eleventh 
to thirteenth centuries CE that Europe developed the production capacity or tactical 
vision to employ crossbows to impact battlefield outcomes.105 
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Roman Artillery 399 BC – AD 363 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), pp. 3-8). 
102 Dunnigan, p. 279. 
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Some scholars argue that the crossbow never seriously challenged the position of the 
mounted cavalry, since the knight’s armour simply became more robust to deal with 
increases in the efficiency of the crossbow.106 At least, that is, not until crossbows began 
to be made out of steel and use a windlass to draw the string in the latter fourteenth 
century. By this time, however, the emergence of a new, explosive projectile weapon 
began to claim the attention of innovators and the further development of crossbows 
largely ceased, although they were still used for a few more centuries. Nevertheless, the 
combination of the crossbow, longbow and pike are claimed by many to have heralded 
the end of the reign of the mounted and armoured knight in Europe.107 
 
One case of innovation during the early Middle Ages bears mention, not only for its 
effectiveness but because its use did not spread beyond its original inventors. While the 
aforementioned Greek and Roman incendiaries had on occasion proven militarily 
helpful, the use of such weapons was perfected during this period by the Byzantines in 
the form of ‘Greek fire’, a liquid-based incendiary similar to napalm that was propelled 
by pumping through a nozzle and that proved especially destructive against the wooden 
naval vessels of the time, as its flames could not be put out with water. ‘Greek fire’, 
while not revolutionizing warfare by any means, did prove crucial in defending 
Constantinople against the onslaught of Arab Islamic forces in 674-678 CE108 and again 
against the Ottoman Turks in 716 CE.109 Significantly, Byzantium was long able to 
prevent the diffusion of the secret of ‘Greek fire’ (especially to the Turks) which 
provided it with a military advantage for hundreds of years,110 a feat almost unequalled 
in the history of weaponry. 
 
The medieval period also included several examples of societies that succeeded, at least 
for a time, without the latest military innovations. In the Muslim case, the astounding 
initial military successes of Muhammad and his followers were driven more by the fire 
of their young religion than any type of technology, although during the first centuries 
of Islamic empire, Muslim scientists adapted and developed the wisdom of the ancient 
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Mediterranean and East, including weapons such as siege engines. However, even 
during these years they produced precious few original weapons and after the Islamic 
theologian al-Ghazali (1058-1111) concluded that science and technology were 
incompatible with preservation of the faith, further scientific progress was attenuated.111 
 
In the thirteenth century, the Mongol hordes swept through much of Eurasia, 
eliminating all opposition, primarily through the genius of Genghis Khan’s organization 
and tactics rather than any new weapons besides their reliable ponies and composite 
bows. Yet the Mongols, while not innovators themselves, were canny enough to employ 
the weapons of their conquered foes, mostly incorporating foreign units drawn from 
vanquished armies into their own formidable forces.112 Thus, in one sense the Mongols 
functioned as a dissemination mechanism for innovative weaponry from East to West 
and vice versa, rather than as a wholesale adopter of these weapons. 
 
Van Creveld has argued that the medieval period (and even the millennium before it) 
did not result in any great innovations in weapons, but rather the incremental adaptation 
and improvement of existing weapons, such as the bow, the sword and the shield.113 
Whether one chooses to agree with so strong an assertion, it does indeed appear as if the 
number and type of new weapons, and the impact they had on warfare, was less than 
that experienced either in the preceding or succeeding periods. Diffusion of many of the 
innovations that did occur was usually slow, with adoption often resisted by the ruling 
elites, the crossbow in Europe being a prime example.114  
 
The Age of Gunpowder to the Time of Napoleon 
 
The development and diffusion of gunpowder-based weapons is a topic that has itself 
grown into a distinct sub-field of military history; as such, this short summary cannot 
                                                          
111 In the wake of al-Ghazali’s writings, the caliph ordered the burning of manuscripts and all science 
became tightly controlled by the ruling class thereafter – hardly a recipe for innovation in weaponry 
(Volkman, p. 60). 
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advent of market conditions in China around 1000 CE led to greater efficiencies and the 
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gunpowder (McNeill, pp. 25-39). 
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hope to capture all of the literally thunderous changes that gunpowder wrought upon 
entire societies over a period of several centuries. So, instead of focusing on the often 
profound effects that the so-called Gunpowder Revolution had on a multitude of battles, 
institutions and socio-political systems (a subject covered quite extensively 
elsewhere115), this overview will limit itself to a brief discussion of the discernible 
technical innovations in the evolution of gunpowder weapons on land and sea, followed 
by a comparative look at the diffusion and adoption experience in five different 
geographic and cultural regions. 
 
Gunpowder, a mixture of sulphur, charcoal and saltpetre, is believed to have originated 
in China sometime in the latter part of the tenth century CE, with the first evidence of 
artifices which channelled the explosive power of gunpowder to launch a projectile also 
appearing in China, possibly as early as the twelfth century.116 These primitive weapons 
consisted of little more than vase-shaped vessels that ejected arrow-like projectiles117 
and similar devices were soon seen in Europe. The earliest guns are thought to have 
done more damage to eardrums than anything else, but sufficiently fascinated European 
rulers and craftsmen to induce a sustained effort at experimentation and development.118 
Yet, considering the difficulties – and hence expense – of procuring saltpetre during 
much of the fourteenth century, it is not surprising that more traditional, mechanical 
projectile launchers such as the trebuchet and crossbow continued to predominate in 
warfare well into the fifteenth century. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, 
however, the early projectiles had been replaced by stone spheres and the vase had 
elongated to form a tube, which increased the velocity attained by the projectiles. These 
‘bombards’, as they came to be called, were commonly made of wrought iron bars 
welded together with hoops and often proved to be unstable, unsafe and inefficient, but 
nevertheless showed potential for use against fortress walls. Their great weight and 
consequent immobility, however, were a serious drawback.119 
                                                          
115 See, for example, Hall, Steel and Dorland, Parker, Lynn, Boot, McNeill and John Guilmartin, 
Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth 
Century, Revised ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004). 
116 A sculpture from a cave in Sichuan seems to show a vase-shaped vessel firing flames and a ball 
(Chase, p. 31–32; Lu, Needham, and Phan, pp. 594-605).  Drawings of the earliest guns date from 1326 in 
both Europe (McNeill, p. 80) and China (David Harding, Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from 
5000 B.C. to 2000 A.D. (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Company, 1990), p. 111). 
117 Keegan, p. 319. 
118 See McNeill, p. 83 for a similar idea. 
119 The guns that were used to attack Constantinople in 1453 were so heavy that they had to be cast on the 




By the mid-fifteenth century, using a technique borrowed from bell-makers, European 
weaponeers discovered how to create a much stronger, smaller weapon by casting it 
from a single piece of bronze. Around the same time, a new method of producing 
granulated gunpowder (ostensibly invented by Czech alchemists120) called ‘corning’ 
allowed more force to be generated from a given charge. By the latter decades of the 
fifteenth century, French designers had combined these developments to create the first 
true cannon, incorporating trunnions to enable the weapon to be affixed to a two-
wheeled vehicle, thus creating some field mobility,121 and replacing the stone shot 
(which was shatter-prone) with smaller, denser iron balls. It was with these weapons, 
which closely resembled artillery used up through the mid-nineteenth century, that 
Charles VIII of France demolished the fortresses of the Italian kingdoms in 1494.  
 
A little more than fifty years later, in the mid-sixteenth century, craftsmen worked out 
methods for casting cannon from iron, which was far cheaper and more widely available 
than the tin required for bronze cannon. There were precious few innovative 
improvements made to artillery in the seventeenth century, but the eighteenth century 
witnessed a host of developments, including a better understanding of the science of 
ballistics (worked out by the Italian Niccolò Fontana Tartaglia  and English engineer 
Benjamin Robbins), barrels bored from solid metal that more exactly fit their shells than 
previous hollow-cast versions, and the small but far from trivial innovations of the great 
French engineer (and inspector general of artillery) Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de 
Griebeauval,122 who imbued artillery fire with more accuracy by adding calibrated 
sights and screw mechanisms to establish elevation with exactitude. Yet these 
developments did not much improve the basic ballistic performance of artillery – by 
Napoleon’s time smoothbore artillery pieces could still usually only fire two to three 
rounds a minute and were not very effective beyond eight hundred yards.123  
 
Although, as Keegan contends, the earliest gunpowder weapons were likely too 
                                                          
120 Volkman, p. 71; Van Creveld, p. 87. 
121 Boot, p. 4. 
122 Griebeauval also implemented organizational improvements by standardizing canon and shells 
(Keegan, p. 311). 
123 Boot, p. 85. It is also one of Hall’s main conclusions that despite a series of innovations, there was not 
much improvement in the performance of firearms between the mid-sixteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries (Hall, p. 156). 
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dangerous and frightening for soldiers to dare to wield in the hand,124 by the mid-
fifteenth century European soldiers had begun to flirt with hand-held firearms, and by 
the sixteenth century, a weapon called the arquebus, with a stock modelled on the 
crossbow, had come into general use. Admittedly initially inferior in range and rate of 
fire to both the crossbow and longbow, the arquebus required far less training to use 
than a longbow and was more powerful than either mechanical weapon. The arquebus 
was in turn superseded by the more accurate and powerful (yet longer and thus more 
unwieldy) musket by the end of the sixteenth century. All of these early ‘matchlock’ 
guns were fired by means of a lit match, a process which was cumbersome and prone to 
misfires, so the introduction of both wheel-lock pistols125 and flint-lock muskets, both 
of which used mechanical friction to generate sparks as a means of firing, were 
undoubtedly enthusiastically welcomed by infantrymen as their use began to spread in 
the sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries, respectively.126 While guns had slowly 
been replacing the pike as an infantry weapon, the widespread adoption of the socket 
bayonet by 1700 finally displaced the older weapon on the battlefield. Yet, as with 
heavy artillery, despite these improvements and the massed volley-fire enabled by the 
development of infantry drill, hand-held firearms were still inaccurate, somewhat 
unreliable and of limited range – hence necessitating the unenviable tactic of lines of 
soldiers absorbing enemy fire and waiting till they ‘could see the whites of their 
[enemies’] eyes’ before being ordered to discharge their own weapons. 
 
While defensive military measures are not the focus here, it is worth highlighting an 
archetypical example of the offense-defence dynamic. Most historians agree that, in 
contrast to many popular perceptions, the advent of gunpowder did not make walled 
fortifications obsolete – it merely changed their shape. For, less than fifty years after 
Charles VIII stormed through Italy, enterprising engineers had developed a new form of 
barrier – the trace italienne – that used earth and geometry to blunt the force of 
cannonballs, and which could withstand almost any artillery arrayed against it. The 
result was that in spite of the introduction of these ‘revolutionary’ weapons, the average 
length of a siege in France between 1500 and 1600 lasted a similar length of time to that 
                                                          
124 Keegan, p. 328. 
125 Wheel-locks were mainly found on pistols as early as the sixteenth century – quickly becoming a 
favourite of horsemen as they could be used in one hand (Hall, p. 193). Yet the mechanism was both 
extremely expensive and fragile, which largely limited its use to noble cavalry and hunting pieces, even 
though it was adopted almost a century before the flintlock. 
126 To put these advances in perspective, the flintlock musket required only twenty-six tiresome steps to 
load, as opposed to the forty-two steps required for the matchlock version (Boot, p. 85). 
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of sieges in the medieval period (65 days).127 This stalemate was in turn overcome by 
new siege techniques, perfected by Vauban in the seventeenth century.  
 
In the maritime domain, the introduction of gunpowder occurred at roughly the same 
time as an epochal change in the nature of seafaring vessels. The age-old tactic for war 
at sea had been either to ram, burn or board the enemy (or a combination of these) but 
gunpowder allowed for more stand-off attacks. The galley, the oar-powered mainstay of 
Mediterranean naval warfare for over two thousand years, was first modified from the 
early-1500s to carry increasing, though inherently limited, numbers of cannon and then 
later modified to rely more on wind power by improving its sail plan128, in the form of 
the galleass, before being replaced almost entirely by exclusively wind-driven ships by 
the seventeenth century. No longer requiring crews numbering in the hundreds, the new 
ships had more room to accommodate the cannon that were appearing at the time. Ships 
were perfectly suited as platforms for heavy cannons, since there was no further need to 
manoeuvre the large artillery pieces long distances once they were installed on board. 
The marriage of artillery and vessel got off to a rocky start, however, because initial 
efforts housed the cannons in pre-existing structures called castles built on the prow and 
stern, which strictly limited the number and weight of artillery that the ship could stably 
and safely carry. A pair of complementary innovations solved this problem. The 
development of hinged gun-ports that could keep the ship watertight when they were 
not in use allowed cannons to be placed below decks along the sides of the vessel, and 
the installation of truck carriages vastly increased the speed and efficiency with which 
the crew could reload the muzzles by wheeling the cannon back inside the ship after 
firing. These innovations allowed large ships to be built with as many as fifty large guns 
by 1650 and one hundred by 1800,129 and made the broadside (simultaneously 
discharging all the guns along one side) the default tactic in naval engagements.130 
 
The diffusion of gunpowder weapons on land and at sea was not uniform, however, and 
                                                          
127 Hall, p. 211. 
128 Although many of even the earliest galleys had used sails, they had always done so opportunistically 
(for instance, in suitable weather conditions), and had primarily relied on oar-driven propulsion.  
129 Keegan, p. 340. 
130 The above developments did not all proceed apace, with one generation of cannons replacing the 
previous one in toto. Old and new weapons systems could coexist for some time. Hildred analyses 
archaeological evidence to show that in the case of one of the earliest large warships, the Mary Rose, the 
latest cannons of the time shared space with models of almost a century earlier (Alexzandra Hildred, ‘The 
Mary Rose: A Tale of Two Centuries’ in Steele and Dorland, p. 137). 
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examining the disparities in adoption between various peoples and polities serves as an 




In the thirteenth century, the Mongol Empire formed a link between Asia, the Middle 
East and Europe and it appears as if the Europeans first learnt of gunpowder weapons 
from the Chinese at this time, probably via a papal ambassador to the Mongol capital131 
and others who brought samples of an array of Chinese ‘fire weapons’ back to Europe. 
These included flamethrowers, firecrackers and perhaps even early projectile weapons. 
Nonetheless, the Europeans had to develop the technology further on their own, a task 
to which they applied themselves with the greatest industry. Roger Bacon described an 
early formula for gunpowder,132 and may have attempted to keep it secret, but the first 
records in Europe of formulae for gunpowder suitable for weapons use is found in a 
section of the Liber ignium ad comburendos hostes, attributed to ‘Marcus Graecus’, that 
dates to 1275-1300.133 This led to a period of intense European experimentation 
(notably by Germans in Cologne134) to develop their own version of a gunpowder-
activated projectile weapon. The novelty (not to mention the  bluster) of these weapons 
seems to have aided in making most of Western Europe’s rulers and military 
commanders aware of the early cannon, since accounts of their use come from, among 
others, Andalusian, French, English, Italian, Byzantine and Russian sources during the 
fourteenth century. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, writers such as Niccolo 
Machiavelli were writing – however hyperbolically – that ‘the impetus of the artillery is 
such that a wall has not yet been found which is so strong that in a few days it will be 
battered down by it’135 and news of any improvements in these wonder weapons spread 
rapidly via espionage, word of mouth, and newly-abundant printed materials.136 
 
While knowledge of gunpowder weapons (of both the artillery and firearm varieties) 
                                                          
131 Volkman, p. 68. 
132 Bacon’s Epistola de Secretis Operibus Artis et Naturae et de Nullitate Magiae (written sometime 
between 1248 and 1257) contains a recipe for gunpowder, part of which may have been written in code 
and thus intended to keep the formula secret. In any event, Hall (p. 42) maintains that the proportion of 
nitrate in Bacon’s recipe is too low for the purposes of a projectile weapon. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Volkman, p.68. 
135 Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (1531), Book II, chapter 17. Accessed from 
http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy_.htm on 19 April 2009. 
136 McNeill, p. 123. 
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was ubiquitous, rulers of European cities and kingdoms still had to decide whether and 
to what extent to invest in the new weapons. Although conservative in many respects, 
Europe’s leaders were eager to embrace any instrument that would give them an 
advantage in their almost incessant conflicts with their neighbours. Several rulers early 
on saw the potential for gunpowder weapons both on land and at sea and 
enthusiastically supported their development. In England, Edward III (1328-1377), was 
an early adopter and utilized primitive guns extensively in the early phases of the 
Hundred Years’ War.137 Over a century later, the French, spurred on by a conflict with 
Burgundy that broke out in 1465, began a concerted effort to improve on existing 
cannons and Charles VIII, like the Assyrians and Dionysus of Syracuse before him, 
assembled a research and development team from all over Europe.138 Constant 
infighting and then Charles VIII’s subsequent invasion of their principalities in turn 
prompted the rulers of Italy to both adopt gunpowder weapons in earnest and to put 
their greatest minds (men such as Leonardo da Vinci and Michaelangelo) to work in the 
hopes of finding a defence against cannonballs.139 Later, rulers even institutionalized 
and sometimes monopolized the development of guns, as seen in the efforts of Peter the 
Great in Russia, England’s Tower of London armoury and the advent of the Ordnance 
Board for naval artillery under Henry VIII. This was followed by the standardization of 
both drill and firearms by Maurice in the Netherlands140 and Louvois in France.141 It 
was thus primarily the rulers of Europe, driven mainly by strong interstate competition 
of both the military and economic kind, who made a conscious decision to adopt 
gunpowder weapons and further their development through government intervention. 
 
Yet three major obstacles stood in the way of a completely smooth diffusion of 
gunpowder weapons throughout Europe – cost, performance, and non-strategic 
resistance by status quo interests. Until the 1380s, the high cost of gunpowder severely 
                                                          
137 Devries, ‘Facing the New Technology: Gunpowder Defenses in Military Architecture before the Trace 
Italienne 1350-1500’, in Steele and Dorland, p. 38.  
138 Volkman, p. 70; McNeill, pp. 87-88. 
139 Parker (pp. 9-10) cites M.E. Mallett, ‘Diplomacy and war in later fifteenth-century Italy,’ Proceedings 
of the British Academy, LXVII (1981), 267-88, at p. 270 who quotes the Venetian Senate in 1498 as 
bemoaning that ‘the wars of the present time are influenced more by the force of bombards and artillery 
than by men at arms’. 
140 McNeill, p.140. 
141 In eighteenth century France, Gribeauval even tried to systematize the improvement of artillery in what 
McNeill refers to as ‘command technology’, although McNeill admits that this kind of regularized 
weapons development was exceptional in European military establishments of the time (McNeill, p. 173-
174). Further, McNeill asserts that once the use of handheld firearms was routinized and standardized in 
an army, it became more difficult to introduce changes, since any innovations had to be accepted on a 
large scale (instead of just a trial segment of weapons), which was extremely costly (p. 141). 
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limited the use of the new weapons, but this was remedied when cheaper sources of 
saltpetre were discovered. Later, the cost of bronze made cannons expensive to make, at 
least until the appearance of iron-cast artillery alleviated these costs. Yet relative 
expense was not the primary impediment to diffusion. 
 
Initially, at least, in spite of their power and the shorter training required, the 
performance of early handguns was far surpassed by the longbow and crossbow in 
terms of range, rate of fire, accuracy and reliability, and that of early artillery was 
inferior to the performance of existing mechanical devices. This remained so for at least 
a century after the introduction of the first firearms and cannon around 1330. A few key 
technological developments, however, including the corning of gunpowder, the casting 
of bronze cannon and the flintlock, together with a gradual revision of organization142 
and battlefield tactics to incorporate the new weapons, vastly improved gunpowder 
weapon performance, eventually superseding that of the bow and the trebuchet. The 
obvious question then is: why did artisans and commanders persevere with what was 
clearly at the time an inferior military technology? Far-sightedness by rulers regarding 
the ultimate potential of gunpowder and psycho-sexual attachment to firearms143 may be 
part of the answer, but neither seems sufficient to explain more than a century of dogged 
experimentation. I am more convinced by Hall’s argument that the new weapons 
performed just well enough to convince decision-makers that continued investment was 
worthwhile – that the ‘killer app’, in the modern vernacular, was just around the corner. 
As he maintains in the case of bombards, ‘the siege gun did not always achieve a 
speedy resolution, but it seems to have done so often enough to be credible. And 
credibility, that most subtle of psychological factors, should not be underestimated.’144 
 
Less tangible sources of resistance, however, remained. The first guns, with their 
booming noise and sulphurous smoke were perceived by many as rather devilish and 
cowardly devices, but as familiarity with the weapons grew, this view subsided. In 
certain instances, however, there was also the social conservatism of the functional 
                                                          
142 For example, Hall illustrates how, during the fifteenth century, ‘[b]etter management, organization, 
and logistics seem to have played more of a role [in artillery’s improved performance] in most cases than 
did better ballistics’ (Hall, p. 106). 
143 McNeill suggests that the sexual symbolism of guns may have played a role in the seemingly 
‘irrational investment’ by European craftsmen and rulers in early firearms, but then admits that this 
cannot be the entire explanation since such symbolism must have been present in other cultures that were 
not quite as enthusiastic adopters of firearms (McNeill, p. 83).  
144 Hall, p. 65. 
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descendants of the medieval warriors, the aristocrat-dominated cavalry, to contend with. 
They initially took an even harsher view of handguns than their forebears had of 
longbows and crossbows. For example, Baumgartner describes the stubborn French 
resistance to the incorporation of arquebuses onto the battlefield in the late fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries, even when it put them at a military disadvantage relative to the 
Spanish and Italians.145 This rejection of the new was born of a desire to keep the 
individual warrior spirit and hand-to-hand skills alive on the battlefield, while ignoring 
the fact that infantrymen acting as a cohesive unit and using both pike and firearm could 
now demolish any armour worn by mounted men-at-arms. Similar seemingly irrational 
motives are also sometimes ascribed to later innovations in gunpowder weapons, for 
example, Prussian gunners were described as possessing ‘a certain gigantism’ in which 
heavier artillery was preferred even if it was not as effective or efficient as smaller 
cannon.146  
 
In any event, it was raw experience that put paid to this resistance – the constant 
improvements in performance made the superiority and military necessity of gunpowder 
weapons undeniable. Nevertheless, although gunpowder weapons gradually displaced 
mechanical projectile weapons completely in Europe, this process was sometimes fitful 
and was only completed in the first quarter of the seventeenth century – almost 400 
years after the first introduction of gunpowder weapons into Europe. 
 
How militaries adapted to the new artillery and handheld weapons is almost as 
important as whether, why and when they did so. Like many new weapons, those based 
on gunpowder emerged in an existing military context and it was within this context that 
their tactical and strategic deployment was first conceived. Initially then, cannon were 
used in much the same way as mechanical siege engines and arquebuses in a similar 
fashion to crossbows and longbows. Handguns like the arquebus, for example, were at 
first mainly popular for use by the defenders of fortresses.147 Any ‘revolutionizing’ of 
warfare only occurred over time, as the new opportunities afforded by these weapons 
(such as the use of artillery in the field or infantry volley-fire) began to be exploited by 
                                                          
145 Frederick J. Baumgartner, ‘The French Reluctance to Adopt Firearms Technology in the Early Modern 
Period’, in Steele and Dorland, pp. 82-83. There are several examples where the French were 
disadvantaged by Spanish and Italian arquebusiers, including the Battles of Cerignola (1503), Sesia 
(1523) and Pavia (1525). 
146 Showalter, p. 189. 
147 I am indebted to Hall (p. 16) for setting me along this line of thinking. 
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military commanders. In other cases, the novelty of the weapons meant that new tactics 
had to be developed rapidly, sometimes in the heat of battle, as was the case in 1588 
when English captains were forced to improvise (at least to some degree) so-called 
‘sail-and-shot’ tactics against the Spanish Armada.148 
 
Although gunpowder weapons did not always perform as intended on the European 
battlefield,149 even in their early incarnations they were at times decisive, as in Charles 
VIII’s aforementioned conquest of Italy, not to mention Gustavus Adolphus’ later canny 
integration of artillery and musket-fire at Breitenfeld in 1631. However, it was in 
combat with non-European powers that the European advances in gunpowder weapons 
became readily apparent, starting with the Spanish defeat of the Moors’ fortresses in 
Grenada (1482-92) and becoming even more glaring when European warships, with 
their superior cannon, sailed the oceans to conquer much of the known world between 
the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
The Middle East and North Africa 
 
The Muslim lands of the Near East may have experimented with gunpowder weapons 
borrowed from the Chinese even earlier than Europe, as indicated by the appearance in 
1118 in some Muslim armies of a contraption called the madfaa, which consisted of a 
wooden pot containing gunpowder and plugged by a stone ball. Needless to say, the 
madfaa was both extremely dangerous – wood and explosions do not make good 
bedfellows – and almost wholly ineffective, mostly because there was no way to predict 
where the ball would land.150 This early experiment apparently went nowhere and 
Muslim armies had to resort to emulating the weapons of Western Europe. So it was 
that in 1453, enormous bombards proved to be pivotal in the Islamic conquest of 
Constantinople, but these were almost entirely built and operated by Hungarian 
mercenaries from Europe. 
 
It was not that Muslim rulers failed to see the tremendous military benefits of both siege 
                                                          
148 Boot, p. 28. Although Boot asserts that the British first conceived of the line-ahead broadside during 
battle against the Spanish Armada, Guilmartin describes an earlier altercation in 1557, when the British 
were themselves exposed to broadside fire from the Portuguese force during unsuccessful attempts to use 
the traditional tactic of closing and boarding the Portuguese vessels (Guilmartin, pp. 101-110). 
149 An example of gunpowder weapons not quite meeting expectations is Frederick the Great’s creation in 
1759 of horse artillery, which did not prove too useful in battle (Showalter, p. 189). 
150 Volkman, p. 68. 
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cannon and handguns; indeed the Ottomans in particular were avid adopters of 
gunpowder weapons, especially under the sultans Mehmet II in the fifteenth century and 
Bayezit II in the sixteenth.151 These weapons were especially helpful for subduing local 
enemies.152 The problem stemmed from a reluctance to modify existing practices to 
fully integrate gunpowder weapons and a failure to encourage further development of 
these weapons to keep pace with advances elsewhere. This was not due to any technical 
failings – Arab scientists (at least up to the sixteenth century) were capable of reverse 
engineering any weapon that fell into their hands. Rather, the failure to properly adopt 
and adapt gunpowder weapons was rooted in cultural chauvinism and religious 
orthodoxy.153   
 
The cultural chauvinism is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of the Mamluks in 
Egypt at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Mamluk ruling class prided itself 
on its horsemanship and skills with the sword and the compound bow and had relied on 
these traditional weapons to successfully overcome what they viewed as an upstart 
group of black slaves whom their sultan had equipped with firearms in 1497.154 When 
confronted by Portuguese warships with heavy cannon in the Red Sea, as well as 
Ottoman forces that were well-armed with musketeers and artillery on Egypt’s borders, 
the Mamluk sultan ordered the casting of large numbers of cannon and the formation of 
musketeer units.155  Yet the ruling Mamluks themselves refused to use these weapons, 
but recruited gunners and musketeers from black Africans and people of the Maghreb, 
while themselves retaining their traditional weapons. Unsurprisingly, this half-hearted 
and Johnny-come-lately adoption effort resulted in the Mamluk armies suffering 
complete defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in the battles of Marj Dabiq (1515) and 
Raydania (1516),156 after which the Mamluk leader Kurtbay is reported to have 
lamented that ‘A single one of us can defeat your whole army.  If you do not believe it, 
you may try, only please order your army to stop shooting with firearms…The 
                                                          
151 Nafziger and Walton, p. 13. 
152 Barton C. Hacker, ‘Gunpowder and the Changing Military Order: The Islamic Gunpowder Empires ca. 
1450 – ca. 1650’, in Steele and Dorland, p. 87. One example of the effective utilization of gunpowder 
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contrivance is that musket which, even if a woman were to fire it, would hold up such 
and such a number of men … And woe to thee! How darest thou shoot with firearms at 
Muslims!’157 
 
A strict religious orthodoxy, spearheaded by ideologues such as the previously 
mentioned al-Ghazali, did permit the emulation of the objects offered by the infidel 
world. The social and organizational changes that were required to put gunpowder 
weapons to optimal use were another matter entirely. Moreover, scientific advances 
were viewed as potentially subversive and their dissemination was strictly controlled by 
the ruling classes in the Middle East. This fear of religious taint may have accounted for 
the fact that many of the Ottoman janissaries who were equipped with arquebuses in the 
fifteenth century were recruited from among Christian subjects in the Balkans.158 
 
In essence, although the Ottomans possessed few inhibitions about adopting the 
hardware of the Gunpowder Revolution, they were unwilling to adopt the corresponding 
military software related to new approaches to science and organization,159 becoming, in 
Parker’s words ‘expert imitators, but poor innovators’.160 Much later, when Von Moltke 
was sent in 1835 to assist the Ottomans in military modernization, he found that this 
attitude was still evident, as can be gleaned from his remark that ‘a Turk will concede 
without hesitation that the Europeans are superior to his nation in science, skill, wealth, 
daring, and strength, without it ever occurring to him that a Frank might therefore put 
himself on a par with a Muslim’.161 
 
While the widening military disparity between the Christian and Islamic worlds in the 
early modern era was by no means solely the result of an incomplete adoption of 
gunpowder weapons, the inferiority of Muslim weaponry played a large role in the 
growing litany of Muslim defeats at the hands of Europeans, including major battles 
such as Lepanto (1571),162 Vienna (1683), and the Battle of the Pyramids (1798). 
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Gunpowder had reached the Indian subcontinent by the mid-1300s at the latest, if not 
earlier, probably facilitated by the Mongol conquests. By the sixteenth century, the 
various South Asian kingdoms and empires were manufacturing their own firearms and 
artillery. Many of the rulers of the various Indian kingdoms (including the Mughals) 
sought the expertise of foreign experts, including Turks and Europeans and supplied 
their arsenals with a variety of gunpowder weapons. However, the core of the 
subcontinent’s armies was centred on the cavalry and it is argued that, until the mid-
eighteenth century, there was a ‘complicit symmetry’ between local forces in which the 
cavalry was permitted to retain pride of place in battle, with flintlock firearms not really 
utilized to their maximum ability.163 
 
When European interlopers from Portugal, France and predominantly Great Britain 
began to encroach on Indian territory from the seventeenth century on, they did not 
share these traditional practices and the Indian princes endeavoured to use their 
gunpowder weapons more effectively. Initially, the quality of the local artillery was 
mediocre at best, which had become apparent to the local rulers in their first few 
engagements with European forces. Therefore, by employing European craftsmen and 
advisors, they increased artillery quality and began arming their infantry in earnest with 
flintlock muskets. Yet even with this ‘crash-course’ weapons development, the local 
rulers of the subcontinent were ultimately unable to replicate the efficiency in firepower 
of their erstwhile European colonizers. The reason for this did not seem to lie in a 
rejection of outside practices to the same degree as in the Muslim case, but rather in an 
inability to properly incorporate gunpowder weapons into indigenous fighting 
traditions, despite a willingness to do so. So, while Arthur Wellesley would proclaim 
after the Battle of Assaye in 1803 that the bronze cannon of the Maratha Confederation 
was ‘so good…that it answers for our service’,164 the inability of the chieftains during 
the battle to make effective use of this artillery represented a fatal flaw in doctrine.  
 
By means of comparison, the British succeeded in conquering India using mainly 
                                                          
163 Bryant, p. 469. 
164 Arthur Wellesley to Henry Wellesley. 
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sepoys (native infantrymen who fought for the British) trained and armed according to 
contemporary European levels. However, the British attempted to adapt these 
techniques to local cultural traditions,165 and succeeded for the most part, at least if 
measured by their military successes up to the first decades of the nineteenth century. 
Tellingly, when the Imperial masters in London expressed concern to their local 
commanders that arming and training the sepoys with the latest guns might lead to 
dissemination of British military practice to the enemy, the local commanders retorted 
that the Indians had already had skilled Europeans at their disposal for many years, but 
had still failed to reach parity with the quality of British arms and doctrine.166 
 
In short, at least after 1750, it was more the lack of capable commanders who knew how 
to best employ gunpowder weapons and the stasis of traditional military doctrine, rather 
than any technical or resource-driven constraints, which proved the undoing of the 
indigenous kingdoms of the subcontinent.  
 
Native Americans in the New England Colonies of North America 
 
The indigenous inhabitants of the New England colonies, although having no 
experience with gunpowder weapons prior to 1620, quickly recognized the advantages 
of a musket over a bow in terms of speed, directness and penetrating power. Unlike the 
majority of colonists, the Native Americans further saw the advantages of flintlock over 
matchlock guns in the forested areas of New England.167 Moreover, through 
apprenticeships to English craftsmen and other means, they soon procured the skills 
needed to repair firearms and even cast their own ammunition.168  
 
In contrast to several other cultures around the world, there was no resistance to 
adopting these new weapons. Quite the opposite – as soon as the local tribesmen 
realized the superiority of European weapons and technology, they made every effort to 
acquire it.169 In fact, objects of European origin actually enhanced the status of Native 
American warriors.170 At the same time as they were acquiring English skills in 
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maintaining and repairing firearms, the local Native American braves were arguably 
surpassing the colonists’ skills and tactics in using them. They became adept 
sharpshooters, in a culture where ‘accuracy could have a mystical aspect’171 and quickly 
developed tactics alien to the European battlefield – stealth, surprise, high mobility and 
shooting from behind the cover of rocks, trees and brush. 
 
Firearms began to diffuse rapidly through the tribes of New England, since any tribe 
that did not adopt the new weapons suddenly found itself at a serious military (or at 
least prestige) disadvantage with respect to its neighbours.172 This alarmed many of the 
colonists173 who attempted to ban the sale or transfer of firearms to Native Americans, 
by appealing to the Crown and enacting a series of what would ultimately prove 
ineffectual prohibitions on the transfer of firearms and other European weapons (the 
Dutch, French and even many of the English colonists simply ignored the enactments). 
By the late 1660s, these restrictions had largely been abandoned and the diffusion of 
arms to Native Americans escalated further, so that by the outbreak of King Philip’s 
War in 1675, most warriors were amply equipped with flintlock muskets and pistols. 
Furthermore they had experience with these weapons and had adapted tribal combat 
systems to accommodate the advantages and constraints presented by firearms. 
 
The great Wampanoag sachem Metacomet (referred to as ‘King Philip’ by the English) 
launched an insurrection against the colonists in June 1675, which quickly involved 
surrounding tribes and has become known as King Philip’s War.174 While the 
Europeans were wedded to traditional volley tactics and single-shot musket balls, the 
Native Americans engaged in guerrilla warfare, relying on cover, accuracy and 
dispersed shot to confound the English in the dense forest environment. The Native 
Americans inflicted heavy losses on the English, who only began achieving some 
success when they mimicked the tribal warriors’ tactics and enlisted the help of native 
allies.175 Despite their tactical success, by 1676 the insurrectionists were overcome by 
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disease, starvation, and far more numerous and well-supplied opponents. Nevertheless, 
the Native Americans of New England had not only adopted the firearm, they had 
imaginatively adapted it to the local environment in a manner not foreseen by its 
originators. As Malone maintains: ‘The Colonists had brought the firearm to the New 




The Far East presents a curious set of cases of diffusion and innovation with respect to 
gunpowder weapons. In addition to serving as the fountainhead of the Gunpowder 
Revolution, the region offered a range of innovations, from Admiral Yi’s ingeniously 
formidable ‘turtle ships’177 in Korea, to early forms of volley-fire in Japan. How then 
did an initial flowering of armaments become largely surpassed by Europe by the end of 
the sixteenth century? Starting with China, a string of early developments in artillery, 
handguns and ship-borne weapons made it arguably the most advanced military power 
on earth by the middle of the fourteenth century, when European arms-makers were still 
tinkering with primitive cannon. In the latter fifteenth century, however, China turned 
inward, cementing government control and stifling much innovation.178 The famous 
self-destruction of its mighty sea-going vessels and prevention of the further 
development of well-armed ocean-going warships is a well-worn story of bureaucratic 
short-sightedness. Chinese armies were also huge by comparison with European 
militaries of the same time and decision-makers may have believed there to be little 
need (not to mention insufficient resources) to equip all its soldiers with firearms. 
Therefore, although the use of cannon and firearms persisted in China, these did not 
develop much further and traditional weapons dominated right through to the nineteenth 
century.179 The result of this lack of dynamism was that, by the sixteenth century, China 
and the rest of the Far East had been overtaken in the development of gunpowder 
weapons by the Europeans and were forced to look to European explorers and traders to 
learn of the latest innovations in firearms and artillery. 
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The Japanese experience with gunpowder weapons shares some parallels with that of 
the Chinese, but also some remarkable differences. First made aware of Western 
firearms from the Portuguese in 1543, the Japanese adopted them with far more zeal 
than their neighbours to the west. By 1575, during the Japanese civil war, the warlord 
Oda Nobunaga fielded over three thousand musketeers and directed them to utilize 
ranks and volley fire several decades before this tactic became popular in Europe.180 
Unlike the Europeans, however, Japanese tactics stressed accuracy over rate of fire. By 
the time the reunification of Japan was finally consolidated by one of Nobunaga’s 
successors, Tokugawa Ieyasu, in 1616, firearms had played a major role. Then a 
development occurred that has few parallels in the history of weaponry – the new 
Tokugawa shogunate introduced drastic changes, starting with the destruction of almost 
all fortresses in Japan, then closing the country to outside influences and, most relevant 
to the current discussion, all but outlawing firearms for almost another two hundred and 
fifty years. Keegan has advanced several explanations for this behaviour, viz., the 
association of guns with the West and the Christian religion which Japan’s rulers found 
threatening to its traditional society; the firearm, by empowering commoners, was seen 
as socially destabilizing; gun control in Japan’s relatively isolated and homogenous 
polity was a viable policy; gunpowder was seen as antithetical to the samurai warrior 
ethos; and gunpowder weapons challenged the Japanese affinity for the purity of 
muscular effort, which was perceived as being in harmony with the natural world, 
something which the artificial chemical reactions of gunpowder are not.181 
 
Over the next hundred years, the Japanese government imposed stricter and stricter 
forms of gun control until by the end of the seventeenth century firearms had almost 
completely ceased to be used in Japan, with all existing weapons and related knowledge 
closely held by the shogunate until the forced opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 
1854.  
 
The experiences of China and Japan with respect to the diffusion of firearms in the early 
modern age thus provide clear demonstration that when new weapons challenge deeply-
held cultural, political, or social mores, their adoption is by no means guaranteed, even 
where these weapons might bestow large or even vital military advantage. 
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It took a period of over four centuries for the world’s warfighters to adequately adjust to 
weapons driven by explosive chemical reactions, weapons which amplified the power of 
destruction several orders of magnitude over that of muscle and mechanics. The advent 
of gunpowder weapons did not consist of a single innovation, but a series of 
improvements, some incremental, others seismic, that overcame most (but by no means 
all) of the technical and tactical problems presented by trying to confine an explosion in 
a metal tube.182 Nor was the diffusion of these weapons uniform or successfully 
implemented in all quarters. 
 
Renaissance Europe proved to be the most dynamic adopter of gunpowder weapons. It 
was a font of new ideas, many of which could not even be realized with the materials 
and tools of the time, and this creativity extended to the operational military sphere 
despite the lack of a formal scientific approach to invention. The desire to perpetually 
improve their weapons was emblematic of the age in another way, with polities being 
galvanized by the widespread political instability on the Continent into always seeking a 
new technical or tactical advantage. These forces provided a sufficiently powerful 
impetus to overcome inherent conservatism and entrenched ideas about warfare.183 
 
This was not so in all locations to which cannon and firearms spread. The Islamic world 
of the Middle East and North Africa would not, while the indigenous inhabitants of 
South Asia could not, accept the organizational, doctrinal and invariably social 
corollaries to the adoption of the weapons themselves, being, as these were, antithetical 
to extant warrior cultures. It was in this sense not a failure to adopt the weapon, but the 
weapons system, that resulted in what can be termed a partial diffusion of gunpowder 
weapons to these cultures. The Native Americans of New England were far more 
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successful in their adoption of firearms, but alas were beset by more fundamental 
immunological and numerical weaknesses, while the East Asians more or less 
voluntarily surrendered their early achievements with respect to gunpowder weapons 
and tactics. It is thus no surprise that the Europeans’ successful adoption of gunpowder 
weapons and the successive technical and tactical innovations needed to properly 
exploit these weapons are often pointed to as a key lever in Europe’s global 
ascension.184  
 
The Industrialization of War  
 
Warfare at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries was 
dominated by Napoleon’s quest for supremacy in Europe. Yet the innovations heralded 
by the diminutive Corsican were above all organizational and political – the plenitude 
and passion of the levee en masse, the competence of a meritocratic officer corps and 
tactical wizardry with columns of men – rather than technological. There were few if 
any developments in weaponry during this period of what John Lynn refers to as a 
‘complicated interaction of intellectual and institutional factors in a static technological 
environment’.185 Indeed, historian Russell Weigley has gone so far as to declare that 
‘[t]he hardware of war was essentially the same in 1815 as in 1631’.186 
 
Even those few weapons innovations that did emerge during this period were largely 
stillborn at the hands of technologically conservative commanders. Napoleon famously 
disbanded the French balloon observation corps in 1799,187 despite the potential of the 
Montgolfiers’ relatively recent invention to serve as a reconnaissance and possibly even 
a weapons platform. He also squandered Robert Fulton’s offer to develop a submarine 
for combat purposes, including the first torpedoes, by cutting off Fulton’s funding after 
only one year, even after the inventor had produced promising prototypes.188 Napoleon 
was not the only leader to eschew novel, yet potentially useful, weapons – his nemesis, 
the Duke of Wellington, refused to employ the new Congreve rockets on the battlefield.  
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These rockets, which were somewhat inaccurate but still useful against large targets 
such as towns and forts, were themselves the product of an interesting diffusion process. 
Their inventor, William Congreve, learnt from accounts of the Mysore Wars in India 
that Tipu Sultan and his father, Haider Ali, had harried the British with their extensive 
use of rockets. From captured rocket casings, Congreve set about designing his own 
larger and more powerful versions using a new propellant, the first successful testing of 
which occurred in 1805. This in turn led to their use in several battles, including the 
attack on Fort McHenry during the War of 1812, after which Congreve’s rockets 
became immortalized in the American national anthem. Yet, despite their greater range 
than contemporary artillery, their inaccuracy meant that they were little used in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and only made a comeback in World War II.189 
 
It was only in the years leading up to the Crimean War (1853-1856) that significant 
innovations in weaponry occurred. The rapid spread of these and subsequent 
innovations, which included breechloading, easier-to-use rifles, machine guns and later 
(at the beginning of the 20th century) naval dreadnoughts, was to a great extent 
facilitated by a larger societal change – the quantum leap in industrialization that began 
in the late eighteenth century and has often received the moniker of an ‘Industrial 
Revolution’. The early part of this rapid growth in industrialization was dominated by 
radical improvements in power technology as machines and workers combined into 
integrated, increasingly productive systems.190 This change does not seem to have had a 
significant impact on weapons technology until it was supplemented by a related 
development – the so-called ‘American System’ of manufacturing in which precision 
machine tools and automation were combined to mass produce complex products from 
sets of interchangeable parts.191 Among the pioneers of these techniques were American 
firearm companies in the Connecticut Valley, demonstrating once again the ironic 
synergy between military and civilian production; the same technologies that would for 
the first time make a host of consumer products affordable and thus enrich the lives of 
large portions of humanity, would simultaneously greatly enhance the capacity for 
ending those same lives. By the mid-nineteenth century, large numbers of standardized 
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weapons of identical quality could be produced in a short space of time using these 
techniques – the British Woolwich Arsenal by the 1850s could produce 250,000 rifle 
cartridges per day.192 One of the important consequences was that an entire army could 
be equipped with a new weapon relatively quickly, which drastically shortened the 
interval between different generations of weaponry. It also appreciably lessened the 
penalty for investing in the wrong weapon or technology, since adoption mistakes, 
while costly, could be rectified without setting the military at a long-term 
disadvantage.193  
 
Another aspect of these developments is the changing role of private industry in 
weapons innovation and production. During previous centuries, weapons innovation had 
sometimes been encouraged or even monopolized by rulers, but had also been the 
province of guilds and even individual armourers, depending on the period and weapon. 
In the nineteenth century, the onus – at least in Europe and North America – first shifted 
towards private producers. It was up to the individual inventor to create a prototype and 
try and sell it to one or more governments, who would often only adopt the innovation 
once it had been proven in use elsewhere or in the civilian sector.194 The private 
businessman took responsibility for spotting a need or an opportunity and addressing it, 
as well as bearing all the risk and initial costs. At the same time, military officials were 
often deluged with offers for new weapons, many of which were outlandish and 
unsound, leading to much scepticism of claims for weapons innovations and a robust 
conservatism.  After 1880, however, there arose a new era of ‘command 
technology’,195starting with naval vessels and equipment, whereby military officers set 
out the parameters for new weapons and invited private producers to come up with 
suitable designs and innovations. This meant that weapons innovation was at least to 
some extent driven by the perceived needs of military leaders, rather than being 
completely dependent on the whims of inventive outsiders. This state of affairs has 
continued through to the present day. 
 
The Industrial Revolution and the production methods accompanying it did not diffuse 
worldwide, at least not immediately. This meant that the mass production of weapons 
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was limited mainly to Europe and North America, which only served to widen the 
military gap between countries in these regions and most of the rest of the world. The 
Muslim world, for example, beset by would-be European colonizers at every turn, may 
have been able to buy and use modern weapons, but they could not manufacture them in 
bulk or improve upon them, which put them at the mercy of their supply chains. One 
exception was Japan – the Meiji Restoration that sought to rapidly modernize Japan in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century entailed the rapid assimilation of Western 
science and technology and included the emulation and production of Western arms. 
 
Several developments in both small and large guns made good use of these advances in 
production. The first of these was the widespread adoption of rifled barrels. The 
additional accuracy and thus range resulting from the spin imparted by grooves in the 
barrel to the bullet had been known for some time, and indeed rifles (as these guns came 
to be known) had been in occasional use since the sixteenth century. The major 
problem, in addition to the increased cost, was that in order for the round shot to engage 
the grooves, there had to be a very tight fit between ball and barrel, which made it more 
difficult to push the ball down and thus made the rifle’s rate of fire far lower than that of 
the smoothbore musket. However, when combined with an elongated, conical bullet 
with a hollow base (designed in 1843 by the Frenchman Claude Etienne Minié) and the 
percussion cap (which obviated the need for a flintlock mechanism), the rifle could 
really come into its own. Adoption was almost immediate: within 15 years of the 
introduction of Minié’s system, France, Britain, Prussia, and the United States had 
adopted rifling.196 Those who failed to adopt these new weapons en masse were 
punished for their lassitude – the Russians were at an acute disadvantage during the 
Crimean War against French and British rifles that had an effective range five times 
further than their own smoothbore weapons.197 
 
It was also during this conflict that another innovation came to the fore. The Prussians 
were among the first to equip their infantry almost completely with a breechloading 
rifle.198 Easier to load than muzzle-loading weapons, breechloaders enabled soldiers to 
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reload from a crouching or lying down position (and thus reduce the enemies’ target) 
and also allowed for a far greater rate of fire than previous firearms. On the battlefield 
this effectively multiplied the amount of firepower a given number of soldiers could 
bring to bear, or conversely reduced the number of soldiers necessary to effectively 
combat an opposing force armed with muzzle-loading rifles. Previously, firearms that 
were loaded from the breech were too prone to misfires, but the new methods of 
precision machining allowed for the creation of a viable weapon. Christened the needle 
gun (or Zündnadelgewehr in the original German), this remarkable weapon had been 
developed by a German craftsman named Johann Nikolaus von Dreyse over a twenty-
year period starting in 1820.199 Dreyse was able to persevere in large part due to 
financial support from the Prussian military. It took a full twenty-six years for the entire 
Prussian army to be equipped with the needle gun, but by the time its effectiveness 
became apparent in 1866 against Austria, production techniques had improved so much 
that it took only four years to duplicate this feat with a new generation of rifles. The 
Austrians, despite plenty of opportunity, failed to incorporate breechloaders into their 
tactical repertoire and suffered in their war with Prussia in 1866. Austria had rejected 
breechloaders for fear that their high rate of fire would encourage soldiers to waste their 
ammunition, a result the Prussians avoided through excellent training.  
 
Further innovations in firearms during the latter half of the nineteenth century included 
the development of a metal cartridge combining powder and bullet and repeating rifles, 
which used a bolt-action mechanism to reload a new bullet from a magazine each time 
the gun was fired, thereby allowing for an even more dramatic increase in the rate of 
fire.200 Last, the invention of smokeless gunpowder (Poudre B and then Cordite) meant 
that the literal ‘fog of war’ that had obscured battlefields for hundreds of years would no 
longer be a problem; nor would it be an easy matter to locate a concealed enemy by 
looking for the tell-tale puff of smoke that the old black powder had released when 
fired. Moreover, the smokeless powders left residues that were far less deleterious to the 
weapon, thus making automatic weapons feasible. These improvements in gunpowder 
were driven in large part by government-supported programs of experimentation and 
applications of science to war.201 
                                                          
199 Boot, pp. 128-129. 
200 Early models included the Winchester and Spencer rifles from the United States and the British Lee-
Metford (Boot, p. 149). 
201 Seymour H. Mauskopf, ‘Chemistry in the Arsenal: State Regulations and Scientific Methodology of 




Even outside of Europe the more astute amongst military men soon discovered the 
utility of rifled arms, among these the Turks and Boers, who put their repeating, 
breechloading rifles to good use in 1877 and 1899 respectively.202 The Anglo-Boer War 
in particular provided an example of the necessity for armies to be equipped with the 
most modern firearms, for a small technological asymmetry between the two forces 
nearly upset the mighty British Imperial Army. The more modern Mauser rifles of the 
Boers used clips of five bullets203 whereas the ammunition for the British army’s Lee-
Enfield MLE rifle had to be inserted singly into its magazine, thus making reloading 
much easier and faster for the Boers. This helped to offset some of the numerical 
disadvantage in which the Boers found themselves during individual battles and, when 
combined with the Boers’ superior marksmanship and tactics of defensive 
entrenchment, led to several surprising early battle victories for the Afrikaners. 
Although the British ultimately won in South Africa, victory was accomplished at 
arguably a much greater cost – the war cost Britain at least a whopping £223,000,000 
and with 448,000 men participating204 it was the largest overseas deployment in British 
history – than might have been the case had they enjoyed parity with the Boer’s Mauser 
rifles.205  
 
The rate of fire also reached a relative apogee in the nineteenth century with the 
development of the first true machine gun by Hiram Maxim in 1884, which built on 
semi-automatic predecessors, namely the American Gatling gun and the French 
mitrailleuse of the 1860s and 1870s, respectively. The Maxim gun, which could fire at a 
rate of 600 rounds per minute,206 amounted to the most devastating anti-personnel 
weapon yet devised, mowing down less well-equipped opponents in clashes such as that 
at Omdurman in 1898. It is interesting that the European powers sought to create and 
maintain a monopoly on these new weapons. For instance, to prevent non-Europeans 
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from learning how to use the machine gun, they did not allow even the non-Europeans 
fighting on their behalf to operate machine guns.207 
 
With respect to heavy artillery, the development of the Bessamer process for producing 
high-quality steel and advances in the configuration and composition of propellant 
charges resulted in the construction of far larger and more powerful guns by men like 
the German steelmaker Alfred Krupp. Adding explosive shells only increased their 
destructive power. Despite much scepticism towards many of these developments on the 
part of European military leaders, after the successful showing of new Prussian artillery 
in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to 1871, European armies were quick to replace 
their bronze muzzle-loaders with breech-loading steel guns.208 Artillery soon came to be 
the primary weapon on the battlefield, and the relative immobility resulting from the 
massive size and weight of steel breechloaders meant that the defence became 
paramount. There was one significant problem – the longer range of the rifle brought 
the opposing artillery crews into danger, a problem that would only be solved when the 
advent of theatre communications enabled commanders to station artillery in the rear, 
safe from snipers, and communicate the enemy’s positions to the artillery crews by 
means of the field telephones in what came to be called ‘indirect fire’.209 Moreover, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, the introduction of a recoil system enabled the 
introduction of far smaller, yet equally if not more powerful, artillery pieces that were 
highly mobile. 
 
Two further innovations that perturbed existing systems of land warfare during the 
nineteenth century were the advent of the railways and the electric telegraph.210 While 
not weapons themselves, these enabling technologies ensured that the weapons 
described above got to where they needed to be when they needed to be there and that 
when they arrived, the users of the weapons knew where to go and what to fire at. 
General staffs using the telegraph and extensive planning to coordinate troop 
mobilization and movement over rail systems utterly remade the logistical and 
command aspects of warfare, a strategic transformation demonstrated most notably by 
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the performance of the Prussians under Von Moltke in 1866 against Austria and again in 
1870-1871 against France. From a weapons-oriented perspective, these were ancillary 
activities, but were nevertheless vital in order for the concurrent developments in 
weaponry to realize their full potential. From this point of view, at least, the symbiosis 
of rail and telegraph can be thought of as part of the larger weapons systems of the rifle, 
the machine-gun and the Krupp artillery piece, and their diffusion acted as force 
multipliers to the firepower of the new weapons, a feature that might be relevant in the 
terrorism context. The rise of these new communications and transport technologies also 
meant that war now constituted a complex system whose management could no longer 
be undertaken by an individual commander; no matter what the degree of personal 
genius, all this coordination required a large general staff. Railways, especially, were 
large infrastructural undertakings and in most areas expanded through a combination of 
public investment and private capital.211 This new channel of mobility did have one 
serious limitation, however. When the track ended, the army had to resort to the same 
plodding means of transportation it had used for thousands of years – the horse and the 
march on foot. Overcoming this obstacle would have to await the introduction of 
mechanized warfare in the twentieth century. 
 
In the naval arena, guns and ships coevolved in a series of step-wise innovations to 
change the face of naval warfare profoundly. 212 Improvements in artillery and the 
development of exploding shells rendered wooden hulls useless in warfare, a result that 
was underlined by the rapid development of the self-propelled torpedo from 1866 
onwards. Developed by Robert Whitehead, the range of the torpedo increased fifteen-
fold and its speed more than four-fold between 1866 and 1914, and by the 1870s these 
weapons were being purchased by all the major naval powers.213 These changes in the 
nature of warships were not smooth or comprehensive – for a long time sails and steam 
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destroyer – to intercept torpedo boats. These ‘destroyers’, as they came to be more simply known, in turn 




power coexisted in misshapen hybrids of the old and the new.214 However, by the turn 
of the twentieth century, almost all capital ships in the fleets of the naval powers were 
steam-powered, steel-hulled hulks bearing one or more gargantuan guns. Part of the 
reason was the intense technological rivalries and corresponding arms races that 
developed between the European powers. The pattern in the mid-late nineteenth century 
usually saw France develop a new naval innovation first, with the British navy 
responding soon afterwards to adopt a similar or offsetting innovation. In the early 
twentieth century, the primary rivalry for bigger and better vessels and guns was 
between Britain and Germany, but the dynamic was similar. 
 
These developments were not without their complications, however. The controversial 
case of the British Royal Navy’s rejection of the entrepreneur Arthur Pollen’s fire 
control system in favour of the in-house Dreyer tables, whatever the true causes or 
consequences of that decision,215 demonstrated that, for perhaps the first time in history, 
weapons systems were becoming so complex that military commanders tasked with 
deciding whether or not to adopt innovations might no longer have the technical 
knowledge or time to understand or properly evaluate them. This meant that other 
parties, whose interests might differ from those of the military commander, had 
additional space in which to influence adoption decisions – a state of affairs that has 
grown progressively more pronounced over the course of the past century.216 
 
Many of the innovations in weaponry between the Napoleonic period and the First 
World War, such as breechloading guns or rifled barrels, had existed in earlier forms but 
could not be effectively adopted for military use before the coming of precision 
machining and mass production in the nineteenth century. Thus, developments in the 
broader economy directly affected warfare and precipitated the diffusion of new 
weapons. This diffusion was helped by other socio-political developments, including 
                                                          
214 Part of the reason for retaining sails was that initially steam powered ship engines were somewhat 
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directed invention driven by governments217 and enacted by both the military and 
private sectors, as well as a renewed vigour in applying the latest scientific and 
engineering principles to solve problems that had long bedevilled weapons 
performance. The appearance of innovations also accelerated, sometimes outstripping 
the ability of militaries and their societies to accommodate them, irrespective of cultural 
compatibilities.  
 
In terms of leveraging organization and tactics to effectively exploit these technical 
innovations, the Prussians must rank near the top, with the French also among the 
earliest adopters of new weaponry, especially during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Since the failure to adopt seemed to mean quick defeat, several countries felt 
compelled to emulate the Prussian model and only partially succeeded, once again 
finding the hardware far easier to implement than the required software (modifications 
in doctrine and organization) that attended new weapons. The British, although by no 
means at the vanguard, did tend to follow closely in adopting the majority of the most 
important advances in weaponry during this period.218 Thus, by the outbreak of World 
War I, most of the belligerents were equipped with large numbers of strikingly similar 
weapons, including heavy artillery, steel-hulled warships, machine guns, and so forth, 
and the volume of firepower they could deploy against each other was unprecedented. 
Furthermore, each of the major powers (except perhaps Britain) could mobilize their 
forces massively in short order. 
 
While the latest weapons had been assimilated into all the modern militaries, what had 
not quite sunk in (except among the prescient few) was that the tremendous firepower 
and mobilization capacity would favour the defence over the offense. The results are 
familiar: a mixture of entrenchment, indirect fire, and command by wire from the rear 
formed the ingredients from which the morass of the Western front was concocted. 
Unfortunately for all concerned, doomsayers like Bloch were largely vindicated, as the 
attaque à outrance failed tragically and the conflict settled into a fetid state of attrition 
wherein victory would be decided by which society could manufacture the most 
ammunition and explosives. 
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World Wars and Beyond 
 
The 20th century witnessed a plethora of innovations – not only the pace but the breadth 
of new weapons development accelerated immensely. These included new weapons 
platforms such as the submarine and the aircraft carrier, entirely new combat arms (the 
strategic air force), technological breakthroughs in reconnaissance and navigation such 
as radar, satellites and more recently GPS, and novel tactical aids such as the Norden 
bomb-sight, night-vision devices and laser illuminators to direct aerial bombardment. 
Substantive discussion of the diffusion experience of only a select sample of these is 
possible here,219 followed by a more general consideration of the nature of weapons 
diffusion in the twentieth century. 
Armoured Mechanized Warfare 
The development of the tank and attendant doctrines of mechanized warfare presents a 
variety of diffusion experiences. Ideas for motorized, armoured, tracked vehicles that 
could be used in combat had been proposed by several inventors before World War I, 
but none were pursued because the militaries of the day did not see any need for them. It 
was only when the fighting in World War I became bogged down in the trenches that 
concerted efforts were made, mostly in Britain,220 to develop what became known as the 
tank. Yet, even with the desperate need to break the logjam at the front, the British army 
only tepidly embraced the tank. The early versions proved helpful (but not decisive) in 
overrunning enemy trenches, and even began to take on some of the traditional cavalry 
roles by 1918, but did not overwhelm many observers during their initial forays into 
battle. It was the performance of tanks at Cambrai in November 1917 that got several 
military observers to take notice and forward thinkers to begin to imagine a role for the 
tank beyond infantry support.221  
 
After the War, thinking about mechanized warfare split into two camps – one which 
viewed tanks and similar motorized vehicles as merely an adjunct to the core fighting 
elements of infantry and artillery, and a vocal minority who saw in the tank a means by 
which warfare would be revolutionized by restoring strategic mobility to combat and 
                                                          
219 For further examples, see Murray and Millett, Goldman and Eliason, and Rosen. 
220 Indeed, it was none other than Winston Churchill, at the time an ‘eccentric civilian in the British 
Admiralty’ (Van Creveld, p. 222) who championed the production of the early tanks. 
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relegating all other arms to a supporting role. Among the enthusiasts were Basil Liddell 
Hart and J.F.C. Fuller in Britain, Charles de Gaulle in France, Heinz Guderian in 
Germany, Adna R. Chaffee, Jr. in the United States and Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the 
Soviet Union, however each fared differently in encouraging military or political leaders 
to adopt the new concept of mechanized warfare. The familiar tale of the adoption of the 
tank can be summarized thus: only the Germans, the losers in World War I who were 
not even supposed to possess such weapons under the armistice agreement, 
wholeheartedly embraced the tank and the motorized division and centred their strategy 
on the new combined-arms armoured warfare concept of blitzkrieg, in what has been 
described as ‘the canonical case of peacetime military innovation’.222 The Soviets were 
the next most successful adopters, devising a somewhat different strategic concept of 
‘deep operations’ and licensing tank technology to build its T-34 tank from the 
American inventor J. Walter Christie after the U.S. Army had rejected the same. Despite 
producing more tanks than anyone else, training and doctrine suffered, especially after 
Stalin’s purges of thousands of talented military officers in the late 1930s. The United 
States went some way towards developing the designs for an armoured corps, but 
rejected or quickly disbanded any attempt to seriously implement the idea. In Britain, 
substantial development work took place in the interwar years, but except for the short-
lived Experimental Mechanised Force in the late 1920s, tank doctrine was conservative 
and stressed support for the infantry. The French developed possibly the most advanced 
tanks, and almost as many as the Soviets, but did not succeed in integrating these into a 
cohesive armoured doctrine. It is worth noting that both Liddell Hart and de Gaulle, 
after failing to convince their military commands of the potential of armoured warfare, 
looked for champions in the civilian leadership of their respective war departments. 
Although they did find more receptive audiences there, this attempt to circumvent 
standard military protocols did not ingratiate them to their commanders, who in turn 
became even more obdurate with respect to their ideas and, arguably, left a sour taste 
for technical innovation in general.223  
 
The astonishingly effective performance of German mechanized warfare at the 
beginning of World War II eliminated any reticence regarding the utility of armoured 
                                                          
222 Mahnken, ‘Beyond Blitzkrieg’, p. 244. 
223 Rosen, p. 13.  
 301 
 
warfare and the decisive advantages of the mobility it represented.224 This was set in 
stark relief by the rapidity of the French defeat, whose army, despite having more 
numerous and in some ways more advanced tanks,225 squandered any potential 
advantage by misapplying the new innovation of mechanized warfare, including 
sprinkling their armour throughout their infantry divisions,226 rushing their best units 
into Belgium and keeping many of their forces in reserve until it was too late. In light of 
the Germans’ initial success, the armies of the remaining Allies – Britain, the Soviet 
Union and the United States – all ramped up their production of tanks and other armour, 
in addition to changing their doctrine to versions of the combined-arms approach, but 
even then their adoption of the German model was imperfect, having to contend both 
with playing catch-up during a war and pockets of continued organizational-cultural 
resistance to the new means and methods.227 For example, while the Germans were able 
to masterfully coordinate their tank assaults with two-way radios in each tank, most of 
the American and British tanks only had radio receivers, with much of the Soviet force 
without any wireless communication. So, even though many of the Allied tanks were 
superior in terms of firepower and armour, they could not be as effectively utilized as 
the German tanks. Other seemingly small details would also prove crucial – such as a 
more efficient interior layout within the German tanks, and the greater overall reliability 
of the German tank engines.228  
 
Although it quickly became a key element of land warfare, the tank did not quite live up 
to the lofty expectations of its most ardent initial supporters. The development of anti-
tank infantry weapons is one reason. Another is an aspect of mechanized warfare that 
proved just as critical in the Second World War as it does today – the constraint 
imposed by the supply train. Tanks, from the opening salvos of World War II to the 
Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, have proven able to provide far-ranging mobility that 
allows for an almost unstoppable forward momentum. But such momentum will be only 
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transitory if fuel, spare parts and maintenance crews do not keep up with the leading 
edge of the mechanized spear; brief armoured forays using pre-positioned supplies that 
quickly subdue the enemy (like those against France in 1940 and Iraq in 1991) are 
therefore strikingly effective, but longer campaigns, which tax the ability of supply 
trains to keep up, such as the deep German attack into the Soviet Union in World War 
II, can blunt the advantages of mechanized armour. Armoured, mechanized warfare has 
continued to play a central role on the traditional battlefield right up to the present, 
however, with steady if not revolutionary innovations such as composite and reactive 
armour, computerized ‘one touch’ firing systems and armour-piercing depleted uranium 
projectiles, maintaining the tank’s strategic punching power.229 
Aircraft Carriers 
One of the key decisions that faced the navies of the major powers in the interwar 
period was whether to adopt the aircraft carrier as a platform for exploiting air power at 
sea. This was not an enterprise to be embarked upon lightly – aircraft carriers would be 
for all involved the most expensive piece of naval equipment yet conceived of. There 
were strong strategic reasons for several of the major powers of the time (Italy, Britain, 
the United States and Japan) to invest in the aircraft carrier, while for others (Germany 
and the Soviet Union) this was (initially at least) a matter of prestige and declaring 
equal status as a Great Power, serving much the same function as the capital ships of 
half a century earlier. Yet, as with so many other weapons systems, adoption was not 
purely a rational response to needs. The British could have used carriers to cement their 
naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the Italians to challenge the British there. Yet 
the British deployed their carriers defensively, subordinate to their traditional naval 
strategies, while the Italians believed land-based aircraft would suffice, the result being 
that neither country adapted aircraft carriers for offensive purposes, at least not until 
very late in the war. Similarly, Germany initially viewed naval air power as useful 
mainly for reconnaissance, coastal patrol and escort and only belatedly came around to 
viewing carriers as means to push the strategic offensive.230 
 
Even the United States and Japan, who understood the power-projection capabilities of 
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the carrier group and overcame orthodoxy to make naval air power the centre of their 
maritime strategies, both experienced setbacks in the adoption process. On the 
American side, even after Pearl Harbour, the proponents of decisive sea battles between 
large battleships retained influence, subordinating the air arm to traditional naval 
concerns until late in the war. The Japanese navy, for its part, became embroiled in a 
bureaucratic tug-of-war with its army over priorities for its aircraft.231 Furthermore, only 
the United States actually possessed the resources and productive capacity to sustain 
several large carrier groups over an extended period in the face of battle losses. One 
noteworthy aspect of the diffusion of aircraft carriers in the Second World War is that 
late in the war, the British operated closely with the Americans in the Pacific, allowing 
for the rapid dissemination of U.S. carrier doctrine and technologies to the British,232 
possibly indicating the role that close cooperation with allies can have in facilitating 
successful diffusion of weapons innovations.233 
Nuclear Weapons 
The question of whether nuclear weapons are singular devices in the annals of 
weaponry234 and the extent to which they have impacted the nature of war, strategy, the 
conduct of international politics and even the future of the human species, is a matter of 
much debate.235 The focus here, however, is on the historical experience of the diffusion 
of nuclear weapons at the state level. In terms of their origin as an innovation, Colin 
Gray makes a strong case for nuclear weapons being largely the product of 
technological determinism. This line of argument proceeds that, although the timing 
may have been accelerated by the glaring focus of the Manhattan Project, scientific 
understanding of the physics of the atom had reached a critical point in the early 
twentieth century, to the extent that even the fertile imaginations of science fiction 
writers foresaw the military exploitation of the awesome energies lurking deep within 
matter.236 When combined with the increasing mechanization of combat from the First 
World War onwards and the trajectory towards unrestricted conflict – the erosion of the 
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line between front and rear, solider and civilian – Gray paints the invention of nuclear 
weapons as all but inevitable.237  
 
As for the genesis of nuclear weapons, in one of the few clear-cut cases of non-military 
scientists perceiving the military ramifications of new knowledge, it was physicists Leo 
Szilard and Albert Einstein who brought the terrifying possibility of the atomic bomb to 
political and military leaders and urged its development as a strategic necessity in the 
face of a possible German bomb. Moreover, unlike many weapons innovations, the 
advent of nuclear weapons was driven by and took place almost exclusively during a 
period of war, rather than as a response to a previous conflict or in preparation for a 
potential conflict to come. In any event, the drama surrounding the development of the 
first nuclear weapons and their subsequent deployment against the Japanese has been 
eloquently told238 and it is enough to state the obvious, that every military-minded 
person on the planet became abruptly aware of the significance of the atomic bomb in 
August 1945.239 The relevant questions then became: who would emulate the United 
States in adopting these weapons and why, or perhaps more tellingly, why not? 
 
After 1945, and even more so with the rise of thermonuclear weapons in the 1950s, the 
stakes surrounding these terrible weapons were such that no major power (or would-be 
major power) could afford to ignore a decision on the nuclear option. Predictably, the 
United States’ incipient rival, the Soviet Union, immediately concentrated a significant 
portion of its meagre post-war resources on developing their own weapon, something 
they succeeded in doing in 1949.240 By the early 1970s, the USSR possessed more 
warheads than the United States and the bi-polar Cold War system had settled under the 
shadow of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD). Yet in what retrospectively seems a 
rather ill-considered move, both the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s 
actually facilitated the transfer of nuclear know-how not only to their immediate allies, 
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but to several other states within their hoped-for sphere of influence. For example, the 
American ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative explicitly sought to spread nuclear expertise, 
ostensibly only for peaceful purposes like research and power generation, but which 
consequently served as the kernel for weapons programs in several countries. Many 
countries were content to forego the development of nuclear arms in exchange for 
security guarantees; others, for a variety of reasons, were not.  
 
William Potter traces the array of possible motivations why a state might seek nuclear 
weapons, divided into sets of incentives, disincentives and situational, or so-called 
‘trigger’, events.241 Incentives include deterrence of adversaries, a military advantage if 
war erupts, coercion of opponents, the result of being an international pariah, a quest for 
status and prestige, domestic bureaucratic interests aiming to benefit from a weapons 
program and, finally, technological incrementalism, wherein a weapons capability is 
attained without a preconceived plan.242 Disincentives for producing nuclear weapons 
can include cost, international opprobrium and sanctions, upsetting the balance of power 
and destabilizing the regional or global system, and domestic or bureaucratic 
opposition.243 Scholars have also put forward a number of trigger events that might shift 
a state’s cost-benefit calculus so that acquiring nuclear weapons becomes favoured, or 
vice versa. These can include the nuclearization of a neighbour or close rival (the 
domino theory of proliferation), increased accessibility of material and know-how, 
domestic crises that encourage leaders to divert attention outwards, and a variety of 
looming deadlines for a state, such as an election, or a treaty coming into force.244 
 
After an analysis of the decisions of twenty-six states to acquire, forego or renounce 
nuclear weapons, Potter concludes that there is no typical profile of underlying factors – 
varying country-specific incentives, constraints and trigger events combine in each case 
to yield a final decision whether or not to produce nuclear weapons and how many and 
of what type to produce.245 
 
The British tested a nuclear weapon in 1952 and the French in 1960. After the Chinese 
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tested their first atomic bomb in 1964, the leading powers feared a rapid destabilization 
of the international system should dozens of states acquire nuclear weapons and decided 
to attempt to prevent any more states from acquiring these weapons. To accomplish this, 
they created a nonproliferation regime with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as its centrepiece. Imperfect as this regime is, it placed 
controls on the materials and technology required to produce nuclear weapons and 
represented one of the first concerted and sustained global efforts to prevent the 
diffusion of a new weapons system to most of the world’s nations.246 Yet some states, 
namely Israel, India, South Africa, Pakistan and North Korea, stayed outside or defected 
from the regime and successfully pursued nuclear weapons over the following decades. 
Other states flirted with development programs but chose to abandon them.247 In all 
these cases, the development of nuclear weapons has involved a significant devotion of 
state resources, and prolonged endorsement by military and political leaders. The 
nuclear nonproliferation regime is currently under strain, primarily from defectors such 
as North Korea and Iran, but also because the existing nuclear powers have failed to 
hold up their end of the nuclear grand bargain and work towards complete disarmament. 
From a historical point of view it is worth noting here that nuclear weapons, with their 
sobering power to end all human life, have dominated strategic discourse for over sixty 
years, despite not having killed a single person since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Guided Projectile Weapons 
The technologies that allowed for extended human control of projectile weapons at 
various stages of their flight paths encapsulate several features of weapons diffusion and 
thus provide a good example of 20th century advanced technology diffusion. Guided 
weapons were developed out of a need to address the inaccuracy of standard bombs 
when dropped from airplanes, as it was far more difficult to establish reliable ballistic 
trajectories than was the case with artillery. The first guided, as opposed to aimed, 
munitions made their debut in 1942, with the German Fritz-X guided bombs whose 
flight paths could be modified to some extent by radio control. This prompted the 
expected mirror response by the Allies, who developed the AZON, RAZON and 
TARZON guided bombs. Miniaturization of electronic components led to the 
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deployment of the Walleye EOGB (Electro-optical Glide Bomb) in 1962, which utilized 
television cameras to home in on its targets,248 followed by laser-guided bombs used 
from the later stages of the Vietnam War onwards. Guided weapons are thus another 
example of novel high-technology weapons systems that initially did not perform to 
expectations, but consistently improved to the point where ‘take-off’ could occur and 
they would become indispensable weapons on the modern battlefield. 
 
The development of the ballistic missile can be traced back to Chinese fireworks 
through to the Congreve rockets of the nineteenth century, but the first use of large-
scale missiles occurred following the German development of the V-2 during the 
Second World War. This has been described as representing a military takeover of what 
was essentially a civilian invention up to that time,249 but it can also be argued to 
constitute an example of the folly of vacillation in adopting an innovation. Ernest 
Volkman argues that it was Hitler’s dithering regarding full endorsement of the V-2 
until 1943 which delayed its deployment until 1944, too late to have any militarily 
significant impact on the war,250 although there continues to be debate over whether the 
technology would have been ready until 1944 regardless. In any event, the weapon’s 
potential had been appreciated since the Allies had first learned of the weapon from the 
famous ‘Oslo Report’ in 1939. 
 
In the post-war environment, the U.S. is argued to have ‘hedged’ its weapons innovation 
program; in order to account for the abundant uncertainties with the new weapon, the 
U.S. pursued multiple research efforts to the point of procurement but no further, rather 
than fully implementing any specific weapons.251 This weapons development strategy 
seems to have paid off when, a few years later, the invention of the hydrogen bomb 
enabled lighter warheads, thereby making intercontinental ballistic missile delivery 
vehicles a feasible option for part of the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent.252 Ballistic 
missiles have since become one of the most sought-after pieces of military technology, 
proving to be within the capabilities of several states outside of the major powers and 
leading to separate attempts at arms control. For example, in the case of Iraq, Saddam 
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Hussein purchased the basic Soviet missile technology and then proceeded to 
successfully retrofit and adapt these missiles to perform new, expanded missions that 
met his requirements in both the Iran-Iraq and first Gulf Wars.253 Such occurrences no 
doubt encouraged many other actors, who have embarked upon similar large-scale 
indigenous weapons development programs, including North Korea and Iran. 
 
In terms of air-to-air missiles, the first success actually emerged from a secret, 
unauthorized development project undertaken by maverick U.S. navy weapons 
engineers in 1953 to produce the AIM-9 sidewinder heat-seeking missile.254 This is yet 
another illustration in a long line of historical examples, that under certain conditions, a 
small group of resourceful and committed actors can produce a significant weapons 
innovation. Another set of cases where an actor outside the official military structure of 
a great power innovated to produce an asymmetric weapon can be found in the Israeli 
weapons development experience. Hoyt describes the production of several weapons 
and weapon systems, including the Gabriel ship-to-ship missile and the first unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), which the Israelis succeeded in developing more rapidly and 
inexpensively than the major powers. In fact, several of these weapons systems then 
diffused to both superpowers and other periphery states, such as India.255  
 
Guided projectile weapons also serve as an example of an instance where increasing 
complexity in electronics and materials made the weapons more reliable and 
efficacious, rather than less, which cannot be said for all weapons systems. The 
remarkable growth in the performance of guided munitions can be summed up by 
comparing bombing efficiencies: during World War II, it took B-17 bombers flying 
4,500 sorties and dropping 9,000 bombs to have the same effect that today can be 
attained by a single F-117 on a single sortie dropping a single guided bomb.256 
Major Features of 20th Century Weapons Innovation and Diffusion 
As the pace of scientific advancement quickened, the military history of the twentieth 
century became more inextricably linked than any previous period with quests to create 
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and adopt ever more complex and destructive technologies. Unlike past demagogues 
like Napoleon or Alexander, many of the more insatiable and warmongering autocrats 
of the twentieth century, men such as Hitler or Saddam Hussein, became obsessed by 
military technologies and seduced by the siren songs of weapons that they believed 
could give substance to their delusions of power and domination. They were not the 
only ones – whether out of a sense of self-preservation or creative industry, most of the 
world’s military and political leaders eventually came around to a way of thinking that 
equated technological prowess with military success and national security. This shift in 
emphasis away from tactics and esprit and towards the technical was not always explicit 
or planned, nor was it always warranted. Nonetheless, in the behaviour of the world’s 
militaries, even if only intermittently in their stated objectives, the perception of the 
criticality of technology prevailed.257 
 
One consequence of this was the elevation in the military regard for the scientist, who 
quickly became as much an element of military thinking as any field commander or 
operational terrain. Since scientists would continue to discover and invent and 
technology would therefore invariably advance, military planners were driven by a 
‘technological imperative’258 to institutionalize or otherwise manage technological 
change. In the case of weapons, one option was to systematically import novel weapons 
systems in order to maintain parity with competitors. Where this was impossible, or 
where resources permitted, the second option was to steer the latest scientific 
developments in one’s own country towards exploitation by the military, as, for 
example, intended by the American Office of Scientific Research and Development 
during the Second World War, or the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
today. This long-term merging of the military and scientific establishments, while by no 
means historically unique, was unprecedented in scale and has been argued to have been 
more efficacious in terms of weapons innovation than either the military or scientists 
working alone.259 For example, the Allies in World War II are described as having 
benefited tremendously from ‘a centralized scientific research and development 
apparatus that could react quickly to any new threat, redirecting resources to come up 
                                                          
257 Although it is debatable whether it would ultimately have been effective, the initiation of the ‘Assault 
Breaker’ program by NATO during the Cold War had a tremendously unsettling effect on Soviet military 
planners, because they believed that NATO technological advances in computing and miniaturization 
would be able to offset the conventional military superiority of Warsaw Pact forces in Europe (Gray, pp. 
247-248). 
258 Buzan, p. 110. 
259 Rosen, pp. 249-250 
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with a counter’260  in that any emerging German technical advantage was quickly 
blunted. This trend is demonstrated perhaps most vividly with Operation Paperclip and 
equivalent initiatives, where the victorious powers scrambled to locate and recruit Nazi 
and Japanese scientists after World War II, who were spared the punitive measures 
meted out to their less technically-proficient compatriots. 
 
Moreover, the perception that conflicts could be won and lost by the creation of a 
decisive new weapon, a secret enfant terrible that might emerge in the hands of the 
enemy to turn the tide in his favour, meant that governments devoted ever greater shares 
of their national resources to military research and development. It also meant that any 
major weapons innovations were emulated far more rapidly than before, especially 
during times of war.261 Some have argued that this in turn led to an isolated 
institutionalization of weapons innovation, where ‘technological innovation [became] 
largely unaffected by the activities of potential enemies, a rather self-contained process 
in which actions and actors within the military establishment were the main 
determinants of innovation’.262 In a dangerous inversion of Clausewitz’s primary 
dictum, policy could thus come to serve war263 – or, more precisely, the threat of war, a 
condition excoriated by opponents of the so-called ‘military-industrial complex’. 
Whatever the veracity of such depictions – the reality probably lies somewhere between 
an exaggerated conspiracy and a completely sanguine civil-military partnership – a 
convincing case can be made that the first four decades of the twentieth century 
witnessed continual increases in the overall level of destructiveness with no 
insurmountable or persistent advantage accruing to any single actor. The inevitable 
result of this technological treadmill, one may argue, was the ultimate technological 
stalemate of MAD and mostly futile efforts ever since to step down from the precipice 
of nuclear Armageddon. 
 
In terms of the diffusion process itself, the twentieth century brought to light several 
dynamics that had not been seen previously or had merely been hinted at in previous 
                                                          
260 Volkman provides a convincing list of such technological ‘counterpunches’ (Volkman, p. 174). 
261 Indeed, Dunnigan (p. 17) credits the intense conflicts of the twentieth century (especially the two 
World Wars and the rivalries of the Cold War) as being responsible for the accelerated pace of weapons 
development in the twentieth century, with a decade to decade increase in development tempo. 
262 Rosen, p. 250. 
263 Van Creveld points towards Ballistic Missile Defence as a recent example of an innovation that was 
‘driven less by any clear idea as to [its] usefulness or even desirability than by the foibles of the powers 
that be’ (Van Creveld, p. 260). 
 311 
 
centuries. One of these is the role of champions within military structures that can 
sometimes override bureaucratic inertia or institutional resistance to adoption of a new 
weapon. Pierce argues that in the case of disruptive innovations, these champions may 
even have to disguise their work with a new weapon by portraying the innovation as an 
incremental advance and cites the example of Admiral Moffett and carrier warfare.264 
Another dynamic is the diffusion of weapons to allies. In some cases this occurs in a 
surprisingly unimpeded and, some might say, even hasty manner, two examples being 
the exclusive relationship between the United States, Britain, Australia and Canada, 
who ‘allow an all but free flow of information of military technical and organizational 
innovations’265 even when mutual perceptions of threat are absent, and when NATO 
members make familiar, accessible or politically expedient weapons adoption decisions 
even when certain systems are not the most effective.266 Soviet weapons diffusion to the 
Warsaw Pact demonstrated the converse approach with similar effects – there the 
coercive dissemination of innovations to its allies was driven by the political desires of 
the patron rather than the military needs of the client, thus resulting in weapons that 
were often ill-suited to the social, political and cultural contexts of the adopters.267   
 
 
                                                          
264 Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (New York: Routledge, 
2004), p. 183. 
265 Thomas-Durell Young, ‘Cooperative Diffusion’, in Goldman and Eliason, p. 111, 113. 
266 Goldman and Ross, p. 377. 
267 Jones, p. 117.  
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Appendix B: Case Study Tables 
Notes: For all of the tables below, space constraints necessitate abbreviating the variable names; for the full descriptions, see Table 4.1. The first time 
the value for a variable is presented for a particular organization, a justification for the selection of that value and appropriate citations are given in an 
attached endnote, unless the value is obvious from the case study. The ‘+’ or ‘–’ signs in parentheses denote the degree to which the variable is judged 
to affect the overall outcome, as described in Chapter 4 (with ‘.’ denoting no effect). Also, as detailed in Chapter 4, the totals in each column are 
derived by a simple algebraic sum of the scores for individual variables. Under the ‘Support Hypothesis’ column, ‘S’ denotes ‘supports hypothesis’, 
‘U’ denotes ‘undermines hypothesis’ and ‘-’ denotes ‘neither supports nor undermines hypothesis’. In Tables B.4 to B.6, the ‘C’ in the ‘Support 
Hypothesis’ columns refers to cyanide, while the ‘R’ refers to rockets. 
Table B.1.: PIRA-INLA Weapon Awareness Sub-Model 







Infrastructure  Developed1 (++) S Developed  (++) S
Social/Political Openness Yes2 (++) S Yes3 (++) S
Security Pressure  Yes4 (+) S Yes5 (.) S
PRIOR ADOPTION 
Networked (General) Highly6 (+) S Low7 (.) ‐
Networked (VNSAs)  Low8 (.) ‐ High9 (++) S
Demonstration (1st)  Unknown10 (.) ‐ Yes11 (++) S
Proselytization  No (.)12 ‐ No13 (.) ‐
State Sponsorship  Medium (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Serendipitous Acq.  No14 (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS






# of Successful prior adopters None16 (‐) U 117 (+) S
Prior Autarkic Adoption No18 (.) ‐ Yes19 (+) S
Size  Large20 (+) S Medium21 (.) ‐
Talent pool size  ?22 (.) ‐ Small23 (.) ‐
Centralization  Mixed24 (++) S Centralized25 (.) ‐
Learning Org.  Yes26 (++) S No27 (.) ‐
Skunkworks  Yes28 (+++) S No (.) ‐
Techne Org.  Medium29 (.) ‐ High30 (+) S
Mētis Org.  Low31 (.) ‐ High32 (+) S
Safe Haven  Yes33 (+) S Yes34 (+)
Access to Training Programmes ?35 (.) ‐ Yes36 (++) S
Resource Surfeit  No37 (.) ‐ No38 (.) ‐
Cognitive Biases  In favour39 (.) ‐ Against40 (‐) U
Follow‐the‐leader Bias No41 (.) ‐ No42 (.) ‐
Attitude towards Innovation In favour43 (+) S In favour 44 (+) S
Affinity for weapon / technology No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Ideological / Cultural Compatibility Unknown45 (.) ‐ ?46 (.) ‐
Perceived Urgency  Yes47(.) U No48 (.) ‐
Guardians of SQ  Yes49 (‐) U No50 (.) S
Active Searching  Yes (++)51 S Yes52 (++) S
Strategic Compatibility High53 (+) S High54 (+) S
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS
Information  (entire technology) Medium55 (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐
Techne Weapon  High56 (‐) U High  (‐) U
Commercialized Tech. Yes [Limited]57 (+) S Yes [Limited] (+) S
Observability  High (++) S High (++) S
Environmental Persistence Low (.) ‐ Low (.) ‐




Table B.2.: PIRA-INLA Adoption Decision Sub-Model 
  PIRA [Decided to Adopt Mortars] INLA [Did NOT Decide to Adopt Mortars]














Infrastructure  Developed (+)  S  Developed (+) S Developed (+) S Developed (+) S Developed  (+) U Developed (+) U
Security Pressure  Yes (‐)  U  Yes59 (‐) U Yes (‐) U Yes (‐)  U Yes (‐) S Yes (‐) S
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Demonstration (1st)  Unknown (.)  S  Yes60 (++) S Yes (++) S Yes (++)  S Yes (++) U Yes (++) U
Cultural Affinity 
(Homophily) 
No61 (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No62 (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ Yes63 (++) ‐ Yes (++) ‐
Proselytization  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Serendipitous Acq.  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Intergroup Competition  Yes64 (+)  S  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Yes (+)  S Yes65 (++) U No66 (.) ‐
PRIOR ADOPTION 
Demonstration (2nd)  Yes (+)  S  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Yes (+)  S Yes (+) U Yes (+) U
#of Successful Prior 
Adopters 
None (.)  ‐  None (.) ‐ None (.) ‐ None (.)  ‐ 1 (++) U 1 (++) U
ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS 







S Successful (+) S None (.) ‐ Successful69
(+) 
U
Size  Large (+)  S  Large (+) S Large (+) S Large (+)  S Medium (.) ‐ Small70 (‐) S
Talent Pool Size  Unknown (.)  ‐  Large (+) S Large (+) S Large (+)  S Small (‐) S Small (‐) S
Centralization  Moderate (.)  ‐  Moderate71
(.) 
‐ Low72 (+) S Low (+)  S Moderate (.) ‐ Low73 (+) U
Learning Org.  Yes (+)  S  Yes74 (+) S Yes (+) S Yes (+)  S No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Skunkworks  Yes (++)  S  Yes (++) S Yes (++) S Yes (++)  S No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Cohesiveness  High (++)  S  High (++) S Medium75 (.) ‐ Medium76 (.) ‐ Medium77 (.) ‐ Low78 (‐‐‐) S
Techne Org.  Medium (.)  ‐  High79 (++) S High (++) S High (++)  S High (++) U Medium80 (.) ‐
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Mētis Org.  Medium (.)  ‐  High81 (+++) S High (+++) S High (+++)  S Medium (.) ‐ Low82 (‐‐) S
KT Ratio (org)  Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ High (.) ‐
Safe Haven  Yes (+)  S  Yes83  (+) S Yes (+) S Unknown (.) ‐ Yes (+) U Unknown84 (.) ‐
Resource Surfeit  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No85 (.) ‐ No86 (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Access to Training 
Programmes 
Yes (+)  S  Yes87 (+) S Yes (+) S Unknown (.) ‐ Yes (+) U Unknown88 (.) ‐
Cognitive Biases  In favour (+)  S  In favour (+) S Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Against (‐) S Against89 (‐‐) S
Follow‐the‐leader Bias  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No90 (.) ‐
Attitude Towards 
Innovation 
In favour (++)  S  In favour (++) S In favour91
(++) 
S In favour (++) S In favour  (++) U Unknown92 (.) ‐
Affinity for Weapon / 
Technology 
No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Ideological Compatibility  Unknown93 (.)  ‐  Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐
Perceived Urgency  Yes (‐)  U  No94 (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Champion in Leadership  Unknown95 (.)  ‐  Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ No96 (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Veto Players  No97 (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.)  ‐ Partial98 (.) ‐ No99 (.) ‐





U  Multiple (‐) U Multiple (‐) U Multiple (‐) U Multiple104 (‐) S Unknown (.) ‐
Risk Tolerance  High105 (+)  S  High (+) S High106 (+) S High (+)  S High107 (+) U High108 (+) U
Active Searching  Yes (++)  S  Yes109 (++) S Yes110 (++) S Yes111 (+)  S Yes (+) U Yes112 (+) U
Need to Overcome 
Countermeasures 
Yes113 (+)  S  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Yes (+)  S Yes (+)114 U No115 (.) ‐
Need to Overcome 
Desensitized Public 
No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ Yes116 (+) S Yes (+)  S No117 (.) ‐ Yes118 (+) U
Perceived Advantages of 
Technology 
High (++)  S  High (++) S Unknown119
(.) 
‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown120 (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐





‐  Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown122 (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS 
Information (Entire Tech.)  Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐
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Techne Weapon  High (‐)  U  High (‐) U High (‐) U High (‐)  U High  (‐) S High (‐) S
Mētis Weapon  High123 (‐)  U  High (‐) U High (‐) U High (‐)  U High (‐) S High (‐) S



























Economies of Scale  Yes (+)  S  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Yes (+)  S Yes (+) U Yes (+) U
Trialability   Moderate124 
(.) 
‐  Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐
Observability   High (+)  S  High (+) S High (+) S High (+)  S High (+) U High (+) U
Stability  Moderate (.)  ‐  Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐
Life Span  High (+)  S  High (+) S High (+) S High (+)  S High (+) U High (+) U
Env. Persistence  Low (.)  ‐  Low (.) ‐ Low (.) ‐ Low (.)  ‐ Low (.) ‐ Low (.) ‐
Active Opp. of Possessors  Partial (.)  ‐  Partial (.) ‐ Partial (.) ‐ Partial (.)  ‐ Partial (.) ‐ Partial (.) ‐







Table B.3.: PIRA-INLA Adoption Success Sub-Model 
  PIRA [Were Successful] INLA [Did NOT Attempt]














Infrastructure  Developed (+)  U  Developed (+) S Developed (+) S Developed (+)  S  Developed (+) N/A Developed (+) N/A
Social/Political 
Openness  
Yes (.)  ‐  Yes (.) ‐ Yes (.) ‐ Yes (.) ‐  Yes (.) N/A Yes (.) N/A
Security Pressure  Yes (‐‐)  S  Yes (‐‐) U Yes (‐‐) U Yes (‐‐) U  Yes (‐ ‐) N/A Yes (‐ ‐) N/A
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Networked (Genl)  High (+)  U  High (+) S High (+) S High (+) S  Low (.) N/A Low (.) N/A
Networked (VNSA)  Low (.)  ‐  High (++) S High (++) S Medium  (+)  S  High (++) N/A Medium (+)125 N/A
Demonstration (1st)  Unknown (.)  ‐  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Yes (+) S  Yes (+) N/A Yes (+) N/A
Cultural Affinity 
(Homophily) 
No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  Yes (+) N/A Yes (+) N/A
Proselytization  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
State sponsorship  Medium (+)126  U  High (++) S High (++) S Unknown (.)  ‐  No (.) N/A No127 (.) N/A




None (.)  ‐  None (.) ‐ None (.) ‐ None (.) ‐  1 (+) N/A 1 (+) N/A
ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS 
Age of Group  0‐2 (.)  ‐  3‐5 (.) ‐ 6‐18 (+) S 19‐29 (+) S  0‐12 (.) N/A 13‐25 (+) N/A
Prior Autarkic 
Adoption 





‐ Successful (+) S Successful (+)  S  None (.) N/A Successful 
(.)128 
N/A
Size  Large (+)  U  Large (+) S Large (+) S Large (+) S  Medium (.) N/A Small (.) N/A
Talent Pool Size  Unknown (.)  ‐  Large (+) S Large (+) S Large (+) S  Small (‐) N/A Small (‐) N/A
Centralization  Moderate (+)  U  Moderate (+) S Low (.) ‐ Low (.) ‐  Moderate (+) N/A Low (.) N/A
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Spatial Proximity  Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.)  ‐  Low129 (.) N/A Low (.) N/A
Learning Organization  Yes (++)  U  Yes (++) S Yes (++) S Yes (++) S  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Skunkworks  Yes (++)  U  Yes (++) S Yes (++) S Yes (++) S  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Cohesiveness  High (+)  U  High (+) S Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) N/A Low (‐ ‐) N/A
Techne Org.  Medium (.)  ‐  High (++) S High (++) S High (++) S  High (+ +) N/A Medium (.) N/A
Mētis Org.  Medium (.)  ‐  High (++) S High (++) S High (++) S  Medium (.) N/A Low (‐) N/A
KT Ratio 
(organization) 
Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.)  ‐  Medium N/A High N/A
Safe Haven  Yes (+)  U  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Unknown (.)  ‐  Yes (+) N/A Unknown (.) N/A
Resource Surfeit  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Access to Training 
Programmes 
Yes (+)  U  Yes (+) S Yes (+) S Unknown (.)  ‐  Yes (+) N/A Unknown (.) N/A
Cognitive Biases  N/A (.)  ‐  N/A (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.)  ‐  Against (‐) N/A Against (‐)130 N/A
Follow‐the‐leader Bias  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Ideological 
Compatibility 
Unknown (.)  ‐  Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.)  ‐  Unknown (.) N/A Unknown (.) N/A
Perceived Urgency  Yes (‐)  S  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Champion in 
Leadership 
Unknown (.)  ‐  Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.) ‐ Unknown (.)  ‐  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Veto Players  No (.)  ‐  No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  Partial (.) N/A No (.) N/A
Guardians of SQ  Yes (‐)  S  Yes (‐) U No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A No (.) N/A
# of Weapons Needed 
/ Desired 
Multiple  (‐)  S  Multiple (‐) U Multiple (‐) U Multiple (‐)  U  Multiple (‐)  N/A Unknown (.) N/A









Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.)  ‐  Medium (.) N/A Medium (.) N/A
Techne Weapon  High (‐)  S  High (‐) U High (‐) U High (‐) U  High (‐) N/A High (‐) N/A
Mētis Weapon  High (‐‐)  S  High (‐‐) U High (‐‐) U High (‐‐) U  High (‐ ‐) N/A High (‐ ‐) N/A
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Technology Maturity   Late (+)  U  Late (+) S Late (+) S Late (+) S  Late (+) N/A Late (+) N/A
Trialability  Moderate (.)  ‐  Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.) ‐ Moderate (.)  ‐  Moderate (.) N/A Moderate (.) N/A
Observability  High (+)  U  High (+) S High (+) S High (+) S  High (+) N/A High (+) N/A
Stability  High (+)  U  High (+) S High (+) S High (+) S  High (+) N/A High (+) N/A
Active Opp. of 
Possessors 
Partial (‐)  S  Partial (‐) U Partial (‐) U Partial (‐) U  Partial (‐) N/A Partial (‐) N/A
TOTAL SUCCESS 
SCORE 






















Infrastructure  Developed (++)133  U Developed (++) S  Developed (++) S
Social/Political Openness  Yes (++)134  U Yes (++) S  Yes (++) S
Security Pressure  No (.)135  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Networked (Genl)  Low (.)136  ‐ Low (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐
Networked (VNSAs)  Low (.)  ‐ High (++)137 S  High (++) S
Demonstration (1st)  C: No (.); R: No (.)138 ‐ C: No (.); R: No (.) ‐ C: No (.)139; R: No (.) ‐
Proselytization  C: No (.); R: No (.)  ‐ C: Yes (+++); R: Yes (+++)140 C: S; R: S  C: Yes (+++); R: Yes141 (+++) C: S; R: S
State Sponsorship  No (.)  ‐ No (.) ‐ No142 (.) ‐
Serendipitous Acq.  C: No (.); R: No (.)  ‐ C: Yes (+++); R: No (.) C: S; R: ‐  No (.) ‐
PRIOR ADOPTION 
Demonstration (2nd)  C: No (.); R: Yes (+)143 C: ‐; R: U C: No (.); R: Yes (+) C: ‐; R: U  C: No (.); R: Yes144 (+) C:‐; R: S
# of Successful Prior 
Adopters 
C: None (.); R: Few (+)145 C: ‐; R: U C: None (.); R: Few (+) C: ‐; R: S  C: None (.); R: Few (+) C: ‐ ; R: S
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Prior Autarkic Adoption  No (.)  ‐ Yes (+)146 S  Yes147 (+) S
Size  Small (.)148  ‐ Med to Large (+) S  Small (.) ‐
Talent Pool Size  N/A (.)149  ‐ Small (.) ‐ Small (.) ‐
Centralization  High (.)150  ‐ High (.) ‐ High (.) ‐
Learning Organization  No (.)151  ‐ No (.) ‐ Yes152 (++) S
Skunkworks  No (.)  ‐ Yes (+++)153 S  No (.) ‐
Techne Org.  C: Low (‐); R: Low (‐) S C: Low (‐); R: Medium (.)154 C: U; R: ‐  C: Low (‐); R: Medium155 (.) C: U; R: ‐
Mētis Org.  C: Low (.); R: Low (.) ‐ C: Low (.); R: Medium (.)156 ‐ C: Low (.); R: Medium157 (.) ‐
Safe Haven  Yes (+)158  U Yes (+) S  No (.) ‐
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 Resource Surfeit  No (.)159  ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Access to Training Programs  No (.)  ‐ Yes (++)160 S  No161 (‐) U
Cognitive Biases  Indeterminate (.)162 ‐ Indeterminate (.) ‐ Yes (‐)163 U
Follow‐the‐leader Bias  No (.)  ‐ Yes (++)164 S  Somewhat165 (.) ‐
Attitude towards innovation  Unknown (.)166  ‐ In favour (+)167 S  In favour (+) S
Affinity for Weapon / Tech.  C: No (.); R: No (.)  ‐ C: No (.); R: Possible (.)168 ‐ C: No (.); R: Yes169 (+) C: ‐ ; R: S
Ideological Compatibility  C: Low (.); R: Low (.) ‐ C: High (+); R: High (+)170 S  C: High (+); R: High171 (+) S
Perceived Urgency  No (.)172  ‐ Yes (‐) U  No (.) ‐
Guardians of SQ  Low (.)173  ‐ Low (.) ‐ No174 (+) S
Active Searching  No (.)  ‐ Yes (++)175 S  ?176 (.) ‐
Strategic Compatibility  C: No (.); R: No (.)177 ‐ C:? (.); R:? (.) ‐ No178 (.) ‐
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS 
Information (Entire Tech.)  C: Low (.); R: Medium (.)179 ‐ C: Low (.); R: Medium (.) ‐ C: Low (.); R: Medium (.) ‐










C: ‐ ; R: U C: Medium (.); R: High (++) C: ‐ ; R: S  C: Medium (.); R: High (++) C: ‐ ; R: S
Environmental Persistence  C: Low (.)183; R: Low (.) ‐ C: Low (.); R: Low (.) ‐ C: Low (.); R: Low (.) ‐
















































N/A Developed (+) C: S; R: U Developed 
(+) 
C: S; R: S Developed (+) U Developed (+) C: S; R: U







































C: S; R: ‐ No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐























































‐  Small (‐) S Medium (.) ‐
Talent Pool Size  N/A (.)  N/A Small (.) ‐ Small (.) ‐  Small (‐) S Small (‐) C: U; R: S
Centralization  High (.)  N/A High (.) ‐ High (.) ‐  High (.) ‐ Low (++) C: S; R: U
Learning Organization  No (.)  N/A No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  Yes (+) U Yes (+) C: S; R: U
Skunkworks  No (.)  N/A Yes (++) C: S; R: U Partial (+) C: S; R: S No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐



































Safe Haven  Yes (+)  N/A Yes (+) C: S; R: U Yes (+) C:S; R: S No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Resource Surfeit  No (.)  N/A No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) ‐ Yes (+) C: S; R: U
Access to Training 
Programmes 
No (.)  N/A Yes (.) ‐ ? (.) ‐  No (‐) S Partial (.) ‐
Cognitive Biases  Indeterminat
e (.) 
N/A Yes (+)195 C: S; R: U Yes (+) C: S; R: S Yes (.)196 ‐ Yes (+)197 C: S; R: U
Follow‐the‐leader Bias  No (.)  N/A Yes (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  Somewhat 
(+198) 
U Somewhat (+) C: S; R: U
Attitude towards innovation  Unknown (.)  N/A In favour (++) C: S; R: U In favour 
[strongly] 
(+++) 
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Perceived Urgency  No (.)  N/A Yes (‐‐) C: U; R: U Yes (‐‐) C: U; R: U No (.) ‐ Yes (‐‐) C: U; R: S












Veto Players  Yes (‐)  N/A No201 (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No202 (.) ‐ Yes (‐) C: U; R: S





















C: S; R: S Medium205 (.) ‐ High (C:+; R:+) C: S; R: U
Active Searching  No (.)  N/A Yes (++) C: S; R: U Yes (++) C: S; R: S ? (.) ‐ ? (.) ‐
Need to Overcome 
Countermeasures 
N/A  N/A No206 (.) ‐ Yes (+) C: S; R: S No207 (.) ‐ No (.) ‐
Need to Overcome 
Desensitized Public 



























































Mētis Weapon  C: Low (+); R:  N/A C: Low (+); R:  C: S; R: ‐ C: Low (+); R:  C: S; R: S C: Low (+); R:  C: U; R:  C: Low (+); R:  C: S; R: S
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N/A Developed (+) C: U Developed 
(+) 
C. U; R: U Developed (+) N/A Developed (+) U
Social/Political Openness  Yes (+)  N/A Yes (+) C: U Yes (+) C. U; R: U Yes (+) N/A Yes (+) U
Security Pressure  No (.)  N/A No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A Yes (‐‐) S
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Networked (Genl)  Low (.)  N/A Low (.) ‐ Low (.) ‐  Medium (.) N/A Medium (.) ‐
















































































‐  Small (.) N/A Medium (.) ‐
Talent Pool Size  N/A (.)  N/A Small (‐) C: S Small (‐) C: S; R: S Small (‐) N/A Small (‐) S
Centralization  High (+)  N/A High (+) C: U High (+) C: U; R: U High (+) N/A Low (.) ‐
Spatial Proximity of 
Organization Elements 
High (+)  N/A High (+) C: U High (+) C: U; R: U Partial223 (+) N/A No (.) ‐
Learning Organization  No (.)  N/A No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  Yes (++) N/A Yes (++) U
Skunkworks  No (.)  N/A Yes (++) C: U Partial (+) C: U; R: U No (.) N/A No (.) ‐



































Safe Haven  Yes (+)  N/A Yes (+) C: U Yes (+) C: U; R: U No (.) N/A No (.) ‐
Resource Surfeit  No (.)  N/A No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A Yes (+) U
Access to Training  No (.)  N/A Yes (+) C: U ? (.) ‐  No (‐) N/A Partial (.) ‐
Cognitive Biases  Indeterminat
e (.) 
N/A Yes (C: ‐‐; R: ‐‐‐) C: S Yes (C: ‐‐; R: ‐
‐‐) 
C: S; R: S Yes (‐)224 N/A Yes (‐‐) S














Perceived Urgency  No (.)  N/A Yes (‐) C: S Yes (‐) C: S; R: S No (.) N/A Yes (‐) S
Champion in Leadership  No (.)  N/A Yes (+) C: U Yes (+) C: U; R: U No (.) N/A Yes (+) U
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Veto Players  Yes (.)  N/A No (.) ‐ No (.) ‐  No (.) N/A Yes (‐) S














Determination  Medium (.)  N/A Medium (.) ‐ Medium (.) ‐  Partial226 (+) N/A Partial (+) U
Strategic Compatibility  C: No (.); R: 
No (.) 






















































































































Stability  C: High (+); R:  N/A C: High (+); R:  C: U C: High (+); R:  C: U; R: ‐ C: High (+); R:  N/A C: High (+); R:  C: U
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1 Although Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were experiencing similar economic problems to the rest of the developed world in the early 1970s, both countries had fairly 
modern infrastructures, at least in terms of access to information through print, radio or television. 
2 Although access to political power was practically cut off to Catholics in Northern Ireland at the time and there were curfews and similar arrangements in the North that curtailed 
activity somewhat for Republicans, there was generally freedom of movement between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and once in the Republic of Ireland, PIRA members 
would have enjoyed extensive freedom of operation and association. 
3 Similar to above. 
4 In this case, the security pressure arguably prompted the PIRA to look for new alternatives in order to circumvent countermeasures. 
5 There were intense security pressures, but there is no indication that this made the INLA more or less likely to be aware of new technology options. 
6 PIRA members were firmly embedded in their communities and there was a lot of support, especially in the Catholic communities in the north and several Republican-leaning areas 
in the Republic of Ireland. One example of this is the many local farms that were lent to the PIRA to build and test weapons (Coogan, p.34). 
7 The INLA did not have nearly as many connections in either their own community or with other states as the PIRA did. 
8 Although allegedly connected to the PLO as early as 1969, they did not form close connections with other organizations like ETA or the Breton militants until late 1971 or early 
1972 (Dillon, p. 392; Maloney, p.9). 
9 During this period, the INLA developed relationships with multiple (mostly leftist) extremist organizations, including the RAF, PLO, CCC, and Action Directe (see Chapter 6 for 
details).  
10 Although they might have had people in their own Republican network who had used mortars or encountered demonstrations among new-found friends (allegedly including the 
PLO as early as 1969 (Craig and Geldard p. 65) as well as elements of the Irish government like Captain James Kelly – see Dillon, p. 15) there is no direct evidence of this. 
11 As noted in Chapter 6, the OIRA had planned to use mortars and the PIRA had already made numerous attempts during this period. 
12 There is no evidence of anyone trying to ‘sell’ the PIRA on mortars. 
13 There is no evidence of anyone from another organization or state encouraging the INLA to adopt mortars. 
14 There are no indications that the PIRA ‘stumbled upon’ a mortar system at any point in time. 
15 It is likely that in the military manuals the PIRA were consulting they would have come across the possibility of mortars. 
16 As far as the author is aware, no other terrorist or insurgent group had utilized mortars by this time. 
17 During this period, the PIRA had successfully demonstrated their adoption of the mortar. 
18 While still working on adopting a variety of improvised explosive and incendiary devices, at this stage the PIRA probably did not regard any of these as being completely 
successful. 
19 The adoption of the mercury tilt switch had been a success. 
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20 After the disruptive social events (riots and so forth) of the late 1960s, recruits had flooded into the new PIRA. In 1970, the PIRA was estimated to have around six hundred active 
volunteers (Toolis, pp.23-24) with several hundred more supporters (English, p.114). 
21 The size of the organization varied throughout the period, from ‘several hundred’ to around forty (see Chapter 6). 
22 While the PIRA had many recruits join during this period, most of these probably lacked the requisite techne and mētis. The PIRA did have a cadre of trained technicians in the 
ED, but it is unclear whether during this early period they had the high levels of both techne and mētis related to weapons development that they did in later periods. 
23 See Chapter 6. 
24 This is a mixed variable, since the PIRA contained some aspects of high control from the centre as well as more decentralized elements. Up until the late 1970s, the PIRA was 
structured hierarchically, with most power residing in the centre with the Army Council (Coogan, p. 379), but individual units still had a high degree of autonomy (Jackson, 2005, 
p.134; O’Doherty Interview). Since there were at least some elements of decentralization, the score will be given as if the group was decentralized. 
25 Although there was no leader with absolute control, during this period, major operations were directed and approved by Seamus Costello, followed by Ronnie Bunting and then 
Dominic McGlinchey. 
26 Although many of its institutionalized learning practices are not explicitly described until later periods, there is still evidence that even the early PIRA sought to learn from its 
initial mistakes (such as the example of learning from the McCabe and other ‘own goals’ – see Oppenheimer, p.255 and Jackson, 2005, p. 98). 
27 See Chapter 6 – the INLA did not display most of the traits of a learning organization. 
28 It is unclear exactly when the ED was set up, but all indications are that it was in place by the early 1970s. 
29 At this point the organization was still consolidating its technical skills, which had not reached a high level of proficiency yet in explosives or other technologies related to mortars. 
30 While this is open to some debate, by the late seventies the INLA had demonstrated high proficiency in improvised explosives, including the Mount Gabriel and Airey Neave 
attacks. 
31 While developing large amounts of mētis extremely rapidly, at this early stage, the organization was still developing its mētis, which was fairly low (see Oppenheimer, p.254). 
32 At least some members of the organization had become proficient in shooting and bomb attacks, so at this point their mētis was probably quite high in terms of conducting attacks 
with these weapons. 
33 As noted in Chapter 6, the PIRA enjoyed a safe haven in the Republic of Ireland. 
34 While the INLA was primarily an urban-based organization, during this phase it was able to maintain certain training and other activities in the Republic of Ireland, although not to 
the extent of the PIRA. 
35 There are reports (Craig and Geldard, p. 65) that IRA volunteers did train with the PLO before the split, which may have exposed them to the use of mortars, but this is speculative. 
36 Reportedly, INLA representatives attended training camps in Lebanon (Magill, p.20) and Palestinian experts came to Ireland to train INLA cadre in explosives, particularly car 
bombs (Craig and Geldard, p.68). 
37 See Chapter 6. 
38 See Chapter 6 for a description of the INLA’s financial woes. 
39 The youthful recruits to the new PIRA were intent on striking back at the RUC, Protestants and British in any way they could, with scant regard for the human consequences of 
their actions. For instance, Oppenheimer describes the state of mind of people like O’Doherty at the time as, ‘Preoccupation with the technicalities of bomb-making and deployment, 
and the excitement and power that entails’ (Oppenheimer, p.269). 
40 As described in Chapter 6, both leaders and rank and file members displayed egotism and a desire for self-glorification. Some of the leaders also apparently were narcotics users 
(Cusack interview). This may have had a slight negative effect on the ability to be open to new possibilities. 
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41 Although the PIRA operated strategically and structurally based on a tradition of armed republicanism that went back to the Fenians (Oppenheimer, pp.40-56), there is no 
indication that there was any prior or contemporary model for the PIRA that utilized mortars. 
42 There are no indications that the INLA sought to follow in the footsteps of the PIRA or any other group – in fact they wanted to outdo these groups, but not necessarily using the 
same means. 
43 While during this period some of the old guard who set up the IRA were a little reticent at first to endorse exploring novel methods, the young new recruits who had flocked to the 
organization, like Shane Paul O’Doherty, were extremely keen on innovating and, because there was a surfeit of young volunteers, the leadership generally acquiesced in leaving 
some to their own devices to experiment; in other words, the influx of new members resulted in the PIRA ‘breeding tinkerers at the back’ even in the early 1970s (O’Doherty 
interview). 
44 See Chapter 6 and McDonald and Holland, p.396. 
45 Although not a strong connection, if anything the tendency of mortars to be somewhat inaccurate and hence indiscriminate in their effects, would tend to make them a little less 
compatible with the PIRA’s avowed belief in not causing civilian casualties, at least in Northern Ireland. However, in practice, while not specifically targeting civilians, the PIRA 
never seemed to be particularly averse to causing civilian casualties, usually justifying them as collateral damage in their war. In addition, attacks on the British mainland expressly 
targeted civilians.  
46 There are no indications whether mortars would be particularly compatible or incompatible with the INLA’s ideology. 
47 The PIRA certainly felt the need to ‘take on’ the British / RUC and overcome their countermeasures as soon as possible in the period 1969-1971. 
48 Other than their general desire to attack the enemy and keep the organization together, there was no real sense of urgency to engage in attacks. There were certainly concerns about 
the future of the organization, both structurally and financially, but these did not really lend a sense of urgency as such, except perhaps within the first few months of the 
organization’s existence. 
49 As noted in Chapter 6, there were many old guard leaders at this time who opposed innovation. 
50 There are no specific indications of any guardians of the status quo within the INLA. 
51 The PIRA was actively looking for weapons (Dillon, p. 388; English, p. 115; Moloney, pp.114-115) during this period and were reading military manuals and new product 
magazines for new ideas (O’ Doherty Interview). 
52 Seamus Costello was obsessed with finding weapons with which to arm his new organization (McDonald and Holland, p. 135), and even after his death much of the focus was on 
procuring arms, e.g., following the Barna Gap robbery in 1978. Yet almost all of the discussion surrounding the INLA’s weapons acquisition concerns fairly traditional automatic 
firearms and explosives rather than rockets or mortars. It is probable, however, that the group was in active procurement mode and would have paid attention to news of any weapon 
upon which they could lay their hands. 
53 See Chapter 6 for an in-depth discussion of the way in which mortars met the PIRA’s strategic needs. 
54 See Chapter 6 for a description of how the INLA had similar strategic concerns to the Provisionals; however, the INLA ostensibly were less interested in destroying some 
commercial targets because it was contrary to the interests of the working class (Craig and Geldard, p. 13). However, if used correctly, mortars could still be focused on security 
force and government targets. 
55 While the basic functions of mortars were fairly well-known, aspects of their use and construction were available mainly in state militaries and this variable does not receive a 
positive score. 
56 Mortars were a weapon that was more sophisticated than small arms, hand grenades or improvised explosives and required some degree of skill even to operate, let alone produce. 
57 Mortars were available at the time on the international arms market, but – at least for the legitimate part of this market – purchase was limited to states. 
58 Mortars were primarily available for sale to states, but there were no active international controls on their sale or transfer. 
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59 This was operative throughout the period, from internment, to Operation Motorman and the use of targeted killings, infiltration and informants in the 1980s. See Bradley and 
Feeney (pp. 206, 259 and 289) for examples. 
60 Their own previous attempts serve as a demonstration for later decisions. 
61 It is unclear whether the PIRA actually adopted mortar technology from any external actors, but supposing that it did, the most likely suppliers would have been the PLO, with 
whom Irish Republicans did not have any cultural similarities. 
62 The reported attempts to purchase mortars externally in 1977 again involved the PLO (Dillon, p. 399), with whom the PIRA had little cultural similarities. Thereafter, the next 
most likely supplier would have been the Libyans, which was again hardly an instance of homophily. 
63 During both phases, there were similar entities – the PIRA and OIRA – who had attempted to, or actually used, mortars. While there were intense strategic and political differences 
between the INLA and these organizations, culturally and socially there were similarities in background and membership, i.e., Republican, Catholic and predominantly working 
class. 
64 The PIRA initially competed with the OIRA, then with the INLA and later with the IPLO, which the Provisionals essentially wiped out in 1992. 
65 There was, of course, the 1975 feud between the INLA and the OIRA, but the INLA was also driven to compete with the PIRA (see McDonald and Holland, p.265; Dillon, p. 261).  
66 During the second phase, the internal instability of the INLA relegated any competition to the backburner, in fact, there are reports (McDonald interview) that the two 
organizations actually collaborated during the early 1990s. Parts of the INLA did compete with the IPLO, but others cooperated with it, so on balance, there does not seem to have 
been a large intergroup rivalry.  
67 This refers to the organization’s early attempts at producing explosives. 
68 Previous models of mortars qualify here. 
69 The mercury tilt switch is the seminal example here. 
70 The feuding, supergrass trials and other factors led to the INLA’s active membership being restricted to several dozen active members; estimates are between forty to fifty persons 
(see Chapter 6, ftn 189). 
71 In operational terms, the local units, at least at the Brigade level, had a lot of autonomy (O’Doherty interview). 
72 With the introduction of Active Service Units in the late 1970s, which were largely responsible for their own funding and targeting, operations became even more decentralized 
(Maloney, pp.156-157; Toolis, p. 319). 
73 As detailed in Chapter 6, there were multiple loci of power and command during this period, with different factions vying for control and acting independently. 
74 See Jackson, 2005, passim, Maloney, p.174, and Horgan and Taylor, p. 27 for evidence that the PIRA acted as a learning organization over the entire period.  
75 In the mid-to-late 1970s, the PIRA experienced a degree of factionalization as the old guard based in Dublin were displaced by a new crop of reformers in the North led by Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuiness. By 1986, however, the new faction had gained control of the organization (for more detail see Dillon, p.54, 75; Bradley and Feeney, p.175). 
76 During this period there was internal friction over the central leadership surrounding Gerry Adams beginning to emphasize the political work of Sinn Fein over military operations, 
which many stalwarts of the armed struggle (correctly) viewed as a prelude to a peace process and the giving up of arms. 
77 There was a fair amount of internal dissension during this period, but the organization had strong leaders who kept it together. 
78 As detailed in Chapter 6, the INLA was riven by feuds during the second phase. 
79 See Chapter 6. 
80 Owing to a loss of key personnel through feuds and incarceration, and the quality of new recruits declining over the second period, it can be assumed that the general degree of 
technical knowledge decreased considerably. It is certainly true that there were no new technical innovations during this period.  However, since it is not known for certain how large 
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the diminution in technical capabilities was and we know that the group retained basic bomb-making abilities as late as 2005 (John Mooney, ‘Dissident Republicans Linked to 
Dublin Pipe Bombs’, Sunday Times, London (June 1, 2008), p.8), to be conservative, the value is only reduced to ‘medium’. 
81 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the capabilities of PIRA personnel. Also see Jackson, 2005, pp. 107, 121 and Coogan, p. 384. 
82 It can be assumed that mētis also decreased together with techne, by an even greater amount – it is reported that from the late 1980s until 1992, for example, the INLA had failed to 
kill or seriously injure a single member of the security forces (McDonald and Holland, p. 416) – even after the feud had subsided. 
83 These persisted throughout the Troubles, although by the late 1980s, the Garda had become more proficient at identifying and raiding PIRA safe-houses, storage depots and 
factories in the Republic. 
84 By the late 1980s, it appeared that the Garda had begun to pursue the INLA more rigorously, and the organization had been eviscerated by feuds and infiltrators, but it is unknown 
to what extent this affected their safe-houses in the Republic and elsewhere. 
85 Oppenheimer (p.154) states, ‘The IRA’s finances actually came under pressure during the 1980s due to further infiltration of the organization with highly placed informers, as well 
as demands on funding by Sinn Fein’s increased political activity.’ 
86 Despite its multiple sources of income, Maloney (pp. 459-460) argues that by the mid-1990s, ‘… the organization was broke and owed money everywhere, not least to Slab 
Murphy, who had lent the IRA some of the proceeds from his cross-Border business operations, and had not been repaid.’ 
87 Although most of the cadre either learned themselves or were trained internally by the PIRA, at least some members were trained in Libya (Coogan, p. 436) or with Fatah 
(Oppenheimer, p. 97) and others, such as Danny McNamee, attended university to hone their skills. This occurred during the 1970s, and it is unclear to what extent it continued 
thereafter. See Chapter 6 for details. There may also have been a PIRA training camp in Algeria (see Craig and Geldard, p. 67). 
88 There is no evidence of any new training programmes in the second phase and it is unclear whether or not the INLA still had access to its earlier training programmes. 
89 The same biases persisted into the second phase as in the first, except perhaps even exacerbated by the brutality of the internal fighting and hatred as former comrades turned on 
each other. 
90 See endnote 42. 
91 An example that indicated that the PIRA was still an innovative organization in general is the following from Eamon McGuire, ‘ “So, I felt, here was an army that had all the latest 
training, weaponry and technical know-how: was there any way that I could help to face down such an army?” Could I confuse their technicians, second-guess their strategies and 
their tactics? I returned to the desert of the Middle East to work out how the cutting-edge technology of that time could be integrated into modern guerrilla warfare to offset all these 
enemy advantages’ (McGuire, pp.211-212). 
92 There is no information after the early period of the INLA seeking to adopt new practices or technology. 
93 See endnote 45. 
94 After their initial flurry of activity in establishing themselves, there is no evidence that the PIRA ever perceived a high degree of urgency in its operations. 
95 There is no clear evidence of any single individual within the upper echelons of the PIRA who championed mortar development. 
96 While there were several members generally in favour of innovative attacks, there is no evidence of any member, least of all a member of the leadership, pushing for mortars. 
97 There is no mention of any specific veto players in the organization as a whole – decisions were taken mostly collaboratively within the Army Council – or specifically with 
respect to mortars. 
98 Costello had a powerful voice, but even he was disobeyed by the Belfast membership on occasion; however, when McGlinchey took over, he ruled with an iron fist and could have 
been said to have possessed veto authority. 
99 Most of the leaders in the second phase were fairly weak and cannot be said to have had veto authority, especially in the presence of so many factions. Neither could any of the 
individual faction leaders veto any decisions of the other factions, except through assassinating the other leaders. 
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100 See Jackson, 2005, p.136. 
101 After 1973, there is no evidence of any individuals who pushed the organization in a conservative tactical direction. 
102 There is no evidence that there were any such actors active in the group during this phase. 
103 The PIRA clearly sought to use mortars extensively. 
104 While it is unknown how many mortars the INLA might have sought, they generally wanted to carry out as many attacks as possible during this period, so it can be inferred that 
they would have preferred more than a handful of mortar systems. 
105 See, for example, Oppenheimer, p.249, O’Doherty, p. 41, Bradley and Feeney, p.121 and O’Doherty interview. 
106 The record of risk tolerance from the 1980s on is mixed. On the one hand there are many reports that operations were routinely cancelled if they were viewed as too risky 
(Bradley and Feeney, p. 280), while at the same time the Engineering Department embarked on the extremely risky and potentially hazardous production of detonators 
(Oppenheimer, p. 204). Since we are concerned here mainly with the production of weapons, we will take the latter activity as indicative that at least the technicians were still willing 
to take substantial risks for the cause. 
107 The INLA engaged in many risky behaviours, such as the Mount Gabriel attack and the St. Patrick’s Cathedral plot (McDonald and Holland, p.161). See also McDonald and 
Holland, p. 93. 
108 There is no evidence to suggest that their risk tolerance decreased. 
109 During this phase, the PIRA was still intent on building up its weapons capabilities as much as possible (Dillon, pp.393-394; Brian and Feeney, p.96). 
110 If anything, the PIRA increased their attempts to expand their arsenal during this period, engaging in acquisition activities ranging from buying up all the Memopark timers they 
could purchase to use in bombs (Craig and Geldard, p.39), to attempts to buy a Red-eye missile in the United States (Moloney, p.16), to becoming involved with the large Libyan 
arms shipments of the mid-1980s. Also, see McGuire, p. 227. Most of all, there is evidence of a continued interest in mortars, with the PIRA reportedly attempting to smuggle them 
in the 1977 electric transformer smuggling case (Dillon, p. 399-400). 
111 Despite losing Libyan assistance and much of its American supply lines, the PIRA was still intent on acquiring a range of weapons during this period. The evidence found during 
the Garda raid on the Clonaslee arms ‘factory’ in 1996 revealed ‘forty mortar tubes, Semtex, large amounts of ammonia and nitrate used in homemade explosives, along with 
switches, timers, detonators, guns, tail fins and other mortar parts’ (Oppenheimer, p.359), which indicated that their interest in mortars was undiminished. Also, see McGuire, p.263. 
112 Although not very successful in the second phase, the INLA still seemed to be looking for weapons wherever they could find them, including sourcing from black market dealers 
(McDonald and Holland, p.430) and even utilizing the services of William Wallace Norton, a retired Walt Disney screenwriter, in an attempt to smuggle weapons into Ireland (J.L. 
Stone Jr., ‘Irish Terrorism Investigations’, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (October 1987), pp. 22-23). However there are no indications that they were specifically searching for a 
mortar capability in either phase. Nonetheless, it is assumed that they were still actively searching for weapons that could fulfil their perceived needs, as in the initial phase. 
113 See the accompanying discussion for the countermeasures that spawned the first interest in mortars. This persisted right through the 1980s and into the 1990s. There were, for 
example, almost no other options for a direct, targeted attack on Number 10 Downing Street than mortars. For the general need to circumvent British countermeasures, see 
Oppenheimer, pp. 150, 199, 204, 141, 277; Collins and McGovern, p. 156; and McGuire, pp. 256-257. 
114 During the early stages, there were clear attempts to reach targets despite countermeasures (cf. the Neave assassination), but this was not as strong as in the case of the PIRA. 
115 Since there was very little activity against the security forces during this period, but more a struggle for survival from internal and external threats, there is no evidence of a desire 
to circumvent the target hardening by the authorities. 
116 There are multiple examples of public outcry over the actions of the terrorists in Northern Ireland, although on the mainland, Oppenheimer (p. 29) opines that the British public 
had become inured to the violence of the PIRA over the years. 
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117 There is no evidence that the public had become desensitized to the Troubles during this phase. In fact, both sides (Catholic and Protestant) routinely expressed outrage at the 
INLA’s actions, for example, see McDonald and Holland, p. 260. 
118 See endnote 116.  
119 After some success had been achieved with the advent of the Mark 6, most subsequent models demonstrated a more moderate change from the status quo. This was not 
necessarily how these would be perceived, though, so the value for this variable after 1974 is given as ‘Unknown’. 
120 There are no indications how the INLA might have viewed mortars with respect to the status quo – while the INLA no doubt would have liked to attack hardened targets, they 
also seemed content to concentrate on their existing shooting and bombing activities. 
121 There is no available information (short of the fact that the PIRA persisted with its mortar efforts), regarding how key decision-makers perceived the ease of acquiring mortars. 
122 There is no evidence as to how the INLA viewed mortars in terms of ease of acquisition or use. 
123 As shown by the initial failures not only to produce a reliable weapon, but to even use it discriminately, it can be assumed that the mētis required for using (and even more so for 
developing) a mortar system is substantial. 
124 In terms of internal development, trialability is relatively low – one has to commit to quite a lot of investment before being able to fire the first shot. A ready-made, commercial 
system is readily trialable though. 
125 Almost all reports of INLA connections with other VNSAs end in the mid-1980s, with the last report referring to the INLA’s rejection of a Libyan offer of arms. By 1987, the 
INLA’s main contact in the European extremist left, Action Directe, was essentially destroyed, thus cutting off this line of support. However, INLA’s links with Fatah and other PLO 
factions, as well as other sympathizers in Europe, may have continued past this date. 
126 During this period, although there were some connections with Ireland and potentially Algeria and some Eastern European states, this was not as robust as in the mid-1970s or 
1980s when Libya was the PIRA’s main state benefactor. 
127 According to Holland and McDonald (pp. 303-304), in 1986 Libya approached the INLA with offers of weapons but these were rebuffed because the INLA lacked the capacity to 
absorb them. Besides certain Eastern European states allegedly turning a blind eye to the INLA’s activities, there was no real state sponsorship and the OIRA’s extensive links with 
groups such as the Stasi did not carry over to the INLA (McDonald interview). 
128 The mercury tilt switch and standard explosives rely on quite different technology than the propulsion systems required for mortars, so their success in these areas would not 
necessarily translate directly into prospects for success in the development of mortars. 
129 Throughout their existence, there were tensions between the Dublin and Belfast factions of the INLA, with many members spread out all over the island. According to Henry 
McDonald, they ‘were always stretched geographically’ (McDonald interview). 
130 It is unclear how the internal fighting of its members would bias their implementation of any adoption decisions, but their rash egotism (present throughout) is surely not 
conducive to successful development of a new weapons capability. 
131 During the early years under Costello and then McGlinchey, the INLA seemed to be completely committed to their militarism and causing as much mayhem as possible. After the 
feuds broke out in the second phase, it can be argued that the group was too distracted by internal rivalries to remain nearly as focused on their strategic or tactical objectives. 
132 Although the model prescribes a ‘++’ for commercially available technology, legitimate sale of mortars was generally limited to specific state actors. While the PIRA could have 
obtained these weapons on the black market, this was more difficult and fraught with the danger of interdiction (which is what mostly did occur with attempts to import mortars). 
This limited availability is thus reflected with a ‘+’. 
133 The United States was amongst the most developed nations on earth throughout the period of analysis. Even though the area in which the CSA compound was situated – the 
Ozarks – and many of the rural, sparsely populated areas where the Order operated out of were some of the least developed parts of the United States, the general infrastructure made 
almost any resources and technology available to the CSA and the Order. 
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134 The open democracy of the United States, especially the protections afforded to religious practice, weapons ownership and entrepreneurship, meant that there were no broader 
social constraints acting to inhibit awareness or adoption of innovations. In fact, the CSA enjoyed flaunting their weapons when they left their compound (Noble, p.81). 
135 While law enforcement (both at the local and federal levels) had been aware of the CSA and had some concerns as early as 1978 (Hamm, p. 107, Noble, p. 122) and had even 
discussed raiding the compound as early as 1983 (Memorandum: SAC, Little Rock to Director, FBI), it was not until 29 January 1985 that a full domestic terrorism investigation was 
launched (Declassified FBI Memorandum, Little Rock Office, dated 2 July 1987), and not until April 1985 that the compound was searched. There were no significant security 
pressures during the development of either the cyanide or the rocket plots. 
136 Throughout the entire period from 1976-1985, the CSA was isolated from the mainstream culture, as Kerry Noble states: ‘We were not content to be merely separated from 
society; we put ourselves in a position to be totally isolated and insulated from it. We rarely kept up with the news of the world. The only input we were eventually receiving was 
from publications by various neo-Nazi and KKK groups, other Christian survivalists groups, or individuals like John Todd – constantly feeding us fear, hate, and paranoia’ (Noble, p. 
113). 
137 From mid-1978 onwards, the CSA was increasingly embroiled in the far-right survivalist and Identity milieu (see Chapter 7). 
138 There is no indication that anyone within the right-wing milieu had used either cyanide or rockets during this period. 
139 See above endnote. Even though some Order members who had previously been at the CSA compound may have heard about the cyanide that CSA had on hand, this did not 
constitute a use of the weapon, which this variable applies to. 
140 Robert Miles had given the CSA the cyanide in 1981 and the Turner Diaries, with its tacit advocacy of rockets and mortars (see Chapter 7), had been published in 1978. 
141 Poisoning of water supplies had been advocated at the clandestine 1983 gathering of right-wing leaders. Rockets had been advocated in the Turner Diaries (see Chapter 7). 
142 Although they did not receive any state sponsorship, the Order made overtures to the Syrian government for support in their struggle against the Jews (Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 98-
100, 323; Hamm; p. 140-141, 147; Singular, pp. 246-247). 
143 The PIRA in particular had already made media headlines with their use of home-made mortars and rockets by this time (see PIRA case study). There were no prominent cases of 
cyanide use by militant groups to cause mass casualties during any of the three phases (the infamous Tylenol tampering case only occurred in September and October of 1982 and, 
moreover, was not a mass-casualty attack). The closest to a previous use of cyanide by the far right milieu occurred in 1970 when a stream which acted as the water supply for cattle 
on a farm in Alabama that was owned by African-American Muslims was poisoned, resulting in approximately 30 cows dying. Certain reports identified the poison as cyanide and 
the Ku Klux Klan may have been implicated, although both of these pieces of information are unclear. See, ‘Poison Is Suspected in Death of 30 Cows on a Muslim Farm’, New York 
Times (16 March 1970), p. 30. This case was unlikely to have served as a ‘demonstration’ of cyanide’s mass-casualty potential and is therefore not coded as such. 
144 See above. 
145 Throughout all phases, no state or non-state actor had used cyanide as a mass-casualty weapon. The PIRA and some of the Palestinian insurgent groups were among the few who 
had used rockets against their enemies by this time. 
146 From Phase II onwards, the CSA had successfully developed the capability to convert firearms on their own, as well as to produce firearm accessories like flash suppressors and 
silencers. 
147 The group had built some reasonably effective explosives in early 1984 (see Table 7.2). 
148 CSA had an estimated 50 members in 1978, 130 in 1982 prior to the split and only around 50-75 after the split (Noble, pp. 20; 86-87; CSA FBI Files 1982 Report; Grand Jury 
Testimony of James Ellison). 
149 In Phase I, there was no real weapons development, while even in Phases II and III, there were only ever a handful of members with the requisite techne and mētis. 
150 For its entire lifespan, the CSA was highly centred on James Ellison and the CSA compound (originally known as Zarephath-Horeb). 
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151 Although they trained hard and increased their military capabilities, there are no indications that the CSA consciously incorporated learning mechanisms within the organization, 
or even that they assessed failures methodically. 
152 The Order did analyse its operations and attempt to learn from its mistakes (although it was not always successful in implementing its learning). Examples include when Daniel 
Bauer and Denver Parmenter visited a university library to learn more about explosives in November 1983 (Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 106), when Richard Scutari was brought on board 
in order to improve security (Hamm, pp. 132-133), and when Bruce Pierce insisted that his cell of robbers attach lanyards to their weapons to avoid a repetition of Robert Mathew’s 
loss of his weapon during the Ukiah robbery (Flynn and Gerhardt, p. 282). 
153 From the second phase and the setting up of the machine shop to convert weapons, CSA had an entity whose specific function was to work on weapons, with Randall Rader 
actively exploring military matters. After Rader left the CSA, Kent Yates took over this role, but appeared to be less independent-minded than Rader and took orders from Ellison, 
thus making this function less independent of the central leadership. 
154 The CSA did not possess any chemical expertise throughout its lifespan, but it gained some machining and weapons expertise (related to rockets) after 1979. 
155 There is no evidence that anyone in the Order had any knowledge of how to work with or deploy cyanide. With respect to rockets, there was at least one member with machining 
knowledge (Rader) and several members with explosives knowledge. 
156 The CSA never worked with or recruited anyone who worked with cyanide. As for rockets, they had some experience converting firearms to automatic versions and producing 
silencers, as well as basic military tradecraft. After 1982, they also had several experiences of fielding weapons, but these were never very successful, which implies that their mētis 
with respect to explosives was medium at best. 
157 Similar to above with respect to cyanide. In addition to technical knowledge, Rader had experience in actually machining weapons, while Yarbrough and Pierce had actually 
manufactured explosives, at least a few times. 
158 Although not completely secure – the U.S. government had allegedly been able to infiltrate several informers over the years into the compound – the remoteness of the CSA 
property, as well as the freedoms afforded religious communities in the United States, meant that it could continue its weapons acquisition and development activities for several 
years without detection or disruption. 
159 The CSA, while able to pool sufficient money to buy substantial stocks of weapons, were mostly close to poverty for their entire lifespan (see Chapter 7). 
160 From late 1978, CSA members engaged in prolific military training programs (Noble, pp. 81; 91). These seem to have diminished after Rader left (Report of interview with Rudy 
Loewen (2 May 1985), presented as evidence in United States of America v. James D. Ellison et. al. (CR85-20017)), but most likely continued in some reduced fashion in Phase III. 
161 Initially, although some members had had prior military or paramilitary training at the CSA or elsewhere, there were really few avenues to increase their capabilities. Later, once 
Randall Rader was brought into the organization and had the funds to set up training facilities, this became possible, however, the camps were poorly run and largely unsuccessful in 
their training goals (Flynn and Gerhardt, pp. 327-328). 
162 James Ellison displayed numerous cognitive biases, including paranoia, narcissism and intense superstition. However, while affecting his ability to see a project through, there is 
no indication that they acted to affect his awareness of potential new weapons (see Chapter 7 for a full discussion of these issues). 
163 Initially, the predominant biases were the action orientation of senior members (like Mathews and Pierce), as well as Mathews’s self-reliance, which arguably could have made 
him less likely to be aware of opportunities in the broader environment with respect to weapons. 
164 Although Rader modelled his Silhouette City training venue after the FBI’s Quantico facility, this was not really following a leader within his own network. Ellison, however, was 
especially interested in setting himself up as a prominent member of the far right, emulating many of their prominent leaders, for example, in 1982 even copying a routine used by 
Louis Beam of the KKK – tossing a piece of meat to the ‘federal dogs’ (Noble, p.129). 
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165 It is clear that Mathews and the Order sought to follow closely the precepts laid out in the Turner Diaries and were inspired to emulate the exploits of the fictitious group in the 
novel. However, this group could not provide a real-world model for Mathews and when it came to the real leaders of the movement, Mathews believed that they talked too much 
and acted too little. Thus, rather than seeking to emulate them, he sought to provide inspiration to them through the actions of his own group (see the Order case study in Chapter 7). 
166 At this stage, the CSA were primarily isolationist. 
167 During this phase, Rader in particular was interested in new weapons and materials, and the far right movement as a whole accepted innovation, at least of the technical kind 
(Barkun, 1996, pp. 55-57). 
168 Although both cyanide and rockets were weapons that aligned with their strategic outlook, there was no particular affinity for cyanide. From Phase II, however, it can be argued 
that the influence of the Turner Diaries in the far right community and the prominent place that rockets played in it, created an affinity for these weapons. However, there is no direct 
evidence that Ellison was influenced by the Turner Diaries at a tactical level, as was the case with Bob Mathews and Timothy McVeigh. 
169 There is no evidence of a particular affinity for cyanide, but there was certainly likely to be one for rockets (see Chapter 7). 
170 As soon as the group began embracing a millenarian outlook, with tropes of a conflagration and widespread destruction in which they might have to play a role, both weapon 
types became ideologically compatible. 
171 See Chapter 7 for details regarding the mass-casualty ideological tendencies of the Order. 
172 CSA operated initially as a refuge from the corruption of the world, but after mid-1978, when Ellison began prophesying the impending apocalypse and later on a race war, there 
was a perceived sense of urgency attached to everything the CSA did. 
173 Noble (and at times others) opposed some of Ellison’s decisions and on occasion resisted change to a more violent footing, but Ellison rarely paid much heed to this and the 
followers continued to go along with Ellison. 
174 Although there were some Order members (such as Rader, Loff and Bauer) who were more hesitant to engage in certain violent activities, and others such as Pierce who differed 
with Mathews as to command and control matters, as a whole the group was action-oriented and innovative and wanted to break away from the status quo. 
175 During this phase, the CSA were busily accumulating weapons, travelling to gun shows and reading military manuals (Hamm, p. 91; Noble, p. 81). 
176 Evidence for this is mixed. On the one hand Pierce and several of the other members were avid technofiles, and Roberts did try to acquire a rocket tube. On the other hand, there is 
no evidence that the group actively sought out any weapons besides small arms or explosives. 
177 There were no plans for mass-casualty attacks in Phase I. In Phase II, although there had been a conversion to Identity thought by 1980, and there was a lot of talk about preparing 
for war (for instance, Rader apparently made plans in 1982 to attack a dam – Hamm, p.100), it is unclear what Ellison’s actual strategy was during this time. By mid-1983, however, 
the strategy had clearly become large-scale conflict with the government. 
178 See Order case study in Chapter 7 for an extensive discussion. 
179 While cyanide was known to be a toxic chemical, the amount of information widely available on its usage as a mass-casualty weapon was minimal. Similarly, rockets were well-
known military weapons, although the details regarding their fabrication were not. 
180 The chemical and engineering principles associated with using cyanide as a mass poison require some technical background, but are not especially complex when compared to the 
production and distribution of other chemical weapons, such as nerve agents. Rockets require a significant amount of technical knowledge (related to machining, explosives, 
detonators and propellants) to produce. 
181 Throughout all phases, cyanide was readily commercially available for use in industry and agriculture, but the delivery mechanisms and amounts needed to cause mass casualties 
remained within the purview of states. Similarly, rockets were available for purchase on international arms markets, but their sale was generally also restricted to state actors. 
182 The effects of cyanide are not immediately apparent, but can usually be determined by forensic investigation; rockets are immediately observable. 
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183 ‘Environmental and Health Effects of Cyanide’, International Cyanide Management Code For the Manufacture, Transport, and Use of Cyanide In the Production of Gold. 
Accessed at http://www.cyanidecode.org/cyanide_environmental.php on 26 October 2013. 
184 Although there have been federal, state and local regulations since the 1970s in the United States regarding cyanide, most of these are designed to prevent environmental damage 
from industrial or mining applications. It was reported that the purchase of cyanide was limited to research and industrial purchasers, but as late as 2003, cyanide in bulk quantities 
was available online in the United States (Sara Rimer, ‘Cyanide Purchase is Linked to Death in Nashville’, New York Times (1 March 1986). Accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/01/us/cyanide-purchase-is-linked-to-death-in-nashville.html on 26 October 2013; ‘Interview with Dr. Sanjay Gupta: Cyanide poison hard to 
detect’, CNN (10 January 2003). Accessed at http://articles.cnn.com/2003-01-10/us/otsc.gupta.cyanide_1_potassium-cyanide-benjamin-vassiliev-ryan-furlough?_s=PM:US on 26 
October 2013). Rockets, while ostensibly available only to government purchasers, were not strictly controlled internationally in the 1980s. The ability of the CSA to procure a 
working LAW rocket illustrates this (see Chapter 7). 
185 Owing to the fact that the outcome for cyanide is equivocal, it is not possible to make firm judgments on whether the hypotheses relating to the decision to adopt cyanide are 
supported. However, for the purposes of discussion, it will be assumed that there was a positive decision to adopt cyanide as a mass-casualty weapon to be used through the water 
supply. 
186 There were close cultural affinities between Miles’ group and the CSA. 
187 During the initial part of Phase II, it appears as if Ellison and the CSA were merely trying to stake their claim as legitimate members of the far right Identity movement. However, 
during the latter stages (from 1982 onwards), Ellison intended to dominate the movement and thus was implicitly competing (while simultaneously cooperating) with the other 
organizations. From 1983, Ellison did seem to be trying to fortify his claim to leadership of the movement, but this was still a state of cooptation (a combination of competition and 
cooperation commonly seen among multinational corporations). 
188 There is no mention in any of the sources of Mathews seeking to compete with the rest of the far right. Although his frustration with their lack of action was one of the impetuses 
for creating the Order, it appeared as if he merely wanted to catalyse and invigorate the white supremacist movement rather than compete with any group. Further evidence can be 
found in his desire to support most of the key far right entities financially with the proceeds of his actions. 
189 This includes the weapons fabrication and conversion. 
190 During this period there were successes as well as failures (for example, bombs causing only minimal damage). 
191 Although they had managed to successfully detonate an explosive in the Embassy Theatre bombing, other attempts, such as the synagogue bombing, were less successful. In terms 
of the electronic surveillance technology they had adopted, they believed that the voice stress analyser and transmitter detection technology worked. 
192 During this period there was increasing opposition to Ellison’s rule, primarily by Randall Rader and then by several other elders upon learning of Ellison’s polygamous intentions, 
culminating in the split at the end of 1982 (see Chapter 7). 
193 After the split, the remaining CSA was generally united behind Ellison, although several people, including Noble, were still clearly dissatisfied and continued to question Ellison’s 
decisions and actions. 
194 In addition to the simmering tensions between Bruce Pierce and Mathews, there were several other disagreements, ranging from objections to the assassination of Berg and 
several members dropping out in the first few months. Even though structurally the Order was more diffuse in Phase II, they were arguably somewhat more cohesive, although there 
was increasing dissatisfaction amongst some members with Mathew’s erratic behaviour in the last few months of 1984. 
195 Ellison’s narcissism and belief in his and the CSA’s centrality most likely would bias him in favour of attempting to adopt new weapons, irrespective of the difficulties involved. 
196 The biases here seem to act in opposite directions on the variable of interest. On the one hand, Mathew’s self-reliance and belief in his ability to change history might have made 
him more likely to want to adopt innovative weapons, while, on the other hand, his action-orientation would seem to argue against his having the patience to engage in any sort of 
development or complex acquisition activity. 
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197 It can be argued that Mathews’ increasing recklessness and desire to move on to step six of his strategic plan meant that he would be more likely to embrace new weapons. 
198 Because this is only partially the case, a weaker effect is predicted than shown in the model. 
199 Both Rader and Ellison seemed to favour developing new technologies (like the firearm conversions) during Phase II and Ellison was in favour during Phase III. 
200 While Mathews was by no means inimical to adopting new technologies or weapons, he did not take this as a central element of his thinking. Rather, it was really Pierce and 
others who seemed keen on pushing for new technologies, and it was not until these individuals took on more of a leadership role in Phase II that one might argue that there was a 
technology ‘champion’ making tactical decisions. 
201 By Phase II, Ellison was the sole decision-maker and, besides him, there were no veto players. 
202 Initially, Mathews alone seemed to have veto authority (for instance when he ignored objections to assassinating Berg or rejected the Rothschild bomb plot), but in Phase II, when 
authority was more dispersed, at least at a tactical level, there was a lot more autonomy and it can be argued that other members possessed some degree of veto power, at least in 
terms of weapons selection (see Chapter 7). 
203 There are no indications that the CSA ever sought more than the single barrel of cyanide; as for the rockets, Ellison realized that many would be needed to destroy a large 
building, so they clearly planned on pursuing the acquisition of multiple rockets. It is unknown whether they intended using the rockets for other attacks besides the Murrah Federal 
Building attack, although it can be argued that, were they successful with the first attack and had already produced a dozen or so rockets, they would have continued attempting to 
use them. 
204 Ellison was not at all risk averse: he participated in attacks and other crimes himself – even being caught shoplifting at one time – and was willing to countenance increasingly 
brazen attacks. 
205 While engaging in fairly risky robberies and assassinations during Phase I, the group almost always engaged in extended preparations and intelligence gathering. However, in 
Phase II, when authorities were closing in, Mathews especially began to take increasing risks, several of which could be described as negligent (see Chapter 7). 
206 There are no indications that the envisaged use of cyanide was to overcome any specific countermeasures. With respect to rockets, they were specifically sought in 1983 to enable 
the standoff destruction of a federal building, presumably because an inside attack was believed to be too risky considering the security attached to federal buildings. 
207 There is no indication that the Order was seeking weapons to overcome any specific countermeasures in general. 
208 There is no evidence to suggest that either the cyanide or the rockets were intended to arouse a public that had been desensitized to violence. Rather, the main purpose of the 
cyanide was to kill sinners and of the rockets was to provoke the government and initiate a war (see Chapter 7). 
209 During the first phase, most of the Order’s activities were centred on building the organization, with the possible exception of the murder of Alan Berg (although that seemed to 
emerge more from a punitive desire to strike back at the Jews and show them to be vulnerable). Near the end of Phase II, however, they began to enter step six of Mathews’ plan, 
which involved announcing their intentions to the world through their declaration of war and so forth. Although the primary aim was to initiate the revolution, implicit within this 
might have been a desire to wake the white masses from their ignorance of the threat to their race (as envisaged in the Turner Diaries). 
210 The CSA perceived that cyanide enabled truly biblical-scale attacks, which was a vast improvement over the small arms they possessed at the time. It is unknown how they 
viewed rockets relative to the bombs they already had, since rockets did not allow them to do something that they couldn’t have done with a large truck bomb, i.e., destroy a federal 
building (see Chapter 7 for details). 
211 Based on Mathews’ strategic outlook, these weapons offered no real advantages during Phase I; however, by the end of Phase II, cyanide would allow the group to substantially 
increase its destructive and disruptive capabilities (see Chapter 7). It is unknown to what extent they believed rockets might do the same. 
212 Having been given the cyanide, the CSA did not have to assess how easy it would be to acquire. With respect to rockets, there is no available information (short of the fact that he 
chose this option), regarding how Ellison perceived the ease of acquiring rockets. 
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213 There is no evidence as to the perception of the ease of acquisition of either cyanide or rockets. The way that Bruce Pierce almost casually described his plans with the cyanide 
suggests that he might have perceived its acquisition to be fairly easy, but this is far from conclusive. 
214 It can be argued by looking at Noble’s statements (see Chapter 7) about how the CSA’s leaders viewed the cyanide that the very fact that not much information was widely 
available about how to use cyanide to poison a water supply meant that the CSA was not aware of the difficulties involved and that this made them more likely than otherwise to 
adopt.  
215 It is unclear from the evidence whether the low degree of availability of information about cyanide might have had any effect on the desire to adopt. 
216 The medium techne required for cyanide most likely did not affect the CSA’s decision whether or not to adopt it. The high techne required for rockets, while during Phase II 
might not have affected the decision, during Phase III, when the CSA was attempting a variety of tactics, might very well have stimulated Ellison to attempt to adopt these weapons. 
217 There is no indication that the Order was particularly attracted towards a challenge, which would imply that the higher techne requirements would be discouraging. 
218 Once the science behind cyanide’s toxicity is well-understood (for example, the dilution factor), the actual dissemination through a water supply is not too complex. The mētis 
required for developing and using rockets is substantial. 
219 Cyanide was widely available commercially and not overly expensive, whereas either buying rockets on the open market or assembling the materials and equipment to produce 
them in-house, would require fairly substantial financial resources, at the time probably running from several hundred to several thousand dollars. 
220 The effectiveness of a cyanide weapon depends to a large extent on the amount of agent and where it is inserted, which are not scalable. Machining and producing rockets does 
lend itself to economies of scale. 
221 Cyanide itself is readily trialable (as shown in the case of al-Qa’ida’s testing on small mammals in Afghanistan). However, the dissemination with the intended outcome being 
mass-casualties through the water supply is more difficult, although a competent chemist could conceivably test concentrations in a small-scale model if the size of the target 
reservoir and the type of treatment is known beforehand. With respect to rockets, in terms of internal development, trialability is relatively low – one has to commit to quite a lot of 
investment before being able to fire the first shot. A ready-made, commercial system is readily trialable though. 
222 In the case of both cyanide and rockets, even though there were members of or artefacts in their milieu which endorsed these agents, none of these (neither the right-wing 
leaders nor the Turner Diaries) provided any tangible assistance in doing so. 
223 At its founding, most of the members of the Order lived within a few hundred miles of each other in the Pacific Northwest, although even at this stage, there were some members 
based as far away as the Central Coast of California and even in Pittsburgh. By Phase II, when the group became less centralized in structure, members were even more spread out. 
224 The action orientation of Mathews and most of the rest of the Order could be expected to make them less patient with longer-term acquisition or development projects, which is 
generally detrimental to prospects for success. This would only have been exacerbated by Mathews’ increasing recklessness in Phase II. 
225 The models followed by Mathews (primarily the Turner Diaries) would not provide any tangible help or hindrance in adopting either weapon. 
226 Although some members of the group were extremely determined – including Mathews, Pierce, Scutari and Lane – others were more equivocal, such as Loff, Soderquist, 
Yarbrough and Rader. The determined sub-group would often keep trying until they succeeded (e.g., with armed robberies), but the less determined group would sometimes give up 
or only engage half-heartedly in their tasks. 
227 Since the commercial availability was only partial or limited, these factors receive a reduced score. 
228 By the early to mid-1980s, cyanide had been used in multiple applications as a poison (both of animals and people) for many years, whereas rockets had been in wide use by 






Appendix C: Illustrative Application of the Weapons 
Adoption Model 
 
The tables below represent the application of the Terrorist Weapons Adoption Model 
(as revised in Chapter 8) to three terrorist organizations (al-Qa’ida central, Hizb’allah, 
and an apocalyptic-millenarian cult modelled on Aum Shinrikyo) and two emerging 
technologies (chemical microreactors and rapid prototyping), as well as improvised 
explosive devices. For the purposes of this application, the ‘+’s and ‘–’s are represented 
by their numerical equivalent, i.e., ‘1’, ‘2’,  ‘-1’, ‘-2’, etc. 
 
Table C.1: Model Factors and Values1 
Factors Values 
   AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
        
SOCIETY       
Developed Infrastructure No No Yes 
Social / Political Openness No No Yes 
Intense Security Pressure Yes No No 
SOCIAL NETWORKS       
Highly Networked (in general) No Yes No 
Highly Networked (with other violent 
non-state actors) Yes No No 
Demonstration – 1st degree (by an 
actor in its own network) 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: 
No ; RP: No 
IED: Yes; MR-C: No; 
RP: No 
IED: No ; MR-C: No ; 
RP: No 
Cultural Affinity (homophily) with 
Relevant Network Node 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: 
NA ; RP: NA 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: NA ; 
RP: NA 
IED: NA ; MR-C:NA ; 
RP:NA 
Proselytization (change agents / 
opinion leaders) 
IED: No ; MR-C: 
Unknown ; RP: 
Unknown 
IED: No ; MR-C: 
Unknown ; RP: 
Unknown 
IED: No; MR-C: No ; 
RP: No 
State Sponsorship Somewhat Yes No 
Serendipitous Acquisition IED: No ; MR-C: No; RP: No 
IED: No ; MR-C: No; 
RP: No 
IED: No ; MR-C: No; 
RP: No 
Intergroup Competition Yes (partial) No Yes 
PRIOR ADOPTION (Outside the Organization) 
                                                          
1 Throughout these tables, ‘IED’ refers to improvised explosive devices, ‘MR-C’ refers to chemical 
microreactors, and ‘RP’ refers to rapid prototyping. 
 344 
 
Demonstration – 2nd degree (by an 
actor out of its network) 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: 
No ; RP: No 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: No ; 
RP: No 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: No ; 
RP: No 
No. of Successful Prior Adopters 
[Linear] 
IED: Many ; MR-C: 
None; RP: None 
IED: Many ; MR-C: 
None; RP: None 
IED: Many ; MR-C: 
None; RP: None 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
History       
Age of Group (more than 5 years or 
not) Yes Yes No 
Prior Autarkic Technology Adoption No Yes No 
Prior Technology Adoption Outcomes NA Success NA 
Momentum IED: Yes ; MR-C: No ; RP: No 
IED: Yes ; MR-C: No ; 
RP: No 
IED: No ; MR-C: No ; 
RP: No 
Structure / Group Dynamics       
Size Medium Large Small 
Size of Talent Pool (with Techne & 
Mētis) 
IED: Medium ; MR-
C: Small; RP: 
Small 
IED: Large ; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: 
Medium 
IED: Small ; MR-C: 
Small ; RP: Small 
Centralization High Medium-High High 
Spatial Proximity of Organization 
Elements Medium Medium High 
Learning Organization Unknown Yes No 
Possesses Institutionalized R&D / 
“Skunkworks” Unknown Yes Yes 
Cohesiveness (lack of intragroup 
competition) Medium Medium-High Medium 
Resources       
Organizational Techne (Similar 
Technologies to Weapon) 
IED: High; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: 
Medium 
IED: High; MR-C: 
Medium ; RP: High 
IED: Medium; MR-C: 
Medium; RP: High 
Organizational Mētis IED: High; MR-C: Low; RP: Low 
IED: High; MR-C: Low; 
RP: Unknown 
IED: Low; MR-C: Low ; 
RP: Low 
Org. Knowledge Type Ratio 
IED: Med; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: 
Medium-High 




C: Medium-High; RP: 
High 
General Tradecraft Medium High Low 
Safe Haven Yes (partial) Yes No 
Surfeit of Resources (esp. financial) No Yes Yes 
Access to Training Programs No Yes Yes 
Decision Making Characteristics       
Cognitive and Related Biases Yes No Yes 
Follow-The-Leader Bias (prior 
technology leader) No No No 
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Disposed Toward Innovation Partial Partial Yes 
Disposed Away From Innovation No No No 
Affinity for the Weapon/Technology IED: No ; MR-C: No; RP: No 
IED: No; MR-C: No; 
RP: No 
IED: No; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: No 
Ideological/Cultural Compatibility with 
Technology 
IED: Yes; MR-C: 
Yes; RP: Yes 
IED: Yes; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Yes 
IED: Yes; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Yes 
Perception of Extreme Urgency 
(limited time to act) No No Yes 
Champion in Leadership No Unknown Yes 
Veto Players Exist Within Leadership 
Structure Unknown Yes No 
Guardians of Status Quo [Linear] Unknown  Yes No 
Multiple Weapons Needed/Desired IED: Yes ; MR-C: No; RP: Unknown 
IED: Yes; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Yes 
IED: Yes; MR-C: No; 
RP: Yes 
Risk Tolerance High Medium High 
Desire for Prestige High High Low 
Determination Yes Partial Yes 
        
Strategic Dynamics       
Active Searching 
IED: No; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: 
Unknown 
IED: No; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: Yes 
IED: No; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: No 
∆ Status Quo Needed: Overcome 
Countermeasures Yes No No 
∆ Status Quo Needed: Overcome 
Desensitized Public Yes No Yes 
Perceived Advantages of Technology 
(vis-à-vis SQ) 
IED: NA; MR-C: 
High; RP: High 
IED: NA; MR-C: 
Medium; RP: High 
IED: Medium ; MR-C: 
High; RP: High 
Compatibility between Strategy and 
Technology 
IED: Yes; MR-C: 
Yes; RP: Yes 
IED: Yes; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Yes 
IED: No; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Unknown 
Perception of Ease of Acquisition / 
Feasibility 
IED: High; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: 
Unknown 
IED: High ; MR-C: 
High; RP: Medium 
IED: Unknown; MR-C: 
Unknown; RP: High 
Availability of alternatives to weapons 
technology under consideration 
IED: Yes; MR-C: 
Yes; RP: Yes 
IED: Yes; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Yes 
IED: Yes; MR-C: Yes; 
RP: Yes 
       
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS IEDS Microreactors Rapid Prototyping 
Information Availability Relative to the 
Entire Technology Medium High Medium 
Weapon Techne Medium High Medium 
Weapon Mētis High Low High 
Knowledge Type Ratio (Techne/Mētis 
Required to Field Weapon) Low-Med High Low-Med 
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Ease of Acquisition High Medium-High Medium-High 
Commercialized Technology No Yes Yes 
Financial Acquisition Cost Low Medium Medium 
Technology Lifecycle Late Early Early 
Economies of Scale No Yes Yes 
Trialability of Technology High Moderate Moderate 
Observability of Technology High Low Low 
Life Span of Technology Medium High Medium-High 
Stability of Technology Medium Medium-High Medium 
Environmental Persistence of 
Technology Low Medium Low 
Active Opposition of Possessors of 
Technology Yes No No 
 
 
Table C.2: Awareness Scores 
Weapon / Technology Awareness 
   AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
        
SOCIETY       
Developed Infrastructure 0 0 2 
Social / Political Openness 0 0 2 
Intense Security Pressure -1 0 0 
SOCIAL NETWORKS       
Highly Networked (in general) 0 1 0 
Highly Networked (with other violent 
non-state actors) 2 0 0 
Demonstration – 1st degree (by an 
actor in its own network) 
IED: 2; MR-
C:0; RP:0  
IED: 2; MR-C:0; 
RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Proselytization (change agents / 
opinion leaders) 
IED:0; MR-C:0; 
RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
State Sponsorship 0 1 0 
Serendipitous Acquisition IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
PRIOR ADOPTION (Outside the Organization) 
  
Demonstration – 2nd degree (by an 
actor out of its network) 
IED: 1; MR-
C:0; RP:0 
IED: 1 ; MR-C:0; 
RP:0  IED: 1; MR-C:0; RP:0 
No. of Successful Prior Adopters 
[Linear] 
IED: 2; MR-C: 





History       
Prior Autarkic Technology Adoption 0 1 0 
Prior Technology Adoption 
Outcomes 0 2 0 
Structure / Group Dynamics       
Size 0 1 0 
Size of Talent Pool (with Techne & 
Mētis) 
IED:0.5; MR-
C:0; RP:0  
IED:1; MR-C:0; 
RP:0.5 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Centralization 0 0 0 
Learning Organization 0 2 0 
Possesses Institutionalized R&D / 
“Skunkworks” 0 3 3 
Resources       
Organizational Techne (Similar 
Technologies to Weapon) 
IED:1; MR-C:0; 
RP:0 IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:1 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:1 
Organizational Mētis IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
Safe Haven 1 1 0 
Surfeit of Resources (esp. financial) 0 1 1 
Access to Training Programs 0 2 2 
Decision-Making Characteristics       
Cognitive and Related Biases 0 0 0 
Follow-The-Leader Bias (prior 
technology leader) 0 0 0 
Disposed Toward Innovation 1 1 2 
Disposed Away From Innovation 0 0 0 




; RP:1  IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1  IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1  
Perception of Extreme Urgency 
(limited time to act) 0 0 0 
Guardians of Status Quo [Linear] 0 -1 0 
Strategic Dynamics       
Active Searching IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:2 IED:0; MR-C:2; RP:0 
Compatibility between Strategy and 
Technology 
IED:1; MR-C:1; 
RP:1 IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1  IED:0; MR-C:1; RP:0 








WEAPON / TECHNOLOGY 
CHARACTERISTICS IEDS Microreactors Rapid Prototyping 
Information Availability Relative to 
the Entire Technology 1 2 1 
Commercialized Technology 0 1 1 
Observability of Technology 2 -1 -1 
Environmental Persistence of 
Technology 0 0 0 
Active Opposition of Possessors of 
Technology 0 0 0 
SUBTOTAL: 3 2 1 
       
OVERALL TOTALS Weapon / Technology Awareness 
  
  
AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
IED 15.5 28 19
Chemical Microreactors 7 19 19
Rapid Prototyping 6 21.5 15
 
 
Table C.3: Decision Scores 
Adoption Decision 
   AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
        
SOCIETY       
Developed Infrastructure 0 0 1 
Intense Security Pressure 0 0 0 
SOCIAL NETWORKS       
Demonstration – 1st degree (by an 
actor in its own network) IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Cultural Affinity (homophily) with 
Relevant Network Node IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Proselytization (change agents / 
opinion leaders) IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Serendipitous Acquisition IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Intergroup Competition 1 0 1 
PRIOR ADOPTION (Outside the Organization) 
Demonstration – 2nd degree (by an 
actor out of its network) IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 
No. of Successful Prior Adopters 




History       
Prior Autarkic Technology Adoption 0 IED:2; MR-C:1; RP:1  0 
Prior Technology Adoption Outcomes 0 1 0 
Momentum IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED: 1; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Structure / Group Dynamics       
Size 0 1 -1 
Size of Talent Pool (with Techne & 
Mētis) IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Centralization 0 0 0 
Learning Organization 0 1 0 
Possesses Institutionalized R&D / 
“Skunkworks” 0 2 2 
Cohesiveness (lack of intragroup 
competition) 0 0 0 
Resources       
Organizational Techne (Similar 
Technologies to Weapon) IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:2 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:2 
Organizational Mētis IED:3; MR-C:-2; RP:-2 IED:3; MR-C:-2; RP:0  IED:-2; MR-C:-2; RP:-2 
Org. Knowledge Type Ratio IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
Safe Haven 0.5 1 0 
Surfeit of Resources (esp. financial) 0 1 1 
Access to Training Programs 0 1 1 
Decision-Making Characteristics       
Cognitive and Related Biases 1 0 1 
Follow-The-Leader Bias (prior 
technology leader) 0 0 0 
Disposed Toward Innovation 1 1 3 
Disposed Away From Innovation 0 0 0 
Affinity for the Weapon/Technology IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:3; RP:0 
Ideological/Cultural Compatibility with 
Technology IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  
Perception of Extreme Urgency 
(limited time to act) 0 0 IED:0; MR-C:-1; RP:-1 
Champion in Leadership 0 0 IED:0; MR-C:3; RP:3 
Veto Players Exist Within Leadership 
Structure 0 -1 0 
Guardians of Status Quo [Linear] 0 0 0 
Multiple Weapons Needed/Desired IED:-1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:-1; MR-C:-1; RP:-1 IED:-1; MR-C:0; RP:-1 
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Risk Tolerance 1 0 1 
Desire for Prestige 1 1 0 
Strategic Dynamics       
Active Searching IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:2 IED:0; MR-C:2; RP:0 
∆ Status Quo Needed: Overcome 
Countermeasures 2 0 0 
∆ Status Quo Needed: Overcome 
Desensitized Public 2 0 1 
Perceived Advantages of Technology 
(vis-à-vis SQ) IED:0; MR-C:2; RP:2 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:2 IED:1; MR-C:2; RP:2  
Compatibility between Strategy and 
Technology IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1 IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1 IED:0; MR-C:1; RP:0 
Perception of Ease of Acquisition / 
Feasibility IED:3; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:3; MR-C:3; RP:1  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:3 
Availability of alternatives to weapons 
technology under consideration IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
SUBTOTAL: IED:25.5; MR-C:10.5; RP:10.5 IED:28; MR-C:11; RP:19 
IED:12; MR-C:19; 
RP:17 
       
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS IEDS Microreactors Rapid Prototyping 
Information Availability Relative to the 
Entire Technology 0 1 0 
Weapon Techne 0 AQ:-1; Hizb:0; Apoc:0 0 
Weapon Mētis AQ:-1; Hizb:0; Apoc:0 AQ:1; Hizb:1; Apoc:1 AQ:-1; Hizb:0; Apoc:0 
Knowledge Type Ratio (Techne/Mētis 
Required to Field Weapon) 0 2 0 
Commercialized Technology 0 2 2 
Financial Acquisition Cost 1 0 0 
Economies of Scale 0 1 1 
Trialability of Technology 2 0 0 
Observability of Technology 1 -1 -1 
Life Span of Technology 0 1 0 
Stability of Technology 0 0.5 0 
Environmental Persistence of 
Technology 0 0 0 
Active Opposition of Possessors of 
Technology -1 0 0 
SUBTOTAL: AQ:2; Hizb:3; Apoc:3 AQ:6.5; Hizb:7.5; Apoc:7.5 AQ:1; Hizb:2; Apoc:2 
       





AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
IED 27.5 31 15





Table C.4: Success Scores 
 Adoption Success 
   AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
        
SOCIETY       
Developed Infrastructure 0 0 1 
Social / Political Openness 0 0 1 
Intense Security Pressure -2 0 0 
SOCIAL NETWORKS       
Highly Networked (in general) 0 1 0 
Highly Networked (with other violent 
non-state actors) 2 0 0 
Demonstration – 1st degree (by an 
actor in its own network) IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
Cultural Affinity (homophily) with 
Relevant Network Node IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
Proselytization (change agents / 
opinion leaders) IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
State Sponsorship 1 2 0 
Serendipitous Acquisition IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
PRIOR ADOPTION (Outside the Organization) 
No. of Successful Prior Adopters 
[Linear] IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
History       
Age of Group (more than 5 years or 
not) 1 1 0 
Prior Autarkic Technology Adoption 0 1 0 
Prior Technology Adoption Outcomes IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
Structure / Group Dynamics       
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Size 0 1 0 
Size of Talent Pool (with Techne & 
Mētis) IED:0; MR-C:-1; RP:-1 IED:1; MR-C:0; RP:0  IED:-1; MR-C:-1; RP:-1 
Centralization 1 0 1 
Spatial Proximity of Organization 
Elements 0 0 1 
Learning Organization 0 2 0 
Possesses Institutionalized R&D / 
“Skunkworks” 0 2 2 
Cohesiveness (lack of intragroup 
competition) 0 1 0 
Resources       
Organizational Techne (Similar 
Technologies to Weapon) IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:2; MR-C:0; RP:2 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:2 
Organizational Mētis IED:2; MR-C:-1; RP:-1 IED:2; MR-C:-1; RP:0 IED:-1; MR-C:-1; RP:-1 
Org. Knowledge Type Ratio IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:-1 
General Tradecraft 0 0 -1 
Safe Haven 1 1 0 
Surfeit of Resources (esp. financial) 0 1 1 
Access to Training Programs 0 1 2 
Decision-Making Characteristics       
Cognitive and Related Biases -1 0 -2 
Follow-The-Leader Bias (prior 
technology leader) 0 0 0 
Ideological/Cultural Compatibility with 
Technology IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 IED:0; MR-C:0; RP:0 
Perception of Extreme Urgency 
(limited time to act) 0 0 -1 
Veto Players Exist Within Leadership 
Structure 0 -1 0 
Guardians of Status Quo [Linear] 0 -1 0 
Multiple Weapons Needed/Desired IED:-1; MR-C:0; RP: 0 IED:-2; MR-C:-2; RP:0 IED:-1; MR-C:0; RP:-1 
Determination 2 1 2 
Strategic Dynamics       
Compatibility between Strategy and 
Technology IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1 IED:1; MR-C:1; RP:1 IED:0; MR-C:1; RP:0 
SUBTOTAL: IED:13; MR-C:4; RP:4 IED:22; MR-C:11; RP:16 IED:6; MR-C:6; RP:5 
       
WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS IEDS Microreactors Rapid Prototyping 
Information Availability Relative to the 
Entire Technology 0 1 0 
Weapon Techne 0 -1 0 
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Weapon Mētis -1 1 -1 
Ease of Acquisition 2 1 1 
Commercialized Technology 0 2 2 
Financial Acquisition Cost [High] 1 0 0 
Technology Lifecycle 1 0 0 
Trialability of Technology 1 0 0 
Observability of Technology 1 -1 -1 
Stability of Technology 0 0.5 0 
Active Opposition of Possessors of 
Technology -1 0 0 
SUBTOTAL: 4 3.5 1 
       
OVERALL TOTALS Success 
  
   AQ Central Hizb’allah Apocalyptic Cult 
IED 17 26 10
Chemical Microreactors 7.5 14.5 9.5
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